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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the development of the internal 
po l itical situation in Poland from the formation of the 
Polish Committee of National Liberation in mid-l944 to the 
consolidation of communist power at the turn of 1946/47. 
It concentrates in particular on the way the organisations 
a nd political strategies of the Polish Workers ' Party and 
t he main non-communist forces: the Polish Peasant Party, 
the Polish Socialist Party , the Catholic political movement 
and the anti - communist underground evolved during these 
years . 
Chapter .One describes the re-establishment of the 
Polish communist movement from 1941 and the shaping of its 
strategy of the national front during the period until the 
Soviet liberation of eastern Poland in 1944. Chapter Two 
examines the relationship between the communist-led ' Lublin 
Committee ' arid the underground movement loyal to the 
Government-in-Exile in London . It identifies the hardening 
of the Polish communists ' stance towards the underground 
from October 1944 . Chapter Three looks at the political 
and economic situation in Poland following the liberation 
of the country in early 1945 . It examines the factors 
which caused the communists to moderate their line in May 
1945 . Chapter Four considers the impact of the legal 
opposition movement which arose around the Polish Peasant 
Party following the formation of the Provisional Government 
of National Unity in June 1945. Chapter Five describes 
the increasing polarisation between the communists and the 
opposition in the first half of 1946 and examines the 
unsuccessful efforts of the Polish Socialist Party to 
restore national unity . The political offensive launched 
by the Polish Workers' Party and its allies against the 
opposition at the time of the elections in late 1946 and 
early 1947, and the consolidation of the communists ' hold 
on power are described in Chapter Six. 
3 
The thesis argues that the national front strategy 
which the communists followed between 1942 and 1948 under-
went a ser~es of major modifications. These modifications 
were in response not only to external pressures, but to a 
very considerable degree to developments in the internal 
situation in Poland. Ultimately the communists were able 
to achieve the objectives of the national front strategy 
only to a very limited extent. In particular, they were 
unable to achieve a broad base of popular support for their 
vision of Poland's future and had instead to rest it on 
force and the state-Party apparatus. 
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For my father, 
Robert James Reynolds (1919 - 1984) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
FROM THE KPP TO LUBLIN (Background to July 1944) 
About 1 a.m . on 28 December 1941 six parachutists 
landed in fields at Wifzowna , near Warsaw. Despite the loss 
of a radio transmitter and the awkward fall of its leader, 
Marceli Nowotko, who broke his leg, the First Initiative 
Group of the Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza 
- PPR) landed undetected. A week later in a sympathiser's 
flat in ~oliborz, a suburb of the capital, the Party was 
formallyestablished. l Some three years after Stalin's 
purge and disbandment of the Communist' Party of Poland 
(Komunistyczna Partia Polski - KPP) in 1938, the Polish 
communists once more had a political vehicle , which enjoyed 
Soviet confidence. 
In several respects circumstances seemed to favour 
the new Party ' s growth. Uneasy though their alliance was, 
Poland and the Soviet Union were linked in the common 
struggle against Nazi Germany. In time it became apparent 
that the Red Army and not the Western Powers would drive 
the Germans from Polish territory. For the first time in 
their history the communists were able to combine their 
loyalty to the Soviets with Polish national interests and 
sentiments. This opportunity was enhanced by the flexibi-
lity and lack of dogmatism which characterised the political 
line of the Soviet Union and the international communist 
movement from 1941 until the late 1940s. Secondly, the 
military regime which had ruled Poland after 1926 had been 
destroyed by Poland's crushing defeat in 1939. The liberal 
democratic government in exile under General Wladyslaw 
Sikorski which took its place had the support of all 
Poland ' s major political parties and the great majority of 
the population in Poland. However its distance from 
Poland and dependence on the Western Powers, which placed 
1 M. Malinowski Geneza PPR (2nd edition, Warsaw 1975) 
pp. 362-63 . 
13 
higher priority on peaceful relations with the Sovie~ 
Union, were ultimately to prove fatal disadvantages in the 
2 
struggle for power in postwar Poland. Thirdly, as else-
where in Europe, the experience of war and occupation 
weakened traditional allegiances and radicalised important 
sections of the population. 3 The communists were optimis-
tic that they could achieve a new and broad appeal based on the 
yearning of the Polish nation for liberation and the popular 
desire for radical reform and reconstruction. The commu-
nists believed that the prestige and unity of Poland's 
wartime underground state, which had the support of almost 
all political groupings from far left to far right, would 
crumble as the end of the German occupation approached and 
conflicts of class t nterest heightened. In this situation 
the Party would be able to win allies on the left and 
centre and isolate its diehard opponents. The PPR would 
thereby avoid the political isolation and eventual fate of 
the KPP. Such was the thinking behind the strategy of 
the national front which, following long discussions in 
Comintern circles prior to its departure, the ' Initiative 
Group', placed at the core of the new Party's outlook. 
However, the two-and-a-half years from its formation 
until its assumption of power in Lublin in July 1944 were 
years of failure as far as the Party's strategy was con-
cerned. The premises on which the national front strategy 
was based were correct only in broad geopolitical terms, 
that is in relation to Poland's likely place in the postwar 
international order. ~stically , its assumptions proved 
false. The Party was quite unable to escape the legacy of 
the KPP. It had very little success in harnessing radical 
2 
3 
See A. Polonsky (ed.) The Great Powers and the Polish 
Question 1941-1945 (London, 1976) pp. 13-48. Polonsky 
makes the point that 'As Churchill repeatedly told 
Mikoiajczyk, the Western Powers were not prepared to go to 
war with the Soviet Union over Poland. The essential fact 
was that concrol of Poland was seen as vital by the Soviet 
Union, as it was not by Great Britain or the United 
States'. See p. 47. 
/ See A. Korbonski Politics of Socialist Agriculture in 
Poland 1945-1960 (New York and London, 1965), pp . 38-40. 
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forces or placing itself at the head of the struggle for 
national liberation. It was unable to expand much beyond 
the political base of the prewar communist movement, while 
the underground camp remained solidly united in its hosti-
lity to the PPR and had little difficulty in keeping it 
isolated. The prestige of the traditional political forces 
remained high, while anti-Soviet feeling ' , projected onto 
the PPR did not abate but was fuelled by such factors as the 
revelation of the Katyn massacres in 1943~ and the Soviet 
claim to much of pre-war eastern Poland. In sum, the fun-
damental weakness of the communist movement within Polish 
society remained a constant between 1942-44 while the 
military victory of the Soviet Union over Germany propelled 
it into government. 
The movement was separated into two far-flung sec-
tions: the circle in Soviet emigration and the clandestine 
PPR in Poland itself. The failure of the PPR in Poland was 
not shared by the Polish communists in the USSR who had 
considerable success in enlisting the co-operation of the 
Polish emigration in the USSR which had no other route to 
return to Poland and was able to participate in the Soviet 
victories of 1943-44. Strongly influenced by Soviet foreign 
policy requirements , the leading communist group adhered 
closely to the national front strategy worked out in 1941. 
They attributed the difficulties encountered in its domestic 
application to what they saw as the ineptitude and sectar-
ianism of the underground Party rather than to any objective 
obstacles. In contrast the PPR was preoccupied with these 
obstacles and convinced of the need to modify the national 
front strategy to meet them. The original line of 1941: 
'the national front without traitors and capitulators' had 
by 1943 reached a complete impasse. For many months during 
4 In April 1943 the Germans announced the discovery in a 
mass gra~e at Katyn in Byelorussia of the bodies of 4,000 
Polish officers and troops. There is little doubt that 
the Poles were prisoners of war captured in September 
1939 and murdered by the Soviets in 1940 . See further 
J.K. Zawodny Death in the Forest. The story of the Katyn 
Forest Massacre (London, 1971). 
15 
1943 the underground leadership seemed directionless until 
at the end of the year, largely on its own initiative, it 
adopted a more radical 'democratic nat10nal front ' and set 
up its own political centre, the Homeland National Council. 
This did not solve the problem. The Council won almost 
no support beyond the Party itself and its formation gene-
rated a sharp, three-way debate amongst the communists 
over strategy which persisted right up to the moment of 
liberation in July 1944. It would be no exaggeration to 
say that the path of the PPR from its foundation to power 
coincided with the steady erosion of its political strategy 
by internal realities. 
The KPP legacy 
The KPP - the Communist Party of Poland - was formed 
in 1918 when the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland 
and Lithuania (Socjaldemokracja Kr6lestwa Polskiego i 
Litwy - SDKPiL) merged with elements from the left of the 
Polish Socialist Party. The KPP existed for two decades 
until 1938 when the Comintern, claiming that the KPP had 
been overrun by 'provocateurs ', disbanded the party, and 
much of its leadership and aktyw fell victim to Stalin ' s 
Great purge. S The PPR specifically disassociated itself 
from what were seen as the errors and false traditions of 
its predecessor. In 1947 Gomulka affirmed that ' ... it 
would be incorrect to define the PPR as a communist party. 
We are not a continuation of the former Communist Party of 
Poland. The first Congress of our Party confirmed that 
"the Polish Workers' Party is a new party ••. ",.6 
However, especially during the war, the legacy of the 
5 For the dissolution of the KPP , see further: J. 
Kowalski , Komunistyczna Partia Polski 1935-1938 (Warsaw, 
1975) Chapters XI , XII ; M. Malinowski Przyczynek do 
sprawy rozwiezania KPP Z pola walki 1968 nr 3 (43) pp. 
3-24 ; A . Litwin Tragiczne dzieje KPP (1935-1938), 
Zeszyty Historyczne 36 (1976) pp . 215-231. 
6 Narada informacyjna dziewirciu partii (Warsaw, 1947) 
pp. 22-23 . 
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7 KPP weighed heavily on the PPR. This inheritance had 
its root in long years of mutual rejection~ . On the one 
hand, for much of its existence, the KPP had been at war 
not only with the Polish state, but with its entire body 
politic, including the legal opposition parties of the 
left. On the other, in the eyes of the great majority of 
Poles, the KPP was a foreign, subversive agency of Moscow , 
bent on the destruction of Poland's hard-won independence 
and the incorporation of Poland into the Soviet Union. 
Labelled a 'Soviet agency' or the 'Jew-Commune ', it was 
viewed as a dangerous and fundamentally un-Polish conspir-
acy dedicated to undermining nationai sovereignty and 
restoring, in a new guise, Russian domination . 8 
The KPP for most of its existence had little in common 
with those mass Communist Parties which operated in the 
open elsewhere in Europe. From its earliest days the KPP 
had been illegal. Party activists often spent more time 
in prison than at liberty. In 1932 when government repres-
sion was fierce, over 10,000 people were detained and 
nearly 7,000 were put under arrest for communist activi-
. 9 
t1es. Amongst the future leadership of the PPR, Bierut 
was imprisoned for six years, Gomu~ka for seven , J6twiak 
and Aleksander Zawadzki each for eleven . lO The Party 
7 In a message from the KC PPR to the CBKP dated 12.1.1944 
Gomulka admitted that 'despite the fact that the poli-
tical line expressed in its programme in no sense 
resembles that of a communist party, the PPR is consi-
dered to be one not only by conservative a nd reactionary 
elements, but also by the working class' W. Gomulka 
Artykuty i przemowienia Vol. I (Warsaw, 1962), p. 61. 
8 'In Warsaw there were slogans in every street , on every 
house: PPR-enemy, agent of Moscow ..• The PPR is an 
enemy ••• A large part of society believed in this and 
also that the KRN was inspired by Moscow , that everyone 
involved in it was rolling in money and the expression 
'Jewish work' became generally accepted' Gomu~ka quoted 
in J. Borkowski Pertrakcje przedwyborcze mirdzy PPR 
PPS a PSL (1945-6), Kwartalnik Historyczny R . LXXI z. 2 
1964 pp. 429-30. 
9 J. Kowalski Trudne lata problemy rozwoju polskiego 
ruchu robotniczego 1929-1935 (Warsaw, 1966), p. 295. 
10 See further W. ~'lazn:ie~ski Boles1:'aw Bierut (Warsaw , 1976) i 
N. Bethell Gomulka: His Poland and His Communism 
contd .•. 
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operated underground. Much of its elite resided a b road 
permanently and congresses were normally held outside 
Poland. Party officials led an undercover existence with 
false identities and constant changes of address , ever-wary 
of informers and infiltration. Government repress i o n 
prevented any true test of the Party's electoral appeal . 
However even in its best year, 1928, when the KPP 'fro nts' 
polled respectably in Lodz, Warsaw and the Silesian coal-
field , its vote amounted to only 2.5 % of the total, very 
much less than its neighbouring German and Czech 
11 
counterparts . 
Membership data bring out more vividly the nar row base 
of the KPP. Kowalski has estimated that the membership of 
the KPP in 1935 was between 7,400 and 8,200. 12 Membership 
in the 1920s had been less - about 3,500 in 192 8-29. 13 Of 
the 1935 membership total, approximately a quarter were 
14 Jewish and no more than about 1,500 were factory workers . 
Although the Ukrainian, White Russian and youth sections 
of the Party supplemented its streng t h, these figures 
indicate clearly its failure to win mass s upport amongst 
the Polish population. 
The other side of the Party's iso latio n was t he way 
in which the communists distanced themselves from the poli-
tical institutions and forces of the Poli s h Second Republic . 
This sprang to a large degree from the i deological stance 
of the Party, its analysis of Poland ' s likely revolutionary 
development and its attitude to Po lish statehood . 
contd ... 
(London, 1972); H. Rechowicz Aleksander Zawadzki . 
Zycie i dzia~alnosc (Katowice, 1969); Z . Jakubowski 
Franciszek J6iwiak "Witold " (Za rys dz ia~alnoici 
politycznej i panstowowej) Z pola walki 1974 nr. 2 (66) 
pp . 225-68 . 
11 The German .Communist Party received 17 % of t he votes in 
the November 1932 elections . The communists received 
13 % of the votes in Czechoslovakia in November 1925, 
coming second. 
12 Kowalski KPP ..• OP e cit., pp. 69-70 . 
13 Kowalski Trudne ... Ope cit., p. 61. 
14 Kowalski KPP •.. OP e cit., p . 61. 
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The KPP did not pursue the modevate and gradualist 
line adopted later by the PPR. Only in 1922-23 at the time 
of the second Congress of the KPP , and again from 1934/5 
when the anti-fascist 'popular front ' was adopted by the 
international movement did the KPP seek to construct alli-
ances with parties from the mainstream of Polish politics. 
Even so, significant sections of the rank-and-file appear 
to have been unreceptive to calls by the leadership for 
moderation during these intervals. 15 For the most part, 
the KPP pursued a radical, ultra-leftist line which 
Gomurka later described as its 'abstract revolutionism' .16 
This assumed that the Polish revolution would not be gene-
rated from within, but would follow a revolution spilling 
across the whole of Europe from the Soviet Union or Germany . 
In Poland it would take a classic Bolshevik course. Armed 
insurrection would _be followed by the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, exercised by a tightly-disciplined, Leninist 
cadre-party, the KPP , through councils of workers , peasant 
and soldiers. The revolutionary party would dismantle the 
bourgeois state and commence the construction of a social-
ist state directly, without any transitional stages. The 
internal class-basis of the revolution would be the prole-
tariat, poor peasants and oppressed national minorities. 
The KPP considered that collaboration with the bourgeois 
parties and particularly with the parliamentary left (the 
Socialists and Peasant Party) was superfluous and would 
weaken the revolutionary commitment of the masses. In 
1918-21, 1924-5 and 1929-34 the European revolution was 
judged imminent. Accordingly , Party activity was aimed 
not at cultivating wide support inside Poland. Instead, 
it gave priority to preparations for the seizure of power. 
15 J. Holzer Mozaika polityczna drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 
(Warsaw, 1974), pp. 231 , 515 . Resolutions were passe d 
at both the IV (1936) and V (1937) Plenums of the KPP 
criticising sectarian and ultra-leftist elements in the 
Party for failing to correctly understand the Party's 
new line . See Kowalski KPP ..• Ope cit., pp . 209, 339-40. 
16 Przemowienie tow Wieslawa na plenarnym posied zeniu KC 
PPR wdniu 3 czerwca 1948 r oku Zeszyty Historyczne 34 
(197S), p. 60. 
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Attempts were made to arouse the working-class through 
militant strike tactics and the national minorities through 
terrorist attacks on the Polish authorities and maximum 
. h' . 1 17 h support was g1ven to t e 1nternat10na movement. T e 
priority the KPP gave to furthering the international revo-
lution and, in particular, to assisting the much larger 
Communist Party of Germany , led the KPP to support the 
demands of the German minority in Poland. This mayor may 
not have assisted the German communists , but it was cer-
tainly highly damaging to the position of the KPP within 
Poland . 18 
In this scheme activity within the bourgeois state or 
i n alliance with the mainstream parties could take place 
o n ly on a temporary , tactical basis , when the prospect of 
the international revolution had for the moment receded and 
when it was felt that the bourgeois right or fascism con-
stituted a real threat to the Soviet Union and the commu-
nist movement . In such circumstances the use o f defensive 
tactics , including support for non-communist democratic 
opposition was regarded as justified. It was such argumen-
tation which led to the KPP lending Pi~sudski its support 
in 1926 at the time of his coup against the right-wing 
Peasant- Christian National government, a move which was 
19 
rapidly condemned as the ' May Error '. At no point, however, 
1 7 Holzer Mozaika .•. Ope cit ., pp. 226-33 , 512-33 . 
18 Gomu~ka wrote in 1948 that ' from 1925 to 1935 • •. the 
KPP either q u estioned the right of Poland to Upper 
Silesia and Pomorze , or employed the slogan of the right 
of these territories to secede from Poland , since they 
had been annexed by Polish imperialism . This was with-
out doubt a misuse of the slogan of the right of 
national self - determination •.. the applicatio n of the 
right of self- determination in those areas would without 
doubt have implied the negation of Poland ' s independence .' 
Wyja~nienie sekretarza generalnego KC PPR W~adyslawa 
Gomulki w zwi~zku z jego referatem i projektem rezolucji 
biura politycznego , Zeszyty Historyc zne 34 (1975), pp. 
81-82 . 
19 Polonsky , ~ticg : in · IndepenQent .Poland 1921-1939. 
(Oxford , 1972) . 
20 
did the KPP abandon its detachment from the Polish political 
system and work within it for an internally-based revolution . 
Closely related to the Party ' s ultra-leftism was its 
position on the ' national question ', the matter of Polish 
statehood . Apart from its brief periods of moderation in 
1922-23 and the later 1930s, the KPP , in Gomu~ka ' s words, 
adopted a position on Polish independence ' which did not 
even arouse any doubts , since it stood either for the orga-
nic integration of Poland as a soviet republic into the 
Union of Soviet Republics , or put forward the slogan of an 
independent Soviet Poland , stating at the same time that 
"for the KPP there can be no defence of the independence 
of bourgeois Poland" ••• ' . 20 This open hostility to Polish 
statehood was a huge handicap in winning the support of a 
strongly nationalistic population which had only very 
recently recovered a precarious independence after more t han 
a century of foreign domination . Nationalism was a force 
amongst the working-class as much as any other stratum. 
I n consequence , the influence of the communists amongst 
organised labour trailed behind that of the Socialists, the 
National and Catholic workers ' movements and even the 
Sanacja . 2l 
During its early years , especially , the position of 
the KPP on the national question was strongly influenced by 
the revolutionary internationalism of the old SDKPiL . In 
1920 , during the Bolshevik advance on Warsaw , the communists 
had formed a revolutionary government in Biatystok and gave 
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active support to the invading Red Army. During this 
20 Wyjasnienie sekretarza generalnego .. • op . cit., p. 81. 
21 In 1935 membership of the major trade union federations 
in Poland was as follows: Zwi~zek Stowarzyszen Zawodowych 
w Polsce (mainly PPS) - 283,000 membersi ZWi~zek Zwi~z­
k6w Zawodowych (Sanacja) - 147 , 000 members ; jednoczenie 
Zawodowe Polskie (NPR) - 129 , 000 membersi Chrescijahskie 
Zjednoczenie Zawodowe (Catholic) had 78,000 members in 
1933 . The Lewica Zwi~zkowa (KPP) had 51,000 members in 
1933 . Kowalski Trudne . . . op . cit . , pp. 251-3 and PPR 
Rezolucje, odezwy , instrukcje i okolniki komitetu central-
nego viii 1944 - xii 1945 (Warsaw, 1959), p. 62 . 
22 See N. Davies White Eagle , Red Star. The Polish-Soviet 
War 1919-1920 (London, 1972), especially pp . 150- 59 . 
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period the Party ' s position was defined in the most uncom-
promising internationalist terms . One of its declarations 
stated that ' for the international camp of social revolu-
tion there can be no question of frontiers ,. 23 In later 
years it was less the " Luxemburgist heritage" of the 
SDKPiL than the Party ' s subordination to the Comintern and 
Soviet foreign policy which accounted for its anti-national 
stance . Th is un-Polishness was self-reinforcing. Because 
of its unattractiveness to the Polish population and 
Polish parties , the KPP turned instead towards the national 
minorities . The disproportionate number of Jews amongst 
its membership and even more amongst its leadership was 
one reflec tion of this . 24 Another was the Party ' s relative 
s u ccess i n winning support within the Ukrainian and White 
Russian communi ties in the 1920s. 
In practice the Party ' s internationalism took the 
form of unquestioning loyalty to the Soviet Union. Though 
the leadership struggle in Moscow during the 1920s was 
reflected in the faction fights inside the KPP, this did 
not undermine the Party ' s enthusiasm for the first social-
ist state . However Stalin ' s purge and disbandment of the 
KPP was a great trauma for the survivors . For some, like 
Gomulka , who had deep reservations about the character and 
line of the KPP , it confirmed the importance of a fresh 
start with a more nationally-based Party which would be 
less dependent on the Soviet Union. Others, with deeper 
attachments to the KPP , did not revise their ideological 
o u tlook fundamentally and seem to have drawn the conclusion 
that Polish communism must rehabilitate itself , avoid the 
disunity which had plagued it between the wars and regain 
Stalin ' s confidence . 25 
23 Holzer Mozaika . .. Op e cit ., p . 226 . 
24 For the connection between the stance of the KPP on the 
national question and the extent of its membership 
amongst Polish Jews, see for instance W. Bienkowski 
Motory i hamulce socjalizmu (Paris, 1969), pp. 45-46. 
25 See for instance A . Zawadzka-Wetz Refleksje pewnego 
iycia(Paris , 1967) , pp . 43-44 on Bierut's attitude. 
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Some feat ures of t he KPP inheritance were more in 
evide nce i n later years when the PPR had already c ome to 
power , b u t t hree were felt deeply during the years of the 
occupation. The first was the persistence of the s ol i d 
fro n t of t h e e ntire political spectrum against the commu-
nists . Even i n 1942- 43 when the Polish and Soviet govern-
ments maintained diplomatic relations with one another 
and the PPR platform was at its most moderate , the Party 
was u nable to gain the trust of any significant section 
of the u nderground camp , not least of its far left. 
Efforts to form alliances with other groupings , whether 
with the leaders or rank- and- file , produced almost no res-
ult r i g h t u p to mid - 1944 . The PPR at no stage came near 
to emu lating the success of the Czech communists who were 
able to b u ild on their prewar role within the Czech poli-
tical system to enter and playa major part in the wartime 
anti- German coalition . The second factor was the 
continuing narrowness of the communists ' base . Because 
of its lack of popular support the P a rty was unable to 
command the attentio n of the underground state . Nor could 
it follow Tito ' s example by creating an alternative under -
ground movement capable of supplanting that of the 
bourgeois parties . Despite its claims to be a new party 
and its national slogans , KPP veterans and sympathisers 
°d d 26 prov1 ed the bulk of PPR ca res . In January 1943 its 
membership was said to be 8 , 000 , 27 about the same as the 
KPP . Its estimated strength of 20 , 000 in mid-1944 28 was 
26 In a telegramme to Dimitrov (12 . 1 . 43) , Finder estimated 
the proportion of KPP veterans in the PPR at one third . 
Depesze KC PPR do GeorgLi Dymitrowa (1942-43) Z pol a 
walki 1961 nr 4 (16) , p . 178 . One historian commenting 
on this estimate has suggested that the non-KPP members 
of the PPR were drawn from former trade unionis ts , 
' united front socialists ' and other 'left -wing anti-
fascist forces ', as well as the peasant movement , but 
that ' the former KPP ... formed the basic cadre in re-
building the party . . . ', J . Naumiuk PPR na Kie1ecczynie 
(Warsaw , 1976) , pp . 75 - 76 . 
27 Depesze KC ••• OP e cit ., p . 178 . 
28 N. Kotomejczyk PPR 1944-1945 (Warsaw, 1965), p . 275. 
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clearly of a very different order than that of the 'London' 
underground with its 350,000 Home Army troops , 29 although 
both claims should be treated cautiously. Partly because 
of its continuing isolation and weakness, the PPR dis-
played a third characteristic of the KPP - its sectarianism 
and disunity . The sectarianism took the form of a persis-
tent lack of consensus on the nature of the national front 
line . While some saw it as a radical departure from the 
strategic thinking of the KPP, others viewed it rather as 
a tactical variation on the old line, necessitated by 
international circumstances . Rank-and-file distaste for 
the liberalism of the new line and disputes in the leader-
ship over how to implement it reflected this divergence. 
' The National Front Without Traitors or Capitulators' 
Following the German invasion of the USSR in June 
1941 , the Comintern rapidly abandoned its assessment of the 
war as a conflict between rival imperialisms and harmonised 
its line with the Soviet Union ' s new international allian-
ces . The formula of the ' anti-Hitlerite national front' 
was adopted and regardless of the PPR ' s formal independence 
of the Comintern , this line was accepted by the Polish 
communists during the second half of 1941 as they prepared 
the Party ' s launch. The national front strategy in this, 
its broadest form, was maintained until 1943 in Poland 
and amongst the Soviet emigration in essence right up to 
liberation in 1944 . 
The strategy had two aspects . First it a.ccepted the 
political structure and leadership of the underground state 
and the Government-in-Exile and attempted to gain entry 
to this coalition as an equal partner alongside the four 
other major parties. At this stage the communists seem 
to have hoped to form a powerful and united working-class 
party including the socialists,30 which would playa 
29 Polskie Si~y Zbrojne w Drugiej Wojnie Swiatowej vol. 
III (London , 1950) , p . 123 . 
30 PPR statements in January-February 1942 spoke of 
con td . .. 
prominent rather than a dominant role in the coalition. 
The formula employed was that ' a united and coherent 
working- class ' would 'fight in the front ranks' of the 
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underground movement . Second , it aimed at constructing 
a coalition ' from below ' around a platform of active armed 
struggle against the Germans. From the first weeks of its 
existence the PPR began to organise guerilla units at a 
time when ' London ' for tactical reasons avoided offe nsive 
measures of this kind . To capitalise on the grassroots 
support it was thought the guerillas would generate , 
the Party set up a network of ' National Committees of 
Struggle ' (Narodowe Komitety Walki ). 
In both its aspects the ' national front without 
traitors and capitulators ' failed abjectly and illustrated 
how far the communists had exaggerated the factors working 
in their favour and wildly underestimated the problems 
they faced in winning support and overcoming the hostility 
of the mainstream parties . Although talks were held in 
February 1943 between the PPR and repre s e ntative s of the 
leadersh~p of the ' London ' underground they only served to 
demonstrate how unbridgeable was the gap between the two 
sides and how widespread the opposition within the London 
camp to collaboration with the communists, even of the most 
limited kind . 32 For ' London ' the PPR was a political 
nuisance to be neutralised and isolated . Its patriotism 
was never taken seriously and it lacked the military or 
organisational strength to attract interest as a potential 
partner . Reporting in 1944 to the Moscow Poles , Spychalsk i 
admitted that ' the first attempts of the PPR to achieve a 
national front in struggle with the occupant produce d almost 
no result . Quite simply , all the parties felt so strong 
in comparison with our movement that they did not consider 
contd ••• 
' putting an end to the split in the Polish working-cl ass 
see W. Gora (ed.) Ksztaltowanie sir podstaw orogramowych 
PPR w latach 1942 1945 (Warsaw , 1958) , pp. 13-16. 
31 Ibid ., p . 13 . 
32 A. Przygorl'ski ' z zagadnien strategii frontu naroroM¥Io PPR 1942-1945 (Warsaw, 1976 ), pp. 103-15 . 
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" """ h d" ,33 openlng negotlatlons Wlt our party expe lent . 
Attempts to create a united working-class party fell 
on stony ground . The strongest political organisation 
amongst the working-class , ' Freedom, Equality, Independence ' 
(Wolnosc, R6wnoi6, Niepodleg:losc), known as WRN. The 
majority of active members of the pre-war Polish Socialist 
Party supported WIDJ which continued the adamant hostility 
to the communists of its predecessor. Although modern 
Warsaw historians stress the significance of the left-wing 
Socialists who remained outside WPJl and formed the 
Organisation of Polish Socialists (Organizacja Polskich 
Socjalist6w - PS ), one has admitted that the left ' was at 
this time so weak that it could only dream of substantial 
inf luence amongst the working-class ' '.J 34 Besides , even 
the Organisation of Polish Socialists did not accept the 
PPR as a genuinely Polish party . At its 1942 Congress it 
defined its attitude thus : ' In relation to the PPR which 
is a new form of communist organisation in our country, 
the PS do not have confidence in the sincerity of its 
ideological platform , or in the autonomy of its political 
line and do not see the possibility of its participation 
" th d d" , 35 In e emocratic understan lng . It was only after a 
succession of splits that the PPR succeeded in winning over 
a small splinter of sympathisers from the Socialist left 
at the turn of 1943/44. 
The campaign to build up popular support ' from below' 
around the guerilla units was equally fruitless. The 
communists ' lack of local support , particularly in the more 
remote rural areas suited to guerilla warfare , severely 
36 hindered the PPR ' s military plans . As a modern Party 
33 rl. Spychalski Informacja przedstawiciela KC PPR na 
zebraniu komunist6w polskich w Moskwie 8 czerwca 1944 r 
Z pola walki 1961 nr 4 (16) , p. 184 . 
34 T . Sierocki PPR-owska koncepcja jednosci ruchu robot-
niczego w latach 1942-48 Z pola walki 1976 nr 4 (76), p. 6. 
35 F. Baranowski Z dziej6w nurty lewicowego powojennej PPS 
Z pola walki 1974 nr 3 (63), pp . 26-27. 
36 M. Spychalski Wspomnienia 0 partyjnej robocie (1931-44) 
Archiwum ruchu robotniczego vol. II (t"larsaw, 1975), p. 
296 . 
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historian has observed , ' in spite of great efforts ... the 
National Committees of Struggle failed to develop exten-
sively in the terrain and i n reality did not get beyond 
a conception of activity. A variety of reasons accounted 
for this ••. the weakness of the Party ' s own organisation, 
which was just in its initial period of activity , the 
effectiveness of the counter-action of the London under-
ground as well as the unfavourable situation on the eastern 
front ' . ?!7 
Instead of rapidly gaining influence within the 
underground moveme nt as it had expected, the PPR leader-
ship soon became embroiled in internal disputes . Party 
historians are divided over the extent of sectarianism 
amongst the KPP militants recruited into the PPR , but it is 
plain that the leadership did encounter resistance to the 
38 
new line in some quarters . Objections which had been 
raised already in the preliminary discussions on the new 
Party programme among the Polish communists in the Soviet 
Union recu rred . For some the new line was too minimalist 
and retreated too far from that of the KPp . 39 Ideological 
considerations were behind disagreement over the Party ' s 
name . Those who wished to stress its broad base preferred 
the label ' Polish Worker-Peasant Party '; those on the 
internationalist wing of the movement considered ' Workers 
Party of Poland ' more appropriate than Polish Workers ' 
40 Party . Some ex-KPP activists would have nothing to do 
with the PPR , objecting to its ' non-class ' character and 
the absen ce of public endorsement by the Comintern . Others 
d d d 1 " 't '1' 41 eman e exp ~c~t comm~tmen to soc~a ~sm . Despite the 
37 Przygonski op. cit ., p . 83 . 
38 Malinowski Geneza .. . op . cit., p. 463. Przygonski op . 
cit ., p . 49-51 suggests that Malinowski exaggerates the 
problem . 
39 Malinowski Geneza . . . op . cit . , p . 360 . 
40 Ibid ., pp. 351-52, 361n . 
41 Ibid . , p . 463; Przygotlski op . cit., p. 49. 
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attention the leadership gave to reassuring such doubters 
the criticism continued. In July 1942, a full seven 
months after the Party had been established, Nowotko rep-
orted to Dimitrov that ' the greatest difficulty is to 
break the sectarian frame of mind, especially amo ng former 
members of the KPP , for whom everyone who is not a commu-
nist is an enemy ' , and went on to complain about the 
Party ' s inability to broaden its base and national compos-
ition . 43 In late 1942 and into 1943 London intelligence 
reports pointed to continued internal divergences in the 
Party where 'once again to a marked extent disputes between 
44 the leadership of the PPR and KPP aktyw have appeared'. 
In January 1943 the Central Committee felt the need to 
warn its members ' Every group/faction: this is the influ-
ence of alien class elements on the party; it is the 
disruption of the party • •. we must strengthen order and 
. d' . l' , 45 ~ntra-party ~sc~p ~ne . 
This warning may have been a reference to events 
within the leadership itself which in late 1942 took a 
dramatic turn . Against the 
the political (Nowotko) and 
of the Party which had been 
background of strains between 
military (B . Molojec) chiefs 
46 
evident as early as 1941, 
and a wave of arrests by the Gestapo which extended to 
their respective families and intensified mutual suspi-
cions , on 28 November Nowotko was murdered on t he orders 
of Molojec , who was himself subsequently executed on the 
decision of a Party court of inquiry . The episode remains 
shrouded in mystery , but it was perhaps symptomatic of a 
certain demoralisation at the top of the PPR as a result 
42 See G6ra Ksztaltowanie sit ••• Op e cit., pp. 27-31. 
43 Malinowski Geneza ... Ope cit., pp. 465-66. 
44 Ibid ., pp . 465-66. 
45 Gora Ksztaltowanie si~ ... OPe cit., p. 79. 
46 Malinowski Geneza .. • Ope cit~, p.357n, 361. 356. 
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of its lack of success in the political sphere . 
Despite these setbacks, the new leadership of the 
Party under Pawe~ Finder persevered with the formula of 
28 
the 'national front without traitors and capitulators ' for 
most of 1943. However, as the months passed its line 
became increasingly blurred. Externally developments were 
encouraging. After Stalingrad in early 1943 the military 
balance on the eastern front began to shift in favour of 
the Russians and following t h e halting of the Germans ' 
final great offensive at Kursk in July 1943 , the Red Army 
began the westward advance which was to bring it to the 
frontiers of Poland in 1944. At the same time the position 
of the Polish Government-in-Exile in the Alliance was 
weakened in April whe n the Soviet Government suspended 
diplomatic relations over the Katyn affair . Immediately 
the Soviet Government began to form the Union of Polish 
Patriots ( Zwirzek Patriot6w Polskich - ZPP) and a Polish 
Division amongst the emigres in the USSR . In July the 
Government-in-Exile suffered a fUrther blow when Sikorski 
was killed in an aircraft accident at Gibraltar . Hi~ successor as 
prime minister, Stanis~aw Mikolajczyk , leader of the 
Peasant Party lacked the prestige which Sikorski enjoyed 
in emigre political and military circles and amongst the 
leaders of the Allied governments. 
However, the isolation of the communists within 
Poland intensified . The rift between the Soviet and Polish 
governments buried for the time being any chance of further 
talks between the PPR and the London Delegation. In any 
case, by this stage the underground leadership had shifted 
47 See f ur t her : Spychalski Wspomnienia ... op . cit. , pp . 
296-98, 314-19: przygo~ski OP e cit ., p . 84; M. 
Malinowski Marceli Nowotko (Warsaw, 1976), pp . 82 - 85 
Bethell Op e cit., pp . 51-53 : Polski S~ownik Biograficzny 
vol . XXIII/2 , p. 297 ; P.T. 0 tajemniczej g~ierci M. 
Nowotki i B. Molojca Zeszyty Historyczne 59 (1982), 
pp . 210 -20; W. J ab~onski ~-;ry~ a§nienia i uzupe~nienia 
do artykutu "0 tajemniczej smierci M. Nowotki i B. 
Mol"ojca " Zeszyty Historyczne 62 (1982), pp. 234-36. 
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f .. h h . 48 to opponents 0 any compromlse Wlt t e communlsts. In 
the aftermath of Katyn the Party found it more difficult 
to win support and h ad to contend with an increase in 
anti-communist propaganda as well as violence from the 
right . In August the National Armed Forces (N arodowe Si~y 
Zbrojne - NSZ) launched a campaign to ' cleanse the terrain 
of subversive and criminal bands ', declaring that 'the PPR, 
People ' s Guard and variou s red partisans must vanish from 
h f f 1 · h . , 49 h . t e sur ace 0 Po 1S terrltory. At t e same tlme 
' London ' , which the communists claimed tacitly supported 
NSZ violence , began preparations for its assumption of 
power in postwar Poland , plans from which the PPR was 
excluded . In August the ' Home Political Representation ' 
(Krajowa Representacja Polityczna) was set up as a half-
way house to a full underground parliament. This was 
formed in January 1944 in the shape of the Council of 
National Unity (Rada Jedno~ci Narodowej). The fo ur main 
political parties , the Peasants, Socialists, Party of 
Labour and National Democrats issued a joint declaration 
defining an agreed programme of post-war reconstruction. 50 
' London' also stepped up the organisatio n of the future 
infrastructure of power , establishing a secret networ k of 
local government and police and expanding the Home Army 
(Armia Krajowa - AK) . 
In January 1943 the Central Committee of the PPR met 
to review progress over the previous year. While reaffir-
ming its pursuit of a ' bro ad natio nal front of struggle 
without traitors and capitulators ' , it was clear that the 
leadership was looking for a way to es cape the impass e it 
was in. Impressed by Tito ' s success and the armed resis -
tance by the local peasants to German colonisation in the 
Zamo~~ region , the Party turned for a while to the idea of 
48 Przygohski op . cit . , pp . 110-11 . 
49 Z . S . Siemaszko Grupa Szanca i NSZ Zeszyty Historyczne 
21 (1972) , p . 12 . 
50 S . Korbohski Polskie pa6stwo podziemne (P a ris, 197 5) I 
p. 102. 
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a national insurrection . 51 However, it was aware of the 
difficulty it faced in breaking 'London's ' monopoly of the 
patriotic platform. As an alternative, the PPR began to 
introduce new notes of social radicalism into its state-
ments of policy and began to employ the slogan of a post-
war ' democratic Poland '. These ideas were further 
developed in a programme issued in March. 52 Although 
internal pressures prompted such modifications of tactics, 
external considerations prevented the leadership from 
departing from its original strategy. The result was a 
blurred and somewhat incoherent line . Thus although the 
attempts to form the National Committees of Struggle were 
abandoned in mid- 1943 and the Party withdrew recognition 
of the Government - in-Exile , Gomu~ka later stated that 'for 
several more months ( from the end of April - J.R.) we did 
not change o u r basic political line towards the Delegation 
and the whole "London camp " ; we were far from burning our 
bridges ,. 53 As long as the possibility of a rapprochement 
between ' London ' and Moscow existed, the PPR could not move 
over to radical opposition to the underground mainstream . 
It was not until after the October conference of foreign 
ministers i n Moscow that the Central Committee decided that 
a resumption of Polish- Soviet relations was unlikely and 
began to clarify its line . All the same no bridges were 
burnt until the Teheran conference (28 Nov - 1 Dec) had 
apparently confirmed the leadership ' s analysis of Soviet 
. t . 54 d' ~n ent~ons . By this time ~rect communications with the 
Russians had been broken . 
51 Przygonski op . cit ., p . 97 . 
52 Ibid . , pp . 96-103 ; Gora Kszta!towanie si~ • .. op . cit., 
pp. 58-63 ; 66-81 ; 93-96 . 
53 W. Gomu~ka Polemika z ' Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego' 
Zeszyty Historyczne 39 (1977), p . 4 . This article was 
f~rst published in the Paris emigre journal Zeszyty 
H~storyczne . It was subsequently published in Poland 
in Archiwum ruchu robotniczego vol. IV (1977). 
54 Z archiwow polskich komunistow List KC PPR ' do tow . D' 
z 7.03 . 1944r Zeszyty Historyczne 26 (1973), p . 187. 
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The Polish communist emigration in the USSR, much 
closer to Soviet thinking and free of the obstacles faced 
by the PPR in forming a broad national front, adhered much 
more consistently to the original version of the front. 
In its 'ideological declaration ' of June 1943, the ZPP 
conformed closely to the ' anti-fascist front' line. The 
aim of the ZPP, it stated, was to 'unite for the duration 
of the war all Poles residing on Soviet territory, regard-
less of differences in political, social or religious 
. . fl' h H' 1 . , 55 Vlews, ln one camp 0 strugg e Wlt lt erlsm. As 
Przygofiski has noted, t~is was the line 'from which the 
PPR in Poland had already at this time begun to depart, 
putting forward the concept of a democratic front' .56 
The Democratic National Front 
Thus in late 1943 the line of the PPR underwent its 
first - but no means last - distinct modification. This 
shift from the ' anti-fascist ' to the 'democratic ' national 
front was principally a response to the failure of the 
existing line to meet internal Polish realities . There is 
no evidence that Soviet prompting lay behind the shift. 
Indeed , the PPR seems to have strayed ahead of Soviet and 
emigre communist thinking in 1943, with the result that in 
early 1944 , when informed of the 'turn ' , the emigres 
received it very critically . 
The essence of the ' national front without traitors 
and capitulators ' had been the communists ' acceptance of 
the political framework of the underground state and 
attempt to gain entry to its leadership. The Party made 
no overt claim to a leading role in this coalition and was 
prepared to work with any group, from left to right, com-
mitted to armed resistance to the Germans. 
The ' democratic national front' was less broad and 
55 I. Blum (ed . ) Or ludowe 0 
W 0 j s k a Pol ski e-=g-=o:-""o~-;;-'::;--~---;:-;--;-;"----'7--;"""--;----"'--:;----:I:-;:V-:;---~"--
Dzialalnodd aparatu (Warsaw , 
1963) , pp . 57 - 61. 
56 Przygoriski op. cit., p. 20. 
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more radical . It rejected the legitimacy of the ' London' 
system and aimed at constructing a rival political camp, 
led by the PPR , by detaching ' democratic ' elements, in 
particular the Socialists and Peasants , from what was 
viewed as the ' reactionary ' leadership of the ' London' 
u ndergro u nd . The basis of this alliance would be a common 
programme combining nationai liberation with radical re-
form and its organisational expression would be a new 
politi c al cen tre , the Homeland National Council (Krajowa 
Rada Narodowa - KRN ), a secret parliament of the parties 
which joined the front . 
The idea of estab lishing some such organ was first 
mooted i n PPR circles in early 1943 , but Gomulka seems to 
have taken the decisive initiative whilst drafting a new 
version of the party ' s programme in September . After dis-
cussions between Gomutka and Finder , the Secretary of the 
Party , the proposal was put to the Central Committee and 
decided in principle on 7 November. 57 
The leadership did not decide what form the new centre 
shou ld take at this meeting . There were in fact two dif -
fering conceptions o~ the purpose of the KRN, and by 
implication , of the character of the ' democratic national 
front '. Gomulka envisaged the KRN as a ' centre of politi-
cal concen tration ', in other words as a point around which 
to gather a broad range of groupings which accepted its 
'f 58 h 'f common programme , the manl esto . T e manl esto was to 
be the key element determining the area of co-operation 
with potential allies . The KRN would serve to dispute 
the monopoly of the London camp and loosen its hold on the 
' democratic ' parties which the PPR regarded as potential 
allies . Later he was to describe the KRN as a 'sort of 
59 
coup d ' etat ' in the underground , in other words it would 
5 7 Gomu~ka Polemika ... op . cit . , pp . 5-6 . 
58 For the KRN manifesto (15 . · 12 . 1943) see W. Gcra (ed . ) 
W walce 0 sojusz robotniczo-chlopski. Wyb6r dokumentcw 
i materia~6w 1944 - 1949 (Warsaw , 1963) , pp. 7-9 . 
59 Gomulka Polemika .. . op . cit ., p . 5 . 
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act as a catalyst to bring about a regrouping in Polish 
politics . From this standpoint the structural details of 
the KRN were of secondary importance, tho~gh Gomu~ka pre-
ferred to avoid a model which would fuel accusations that 
the PPR was intending to ' sovietise' Poland . As soon 
became clear , Gomu~ka saw no advantage in being specific on 
the form of t h e KRN and he was quite prepared to alter its 
character if this would assist the construction of a broad 
democratic front around the KRN manifesto. 
Boleslaw Bierut , on the other hand , led the group in 
the leadership which viewed the KRN rather as an ' organ of 
power ', t h e cornerstone of a rival underground state firmly 
under the Party ' s control wh ich other groups would in time 
accept . For him the structure of the KRN was non-negotiable . 
If it proved a n obstacle in the way of forming alliances, 
the Party shou ld wait until the other side gave way. In 
the meantime cosmetic alliances with splinters of the main 
groupings would suffice . The risk that the Party would be 
s uspected of a~ming at the ' sovietisation ' of Poland did 
not worry Bieru t who insisted 'that the KRN should be under-
pinned by a network of local national councils . 60 
While Gomu~ka represented the current in the PPR 
which wished to rest power on a broad front of the commu-
nists , Socialists and Peasants , Bierut was concerned above 
all with securing state power and was opposed to compromis-
ing on this point in order to widen the front . The two 
conceptions were fused untidily during the second half of 
November 1943 . This was a disastrous time for the Party; 
o n 14 November Finder and another experienced member of the 
leadership , Ma~gorzata Fornalska , were arrested. Since 
they were responsible for communications , contact with 
Moscow was broken and not restored until early January. 
Within hours of the arrests Gomulka, Bierut and Franciszek 
JCZwiak , who now constituted the top leadership of the 
Party , went ahead with a pre-arranged meeting to decide the 
form of the KRN . Bierut ' s scheme of a local network was 
60 Ibid ., pp: 6 - 8 . 
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accepted without enthusiasm by Gomu~ka who, as he later 
recalled, did not wish to waste time and viewed the issue 
61 
as secondary. However, nine days later, unknown to the 
Soviets and emigres, Gomu~ka was elected secretary ln pre-
ference to Bierut and J6zwiak. 62 
This outcome meant that the differences of view with-
in the PPR leadership were not resolved in favour of either 
the Gomulka or Bierut-J6zwiak conception before the KRN 
was inaugurated on New Year's Eve 1944. The timing of 
the inauguration was governed by tactical considerations: 
the imminent entry of the Red Army into pre-1939 Polish 
territory and the Party's desire to pre-empt the transfor-
mation of the London Home Political Representation into a 
Council of National Unity. From the point of view of its 
political base, the establishment of the KRN was premature; 
at this stage very little progress had been made in winning 
over Socialists and Peasants. 
The Socialist left had undergone considerable regroup-
ing during 1943, but remained aloof from the PPR . The 
Organisation of Polish Socialists had split in April 1943. 
Some of its members had joined I'lRN, but the left-wing, 
anti-London faction had formed a new body, the Workers ' 
Party of Polish Socialists (Robotnicza Partia Pol skich 
Socjalistow - RPPS). With at most 1,500 members, the bulk 
63 
of them in the Warsaw area , the RPPS was , as Gomu~ka 
admitted, 'minute', though it was thought by the communists 
64 to have a potential for growth. Despite its very radical 
social programme and opposition to 'London ', at its 
Congress in September 1943 the RPPS had characterised the 
61 Gomu~ka Polemika •.• OPe cit., p. 5. 
62 Spychalski Wspomnienia ... Op e cit., p . 335 . 
63 B . Syzdek PPS w latach 1944-1948 (Warsaw, 1974) , p. 
49n ; A . Reiss Z problem6w odbudowy i rozwoju organizacyj-
,' nego PPS 1944-1946 (Warsaw, 1971) I pp. 26-28 . 
64 Gomu~ka Pismo KC PPR do CBKP w ~SRR z l2.l.44r, 
Artykury ... vo1.-I, o~. cit.-, p . 61. 
PPR as ' representing Soviet influence ' and by a large 
" d' 11 b , 65 b ma]Or1ty vote aga1nst co a orat10n . In Decem er , 
however , the RPPS agreed to talks, but rejected the com-
munists ' concept of a ' democratic national front' around 
the K~~, proposing instead the idea of a ' popular front' 
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of the Peasants , communists and itself based o n the new 
political centre which it had begun to form a few weeks 
before . 66 In the end, only a small faction of the RPPS, 
active in t he vlarsaw co-operative movement with whom Bierut 
had old contacts , entered the KRN. This tiny group of 
Marxists led by Edward Os6bka-Morawski and Stanis~aw 
Szwalbe represented the total outcome of two years of com-
, " l' 67 mun1st effort to W1n Socla 1st support. 
The Party ' s failure to secure backing for the KRN from 
the Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe - SL) was even more 
striking . A formal invitation to the SL leadership did 
not even receive a reply . The communists ' hopes of 
recruiting at least a few SL activists ' from below ' also 
came to nothing . In the end the Party had to make do with 
Wladys~aw Kowalski , a veteran KPP peasant activist , again 
brought in by Bierut . 68 
It has been suggested that Gomu~ka deliberately stayed 
away from the inaugural sitting of the KRN to express his 
dissatisfac tion with the extremely narrow range of its 
65 B . Orukier (O.K . ) Na marginesie polemiki Gomu~ki , 
Zeszyty Historyczne 43 (1978) , p . 215; Przygo~ski o~ . 
cit ., p . 172n. 
66 Przygonski op . cit . , p . 199 , 201 ; Syzdek op . cit ., pp. 
45-46. 
67 Bierut knew both Szwalbe and Os6bka-Morawski well before 
the war . See Wazniewski op . cit ., p . 39 ; H. Rechowicz 
Bolesi:aw Bierut 1892-1956 (Krak6w, 1974), pp. 20, 24 , 
55 . 
68 Kowalski had been an activist on the radical wing of the 
' Liberation' Peasant Party (PSL "Wyzwolenie") in the 
early 1920s and was later one of the leaders of the 
pro-communist Independent Peasant Party (Niezale~na 
Partia Chlopska) and the Peasant self-help movement 
(Samopomoc ChJ:opska) . He joined the KPP in the late 
1920s and worked for the Agricultural Section of the 
Central Committee . He was in regular contact with the 
PPR from its formation in 1942 . See further: Polski 
S~ownik Biograficzny t. vol. XIV/4 z . 63 pp. 575-77; Z. 
Hemmerling vHadys-1:aw Kowalski nvarsaw , 1977) . 
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membership . He later however denied this emphatically.69 
Nonetheless he was very critical of the way in which the 
KRN fell so far short of his original conception . In a 
message to Dimitrov in March 1944 he wrote ' we did not 
wa n t to form this representation on our own , but at the 
very least with the CK (Central Committee , i . e . the 
majority - J . R. ) of the RPPs ,. 70 In his memoirs (1975) 
h e stated plainly, ' I did not want the KRN to be a synonym 
for the PPR at all . The KRtl was intended to be quite 
d ·f 71 1 ferent ' . 
For those like Gomu!ka who had envisaged the KRN as 
a c e n tre of political consolidation for a broad democratic 
fro n t , its failure to attract suppor~ beyond the PPR was a 
major disappointment . Others who viewed it rather as an 
embryonic organ of power were much less disturbed by this 
fact . As we shall shortly see , this divergence of outlook 
grew sharper in early 1944 as the failure of the KRN t o 
escape its isolation became apparent . 
The Communist Emigration in the Soviet Union 
The size of the wartime Polish emigration in the 
Soviet Union is uncertain . Estimates by the ZPP put it at 
between 500 - 700,000 in 1940- 41 . ' London ' sources suggested 
72 
a million or more . Only a relatively small part of this 
total was evacuated to the West in 1942 in the army comman-
ded by General Anders : about 84 , 000 troops and some 30 , 000 
. ·1· 73 C1V1 1ans . The communist emigration was tiny - at most 
a few hundred people 74 - and until 1943 it was unorganised 
69 Gomutka Polemika •.. Op e cit ., p . 16 ; Drukier Na 
marginesie ... Op e cit ., p . 217. 
70 Z archiwQw ... Op e cit ., p . 187 . 
71 Gomulka Polemika ... Ope cit ., p . 31 . 
72 F . Zbiniewicz Armia Polska ZSRR (Warsaw , 1963), p . 13 . 
73 E . Duraczyhski Wojna i Konspiracja wrzesiert 1939 
kwiecie~ 1943 (Warsaw , 1974) , pp . 270-73 . 
74 Thus the total numbers of ex- members of the KPP who had 
been drafted into the political apparatus of the Polish 
Army by the first half of 1944 was just 350 , Zbiniewicz 
OPe cit ., p . 58 . 
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a nd dispersed . Some communists were active in journalism, 
some in the Red Army or Comintern apparatus, but many 
oth ers found themselves in labour brigades or camps. 
{vh en the ZPP was formed some of these communists were 
given positions in its leadership but most were assigned to 
the new Polish Division , chiefly to work in its political 
apparatus . They included a considerable number of the top 
f i gures in the postwar Party : Derman , Minc , Radkiewicz, 
Zambrowski , Ochab , Zawadzki , Jaroszewicz and many other 
sec ond- rank figures . 
The Polish communist group in the Soviet Union inevi-
tab ly had a different perspective on political strategy 
tha n the Party at home . Until 1944 their contact with the 
PPR was i ndirect , sporadic and provided only a very incom-
p lete picture of the situation in Poland . Their thinking 
was much more closely geared to Soviet policy . Without 
any local rival for the patriotic cause it was relatively 
easy for them to recruit the non-communist emigre masses 
i nto a broad front to struggle with the Germans . The 
principal problem which they faced was that of moulding 
t hese masses into a military and political force to place 
at· the disposal of a future communist government . These 
differing vantage- points influenced the character of the 
debate on strategy ; in Poland the PPR leadersh ip had to 
defend a broad , liberal line , which was not producing 
res u lts , against criticism from its own left . Within the 
emi gration the communists were almost over-successfu l in 
widening their base and feared that the nationalistic and 
mil itaristic forces they had harnessed might overwhelm their 
i n fluence in the army. 
The strategic discussions amongst the emigres were 
above all concerned with which element would play the key 
role in liberated Poland , the communist Party or the 
Communist - led army . There was much greater agreement on 
the kind of issues which divided the PPR . The debate over 
the role of the political and military factors in postwar 
Poland was bound up with a struggle for dominance within 
the emigration , between civilian communists in the 
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Presidium of the ZPP and the military men in the command 
of the Polish Division. The communists in the army poli-
tical apparatus were inclined to occupy a middle position. 
In late 1943 this rivalry shaped discussions which were 
held to define more precisely the political aims of the 
emigration . Each of the three factions put forward its 
own 'theses '. Those of the Army command, dubbed 'theses 
number one' , were drafted by Major Jakub Prawin , but iden-
tified with the divisional commander , Gen . Zygmunt Berling 
and his deputy , W~odzimierz Sokorski; Minc and Zambrowski 
wrote ' theses number two ', reflecting the outlook of the 
' politruki ', while' the view of the ZPP Presidium was 
embodied i n ' theses number three ', largely written by 
Alfred Lampe . 75 The debate has been described elsewhere 
in some detail , 76 so here we shall confine ourselves to 
saying that its outcome was a clear victory for the ZPP 
Presidium and its conception of Party control of the army, 
rather than an independent political role for the military. 
This victory was consolidated with a series of personnel 
h 1 · . 77 c anges to strengthen the army po ltlcal apparatus , and 
the establishment in January 1 944 of the Central Bureau of 
Polish Communists (Centralne Biuro Komunistow Pol skich -
CBKP) . This organ for the first time provided the com-
munist emigres with a unified leadership and a channel 
through which PPR communications with Moscow were increas-
ingly directed . 
During the debates on the ' theses ' certain common 
assumptions amongst the Polish communist emigration had 
emerged quite clearly . 
75 For the texts of these ' theses ' , see Blum Organizacja ... 
op. cit ., pp . 98-100 . Wumber one) , pp. 110-20 (Number 
two) . A slightly different version of Number one is 
cited in W. Sokorski Polacy pod Lenino (warsaw, 1971), 
pp . 98-100 . Number three is in G6ra Ksztaltowanie 
sir' " op . cit ., pp . 474-87. 
76 Zbiniewicz op. cit., pp . 149-73 . 
77 Ibid . , pp . 167-68. 
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First , the emigres took a very sanguine vi ew of the 
feasibility of forming a broad coalition on the platform 
of national liberation. While the Party at h ome had a l-
ready limited its goal to a front extending only so far as 
the ' democratic ' wing of the London camp, and had had in 
practice to make do with the very narrow base of the KRN , 
the emigres remained convinced that a much wider 'patrio-
tic front ' was within their grasp . Prawin ' s ' theses ' had 
declared that ' all , without regard to their political past 
who loyally and honestly stand on the gro und of the 
political programme presented will be admitted to (the 
government) camp' . 78 ' Theses number two ' insisted that 
' the creation of a movement linking in a harmonious whole 
the homeland and the emigration is entirely realistic ', 79 
. while Lampe viewed ' national solidarity ' as a prerequisite 
of his conception of Poland ' s development towards social-
ism . BO As became apparent in early 1944, the emigres 
could not understand why the communists at home h ad failed 
to win wider support , or why they had felt the need to 
radicalise their platform . They tended to ascribe this 
failure to what was seen as ' sectarianism ' in the PPR . 
Secondly , while the ' political ' communists insisted 
that the Party should have a leading role , t h ey did not 
mean by this that the underground PPR should exercise that 
fUnction . Lip- service was paid to the formal subordination 
of the emigres to the Party at home and the CBKP was thus 
conceived as ' an organisation of the PPR abroad on Soviet 
territory ,. 8l However , in practice the emigres viewed the 
PPR as too weak and too o ut of touch with Soviet thinking 
to take the lead . ' Theses number o ne ' had bee n criticised 
for undervaluing the part to be played by domestic forces , 
but Minc and Zambrowski too wrote of t he need to create a 
78 Blum Organizacja •.. Op e cit., pp . 98-100 . 
79 Ibid ., pp . 110-20 . 
80 Przygonski Op e cit., pp. 145-46. 
81 Ibid ., p . 212. 
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' unified leadership', arguing that ' the responsibility for 
achieving the task of consolidating Polish democracy falls 
on the ZPP and the Polish Armed Forces in the USSR , to 
which the course of events has granted immeasurably 
bl f .. , 82 f opportune and favoura e scope or act~v~ty . As or 
Lampe ' s ' theses ', they were intended as the basis for the 
programme of a Polish National Committee which the 
Presidium of the ZPP was preparing to launch in early 
1944. This initiative, on which there was no consultation 
with the PPR because of the break in contact, was halted 
when news of the establishment of the KRN arrived . Other-
wise the political hub of the communist camp would have 
shifted decisively abroad . It is worth noting that 
although special attention was devoted to ensuring that 
representation on the Committee would be given to right-
83 
wing opinion , only a quarter of its seats were reserved 
for the homeland, compared to half for the Soviet emigra-
tion . 84 For the emigres it was self-evident , formalities 
apart , that they rather than the PPR held the key to 
Poland ' s future . They tooJ~ the view that their success in 
bringing the broad ' patriotic national fro nt' strategy to 
fruitio n and in building an army 30 , OOO-strong by the end 
of 1943 and 100, 00C-strong by mid-1944 , 85 entitled them to 
the deference of the PPR rather than vice versa. 
The 1944 Strategy Debate 
The proximity of power in early 1944 did not lead to 
any final crystallisatio n of strategy by the communists . 
Three different variations of the national front vied with 
one another right up to the moment of liberation and it 
was the unexpected rapidity of that liberation rather than 
any coming together of minds which shaped the Party ' s 
82 Blum Organizacja ... op . cit., pp . 110-20. 
83 Przygonski op . cit ., pp . 209-11 . 
84 Ibid ., p . 226 . 
85 Zbiniewicz op . cit ., pp. 186, 324 . 
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course during its first weeks on power. 
The lack of consensus within the leadership of the PPR 
over the intended character of the KRN and more generally 
over the nature of the ' democratic national front' became 
increasingly evident in the first months of 1944. At the 
same time the divergence between the ' patriotic national 
front ' ofthe emigres and the ' democratic national front' 
of the underground communists became apparent. 
The gap in thinking between Warsaw and Moscow was 
revealed once radio contact was re-established in early 
January , but the subsequent correspondence did little to 
diminish it . Gomulka's first message (12 January) provided 
a s u rvey of political forces and the internal situation 
which Moscow had requested. The tone was optimistic. He 
claimed that a favourable transformation in public atti-
tudes to the Soviet Union had occurred and that the 
possibility already existed of gathering ' considerable d e mo -
. f 86 b h crat~c orces ' around the KRN . The reply sent y t e 
CBKP in February has not been published but it is clear 
that it contained extensive criticism of the changes which 
the line of the PPR had undergone since autumn. This 
emerges from the response of the PPR Central Committee in 
a letter of 7 March. This time the tone was decidedly 
defensive . Its assurances that ' the idea of the KRN has 
found general support amongst the broad masses' and that 
' a strong foundation of ' support for the KRN is growing fr om 
below ' , were , as we shall see shortly, highly exaggerated 
and were contradicted by t~e Party ' s reply to CBKP charges 
that it had failed to mount a broad coalition where other 
communist parties had succeeded . The Central Bureau had 
seen PPR ultra-radicalism as the obstacle, but the Central 
Committee blamed factors beyond its control: 
86 Gomulka Pismo KC PPR do CBKP w ZSRTI z 12.1 . 44 Artykuly • .. vol. ~ 
op. cit ., pp . 61-76 . Published in translation by A. 
Polonsky and B . Drukier (ed . ), The Beginnings of 
Communist Rule in Poland December 1943 - June 1945 
(London , 1980) , pp. 193-202 . 
' 7he fact that up to now the PPR has not 
succeeded in achieving the creation of a 
national front in Poland on the pattern 
of Yugoslavia , Czechoslovakia or France 
results neither from sectarian political 
positions of the Party nor from our weak-
ness , but from the attitude of our Party 
to Poland ' s eastern frontier question ' . 
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The emigre implication that a more tactful approach might 
improve things was scorned: ' If Saint Anthony ' s brotherhood 
stood 
would 
for revising the eastern frontiers of Poland, it too 
87 be branded by the reaction as a Moscow agency' . 
This defence did not satisfy the Central Bureau which 
in a note written, it seems, in May , repeated its criti-
cisms and in effect told the PPR to abandon the ' democrati c 
national front ' and return to the broad ' patriotic nationa l 
front ' it had strayed away from in late 1943. The note 
gave a somewhat delayed welcome to the initiative of form -
ing the KRN, but raised the same criticism that Gomulka 
had made of the structure which Bierut and Jozwiak had 
insisted on . The CBKP considered that conceived as an 
' organ of power' rather than a ' centre of political con-
centration ', the KRN ' hindered winning over wavering 
elements '. But the Bureau ' s critique extended to the KRN 
programme, which Gomulka had framed and to the very concept 
of a ' democratic national front '. According to Moscow, 
the programme paid insufficient attention to establishing 
' a broad political concentration (original emphasis - J.R.) 
which would be capable of drawing behind it or neutralising 
part of the bourgeoisie ' ; it was not ' the programme of a 
front but amounts to a narrowed national front . . • '. The 
underground leadership had got out of step . It ' had not 
taken enough account of the complexity of the international 
situation . From this point of view (its radical) slogan 
of People ' s Poland is unacceptable as it is in conflict 
with the general political line'. But the CBKP implied 
87 Z archiwQw • .. OPe cit . , p . 189 . Lengthy excerpts from 
this letter were published in Przygortski OP e cit., pp. 
227-33 , 258-59 . See also Polonsky and Drukier Op e cit., 
pp. 203-7. 
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that t h e PPR had also mi sjudged the internal situation and 
advised the Party to take advantage of what the Central 
Bureau saw as a ' ferment ' amongst the London parties. The 
watchword should still be ' a Provisional Government with a 
wide democratic base which will embrace alongside the KRN 
all groups standing sincerely for struggle with the 
Germans in alliance with the Soviet Union ,. 88 
This advice did little to resolve the differences 
inside the PPR. On the one hand , however critically and 
reservedly , the Moscow communists had endorsed the KRN . 
On the other , they had demanded a new drive to win over a 
broad coalition of allies . The emigres did not see any 
contradiction between these two aims, and did not therefore 
address t h emselves to the issue which divided the under-
ground leadership , namely how far should it be prepared to 
compromise on the structure of the KRN in order to win 
allies and broaden the national front. 
As the correspondence between the PPR and CBKP 
reveals , the PPR leadership was reluctant to reveal its 
differe nces to the emigres and appeared united in its 
defence of the KRN . Internally , however , strains increased . 
The Party ' s efforts to broaden the base of the KRN were 
fruitless despite the growing certainty that the German 
occupation of Poland would be ended by the Red Army and 
not the West . Although it proved easier to construct a 
network of provincial and local national councils beneath 
the KRN than had been the case with the National Committees 
of Struggle in 1942-3 , this reflected improved Party 
organisation rather than any marked widening of support for 
the national front . The national councils were based o n 
the PPR itself and the small groups linked with it and 
there was relatively little progress in detaching activ-
ists of the Peasant and Socialist movements ' from below'. 
The Party leadership blamed this on the ' sectarianism ' of 
local organisers , but the continuing solidity of the 
88 Polonsky and Drukier Op e cit . , pp. 212-13. 
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London camp was perhaps the chief obstacle. 89 
Little advance was made in expanding the ti ny RPPS 
and Peasant groups whi ch had joined the KRN . In January 
Os6bka- Morawski set up a pro- KRN central c ommittee and 
began to campaign among the RPPS cells . However , only a 
few cells seem to have disowned the existing anti - KRN 
central committee . Indeed , as we shall see , the r esults 
were so limited that by May the communists were d ivided 
over whether it was worth maintaining Os6bka ' s RPPS at all . 
Gomu~ka and his group i n the leadership thought it might 
be wiser to liquidate it and c o nc e ntrate their efforts o n 
the ' old ' RPPS , with wh ich they conducted negotiations 
90 through February-Marc h . Overtures were also made to the 
1 d h ' ' h 1 91 ea ers lp of the Peasant Party Wlt out resu t . Mean-
while , an attempt to generate an internal oppos i tion in 
the SL was mounted in February around Wladyslaw Kowalski 
and a few other leftist peasants who had t hrown i n t heir 
lot with the PPR . This group took the name of the news-
paper , '' \'101a ludu ", which they b egan to publish . However , 
this was a very cosmetic venture and it was l eft to the 
communists to print , distribute and even , to a large exte n t , 
' h 92 wrlte t e paper . 
By spring 1944 it was clear t hat the KRN , t houg h 
operative as a n embryonic state apparatus , which c oul d be 
used if the PPR fou nd itself install ed in power by the Red 
Army without having gained entry t o the ex i sti ng under -
ground state , was quite useles s as a mea ns of rallying 
support and indeed actually alienated potential allies such 
as the ' old ' RPPs . 93 
89 Pr zygonski o p . cit ., p . 272 . 
90 Ibid ., pp . 228 , 255 - 58 . 
91 R. Halaba Stronnictwo Ludowe 1944-1946 (Warsaw , 1966), 
p . 18. 
92 Gomu~ka Po1 emika ... op . cit ., p . 34 . 
93 J . Paw!owicz Z dziejow ko nspiracy jnej KRN 1943-44 
(Warsaw , 1961), p . 75 ; przygonski op . cit. , pp . 254 - 59 . 
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For Gomu~ka and others in the PPR leadership, notably 
Aleksander Kowalski , Ignacy Loga-Sowirtski , W~adys~aw 
Bienkowski and Ze non Kliszko, the priority was to achieve 
the broadest possible front which would e mbrace in parti-
cular the Socialists and the Peasants and not o nl y cosme-
tic splinter groups from the Marxist fringe of these 
movements . Such a front would provide a genuine political 
base for a communist - led government after liberation . 
Otherwise any new government would have only the meagre 
resources of the PPR and the KRN at its disposal and would 
be forced to rely very heavily on Soviet support to keep 
the London camp , still united , at bay . In the eyes of 
Gomu~ka and his supporters this was the ratio nale of the 
national front strategy and accorded clearly with the 
guidelines sent by the Central Bureau from Moscow in their 
94 
recent messages . Apart from general strategic consider-
ations , Gomu~ka and the others interpreted recent d iploma-
tic moves as indicating the possibility of a resumption of 
relations between the Soviet and Polish Ex i le Governments 
and were anxious to pursue tactics at home in line with 
this scen ario . 95 
Bierut , Jozwiak and Hilary Chelchowski , a more junior 
Central Committee member , saw in t his a threat to the 
character or even existence of the KRN, which they feared 
would be sacrificed - along with Os6bka ' s RPPS and "Wola 
ludu " - in order to achieve a deal with the London group-
ings . They considered that the question of power in 
liberated Poland could be solved b y the PPR itself with 
the active pOlitical support of the Soviet forces and t hat 
to make premature c o ncessions to win Socialist and Peasant 
backing was undesirable . Writing three decades later , 
94 In February the emigres had advised the PPR ' to take 
steps to expand the KRN ' s pol itical base . These should take 
the form of an appeal to member s of t he PPS , SL , NO 
(Nati o nal Democrats - J.R . ) and othe r military and civil 
bodies . The aim s hould be a broadly natio nal front ' , 
Polonsky and Drukier OP e cit . , p. 203 . 
9 5 Gomul-ka Polemika .-.. 0:> . cit. , p. 28. 
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Gomu~ka made it clear that he regarded this stance as 
sectarian and as a fundamental retreat from the conception 
of a broad national front as the basis for mounting a 
broadly-based government on liberation. According to 
Gomulka the Bierut group : 
' did not claim by any means that they 
excluded the possibility of a resumption 
of diplomatic relations •... They treated 
the matter as irrelevant. Their position 
amounted to this : that I underrated the 
possibilities which the liberation of 
Poland by the Red Army opened for us; that 
with its help we would settle the problem 
of government in Poland as we liked; that 
at the same time I was underestimating 
the strength of' our party , which in the 
new circumstances created by the Red Army ' s 
liberation of Poland would become the 
object of attention from the other 
parties .•. • 96 
Bierut , characterising Gomu~ka ' s attitude in 1948, said 
much the same : 
'During the creation of the KRN some com-
rades in our Party did not appreciate the 
true configuration of class forces and 
the special importance of the co-operation 
of these forces in the struggle for poli-
tical power with the armed might of the 
USSR, as a revolutionary , liberating force , 
as a class force , and not simply as the 97 
military force of a n ally .' (My emphasis - J . R.) 
For Gomu~ka ' s group the imminence of the Soviet liberatio n 
of Poland dictated an intensification of efforts to create 
a broad front ; for Bierut and Jozwiak it provided an 
opportunity to escape the constraints imposed by this stra-
tegy and establish a more radical and communist-centred 
government . 
The dispute came to a head in May when the ' old ' 
RPPS put forward the proposal that the KRN link up with 
96 Gomulka op . cit ., pp . 30-31. 
97 Nowe drogi 1948, nr. 11, p. 20. 
47 
the Central People ' s Committee (Centralny Komitet Ludowy) 
or Centralizacja as it was called, a body comprising little 
more than the RPPS and the left of the Democratic Party 
(Stronnictwo Demokratyczne - SD) . The two would then 
attempt to enter the ' London ' Council of National Unity 
as a joint-opposition. On May 19 the PPR telegrammed the 
Moscow communists asking their opinion of this scheme. 
The reply , which arrived a few days later and may well have 
been influenced by Osobka-Morawski who had recently arrived 
in Moscow , expressed the view that the plan was a manoeuvre 
98 designed to subordinate the KRN to ' London '. 
Presumably this message had not been received when 
the Central Committee met (23 May) to discuss the plan. 
Wide differences were revealed in a sharp exchange of 
views . Bierut argued that the PPR should not collaborate 
politically with the Centralizacja because of what he 
claimed was its ' favourable ' attitude to the London govern-
ment and the difference between its ideas and those of the 
PPR on which forces would take power in liberated Poland . 
J6zwiak saw the Centralizacja as a rival to the KRN which 
ought to be eliminated and he accused the Gomu~a faction 
of overrating its importance and underestimating the 
strength of the Party . Gomu~ka overruled these views and 
came down in favour of serious talks with the Centralizacja 
as the first step towards approaching the London ' demo-
crats ': ' We should do everything in order to link up and 
approach the SL (and) WRN together ' . 99 
The next sitting of the Central Committee (29 May) 
was still more heated and brought out clearly the gulf in 
strategic thinking between the two sides . By this time 
news of Moscow ' s attitude to the merger plan and the recep-
tion by Stalin of Osobka- Morawski and the other KRN 
98 Przygortski Op e cit ., p . 261 . 
99 Dyskusje w PPR w sprawie zjednoczenia si~ demokraty-
znych (Notatki protokolarne z posiedzen KC PPR maj -
czerwiec 1944 r) , Archiwum ruchu robotniczego vol. II 
op . cit. , pp. 156-57 . See also Polonsky and Drukier 
OP e cit ., pp . 214-15 . 
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representatives v22 ~ay) had reached Warsaw. This perhaps 
encouraged Bierut and Jozwiak to stick to their guns. 
However , Gomu~ka and his colleagues were determined to 
persevere with the Centralizacja plan. They took the 
view that Stalin ' s public welcome for the KRN delegation 
was intended to reinforce British pressure on the GoverroEnt-
in-Exile to come to terms. Both sides claimed that they 
adhered to the national front philosophy and recognised 
the need for ' national consolidation ' , but the course of 
the argument revealed how differently they conceived this 
strategy. Bierut saw alliances with other parties and 
groups not as desi~able in themselves , but as tactical 
devices to isolate and destroy the ' reaction ' . As he put 
it consolidation was required ' not because "we love each 
other ", but in order to intensify the struggle'. Ale ksan-
der Kowalski , for the other side, expressed an altogether 
more conciliatory spirit and was read to pay a conside rable 
cost to achieve national unity: ' we should be ready to g ive 
up certain preprogatives , among others: exclusive repre -
sentation which alone will form the government ' . For 
Gomu~ka , the Party's objective was to merge the KRN , 
Centralizacja and. ' London ' Council of National Unity, 
purged of ' fascist elements ' in 'one domestic, national 
representative body '. In other words he aimed to achieve 
the kind of broad coalition between the PPR, the left 
Socialists and the London ' democrats' which was finally 
formed in June 1945 . Jozwiak, by contrast, not only 
rejected a deal with ' London ', but regarded the Centrali-
zacja as an unsuitable ally , arguing that it should be 
broken up and that only its ' democratic ' wing could be 
trusted . In his opinion the KRN alone could exercise powe r 
and the national front should be exte nded only marginally 
beyond its present limits. The meeting concluded me ssily 
with Gomu~ka insisting on proceeding with talks with the 
Centralizacja over Bierut ' s protestation that there had 
been a change of Party line . 100 
100 Dyskusje w PPR . . . op. cit., pp . 157-60 . See also 
Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., pp. 216-20. 
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On June 10 it seems that Bierut sent a secret me ssage 
to Dimitrov accusing Gomu~ka of political vacillatio n 
'from sectarianism to opportunism', departing f r om ' col-
lective work ' and forming a faction in the leadership . He 
101 
asked Moscow to step in to rectify matters. 
In other circumstances such a conflict of outlook 
would very likely have led to the expulsion of the minority 
- in this case Bierut, J6zwiak and Che~chowskil02 from t he 
leadership. But in conditions of conspiracy, with power 
almost in their grasp and the attitude of the Soviets still 
very ambiguous, the conflict was left unresolved to await 
the further development of events. 
At the next Central Committee meeting for which we 
have a record (18 June) the rift was still apparent . 
Bierut played for time, _ arguing that 'at the momen t it is 
not possible to assume that an understanding will not be 
made on the basis of the KRN ... we o ught to b e cautious 
and not make commitments '. He and JOzwiak agreed however 
to Gomu!ka ' s formula by which any talks would deal first 
with a joint political programme and o nly move o n to the 
role of the KRN in the future power structure when agree-
ment had been reached on the prog ramme. Such an agenda 
would defer the question of the exclusivity of the KRN and 
would give wide scope for delay. However Gomulka tried to 
put the issue beyond doubt in his summing-up , concluding 
that ' we shall not reach unificatio n from above around t he 
KRN and ought if the KRN proved an obstacle in the way of 
a political understanding, give up the name KRN ' . 103 
Some days later, on 1 July, a l eader ar ticle written 
by W!adys!aw Bien'kowski appeared in the PPR organ "T rybuna 
101 W. Wi(-sowicz i L . Socha Z archi \vum - Bolesl'aw Bieruta 
Krytyka 8 (1981), p . 7 6 . 
102 t-1embership of the Central Committee was as follows : 
Gomu~ka (secretary ), Bierut , Jozwiak, Aleksa nder 
Kowalski , Ignacy Loga-Sowi6ski and Hilary Che~chowski . 
103 Dysuksje w PPR ... o p. cit ., pp . 161-6 3 . See also 
Polonsky and r.rukier op . ci t ., pp . 223 - 26 . 
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Wolnosci" , presenting the majority view as the official 
position of the Party . It is most improbable that such an 
article could have appeared without Gomu~ka ' s prior appro-
val . The statement brought the line of the PPR s ubs tan -
tially into harmony with the ' patriotic national front ' 
stance of the emigration and in fact the Central Bureau 
had called for just such a declaration in its April mes-
sage . It spoke of the urgent need for ' a c o nsolidatio n of 
all the forces of the democratic camp' and ' a broad 
national front embracing everything which stands for the 
struggle to liberate poland , .104 The Party was back to 
the broad front formulas of 1942-43 and its obj ective , so 
-the article implied , was once again the reconstruction of 
the Government-in-Exile rather than its replacement by the 
KRN. Indeed the statement made no mention of the KRN as 
a possible base for a new g overnment bloc, an omi ss i on 
which , at least formally , fitted in with the Central 
Committee ' s decision to place the question of agreement on 
policy in the foreground . However , it also s uggested a 
flexibility on the future role of the KRN which ra n counter 
to the intentions of Bierut and J6Zwiak. In t he leadership 
crisis of 1948 they were to cite this ' document of shame' 
as crowning evidence of Gomulka ' s abandonment of the 
105 KRN , and as the first signal of his ' right-nationalism'. 
Meanwhile the Moscow line c ontinued to cut across 
the divisions at home . On 1 July, the same day that 
Bienkowski ' s article appeared , the emigres finally a nnoun-
ced their formal recognition of the primacy of t he KRN . 
This decision had been taken by the ZPP a week earlier in 
response to Stalin ' s directive that t h e KRN s ho ul d be t h e 
106 base of the future provisional government. However, 
as a letter sent by the Ce ntral Bureau to the PPR o n 18 
104 See M. Malinowski (ed . ) Publicystyka konspiracyjna 
PPR 1942-45 . wyb6r doku me nt6w vol . III (Warsaw, 1967), 
pp . 299-308 . 
105 Nowe Drogi 1948 nr. 11 , pp . 20 - 23 , 46 , 95-97 . 
106 Przygonsk i op . cit., pp. 280 , 283 . The ZPP declaration 
was published in ' Wolna . Polska ' 1 July 1944. 
July makes clear , the CBKP insisted that this should be 
accompanied by mounting of the broadest possible front. 
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The Bureau bluntly stated that Soviet backing for the KRN 
would depend on an early broadening of its base and that 
this was an immediate priority. It also expressed dissat-
isfaction at what it saw as the continuing narrowness and 
'inconsistencies ' of the PPR line . It was worried by 
examples of the PPR ' s excessive radicalism , which it 
feared would alienate the peasantry and prevent the new 
government gathering the support of ' the majority of the 
nation'. The emigres regarded this ambitious goal as not 
only possible , but imperative if the ' formatio n of a power-
ful reactionary underground, possessing a significant 
social base ' was to be avoided . In what might be taken as 
a defi n itive statement of the philosophy of the broad 
national front - and no doubt of Soviet policy in mid-1944, 
the Bureau formulated its strategic objective as being 
' the creation of such an internal balance within which we 
shall be able to smash the reaction with our own internal 
f ' 107 orces . . 
The Polish Committee of Nat i onal Liberation 
In the end geography and the speed of events at the 
front decided the relative influence of the different 
strategic conceptions on the Party ' s line during its 
initial assumption of power . In mid-June when Bierut had 
argued for a waiting-game and Gomu~ka was preparing the 
ground for a deal with the London ' democrats ', the Soviet-
German front was for the most part stabilised well to the 
east of the River Bug ; five weeks later Red Army troops 
reached the Vistula . The unexpected extent and rapidity 
of this advance altered the whole context of the debate 
within the PPR and in effect decided the issue in Bierut ' s 
favour . The Party would take power not in alliance with 
a broad national front of Peasants , Socialists and other 
107 Przygonski op . cit ., pp . 290-93. 
groupings , but instead on the back of the Soviet army and 
within the framework of the KRN. 
It was the emigre line nevertheless which had the 
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most profound influence on the Party ' s strategy in the first 
weeks of power . While the PPR leade rship awaited the 
Soviet advance in Warsaw , in Moscow the e migres put the 
final touches to the arrangements for assuming power . Mes-
sages from Moscow to Warsaw in July hinted that these 
preparations were getting underway but it appears that the 
PPR was only informed of the details by radio post factum . l 08 
Formally , in line with Stalin ' s instructions , the homeland 
109 
was to form the core of the new governement . However , 
only seven representatives of the domes tic wing of the 
national front were present in Moscow to participate in the 
discussions . Of these , three (Osobka-Morawski, Rola-
Zymierski and Spychalski) were second-rank figures in the 
KRN leadership , while the other s were of no importance 
whatsoever. Not one of the top Party l eadership was avail-
able and Spychalski , the s e nior PPR spokesman, h ad l eft 
Warsaw in March and therefore knew nothing of the more 
110 
recent debates in the Party . The Poles were inclined to 
await the expected arrival of further representatives of 
the KRN . However , these did not materialise and the 
RUssians were anxious to finalis e agreeme nt s . In meetings 
with Stalin and Molotov on 17-18 July the Poles were urged 
to go ahead with the immediate formation of a Committee of 
National Liberation to administer the liberated t erritories . ll l 
108 
109 
110 
111 
Extracts from accounts by Franciszek J ozwiak (Fr a nek , 
Witold ) to the PZPR Central Committee (A ZH P 8516 , 
delivered 2 and 6 September 1959), p . 452. Polonsky 
and Drukier, Op e cit . 
Przygonski , Op e cit., p . 283. 
In fact, conspiratorial security was so tight that 
Spychalski was not eve n officially told the ide n tity 
of Gomu{ka and Bierut before his departure for the Sovie t 
Union . Spychalski Wsporonienia . .• , OP e cit., pp . 355-56 . 
J . S. Haneman U progu Polski Ludowej Z pola walki 1969 
nr . 2 (46), p . 144 . 
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However , the Poles decided on 18 July to propose instead 
the creation of a ' KRN Delegation ' to fulfil this role and 
the next day Stalin accepted this solution which at least 
formally embodied the supremacy of the KRN . On 20 July 
the new body held its first and only session at the end of 
which it was announced that Stalin had changed his mind 
and now insisted on his original conception of a Committee 
of National Liberation . The Poles had little choice but 
to accept this volte- face and , adding the word ' Polish ' , 
voted the Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet 
Wyzwolenia Narodowego - PKWN) into existence . Presumably 
Stalin had decided on reflection that to give such promi-
nence to the KRN might provoke the allies and hinder a 
deal with ' London ' which was still in the offing. In 
terms of structure the change made virtually no 
difference . 112 
The political platform of the PKWN , its manifesto, 
was produced in Moscow on 21 July and was very much a 
Moscow product . Based on the draft declarat i o n which 
Lampe had prepared the previous December for the abandoned 
Polish National Committee , it close l y followed the emigre 
concept of the ' patriotic national front ' . The manifesto 
called for ' national unity ' and promised the restoration 
of all democratic freedoms , excluding o nl y ' fascist orga-
nisations ' from the legal political spectrum . It confined 
its criticisms of ' London ' to its military strategy and the 
alleged illegality of the Government-in-Exile but refrained 
from broadening this into a general attack o n the political 
profile of the underground . The KRN was recognised as ' the 
112 K. Kersten Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego 
(Lublin , 1965) , pp . 37-39 ; Pr zygonsk i Op e cit ., pp . 
283-87 ; T . Zenczykowski Geneza i kulisy PKWN , Kultura 
1974 nr . 7- 8 , pp . 138-69 . The minutes of the Presidium 
of the head office of the ZPP for 15 a nd 18 Ju l y 1944 
were published in Pro toko~y prezyd ium za r z~du gtownego 
Zwi~zku Patriotow Polskich w ZSRR (c zerwiec 1943-
liplec 1944r) , Archiwum ruchu robotniczego vol. II , 
pp . 63 - 153 . See also Polonsky and Drukier OP e cit ., 
pp . 21-22 , 233-44 . 
only legal source of authority in Poland' , but the mani-
festo toned down several of the more radical statements 
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of the PPR . For instance t h e pledge in the KRN programme 
to nationalise heavy industry , transport and banks was 
dropped . Instead the PKmJ undertook to restore ownership 
t P 1 ' h' 113 h 1 o 0 es exproprlated by t e NaZ1S . T e Centra Bureau 
had explained the thi nking behind such moderation in its 
letter of 18 July , where it had argued that the use of such 
radical slogans as ' People ' s Poland ' and the nati o nalisa-
tion of industry were ' not calculated to bring about frag-
mentatio n in our opponent ' s camp or to draw wave ring 
bourgeois elements away from reactionary influence or to 
l ' , , , 114 neutra lse parts of the bourgeolsle . 
The PKWN manifesto which served to define the Party ' s 
strategic aims in its first weeks in power was thus l argely 
framed by emigres who had been out of Poland for five 
years and who regarded the assessment of the balance of 
forces at home by their undergro und c omrades as mistaken . 
In line with Soviet thinking , the Moscow Poles believed 
that a mild social programme and a platform of natio nal 
liberation would bring about the broad coalitio n of forces 
which had eluded the PPR since 1942 . The s ummer months of 
1944 would show that this faith was not well-founded . By 
October the communists had no cho ice but to fall back o n 
the Bierut-Jozwiak conception of a cosmetic nati o nal fro nt, 
based on the Party itself and susta ined by Sov i et armed 
might. 
113 Manifesto PKWN (Warsaw, 1974). A signi f icantly d i ffe -
rent version of the text of the manifesto is g i ven in 
T. Zenczykowski Geneza ..• op . cit . , pp . 164-69. 
114 Przygonski op . cit . , p . 291. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
"LUBLIN" AND "LONDON" (July to December 1944) 
The Polish communists took power in summer 1944 iso-
lated and numerically weak. Speaking to the first 
gathering of Party activists in liberated Lublin on 5 
August, Gomu!ka admitted that the wartime efforts of the 
PPR to form a national front had failed to produce a res-
1 
ult. Twenty years later he returned to the subject of 
the internal balance of force in 1944: the London crew 
had a great preponderance over us, a vast apparatus of 
cadres and material resources at its disposal. We had to 
2 
rely on our own modest resources!. 
This of course left Soviet resources out of the cal-
culation. In order to avoid total dependence on Soviet 
might, Party strategy looked to the long-awaited regrouping 
of political forces which it assumed would now take place 
as Poland passed indisputably into the Soviet sphere of 
power and the burden of the war against the Germans moved 
from the 'London' underground to the Polish Army fighting 
alongside the Russians. The expected disintegration of 
the London camp and the gravitation of its more pragmatic 
and radical components towards the Lublin regime would 
provide the PKWN with the internal base it lacked and 
enable the communists to isolate and e liminate their die-
hard Opponents. The plan was set out authoritatively in 
the letter , which the CBKP sent to the Central Committee 
of the PPR on 18 July.3 The l etter argued that the objective 
1 
2 
3 
P~otok6r zebrania delegat6w PPR z Lubelszczyzny, 5 .8.1944 
P~erswze kroki PPR po wyzwqleniu, Archiwum ruchu 
r?botniczego vol. I (Warsaw, 1 973 ), p. 355. A transla-
t~on of the minutes of this meeting is in Polonsky and 
Drukier, op. cit., pp. 258-65. 
Speech to XII Plenum KC PZPR, 9.7.68, W. Gomu!ka Z kart 
naszej historii (4th ed ., Warsaw, 1970), p. 455. 
List Biura Komunistow Polskich w ZSRR do KC PPR ; z dn . 
18.VIII.44r, Z archiw6w .•• op. cit., pp . 191 94. See 
also extracts published in przygo~ski op. cit., pp. 290-
91 and translation in Polonsky and Drukier, op. cit ., pp . 
230-32. ' 
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of establishing 'a genuinely national government gathered 
around itself the majority of the nation' could 'be ful-
filled only by the determined and consistent realisation 
of the national front policy: the working-class under the 
leadership of our party will capture the leading position 
in the struggle for national liberation, achieving at the 
same time the maximum fragmentation of reactionary forces '. 
It continued: 'translating into class terminology , this 
means the struggle to destroy monopoly capital and great 
land-ownership, a struggle led by workers, peasants, intel-
ligentsia, the petit-bourgeoisie, who will lead after them 
part of the middle bourgeoisie, neutralising its majority. 
At the same time a national front conceived in this way 
must guarantee the popular masses the maximum possibility 
of achieving their demands, while creating a favourable 
point of departure for the march towards changes in the 
l ' , 4 po ltlcal system'. 
Reality failed to conform to this scheme. No signi-
ficant regrouping of parties took place until mid-1945 . 
The dividing line between London ' reactionaries ' and 
'democrats ' proved less easy to draw than the communists 
had expected and was in any case less in evidence than the 
divide separating 'London ' from 'Lublin'. Moreover, faced 
with the problem of translating strategy into practice, 
the communists came up against the fundamental dilemma 
which was to dog them for years to come . The kind of 
broad coalition bloc required t~ achieve the defeat of 
their Opponents by political means demanded far-reaching 
compromises on policy and a relaxation of the Party's hold 
on positions of power. In view of Party 's acute lack of 
reliable manpower the danger existed that it would be 
swamped in such a block and thus lose the hegemonic role 
which it considered essential . On the other hand , a nar-
rowly based front which embraced little more than the 
communists and their client parties on the radical left 
would preserve the Party ' s leading role but at the cost o f 
4 Z archiw6w ••. op . cit., p. 191. 
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depriving it of the internal resources needed to defeat 
the opposition po l itically . Such a solution would lead the 
Party with little alternative but to resort to police and 
bureaucratic methods and the direct application of Soviet 
power to deal with its opponents . Throughout its history 
t h e PPR was caught withi n this dilemma , never more so than 
during its first year of rule in 1944-45 . 
The unreality of the assumptions on which the July 
version of the national front rested was revealed within 
a Couple of months . In October the Party line harde ned 
distinc tly and by spring 1945 the momentum of this turn 
had swept it far adrift from the precepts of the natio nal 
front . In May , the leadersh ip facing a worsening political 
crisis and the loss of its authority within the governing 
apparatus , executed an abrupt volte-face , restoring in its 
essentials the general line from which it had departed the 
previous autumn . 
The Lub l in Coalition 
Despite its narrow base the administration installed 
in Lublin displayed , particu larly in i ts first weeks of 
existence , many of the characteristics of a coalition . At 
its core lay the communists , rarely occupying the more 
public positions , but dominating t he key posts in t he army , 
security forces , mass media and central government depart -
ments . The Party itself was a c oalitio n , between the 
emigres and undergro und activists , between the o ld genera-
tion of KPP stalwarts and the younger ex-par tisans , between 
idealists and pragmatists . Such differences in backg round 
and outlook were c ompounded by the differences which 
stemmed from the variety of vantage points from which the 
political situation was viewed . The top leadership , 
keenly sensitive to shifts of mood in Moscow, the inter-
national picture and the broad balance of in ternal forces , 
saw things very differently from the activists sent o ut 
into the countrys ide to establish the rudiments of party 
Organisation and local government from nothing. A security 
man with orders to prevent hostile infiltration a nd uncover 
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'reactionaries' differed in perspective from a political 
officer in the army given the task of winning the allegi-
ance of fresh conscripts with five years of loyalty to 
'London' behind them. 
This heterogeneity was at its most evident in 1944 as 
the Party made the transition from conspiracy to govern-
ment. In one of its first circulars the leadership warned 
cadres of the problems that this process would involve: 
we have become a legal party, co-governing and there -
fore jointly responsible for all deficiencies, shortcomings 
etc •••• On our work and activity, on our organisational 
skill in overcoming post-occupation chaos, on our correct 
party line at this crucial historical moment depends our 
success in winning over the majority of the nation •.•• 
Our party must learn how to govern •.• ,. 5 
The first organisational task was to form a unifi ed 
leadership. This did not take place immediately. Although 
Gom~ka addressed the first Party meeting in Lublin o n 5 
August as secretary, it was Bierut who the same day arrived 
in Moscow for talks with Stalin and Miko~ajczyk o n the 
creation of a coalition government. 6 The Politburo seems 
to have been formally constituted on 29 August. Its 
membership comprised Gomu~ka and Bierut, but not Jozwiak, 
from the underground Secretariat of the PPR and Berman, 
Minc, Zawadzki and Radkiewicz who were 'co-opted ' from 
the Central Bureau. 7 This apparent imbalance illustrates 
5 
6 
7 
Okolnik komitetu obwodowego PPR w Lublinie 0 zadaniach 
partii w organizowaniu w~adzy ludowej (sierpien 1944r.), 
Z pola walki 1959 nr.2 (6), p. 120. 
Kersten PKWN .•• Ope cit., p. 49. Bierut appears to have 
consistently handled top level contacts between Lublin 
and Mo scow in 1944-45. The first visit by Gomulka to 
Moscow of which there is evide nce was made in June 19 45 . 
J. Got~biowski and w. G6ra (eds.) Ruch Robotniczy w 
~olsce Ludowej (Warsaw, 1975), p. 405. However, t he re 
~s Some doubt if Radkiewicz was a full member, Przygonski 
OPe cit., p. 316 and Pierwsze kroki .•• op. cit., p. 362 
omit Radkiewicz's name. Gomu~ka states that the member-
ship of the Poli t buro was decided at a meeting in Lublin 
attended by himself, Bierut, Zawadzki , Berman, Minc and 
Zambrowski . Gomu~ka nominated J6zwiak , despite the ir 
Political differences. However, Bierut opposed hi s 
contd •.• 
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both the seniority of the Moscow group and Gomu~ka's weak 
hold on the leadership: none of the other members were 
his adherents. However Gomu~ka may have found it easier 
to work with the new Politburo than the old underground 
Secretariat, where he was outnumbered by Bierut and 
J6zwiak. 
During August and September the work of establishing 
a centralised organisational network for the Party to re-
place the decentralised underground structure was completed. 
Provincial and district committees were formed everywhere 
except in the remoter parts of Biatystok province where 
the PPR had had no wartime organisation whatsoever. At 
this stage, with local cells still few in number and the 
Central Committee apparatus at an embryonic stage (in 
September it had only 24 political workers ), the district 
committees remained the focus of Party activity.8 
The membership of the Party east of the Vistula in 
the final phase of the occupation has been estimated at 
about 5,000. It is claimed in addition that some 20,000 
troops of the People's Army (Armia Ludowa - AL) were 
deployed in the Lublin region, though this figure may well 
be exaggerated. 9 In August ahd September it was primarily 
from this source that expansion of Party membership took 
place, from 4 ,633 (1. September) to 8 ,960 (1. October) . 
Distribution was uneven: over 70 % of members were c oncen-
trated in Lublin province, compared with about 12% in 
contd ••• 
nomination and J6fwiak was not elected. Gomu~ka 
Polemika ••• op. cit., pp. 35-36 . Zambrowski and Spychal-
ski became members in spring 1945. 
8 Ko~omejczyk PPR •.• op . cit., pp. 22-2~. 
9 Ibid., p. 20. The national strength of the AL in mid-
1944 is generally estimated by Party historians as be-
tween 50-65,000. This figure includes not only partis~, 
but also non-combatant support. The combined strength 
of AL guerrilla units (July '44) seems to have been 
be~ween 6-8,000 troops . 20 lat LWP . II sesja naukowa 
poswircona wojnie wyzwolenczej narodu polskiego 1939-45 
(Warsaw, 1967), p . 142. 
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R / ' '" k 10 zeszow and only 2% ~n B~a~ysto • Even allowing for th e 
exclusion from these statistics of some communists in the 
army, the shortage of Party cadres with which to govern a 
population of approaching six million was apparent. The 
scope for increasing membership was limited by the social 
structu~e of the liberated territories: apart from a few 
pockets of industrialisation (Praga, Bia~ystok, Lublin, 
Stalowa Wola), the region was overwhelmingly agricultural. 
At the end of 1944 as the factories began to resume regu-
lar production, the total industrial workforce was o nly 
about 85,000. 11 Moreover, especially in the towns, some 
Party officials doubted the wisdom of expanding too fast, 
f ' 1 l' , 1 h ' 12 h d b ear~ng a oss of po ~t~ca co es~on. T ese ou ts ran 
contrary to leadership policy which favoured a rapid 
growth. On 15 September the Politburo approved organis a -
tional instructions which relaxed recruitment requirements, 
'opening wide the gates of our party for all who acknowl-
13 
edge the principles of the PPR programme'. By the end 
of the year membership had risen to 21 , 649, thanks in par t 
to the campaign staged around the parcellisation o f the 
great estates. However, there remained an acute lack o f 
cadres. The influx of poor peasants and agricultural 
workers, who with other rural strat a constituted at least 
14 65-70 % of PPR members by December, could not compensate 
10 Kol:omejczyk PPR ... op . cit., p . 275. 
11 Ibid., p. 40. 
12 Ibid., pp. 41- 42 . See also B . Hillebrandt i J. Jakubow-
ski Warszawska organizacja PPR 1942-1948 (Warsaw, 1978), 
pp. 216-17. 
13 Instrukcja organizacyjna KC PPR dla organi zacji party-
jnych na wyzwolonych terenach Polski (10.9.1944), PPR ... 
viii 1944-xii 1945, p. 27. The instruction was dra f t ed 
by Gomulka and approved by the Politburo meeting o n 15 
September. The minutes of this meeting publishe d in 
Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., p. 280 record only that 
the matter was discussed . 
14 Kolomejczyk PPR .•• op. cit. , pp. 45, 275 . 
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in the short term for the absence of educated, politically 
sound activists. 
The other elements in the Lublin coalition: the Peasants, 
Socialists and the army and security forces could only 
marginally alleviate the Party's shortage of manpower . 
The Peasant Party was by far the largest political 
movement in Lublin Poland, where nearly 85% of the popula-
tion lived in rural areas. lS Although the SL was very 
weak in Bia~ystok province; Lublin, Rzesz6w and the liber-
ated parts of Kielce and Warsaw were amongst its strong-
holds. The strength of the Peasant Battalions, the armed 
wing of the SL, stood at about 50,000 men in Lublin 
16 province alon~. The communists saw the Peasants as a n 
obvious and indispensable ally. As Gomurka told delegates 
at the first Party meetingin August, 'the Peasants are our 
natural ally, and though in many cases their ideology and 
structure is different, we shall try to collaborate with 
them. The Peasants represent a serious force a nd without 
them nothing can take place,.17 
The SL "ROCh" was a continuation of the prewar p easan t 
movement, and embraced the overwh e lming bulk of politically 
active peasants within its rather l oose rahks . It consti-
tuted the largest element within the London camp, providing 
b t h If h f h H 18 d . d a ou a of the strengt 0 t e . orne Army, an occuple 
many posts within the apparatus of the undergro und state. 
The choice of Miko~ajczyk as premier of t h e Government-in-
Exile reflected the importance of "ROCh" within the resis -
tance movement. During August and Septe mber 'Lublin' had 
high hopes of winning over "ROCh" in its e ntirety or at 
15 Ko~ornejczyk PPR ... op. cit., p. 40. 
16 R. Buczek Stronnictwo Ludowe 1939-45 (London, 1975), 
p. 175. 
17 Protoko~ zebrania delegatow PPR z Lubelszczyzny 5 . 8 . 44 , 
Pierwsze kroki ••• op. cit., p. 356. 
18 The strength of the Ba talio ny Ch~opskie and associated 
units as of 30 June 19 44 has been estimated as 173 , 000 
troops. Buc zek SL ••• op . cit., p . 172. 
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any rate detaching a substantial section. While negotia-
tions with MiRo~ajczyk were held in Moscow in early August 
and again in October, the authorities operated a relatively 
mild policy towards members of "ROCh" and the Peasant 
Battalions. On 5 September "ROCh" leaders held an illegal 
conference in Lublin itself. Several participants were 
arrested, but on indicating their readiness to co-operate 
with the PKWN were released and made their escape. 19 In 
fact the conference had reaffirmed its support for the 
London government and boycott of the PKWN declared in cir-
culars issued at the beginning of August. Members working 
with the Lublin authorities were threatened with expulsion 
as 'traitors to the peasant cause' .20 Although initially 
some "ROCh" activists did find their way onto local 
national councils or into the Militia, the boycott became 
more effective later and only a small proportion of the 
movement left the conspiracy to throw in its lot with the 
PKWN. 21 
Th±s group, which formed a rival 'Lublin SL' in August 
and September, were led by Peasant members of the PKWN: 
Andrzej Witos and Stanistaw Kotek-Agroszewski. The 'Lublin 
SL' was not a serious rival for "ROCh". Its membership in 
December, by which time a local network had been estab~ i 
22 lished, is estimated at no more than 5,000-6,000. It 
did however provide a significant source of manpower in 
19 Minutes of the PKWN (extracts), 4 October 1944 Polonsky 
~nd Drukier OPe cit., p. 295. The incident appears to 
have assumed considerable significance in shaping the 
policy of 'Lublin' towards 'ROCh'. Stalin was highly 
critical of the decision to release the 'ROCh' delegates. 
Hinutes of the PPR Central Committee (extracts), 9 
October 1944 ibid., p. 300. Gomu~ka returned to the 
incident at a meeting of the leadership of the PPR and 
PPS in September 1945 as evidence of the unwillingness 
of 'ROCh' to co-operate with the PKWN in 1944. Halaba 
Stronnictwo ••• Ope cit., p. 131. 
20 Ibid., pp. 40-42. 
21 Ibid., pp. 42, 51. 
22 Ko~omejczyk PPR •.. Ope cit., p. 34. 
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local government: in early November incomplete data show 
that the SL and Peasant Battalions constituted some 36% of 
the membership of commune and district national councils 
as against 11% for the PPR and 4% for the Socialists a nd 
Democrats. 23 These figures probably underestimate the 
role played by the Peasants and in some districts such as 
Bilgoraj and Krasnik they constituted as many as 80 % of 
councillors at the lowest tier. 24 The SL wielded consider-
able influence at higher administrative levels too . For 
example, Witold Jedliski, an SL member, was placed in 
charge of establishing administration in Rzeszbw province. 
In this positioh he pursued an independent line, attempt-
ing to restore the prewar elective local government system 
. 25 
until he was removed on 29 September. But it was Witos 
as vice-chairman of the PKWN and head of its Department of 
Agriculture and Land Reform, who could most affect policy. 
Until he was sacked in early October, one of the central 
planks of the PKWN programme, agrarian reform , was his 
responsibility. 
In spite of its small size and separation from IROCh", 
the 'Lublin SL' proved an unsteady partner for the commu-
nists. There were divisions over the leadership - no less 
than five candidates stood for chairman of the central 
26 
cOmmittee at its September Congress - as well as policy. 
An important section of the party opposed land reform in 
the shape forced through by the PPR , and inclined towards 
a compromise with IROCh" and Hiko1:'ajczyk . Many members o f 
23 Halaba Stronnictwo .•. op . cit., p. 61 . 
24 Ibid., p. 60. 
25 Kersten PKWN ... op. cit., p. 61; E. Olszewski poc z?tki 
w~adzy ludowej na Rzeszowszczyznie 1944-47 (Lublin, 
1974), p. 98; Resolution of the KRN Presidium, 11 
Septemcer 1944, polonsky and Drukier op. cit., p . 279. 
26 Report on Kotek-Agroszewski (undated), ibid., p . 354. 
The candidates were S. Agroszewski, A. Witos, S. 
Janusz, J. Ma~lanka and J. Czechowski, Halaba Stronnic-
two •.. op. cit., p. 47 . 
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the party, reflecting the strong agrarian current in the 
Polish peasant movement, openly rejected communist claims 
to qegemony and demanded a decisive say for their party.27 
The Socialists, outside a few pockets of strength such 
as Lublin, Zamosc and Krosno, had never been a significant 
force east of the Vistula. During the war the WRN had 
organisations in Lublin and amongst the oil-well workers 
of Krosno. Apart from groups in Bia~a Podlaska there 
appear to have been few traces of RPPS or left Socialist 
t . . t . h . ·28 'bk k . d I .,. ac ~v~ y ln t e reg~on. Oso a-Moraws 1 an Bo eS1aw 
Drobner began talks with other Socialists in Moscow on 
29 re-establishing the PPS even before the PKWN was set up. 
However, within the PPR there were doubts about the wisdom 
of encouraging the emergence of a 'Lublin' socialist 
party, which might fall under the influence of the WRN. 
It was also feared that such a Socialist party might deve-
lop into a competitor for the PPR in working-class areas . 
However, the PPR leadership decided that the balance of 
advantage lay in reviving the PPS . Gomu~ka stated its 
position in his 5 August speech: 'I f we were to absorb 
certain elements from the PPS that party would be destroyed 
while we are after co-operation and it is in our interest 
that the partner organisation is strong so that it attracts 
those masses which we are not able to win over by our-
selves,.30 Locally however the situation was often con-
fused. In Sandomierz, for instance, a 'Lublin PPS ' branch 
began activity on 20 August with the approval of the 
Soviet military authorities. A few days later its entire 
membership joined the PPR, which took over the branch 
27 Ibid., pp. 48-49, 53; H. Stabek Polityka agrarna PPR 
(Warsaw 1st ed ., 1967), pp. 212-15. 
28 Reiss op. cit., p. 51; T. Sierocki Warszawska organi-
zacja PPS 1944-1948 (Warsaw, 1976), pp . 62-64 . 
29 Ibid., p. 63. 
30 Protok6t zebrania delegatow PPR a LubelszCZ vz ny, 5 . 8.44 , 
Pierwsze kroki ..• op. cit., p. 358 . 
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headquarters. The Socialists were co-opted onto the dis-
trict PPR committee, where they constituted a majority of 
the members. It was not until October, that the Socialists 
split away from the PPR and re-formed their o wn organis a -
'tion, on instructions from the PPS executive in Lubl in . 31 
Within the leadership elected at the PPS Congress held 
in Lublin on 10/11 September there were three distinct 
currents of thought abou the party's future. The group 
led by Stefan Matuszewski , the secretary-general, like 
many of the communist leaders, envisaged a very limited 
role for the PPS. According to one modern Warsaw hi sto-
rian, Matuszewski saw the PPS 
' ••. not as an independent political factor , 
but as a useful "label", which was supposed 
to neutralise the influence of the PPS-WRN 
as well as isolate the right-wing o f the 
Foreign Committee of the PPS (i.e. the 
Socialists in London - J.R.), both in its 
relations with Poland and with the Socialist 
parties in the West. At the same time t h e 
political authority of the PP S and its trad-
itions, known to wide circles o f Po li s h 
society, would make possible the widening 
of the narrow social base of the PKWN ••.• 
For these aims the existence of the PPS was 
necessary, but its organisational growth 
seemed superfluous, especially as it might 
become - as indeed it did in the following 
years - serious competition for the fast 
expanding PPR organisation ' .3 2 
l1atuszewski was amongst those who favoured the early merger 
of the two parties. In an article published on 9 November , 
he wrote: 'If today the PPS is consolidati ng i t s ranks, 
if today it is uniting all those who are scattered a nd 
those who were led astray or were disorientated , tomorrow 
31 Naumiuk PPR •.. op. cit., pp . 202, 217. 
(Rzeszow province) PPS activists formed 
PPR organisatio n set up there in 19 44 . 
by W. Zawadzki to the Party conference 
on 10-11 October, pierwsze kroki ••• p. 
I n Mielec 
the core of the 
See the speech 
he ld in Lublin 
373. 
32 J~ Bardach 0 dziejach powojennej PPS, Kwartalnik 
H~storyczny R. LXXIX ' ~3 1972, pp . 686 - 87 . 
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work will begin on achieving unity of the workers ' move- ' 
ment,.33 Such an attitude on the part of the man who was 
in charge of the organising of the party was one of the 
reasons for the shortcomings evident in this area. As 
Bardach has observed: 'the conditions were not created for 
the growth of the party in the localities, limiting it to 
traditional PPS areas ..• (Because of) the conviction that 
the organisational unification of the workers' movement was 
imminent ••• the growth of the PPS, by activating former 
cadres linked in part during the occupation with the WRN , 
was deemed undesi~able' .34 
Boleslaw Drobner, chairman of the party's Supreme Coun-
cil, emerged as the spokesman for those who wished the 
PPS to playa much more positive role by recruiting 
actively among the party's traditional supporters including 
the rank-and-file of the WRN. This stance was popular wi t h 
the activists, a large proportion of whom were formerl y 
linked with WRN. Dr-obner's statement at the September 
Congress that 'the party offers a fraternal hand to the 
WRN-ites, let them return and join our ranks', was greeted 
with loud applause. 35 Drobner was also ready to praise 
t~e traditions of the prewar PPS and assert the party's 
. 36 lndependence of the PPR. At the September 1944 Congress 
he made the startling claim that the PPS thro ughout its 
history had 'stood steadfastly on the position of Poland's 
independence, in accordance with the theories of Marx and 
33 Barykada WOlnosci 9.11.44 - cited in Syzdek Op e cit., 
p. 379n. 
34 Bardach 0 dziejach .•. Ope cit., p. 687. See also Re iss 
OPe cit., pp. 63, 69-70. The PPR was also concerned 
to put pressure on the leadership of the PPS to take a 
harder line against former WRN elements in the party , 
see Minutes of the Politburo of the PPR Central 
Committee, 3 December 1944, Polonsky and Drukier OP e 
cit., p. 391. 
35 Sierocki Warszawska •.. Ope cit., p. 64. 
36 Letter from Julian Finkielsztajn to Comrade Pukhlov, 
10 October 1944, Polonsky and Drukier op . cit. , pp. 
304-5 . 
the views of Lenin and Stalin,.37 
OSbbka-Morawski, as chairman of the PKWN and of the 
Central Executive of the PPS, was the most influential 
figure in the party. He shared Drobner's ambitions for 
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the PPS, but was more circumspect in expressing them than 
his voluble comrade, who it seems often tried his patience. 
According to Drobner's deputy at the Department of Labour, 
Social Services and Health of the PKWN, Feliks Mantel , 
'it was difficult to endure being with Drobner and mor e 
difficult still to work with him .•• he continually pro-
voked OSbbka, preventing him from dealing with important 
problems. He denigrated the communists and the Soviet 
Union constantly •.• '. 38 Os6bka, again according to Mantel ' s 
. account, 'was not a puppet of the PPR, he did not give 
way to them •••• Without personal ambition, he had never-
theless party ambitions. He was determined not to allow 
the PPR to push him to one side' .39 This is borne out by 
other sources. In November Osobka complained to Bierut 
that he was being treated like an ' accessory ' (do c zepka ) 
and a month later the two clashed again, Osobka exploding 
at Bierut: ' You have bandits and Sanacja men in your 
40 
ranks, so purge yourselves and not our party'. 
OSbbka's advantage in the infighting within the leader-
ship of the PPS and in his dealings with the c ommun i sts 
lay in his access to Stalin and the favour he found in the 
Kremlin. For example, in December after a visit to Mos c ow , 
Bierut informed the Politburo that Stalin's attitude to 
.. 
Osobka-Morawski was favourable and that he had suggested 
that the PPR should rely on the Morawski group.41 However 
37 Sierocki Warszawska ••• Ope cit., p. 62. 
38 F. Hantel Szkice pamiE(tnikarskie Zeszyty Historyczne 7 
(1965), p. 129. 
39 Ibid., p. 118. 
40 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee, 
9 November, 14 December 1944, Polonsky and Drukier OP e 
cit., pp. 364, 395. 
41 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee , 
14 December, 17 Decembe r 1944, ibid., pp . 394, 397-98. 
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Osobka seems to have been reluctant to use this Soviet 
support openly as a weapon against his rivals in the PPS. 
Thus he did not take advantage of Stalin's proposal that 
Drabner might be appointed PKm~ representative in Moscow 
or Kiev which would have effectively removed him from 
influence within the PPS. Os6bka also spoke up in defence 
of Drobner when he was criticised by Bulganin at a meeting 
in the Krernlin. 42 
While the PPS was not in a position to dispute PPR 
hegemony in the way that it did after mid-1945, neither at 
central nor local level did it tamely subordinate itself 
to the communists. For example, Hillebrandt and Jakubowski 
writing about the Praga suburb of Warsaw, state that 'full 
confidence between the Praga PPR branch and the PPS group 
was lacking for a long time ••• Socialist activists fre-
quently organised events - as a rule the same as those of 
the PPR - but separately, on their own initiative. In 
general PPS members showed more energy a nd discipline (in 
their own events) than in those staged jointly with the 
PPR •••• Unhealthy rivalry also occurred. For a long time 
the PPS did not want to admit the PPR to some milieu, 
including working-class communities (e.g. the railway 
workers ) '. The situation in Praga improved only after 
widescale changes in the PPS leadership there in late 
43 November. A report by the Warsaw provincial c ommittee 
of the PPR for the period 15 November 1944 to 1 January 
1945 complained that ' according to the informatio n avail-
able 70 % of the PPS aktyw is waiting for "London" to re-
turn, or as they put it "suitable cadres must be ready for 
when London arrives". Like the SL, they direct their work 
to this end. They are trying to build up their organisa-
tion, fill responsible positions and take as little part 
as possible in joint activities . When we call them out 
42 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Centr a l Committee , 
14 December 1944, ibid., p. 395. 
43 Hillebrandt and Jakubowski OPe cit., pp . 230-31. 
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they send representatives or greetings, but do not take an 
active part in campaigns and show little interest in poli-
tical matters, at any rate on the outside ... ' .44 
There is also evidence of tension between the communist 
and Socialist elites. We have mentioned Os6bka's clashes 
with Bierut and Drobner's continual 'readiness for sharp 
debate'. More than once the PPS simply ignored PPR att-
empts to curb its influence. For example, it went a head 
to form its own youth movement despite pressure from the 
PPR to submit to an all-party youth organisation. 45 In 
November, Os~bka and the PPS arranged a Co-operative 
Congress in secret, with the result that the Socialists 
were able to re-establish their dominant position in the 
leadership of the Co-operative movement. 46 Accordi ng to 
Edward Puacz, an emigre historian who obtained access to 
normally classified documents, there were some thirty meet-
ings between Lublin representatives and Stalin during the 
second half of 1944. Their purpose was either to present 
joint PPR-PPS proposals to Stalin or to ask him to arbi-
trate between the two parties when they were in d isagree-
ment. This suggests that the Socialists were in a positio n 
to exert considerable influence and Puacz even argues that 
it was PPS pressure, culminating in an appeal to Stalin, 
which forced the subject of aid to the Warsaw uprising 
onto the PKWN agenda in mid-September. 47 Os6bka also 
implied in an article published in later years , that Stalin 
44 S rawozdanie Warszawskie 0 Komitetu Wo ' ewodzkie 0 PPR 
z dzia~alno ci w okresie 15. .44 - 1.l.45r, Pierwsze 
kroki. .. op. cit., p. 387. 
45 Gomu~ka Sytuacja obecna i zadania Partii Referat wyg~o­
Szony na naradzie PPR w Lublinie lO.lO.l 944r , Artyku~y •. 
vol. I op. cit~, p. 117. The PPS leadership had revived 
its youth section (OM TUR ) a couple of days before, see 
Reiss op. cit., p. 65. 
46 Minutes of the rolitbureau of the PPR Central Committee , 
9 November 1944 Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., p. 364 . 
47 E. Puacz Powstanie warszawskie w protoko~ach PKWN, 
Zeszyty Historyczne 10 (1966), p. 178. 
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overruled objections from Bierut and others to the immed-
iate return to Warsaw as capital in early 1945, supporting 
the stand of the Socialists, Os6bka and Trojanowski. 48 
Such influence that the Socialists exerted sprang from 
their prominence in the top echelons of the PKWN rather 
than any organisational weight. The boycott operated by 
the underground WRN against the 'false PPS' was generall y 
effective, particularly as far as experienced activists 
were concerned. 49 The hostility of such local Socialist 
leaders, Matuszewski's inactivity in the central secreta-
riat and the absence of a strong PPS tradition in the 
region seriously restricted the growth of the party. At 
the end of 1944 it had perhaps 7,-8,000 members. 50 
When the Soviet advance crossed the Bug, the First 
51 Polish Army numbered just over 100,000 men. Initial 
plans for expansion envisaged, quite unrealistically, that 
the army would be quadrupled to some 430,000 men, organis ed 
as three armies of five divisions apiece . 52 Mobilisation 
began at the end of August and during the next two mo nths, 
66,000 recruits were conscripted, chiefly into the Second 
Army. It has been estimated that this draft fell short of 
the total liable for the first stage of conscription by 
between 20-40%. To fill this gap it was decided to call 
53 
up a further 46,000 men from the next classes. The 
48 E. Osobka-Morawski pamirtniki ministra Polityka (1973), 
nr. 42. 
49 Reiss OPe cit., pp. 51-52; Sierocki .!!arsza\o,G!<:a: ••• OPe 
cit., p. 65. 
50 Ibid., p. 66; Syzdek OPe cit., p. 80 says the membership 
was about 5,000; Reiss Op e cit., pp. 67n, 69 gives a 
figure of 7,663. 
51 W. Jurgielewicz Organizacja LWP (22 vii 44 - 9 v 45) , 
(Warsaw, 1968), p. 381, gives the strength of the First 
Army as 107,810 on 1 August 1944. M. Plikas (ed.) Ma~a 
kronika LWP 1943-73 (Warsaw, 1975), p. 484 , gives a----
figure of 100,777 (20.7.1944). Zbiniewicz Op e cit., p. 
324 says 107,000. 
52 Kersten PKWN .•. Op e ci t ., pp . 96-97. 
53 Ibid., p. 104. 
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role of the London boycott of the mobilisation will be 
considered presently, here we are concerned with the army 
as ar'pol-itical. asset of the Lublin administration . 
Though results fell short of the ambitious targets 
originally set, the creation of an army which by the end of 
the year numbered about 172,000 trained men~4 {plus 
100 000 d · .. )55 d ' , more un ergo~ng tra~n~ng represente a maJor 
success for the PKWN and seriously weakened both the organ-
isation and authority of 'London'. This is not to say that 
the new recruits necessarily switched their allegiance . 
In very many cases the decision to submit to conscriptio n 
indicated only a readiness to fight the Germans, rather 
than an endorsement of the Lublin regime. In a report 
wri tten at the end of June Miec zysJ:aw Mietkowski " the head 
of the political apparatus of the First Army , described the 
political mood amongst recruits. These were conscripts 
from the eastern kresy, the main source of expansion of 
the army during the summer . However, it is unlikely that 
the mood of those called up in Lublin Poland differed 
greatly . 
A number of problems crop up amo ngst the 
new (recruits) in a form significantly shar-
per than among the old soldiers. The Ukrainian 
question •.. the frontier issue ("Lwow is a 
Polish city from long ago ... ") •.• 
It is worse in the formations stationed in 
the Przebraz-Kiwerce region. The local Polish 
population there is almost entirely under the 
influence of London propaganda •••• The London 
government has immense authority amo ngst them. 
They imagine the future Poland basically as 
before. Attitude to the Soviet Union cool, 
with some hostile ••.• At first they looked 
on our army with great suspicion after coming 
into contact with officers who spoke Polish 
poorly or not at all •.. 
••. newly arrived units complete ly lack a ny 
political training apparatus ... the human 
54 Kerste n PKWN ... Op e cit., p. 110. 
55 Przygoriski OP e cit., p. 319 . 
element is totally raw, remaining under 
the influence of London propaganda. Our 
propaganda does not get through to them. 
(Their) attitude to our army is full of 
distrust. Statements are made that it is 
"a Polish mass run by the Jew-Commune" or 
that it i~ "the Red Army in Polish uniforms ". 
Hatred of the Ukrainians is very great, 
generalised to the whole nation. Anti-
Semitic feeling is fairly common ... '56 
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The value of placing this mass under military disci-
pline and political influence was indisputable. However, 
in the short-term the army demanded reliable cadres 
rather than providing them. This was apparent during the 
scare in October and November 1944 when the Party feared it 
might lose control of its troops and the flow of political 
officers into administration and security had to be 
reversed. 
The use of the army for civil purposes was necessarily 
circum~cribed by the uncertainty over its allegiance. This 
was illustrated by the problems which arose in the use o f 
troops to collect contingents from the peasantry. During 
September-October crack soldiers from the Special Storm 
Brigade were used for this purpose, but this unit - the 
forerunner of the Internal Security Corps (K orpus Bezpiec-
zerlstwa Wewn?trznego - KBW) - was only 1053 strong in 
August and had grown to a mere 2195 by November, whe n it 
was switched mainly to operations against the underground .57 
In its place ill-equipped and poorly-trained supply regi-
ments consisting largely of Ukrainian and White Russian 
peasants were employed (presumably Poles were not regarded 
as suitable). These units proved both inefficient and 
insensitive:58 About 600 officers and men were used to 
mo re positive effect during the parce llisation of the 
56 Blum Organizacja ••. op. cit., pp. 234-38. Report dated 
30.6.1944. 
57 M. Turlejska (ed.) Z walk przeciwko zbrojnemu podziemiu 
1944-47 (Warsaw, 1966), p. 77. See also J. Czap l a KBW 
w latach 1947-65, ~'lojskowy Prze9lad Historyczny, 1965, 
nr. 3. 
58 Kersten PKWN •.• op. cit., p. 118. 
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great estates, when they participated in the distribution 
of about one quarter of the total land involved and pro-
vided much needed support for the Party's civilian land 
59 
reform apparatus. Even this limited contribution was 
invaluable in view of Lublin's shortage of manpower, but 
the army was able to alleviate the problem only marginally. 
The security forces: the Citizens' Militia (Milicja 
Obywatelska - MO) and Security Office (Urztd Bezpiecze~stwa 
- UB) were throughout 1944 still in the process of f o rma-
tion and like the army their political dependability was 
often suspect. In the first months the security apparatus 
was given priority over the army in the allocation of 
ex-AL partisans and specially-trained army officers. How-
ever, the speed of its expansion inevitably involved 
relaxing recruitment standards. The UB had 2,500 officers 
by December 1944 60 and the MO had about 13,000 by early 
October. 61 The poor quality, lack of equipment and train-
ing, and low morale of these forces was discussed repeat-
edly in the Politburo and PKWN. In October the communists 
decided on a drastic purge of the Militia, transferring 
50% of its members into the army and filling the gap with 
soldiers. 62 Nevertheless two months later Jozwiak, who 
had been appointed to command the HO , reported that 'the 
MO numbers about 14,000. The purge has shown that 7,000 
needed to be dismissed'. He added that the 50 % transfer 
63 had not yet taken place. But even these measures were 
59 H. S~abek Dzieje polskiej reformy rolnej 1944-48 (Warsaw 
1972), p. 80. 
60 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee , 
17 December 1944, polonsky and Drukier op . cit., p. 398 . 
61 Minutes of the PKWN (extracts) , 4 October 1944, Polonsky 
and Drukier op. cit., p. 295. 
62 Minutes of the PPR Central Committee (extracts), 9 
October 1944, Polonsky and Drukier op . cit., p . 302. 
63 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee , 
17 December 1944, Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., p. 
398. Other sources give a figure of 12,934 for the 
strength of the MO in December 1944, J. Czapla (ed.) 
W walce 0 utrwalenie w~adzy ludowej w Polsce 1944-47 
(Warsaw, 1967), p. 221 . 
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unavailing and in May 1945 the MO and UB were once more 
subject to heavy criticism and further large-scale purges 
continued into 1945-46. 
To sum up, by October 1944, the Party east of the 
Vistula numbered perhaps 10,000 members. Its allies t h e 
'Lublin' Socialists and Peasants, according to official 
figures, had together about 10,000 members. However, as 
Gomu~ka admitted neither were very active, while ' the 
Democratic Party in general is no n worth considering'. He 
64 
added, 'our party is the real force!. Apart from one or 
two thousand special troops, the army could not be trusted 
with assignments of a political nature. Work on organi s-
ing the Militia and UB, had only just begun. In many 
areas, the manpower of the security forces overlapped to a 
65 considerable extent with the membership of the Party. 
Nevertheless, these forces were regarded as being in need 
of a drastic purge. 'Lublin' could not ·. rest its rule on 
these narrow resources. The failure of its efforts to 
broaden the national front into the London camp, would 
leave no choice but to fall back on the Soviet factor and 
use more deliberately and extensively some of the 2.5 
million Fed Army troops massed on Polish terri tory . 66 
The Party and the Underground 
The Party's line towards the AK in the s ummer and 
early autumn of 1944 was shaped by its broader commitment 
64 Minutes of the PPR Central Committee (extrac ts ), 9 
October 1944, Polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., p. 300. 
65 W. Zawadzki told the 10-11 October 1944 PPR conference 
that in the urban· areas of Rzeszow province the bulk of 
Party members were in the Militia. In Jaros~aw district 
for instance, of 100 PPR members, 45 were in the Militia 
and 20 in the UB, pierwsze kroki .•. OPe cit., p. 373 . 
66 M. Turlejska (ed.) W walce ze zbroj nym podziemiem 1945-
!2 (Warsaw, 1972), p. 12. According to one estimate an 
average of almost 35,000 Re d Army or Polish Army troops 
were deployed in Lublin Poland for each 1000 sq . km. of 
te rritory, Olszewski poczttki ... OP e cit., p. 103. 
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to the achievement of a national front. A discriminating 
policy was to be adopted towards the underground. As 
Radkiewicz, in charge of Public Security, later put it, 
'we tried to differentiate between elements in the AK -
fighting above all the NSZ, the most fascist, then the 
Pi~sudski-ite, Sanacja core of the AK, while towards the 
Peasant Battalions we (were very moderate'. 67 By stressing '! 
the need for national unity and the defeat of Germany, the 
communists hoped to detach a large part of the rank-and -
file of the AK, which would be used as the basis for a big 
expansion of the Polish Army under Soviet command, l eavi ng 
the 'reactionary' sections of the AK officer corps and the 
right of the London camp isolated. 
The total strength of the AK in the territory of Lublin 
Poland in mid-1944 is impossible to estimate with any pre-
cision. The strength of AK units regularly based in the 
region a few months before was claimed to be between 100 
68 to 150,000 troops. However, the movement of units from 
the eastern kresy as the Red Army advanced, recruitment 
into the Polish Army and Soviet round-ups had greatly com-
plicated the position by July 1944. 
As we have seen, during 1944 the underground state 
increasingly turned its attention to the problem of power 
in postwar Poland. As the likelihood grew that the Soviet 
army rather than the Nestern Allies would liberate Poland 
the question of how 'London' should respond to the advance 
onto Polish soil of the troops of a power with which it 
67 Minutes of the PK~m (extracts), 4 October 1944, Polonsky 
and Drukier op. cit., p. 294. 
68 The strength of the AK (including affiliated formations 
such as the Peasant Battalions) was probably about 40,000 
- 60,000 in Lublin okr~g; about 18,000 - 30,000 in 
BiaLystok okr~g; about 19,000 - 24,000 in Rzesz6w pro-
Vince; about 5,000 in the Sandomierz-Opat6w bridgehe ad ; 
and perhaps 20,000 in the liberated parts of Warsaw pro-
Vince, see Polskie Si~y Zbrojne ••. op. cit., Vol. III, 
p. 123; I. Caban and Z. Mafikowski ZNZ i AK w okr~gu 
Lubelskim 1939-1944 vol. I (Lublin, 1971), p. 81; H. 
Ma~ecki Bia~ostocczyzna w pierwszych 1atach wradzy 1udo -
we] 1944-48 (2nd ed., Warsaw, 1977), p. 12; Ols zewsk i 
P~cz~tRi .•. op. cit., p. 103; P. Matusek Ruch oporu na 
z~em~e opatowsko-sandomierskiej 1939-45 (Warsaw, 1976), 
p. 230. 
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now had no diplomatic relations became extremely urge nt. 
The right-wing nationalists of the NSZ argued.that the 
underground should prepare to continue its war with the 
occupant, whether Nazi or Soviet, by destroying pro-Soviet 
and communist forces operating in conspiracy. However, 
this strategy was not one which the Government-in-Exile 
and the AK could adopt if it was to maintain any standing 
with the British and Americans or keep open the possibili ty 
of an accommodation with the Soviet government. 
The tactics of the AK and the civilian organs of the 
underground towards the advancing Soviet armies as set out 
definitively in General Bor-Komorowski's ormer of 20 
November 1943 were therefore to mobilise and offer assis-
tance to the Red Army, in this way presenting the Soviets 
with the dilemma of either' de facto recognising 'London ' 
as an ally, or repressing 'friendly' AK units, thereby 
risking friction with the Western Powers. The basic objec-
tive of operation 'Tempest', as the plan was code-named, 
was encapsulated in the following passage of Bor's order: 
' ••• I have ordered commanders and units, which will par-
ticipate in fighting the retreating Germans, to reveal 
their presence to the Russians. Their task ... will be to 
manifest through their action the existence of the 
Republic' .69 These tactics were not intended to assist the 
Russians, whose aim, Bor wrote, 'is the destruction of the 
independence of Poland, or at least its political subordi-
nation to the Soviets', 70 but as a means to bolster the 
Polish cause amongst the Western Allies. As he put it, 'by 
giving the Soviets minimal military help we are creating 
political difficulties for them,.71 
'Tempest began in January 1944 when the Red Army 
crossed the prewar frontier, but reached its peak during 
the huge Soviet offensive which began in late June a nd 
69 Po1skie Si~y Zbrojne ••• op. cit., p. 556. 
70 Armia Krajowa w Documentach 1939-1945 nr. 709 Bor to 
Sosnkowski, 22 July 1944, vol. IV (Lo ndo n, 1977). 
71 J. Ciechanowski The Warsaw Rising of 1944 (Cambridge, 
1974) . 
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swept rapidly across the eastern kresy and during the 
second half of July into the territory to the· west of the 
Curzon line which Hoscow recognised as Polish. AK units 
were mobilised in German-occupied areas with instructions 
to capture towns shortly before they fell to the Russians 
and establish Polish administrations there; they were then 
to welcome the advancing Red Army as hosts and reveal their 
forces to the local Soviet command . The tragic culmination 
of this plan was the Warsaw uprising, launched on 1 August 
in the expectation of the imminent Soviet entry into the 
capital. 
In fact the commitment to revaling AK detachments to 
the Russians, though extensive, was not total. Bor, in the 
report he sent to Sosnkowski, the Supreme Commander in 
London, enclosing his order of 20 November , had added that 
'in case of a second Russian occupation, I am preparing in 
the utmost secrecy the skeleton command network of a new 
clandestine organisation ••• it will be a separate network 
unconnected with the AK organisation , which has to a large 
d b 1 · S· . I 72 egree een uncovered to e ements ln OVlet serVlce . 
The new clandestine organisation received the cryptonym 
'Nie', and according to Party historians was responsible 
for a number of the attacks on supporters of the Lublin 
Committee which occurred the following autumn . 7 3 Not only 
' Nie ' remained underground; large sections of the AK were 
critical of the policy of leaving the conspiracy and repor-
ting to the Russians. This was especially true of units 
linked with the National Party, on the anti-Soviet right 
of the 'London' spectrum, belonging either to the National 
Military Organisation (Narodowa Organizacja Wojskowa - NOW) 
Or that part of the NSZ which had been merged into the AK. 
These formations retained a good deal of auto nomy inside 
72 
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Polskie Si~y Zbrojne ••• op. cit., p. 556 . 
T. Walichnowski U zr6de~ walk z podziemiem reakcyjnym 
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the AK and widely opted out of 'Tempest,.74 Finally, the 
extreme-right, National Radical wing of the NSZ, which 
had remained outside the AK, was, as we have seen, pursu-
ing its own private war with the communists. 
Under the 'Tempest' plan, the Polish underground forces 
were to offer co-operation with the Red Army, but insist 
on retaining their identity as an integral part of the 
Polish Armed Forces loyal to the London government. The 
AK and its civilian network were, moreover, to negotiate 
solely with the Russian military authorities and hold aloof 
from any direct dealings with Lublin representatives . It 
was on these points that 'Tempest' came into collision with 
the national front strategy of the communists. 
Already in the eastern kresy 'Tempest' had set into a 
pattern of failure. 75 The Russians, unwilling to accept 
the political conditions implicitly tied to the co-ope r a tio n 
proferred by the AK, had presented the Pole s with the 
ultimatum of either joining General Berling's large ly 
Soviet-officered Polish Army or disarming and dissolving 
their units. The advance across the Bug into territory 
recognised by Moscow as Polish and the priority g i ve n to 
broadening the base of the PKWN, which now for the first 
time became directly involved in the confrontation, ne ver-
theless made what happened in the Lublin r egion something of 
a test-case. 
Lublin city itself was capture d from the Germans in 
fighting between 23 and 25 July. Once shooting had died 
down, the AK and the Government Delegate for the city, 
Wladyslaw Cho~ww began, in accordance with 'Tempest', to 
take over the local administration. Proclamations were 
pasted up, the town hall occupied, State Se curity Corps 
(the underground's police force) patrols stationed in 
74 
75 
See I. Caban and E. Machocki Za wtadz~ ludu (Lublin, 
1975) ~ pp. 53~55 f or the posi tion in Lublin province ; 
Tur1ejska' W walce~ .• OPe cit., pp. 220 - 21 for the situ-
a tion in Rzes~6w province. ' 
Ciechanowskl OPe cit., pp~ 190-211. 
the streets and recruitment offices for the 'Lublin 
Battalion' of the AK opened. On 25 July the first PKWN 
representatives arrived, led by Edward Ochab, and the 
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next day General Berling and Aleksander Zawadzki arrived 
at the head of regular Polish units. On the same day 
attempts were made, by Radkiewicz it seems, to op e n talks 
between the PKWN and the 'Londoners', who in line with 
'Tempest', refused to enter negotiations with anyone ex c ept 
the Soviet military authorities. On 27 July a meeting took 
place between General Kolpaczka, commander of the Soviet 
sixth army, Cholewa and Colonel Tumidajski, the area AK 
commander. Kolpaczka issued the usual ultimatum: the AK 
forces had either to join the Polish Army fighting with 
the Red Army, or lay down their arms. The 'London' repre-
sentatives followed their instructions and chose the latter 
alternative, adamantly refusing to recognise the PKWN. 
It is worth noting that this meeting lasted until 29 
July, whereupon Cholewa and Tumidajski were allowed to 
leave, though under surveillance. Appare ntly Radkiewic z 
and the Russians had not yet excluded the possibility that 
the underground leaders might revise their position. If 
this was the case, there hopes were entertained for o nly 
four or five days as the process of disarming AK units in 
the region got underway. On the one hand the 'Londoners' 
were alarmed by reports of arrests and deportations of 
AK officers and the internment of units, while on the 
other, PKWN security officials became convinced that the AK 
was handing over only a prmportion of its arms and disban-
ding only a part of its network. In both cases these fears 
were probably well-founded. 
The 'Nie' organisation has been mentioned, and in 
February instructions were issued which spoke of a 'seco nd 
subsidiary network of civil and military leaders ... which 
will remain underground, trying to establish contact with 
the Polish authorities and informing them of the fate of 
revealed representatives .•• ' .76 There were bes i des 
76 Ciechanowski OPe cit., p. 188. 
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numerous AK units , particu larly those linked with the 
nationalist front , which disagreed with the ' Tempest ' stra-
tegy and did not come into the open . On the other side, 
t he commun ists were not averse to using limited f orce in 
order t o l oosen what they saw as the hold of reactionary 
officers over the democrati c mass of the AK. In practice 
this task was frequently left to NKVD detachme nts charged 
with providing security behind the front. These uni ts 
were hardly suited to drawing the fine distinctions such a 
policy assumed and from the start bloody clashes occurred 
between AK forces and those of the NKVD attempting to dis -
arm them . 7 7 
The mu t ual suspicisions were greatly intensified by 
the outbreak of the uprising i n Warsaw on 1 August , which 
was interpreted in Lublin as a dire threat to its position , 
demanding a new aggressive stance to replace the flexibi-
lity and optimism of the first week of power . On 3 August 
Radkiewicz put the Security Department ' s view of priorities 
to the PKWN : ' l/Mobilisation irito the army of the broad 
mass of the AK . 2/The arrest of the AK commanders. Our 
tactics - offensive • •. the AK is attempting to seize 
W . . d d . . . , 78 h arsaw , to lnstall lts army an a mlnlstratlon. T e 
repercussions of this tougher line were fe lt in Lublin 
immediately. On 2 August Radkiewicz h ad told t he PKWN 
that ' the AK command in Lublin formall y agreed to l ay down 
its arms , but did this only partially . ... vIe must commence 
determined activity , with the probable u se of repression. 
The AK has begun illegal work • •. ,. 79 The next day 
Tumidajski and Cholewa were brought in for further talks 
with the Russians with P K~m spokesmen in attendance. Th e 
' Londoners ' attempted to clarify the uncertainty over the 
treatment of their men , refusing once more demands that 
77 Turlejska W walce ... OP e cit . , pp . 12-13 . 
78 Minutes of the PKWN (extracts) 3 AU9:us t 1944 , Polonsky 
and Drukier Ope cit . , p . 256 . 
79 Ninutes of the PKWN (extracts ) , 2 AU9:ust 1944 , ibid . . 
82 
they subordinate their troops to the PKWN until such time 
as an agreement was reached between the Committee and 
Mikb~ajczyk, then in Moscow. The two men were thereupon 
arrested and despatched into imprisonment somewhere in the 
S . t . 80 OVle Unl0n. 
The episode was duplicated in many other places: 
Zamosc, Przemysl, Rzeszow, Bia~ystok and dozens of other 
towns and villages, In general, the confrontation lasted 
a few days before the Soviets intervened decisively and 
cleared out the AK authorities. The course of events in 
Lublin demonstrated the inevitability of conflict between 
the two sides as they carried out their instructions, for 
although both strategies aimed at avoiding an open clash, 
they were more concerned with extracting de facto recogni-
tion from the other of their claim to rule Poland. The 
outcome of the manoeuvring in July and August 1944 was 
hardly satisfactory for either side: the PPR captured t h e 
administrative machine, but thanks to Soviet military 
power, not the support of a broad national front ; ' London' 
demonstrated its military and administrative presence, but 
also its total , powerlessness in the face of Soviet backing 
for the PKWN. 
Despite these setbacks to their respective strategies, 
neither side openly abandoned its tactics. 'Tempest' con-
tinued until October, fizzling out as the Soviet-German 
front stabilised. Amongst the communists, the initial jolt 
of the Warsaw uprising gave way witnin a few day s to a 
calmer appraisal of the situation. The arrival in Lublin 
of Gomuika and other leaders of the underground Party was 
followed by reassertions of the broad national front line. 
In his first ?peech to the Party aktyw on 5 August, Gomutka 
warned 'do not alienate other groupings •.. invite (them) 
to co-operate ..• by pursuing such a policy we depr ive the 
conservative element of its weapons, we can isolate the 
80 This account is based on Caban and Machocki o p. cit., 
pp. 36-39; Polskie Si~y Zbrojne ••. op. cit., p. 626; 
Kersten PKWN •.• op. cit., pp. 30-31, 47; S. Korbonski 
Polskie ••• op • . cit., p. 165. 
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reaction from the masses still under its influence' .81 
Over the following weeks the leadership persevered with 
this line, sustained by the Russians' apparent pceference 
for a deal between Lublin and Mikorajczyk's following as 
well as .the distinct possibility of the Red Army relieving 
the 'London' insurgents fighting in Warsaw. But on the 
ground, the strategies of both sides soon began to modify 
in the face of realities. 
Having witnessed what had happened in Lublin and else-
where, AK officers on the ground were most unhappy about 
carrying on with the policy of revealing their forces to 
the Russians. At least one commander wired Warsaw to con-
firm whether this order remained in force, adding that 
'there is strong opposition amongst my officers and men' . 82 
Bia~ystok AK, under the command of Colonel Liniarski, dis-
obeyed the order en masse. 83 By September, Bor himself 
had apparently dropped this aspect of 'Tempest' and began 
ordering AK concentrations to disperse and partisan units 
to dissolve. On 26 September he transmitted this message 
to Rzeszow command: 'Do not organise any conspiratorial AK 
units. Dissolve partisan detachments under Soviet 
occupation ' (my emphasis - J.R.). Disperse the troops ... ,.84 
Although Bor was by this time referring to the Soviet 
presence as an occupation, there is no satisfactory evi-
dence that the ' Nie ' network was activated . Its command 
was pinned down in Warsaw and communications with the out-
side were severely disrupted . Bor, who was gambling on 
the Red Army relieving the insurrection in the capital, 
repeatedly and categorically forbade provincial commands 
81 Protok6k zebrania delegat6w PPR z Lubelszczyzny 
5.8.1944, Pierwsze kroki •.. OPe cit., p. 357. 
82 nr. 1050 Cdr. Zoliborz to Cdr. Warsaw okr~g, 12 . 9.1944, 
AK w Dokumentach ••• vol. IV Op e cit .. 
83 H. Majecki Bia!ostocczyzna w pierwszych latach w~adzy 
ludowej 1944-48 (2nd ed ., Warsaw, 1977), p. 44 . 
84 nr •. 1163 Bor to podokr!g Rzesz6w, 26.9.1944, AK w 
DOkumentach •.. vol. IV OPe cit .• 
84 
to fight the Russians. 85 Clashes occurred all the same; 
orders to avoid conscription were misinterpreted by some 
units, which resisted with force or occas~onally assassi-
nated recruitment officers. 86 Shoot-outs also took place 
between NKVD detachments and AK units in the process of 
d · 1 ... . 87 . ~spersa or remaln~ng ~n consplracy. In some lnstances, 
AK officers disobeyed Bor's orders to dissolve and stayed 
underground to defend the population against marauding 
88 Soviet troops. By the end of the year the Russians we re 
claiming that some 300 Red Army officers had been killed. 89 
Such bloodshed, by no means all the work of the AK ' was 
minimal in comparison with the level it was _to reach in 
early 1945. But together with the growing feeling amongst 
party activists that they were being overwhelmed by the 
sheer inertia of the administrative machine, as well as 
fears for the allegiance of the armed forces , this vio lence 
reinforced the arguments of the hardliners in the PPR who 
were demanding a more radical solution to the problem of 
the underground. 
The October Turn 
The Party's moderation towards the Horne Army and the 
'democratic' wing of the London camp was maintained until 
early October. Its line was then abruptly transfo rmed. 
By November a concerted effort to crush the AK - was under-
way , an aggressive land parcellisation campaign spearheaded 
a general radicalisation of policy, while any deal with 
London had been indefinitely postponed. Although lip-
service was still paid to the construction of the natio nal 
85 nr. 985 Bor to Nowogr6dek okr~g , 2.9.1944, ibid . 
86 nr. 1052 Mikolajczyk to Bor, 13 . 9.1944r , ibid . 
87 Turlejska W walce ••. OP e cit., p . 13. 
88 nrs. 1065, 1089, 14, 16.9.1944, AK w Dokumentach ••. 
vol . IV Op e cit. 
89 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee , 
17 December 1944, Polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., p. 39 7 . 
85 
front, in practice from October 1944 to May 1945 this 
strategy was submerged. Instead, the Party pursued a 
narrowlY-based, radical course which relied heavily on the 
repression applied by its own meagre security forces, 
greatly reinforced by Soviet units and advisers . 
The 'October turn' was sudden and drastic. As late as 
26 September the Party leadership had affirmed that its 
objective was 'not only the maintenance, but also the 
broadening of the national front ••• (and) unification of 
the nation, conceived as the active solidarity of all the 
main strata of the nation, of all the democratic parties,.90 
To the distaste of Party militants, repressive measures 
were kept to a minimum. Edwarda Or~owska, secretary for 
Bia~ystok province, complained of local activists coming 
' ••• to us from the districts and say "What sort of power 
is this?" Volksdeutsche and traitors walk about the town. 
Endeks (National Democrans - J.R.) openly make trouble and 
nothing happens to them .••• Why so far has there been no 
death sentence? Ruthless repression should be applied 
against the leading "(AK) commanders,.91 From what other 
speakers at the same meeting said, it is clear that gene= 
92 
rally the Party aktyw was not even armed at this stage. 
The level of arrests was restrained too . At the end 
of September Radkiewicz reported that only 3,000 (includ~ 
ing 1,500 Home Army ) people had been detained, most of 
whom had been pressed into the army. He admitted though 
that 'so far as arrests by the Soviet authorities are con-
cerned, we do not have full data or information' .93 In 
the army itself the stress was on integrating not only AK 
90 Rezolucja KC PPR a sytuacji politycznej i zadaniach ' 
partii 26.9.44, PPR ••• viii 1944 - xii 1945 OP e cit., 
pp. 30-37. 
91 Protokb~ konferencji sekretarzy komiteto w powiatowych i 
aktywu PPR teren6w wyzwolonych 10-11.10.44, pierwsze 
kroki ••• OPe cit., p. 364. 
92 Ibid., p. 373. 
93 Minutes of the PKWN (extracts) 4 October 1944 Polonsky 
and Drukier Op e cit., p. 294. 
86 
troops, but officers too . An instruction to politruks 
of the 1st Army dated 25 September ordered them to engen-
der 'an atmosphere of friendly concern and fraternity' 
around AK officers, 'strongly emphasising the factor of 
national unity'. While noting the danger of hostile infil-
tration, it warned against the use of 'police surveillance 
methods,.94 
Land reform, which the communists saw as the key to 
capturing the allegiance of the peasants , was handled 
with the same restraint and was entrusted throughout the 
summer and early autumn to Andrzej Witos, head of the 
PKWN Department of Agriculture. Witos was a member of the 
Peasant Party, not noted for his radicalism. He planned 
gradUal land reform 'in the majesty of the law' and was 
sceptical whether this would be administratively possible 
before the end 'of the war. Nonetheless, the communists 
gave him a free hand and as late as 26 September stressed 
in a Central Committee circular that estate workers com-
mittes (organised and often manned by the Party) should 
co-operate with Witos' Land Offices. 95 
During the following week the Party shifted its stance 
fundamentally. On 28 September amended instructions were 
issued to activists in the countryside claiming that 'even 
amongst some district officials of Land Offices and estate 
administrators, just those to whom the state has entrusted 
the implementation of land reform, there is a desire to 
delay and deflect it ••• '. Estate committees were now 
advised to keep a close eye on Witos' administrators and 
special Land Reform Commissions were to be created in 
order, amongst other things, ~to nip in the bud every att-
empt to obstruct the reform by lackies of the reactionary 
94 I. Blum Sprawa 31pp, Wojskowy przegl?d Historyczny 
1965 nr. 3, p. 45. 
95 Ok6lnik KC PPR 0 zadaniach komitet6w folwarcznych w 
realizowaniu reformy rolnej 26 . 9.44 , PPR ... viii 1944 -
xii 1945 op. cit., pp. 39-41 . 
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landowners,.96 This was a portent. On 4 -0ctober ~i~cZ 
addressing the PKWN on security matters, digressed to 
announce the Party's altered strategic perspective. 
Claiming that 'a new situation, a new distribution of for-
ces has arisen', he argued that there was now 'a distinct 
dividing line (between) the two centres: the PKWN and 
London, without any dividing line between Miko~ajczyk and 
Sosnkowski' (leader of the London diehards). The attempt 
to differentiate between the various elements in the Home 
Army had not, he said, 'been confirmed by reality' and the 
divide between 'the PKWN annd on the other side all the 
Opponents of the PK\~', demanded that 'hitherto hapha zard 
repression' give way to 'a period of planned, intensive 
work,.97 A few days later, the land reform campaign was 
set in motion; Witos was dismissed and . Ian improvised appa-
ratus, led by special commissars with sweeping powers, 
forged ahead with the parcellisation of the estates . 
Party militants' were · ~llowed off the leash against the 
underground also. On 9 October Gomulka declared that ' the 
state must reply to the terror; the time has come to 
begin the counter-attack' .98 A Decree for the Defence of 
the State was issued at the end of the month, introducing 
draconian penalties for 'subversion'. By mid-November a 
local commissar could report that 'peoples courts h ave 
been set up; 30 AK have been shot, 500 arrested!.99 In 
the army the volte-face was particularly dramatic. The 
'open-doors' recruitment policy of the s umme r was aban-
doned"Gomutka stating bluntly that 'the AK o n which not 
so long ago we were determined to construct the Polish 
Army, have in the overwhelming majori ty of cases t u rned o ut 
96 Instrukcja KC PPR 0 zadaniach organizacJl partyjnych w 
przeprowadzeniu prac pr zygotowawczych dla podzia~u ziem i 
obszarniczej 28.9.1944, ibid., pp. 42-45. 
97 Minutes of the PK~~J (extracts) 4 October 1944 Polonsky 
and Drukier op. cit., p. 295. 
98 Minutes of the PPR Central Committee (extracts ) 
9.10.44, ibid ., p. 300. 
99~PR National Conference (S e l e cted Minutes ) 1 2-13 November 
~, ibid., p. 371. 
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to be hostile elements,.lOO In November politruks 
received instructions contrasting sharply with those i ssued 
a few weeks before. 'Friendly concern and fraternity' to-
wards the AK were now grounds for suspicion: 'Every poli.;.. i. 
tical worker', the order demanded, 'must understand that 
tOday there is no room for any compromise with the AK in 
the army ••• treat advocates of a "neutral" or conciliatory 
attitude to the AK as AK members unless they immediately 
engage in active struggle with the AK~.lOI 
The Party's change of direction in October 1944 meant 
that in Poland the foundations of communist power were laid 
in conditions of virtual civil war and overt reliance on 
Soviet force of arms. This outcome was at odds with the 
strategy pursued by the communists (both inside Poland and 
in Soviet emigration) during the war, or indeed later in 
1945-48 in Eastern Europe generally. What prompted this 
apparent aberration? 
With the abandonment on 22 September of attempts by the 
Russians and Berling's troops to establish a bridgehead on 
the west bank of the Vistula, it became apparent that t he 
Red Army would not be used to relieve the uprising in 
~~arsaw.102 Until then, this possibility had governed the 
political situation. As we have seen, Horne Army comma nd 
restrained its fovces outside the capital in order not to 
antagonise the Soviets, while Lublin was half-prepared for 
early entry into a coalition with part at least of the 
London camp and the incorporation into its army of thous-
ands of armed, battle-hardened insurrectionaries. With 
the stabilisation of the Soviet front on the far bank of 
the Vistula and the collapse of the last pockets of resis-
tance on the other side a few days later, the political 
100 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee 
29 October 1944, ibid., p. 359. 
101 Blum S ra 't p 45 p wa... op. cl. ., • • 
102 Z.S. Siemaszko Sprawa Berlinga Zeszyty Historyczne 38 
(1976), pp. 224 - 29 • 
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situation was transformed. Whereas during the summer the 
PKWN had been able to some extent to capitalise on the 
patriotic elation which greeted the German retreat, the 
Soviet failure to save the uprising aroused a wave of pop-
ular hostility and bitterness towards the new authorities 
which undermined their appeal to national unity. Moreover, 
it would be several months before the advance could resume, 
until which time the PKWN would have to maintain its grip 
on power and establish a political base by means other 
than patriotic slogans and calls to battle against the 
Germans. 
The implications of the Warsaw fiasco were sensed 
immediately in Lublin and doubtless discussed by the PKWN 
103 
at a secret session held on 23 September. But the 
Party seems to have been perplexed by Soviet policy and 
uncertain how to tailor its own course to the new circum-
stances. The leadership's resolution of 26 September 
was perhaps intended to head-off questioning of the Party ' s 
general line until Soviet intentions were known, but the 
questioning continued anyway. The nex t day, for instance, 
Rola-Zymierski showed the way the wind was blowing in a 
speech to the PKWN: 
' ••• the operation which the AK is undertaking 
in the terrain is becoming increasingly strong 
and determined. I have instructed that all 
materials be examined and am determined to take 
a clear position on this matter. So far we 
have sought a conciliatory way of dealing with 
the problem. As a result of the hostile acti-
vity of the AK and other organisations we were 
unable to achieve this. The state of affairs 
which has arisen in this country cannot be 
tolerated. The Polish population is living 
under terror and we do nothing about it. I 
feel we can no longer be passive observers. I 
Radkiewicz who spoke next supported this call for a more 
104 
aggressive approach. The next day, as we have mentiOned, 
103 Polonsky and Drukier opr cit., p. 292. 
104 Protokol z posied zenia PKvrn z d nia 27 wrzesnia 1944 w 
LUb1inie, Puacz op. cit., p. 192. 
the Central Committee issues its amended and toughened 
instruction on land reform. 
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These moves preceded formal consultations to clarify 
Stalin's attitude. On 28 September a PKWN delegation flew 
to Moscow, staying until 3 October. The visit, as its 
leader, Bierut, reported on his return, 'was the result of 
our doubts over the general situation arising from the 
checking of activity on the Polish front and the failure 
f th r. • I lOSs l' .. . h' k t o e darsaw operat~on_· . ta ~n, ~n ~s remar s 0 
the full delegation, attributed the halting of the Soviet 
advance sOlely to military logistics and denied any poli-
tical motives. 106 However, in conversations with its 
communist members, he bluntly expressed his dissatisfaction 
with their political performance, particularly over land 
reform, and signalled a change of course. According to 
Bierut's subsequent report to the Politburo, 'Stalin can-
not see revolutionary method in our approach .••. He 
sharply criticised our softness, that up to now not one 
landowner has been imprisoned •••• As he put it "get bet-
ter or get out",.107 
Hitherto, Soviet pressure had consistently tended to 
restrain the radicalism of the Polish communists and 
stress the overriding importance of avoiding contention 
with the West over Poland. Now suddenly Stalin was . repri-
manding the Poles for their cautiousness. However, while 
it is clear that Stalin's intervenion was a critical factor 
prompting the 'October turn', it would also seem that a 
significant ahd growing section of the Polish Party had 
reached the same conclusion before the delegation's depar-
ture. Stalin's injunctions obviously demanded an urgent 
display of aggression from the PPR leadership, which 
105 S rawozd anie BolesIawa Bieruta na osiedzeniu KC PPR 
9 pa dziernika 1944r z rozm w z J zefem Stalinem, 
Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego vol. lop. cit., p. 351. 
106 Ibid., p. 352. 
107 Minutes of the PPR Central Committee (extracts), 9 
October 1944 Polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., p. 300. 
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complied without delay, but for much of the aktyw and at 
least part of the upper echelons of the Party, Stalin was 
at last allowing them to go in the direction they favoured 
and which they believed the political situation demanded. 
Many of the Party activists, especially those charged 
with establishirig the authority of the PKWN outside Lublin, 
had for some time been calling for a more aggressive line. 
These cadres were keenly aware of just how narrow was the 
support for the Lublin regime and felt increasingly exposed 
and powerless as the underground dispersed back into con-
spiracy. Sporadic assassinations, passive resistance and 
the continued domination by London sympathisers of large 
parts of the Militia, local government and even the secu-
rity apparatus set up by the communists, aroused the fears 
and suspicions of such beleaguered cadres. These doubts 
were heightened by a growing feeling of immobilisme and 
108 
wasted opportunity, especially over land reform, as well 
as the ambiguous and unreliable attitude of the communists' 
SUpposed allies amongst the Peasants and Soc~alists. The 
outlook of these militants was shaped both by their aware-
ness that time was short in which to install an adequate 
state machine before the Red Army continued its advance 
and by deeply-rooted ideological traits. Veterans of the 
KPP who constituted the backbone of the aktyw of the PPR 
in many cases found the new national front strategy alto-
gether too liberal and gradualist. Internal Party reports 
frequently made reference to the distaste of older commu-
nists £or the tactics they · were expected to apply. Ex-KPP 
cadres who had joined the PPR after liberation , had 
according to one report from Praga, 'a whole range of sec-
tarian prejudices from the period of KPP work and it is 
108 At the PPR conference held in Lublin on 10/11 October 
the PPR district secretary for Bia~a Podlaska expressed 
the incomprehension of the aktyw over the delay in the 
land reform: 'Since the Red Army and the Party are in 
such a strong position , why wasn't reform carried out 
at once? After all , that was our great mistake in 
1920'. Protok6~ konferencji sekretarzy komitet6w 
powiatowych i aktywu PPR z teren6w wyzwolonych, 
10/11.10.1944, Pierwsze kroki ••• op. cit., p. 369. 
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difficult for them to adapt themselves to our Party's 
S t f k · h .. ,109 ys em 0 wor ln t e current sltuatl0n • At Party 
meetings, hardliners found a receptive audience for their 
crit~cisms of the mildness of ~he official line. One of 
them, Witold Konopka, drew applause at a conference o f the 
aktyw held on 10-11 October when he demanded that 'along-
side campaigning aga~nst the AK, we must of course shoot 
at them and gaol them. By not shooting we are encouraging 
the ,. d ,110 th KPP tIt d enemy s lmpu ence . Ano er s a war an pro -
minent figure in the PPR leadership, Leon Kasman, encapsu-
lated the mood of the militants: 'Our Party has succumbed 
to the parliamentary disease. With power in our hands, 
we have not applied terror towards the reaction .... We 
showed our enemies softness - not a single head has 
fallen ..• ' • III 
Some modern Warsaw historians have argued that this 
sectarian strain ih the Party extended into the top leader-
ship where it was represented above all by Jakub Berman, 
Hilary Mine, Roman Zambrowski and Stanis~aw Radkiewicz, 
all of whom had spent the war years in Moscow and were 
judged to be particularly subservient to the Soviets. The 
national front strategy, on the other hand, so it is 
claimed, was identified with the section of the Party which 
had fought underground in Poland during the war and amongst 
whom Gomu!ka was the leading figure. The 'October turn' 
is presented as a victory for the hardline 'Muscovite' 
fact ' . , f h . 1 f 112 10n over the 'natlve supporters 0 t e natlona ront. 
In fact, the differences within the Party leadership 
109 Hillebrandt and Jakubowski Ope cit., pp. 216-17. 
110 
111 
112 
Protokol" konferencj i sekretarzy komi tetow p owiato.wy ch: 
aktywu PPR z terenow wyzwolonych, 10-11.10.1944, Pie r-
wszekroki. •• Ope cit., p. 377. In a letter to the e d i-
tors of Archiwum ruchu robotniczego (vol. II, p. 370), 
Konopka denied that he had called for an intensification 
of repression against the AK. 
Minutes of the PPR Central Committee (extracts), 9 
October 1944, Polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., p. 301. 
J. Borkowski Nie tylko pod Lenino Miesi t cznlk literacki 1972, nr. 4, 'pp. 87-91. 
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over strategy tended to cut across the wartime divide. 
Thus the leading 'hawk' in the Politburo seems to have 
been Bierut, who had been in Warsaw from 1943. His views 
correspond to those of a vocal hardline element amongst 
the rank-and-file of the underground PPR. On the other 
hand, as we have seen, the broad national front strategy 
in the form crystallised in July 1944 had been largely the 
product of the Moscow emigration, closely reflecting Soviet 
requirements. The underground PPR inclined to a more 
radical 'democratic' national front and had been criticised 
for sectarianism by the Moscow group because of this. The 
'October turn' in many ways vindicated the position of the 
'natives' against the emigres, and for all the differences 
in outloDk between them, it was Bierut and Gomu~ka who 
took the lead in orchestrati~g the 'turn~. Moreover, the 
'democratic' character of the national front was o nce 
again accented. 
Ideological undercurrents and differing political back-
grounds apart, by mid-September all sections of the Party 
were increasingly disturbed by accumulating evidence of 
what was taken to be a wide-ranging conspiracy by London 
to overthrow the PK~VN. Reports from local branches were 
alarming; rumours were put about that the PKWN would re-
sign on 15 September; that the Germans were about to 
return; that the Western allies were o n their way or that 
a coup d'etat was imminent. 113 The PKWN deliberating on 
the situation in Warsaw gave serious consideration to the 
possibility that MikoZajczyk was about to parachute into 
114 the city and establish his government there. Disquiet-
ing .- reports were rec~ived from the army too. On 16 
September the deputy-commander (political) of the 5th 
Infantry Division described the progress of political work 
amongst the civilian popUlation: 
113 Ols zewski pocz?tki.~. Ope cit., p. 67. 
114 Protoko! z posiedzenia PKvm dnia 15 wrzesnia 1944r, 
Puacz OPe cit., pp. 183-84. 
'The AK, infuriated by this campaign, has 
gone onto the counter-offensive ••. a peasant 
PPR member of the organisational committee 
was badly wounded. The AK distributes masses 
of leaflets threatening those answering the 
call-up with death and makes armed attacks 
on conscripts •••• The civilian authorities 
are timid and lack imagination. In Lukow there 
is no garriso~ commander .•• the Militia is 
completely helpless. It must be stressed that 
the reserve of the population towards us is 
dictated to a large extent by fear of AK ter-
ror •••• The troops still look on the PKWN 
with reserve, unconvinced of its permanence , 
and the majority still hope for an agreement 
with the London "government". AK activity 
Has a depressing effect on the troops •... 
Almost 100 per cent of the soldiers are fana-
tically religious ••• L • llS 
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A particularly worrying aspect of what was seen as a con-
certed campaign by the AK to undermine the PKWN was its 
apparent success in dissuading trained officers f r om join-
ing the army. Rola-i ymierski informed the PKWN on I S Scrter:1ber 
that while the general mobilisation was go ing a ccord ing to 
plan, only 960 of the 2 , 400 officers required had been 
recruited. 116 
These fears did not abate . On 29 September the Gover -
nor of Bia~ystok province filed a par ticularly disturbing 
report: 'the AK is beginning to activate very intensively 
here •.• setting up armed detachments. In the B ia~owieza 
forests these are thought to number 17,000. Other large 
forests have their units too .•.. Unconfirmed rumours are 
circulating that a large-scale armed demonstration is 
being prepared, with 14 November or another l ater date being 
mentioned,.117 The Party leadership seems to have expec-
ted an insurrection against the PKWN timed to c o incide with 
Mikolajczyk's arrival in Moscow for talks in mid-October .11B 
115 Blum Organizacja ••• Op e cit., p. 3SB . 
116 Minutes of the PKWN, 15 September 1944, Polonsky and 
Drukier OPe cit., p. 291. 
117 MaJ'eckl.' 0 't 46 p. Cl. ., p. . 
lIB Mee ting of the Politbureau arid Central Committee of 
the PPR, 22 Octo ber 1944 Polonsky a nd Crukier OP e cit., 
p. 356. 
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His previous arrival in Moscow in August had been immedia-
tely followed by the outbreak of the Warsaw uprising, 
which the communists were almost certainly right in regar-
dl.' n ' 'd 119 Th d ' f h 1 g as no mere COl.ncl. ence. e esertl.on 0 woe 
units from the army - some 3,000 troops in all from the 
Second Army during October120 - culminated on the nigh t of 
12/13 October with the desertion of much of the 31st 
Infantry Regiment, apparently at the instigation of ex- AK 
officers,121 and was seen as confirmation of such fears . 
The picture which emerges is that by late September 
1944 the leadership of the PPR was encountering increasing 
difficulties in convincing the rank-and-file of the c orrect-
ness of its moderate course. The apparent reactivisation 
of the AK and the hardening of the Soviet attitude to the 
prospect of a deal with London seemed to remove both the 
internal and external props of the broad ' patriotic ' 
national front. Once Stalin had giv e n the signal, the 
Party with alacrity jettisoned the line it had been tied 
to for almost three years. 
The Underground and the Aftermath of 'T empest ' 
The widespread belief within the PPR that t he under -
ground was not only still a military threat, but was also 
sufficiently bellige rent to contemplate a rising aga ins t 
the Lublin Committee was quite mistaken. I n fact, as we 
have seen, by September and October, the AK Command was 
ordering its units to disperse and c ease conspi r atorial 
activity. With the capitulation of Warsaw on 3 October, 
Bor went into German captivity along with many of hi s 
staff, while his successor, General Leopold Okulicki , 
escaped to begin organising a new comma nd in the Cz~sto­
chowa region. This command was cut off from a large part 
119 Ciechanowski Op e cit., p. 273. 
120 20 lat ••. OPe cit., p. 332. 
121 Blum Spr awa •.. OP e cit.; Z . 7,a~uski Czterdziesty 
czwarty (4th ed ., Warsaw , 1969), pp . 409 - 23 . 
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of the AK network and also viewed very suspiciously b y 
government circles in London. Okulicki was regarded by 
many as a reckless officer too closely identified with 
Sosnkowski, the effective leader of the opposition wi t hin 
the emigration to the kind of concessions which might allow 
a deal with the Soviet Union. Okulicki's appointment was 
not officially endorsed until shortly before Chris tmas, by 
which time Miko1::"ajczyk's government had been replaced b y 
one composed of critics of his policy of seeking an agree-
ment at the cost of concessions on the eastern frontier . 
In the meantime, General Tatar exercised temporary c ommand 
122 
of the AK by radio from England. 
Apart from these command problems, after the fail u re 
of the uprising and 'Tempest', the undergro und was in no 
state to undertake offensive operations. In t he liberated 
zone of Poland, where several millio n Soviet troops were 
stationed, this would have amounted to suicide. In his 
'Guideline for activity during the winter period 44/45 ', 
issued on 26 October, Okulicki admitted ' the great c o n fu-
sion and chaos' in the AK ranks and the need to ' overcome 
fatigue and a certain kind of stupor'. He laid stress o n 
the importance of grouping together all military orga ni sa-
tions under the AK, and preparing for the worst by adapting 
the conspiracy so that it could : !last out a possible Soviet 
occupation'. There was to be no armed resistance to the 
RUssians, although the policy of revealing AK units was 
now 'f' d 123 speC1 1cally abandone • 
These instructions no doubt failed to reach many 
'akowcy'in the field, but with very few exceptions, under -
ground detachments were disinclined to take o n Soviet and 
communist forces; their objective was rather to elude NKVD 
round-ups or conscription by dispersing to their homes o r 
into the forest s and sit t ing out the winter until the Red 
122 W. pob6g-Malinowski Najnowsza historia polityczna 
Polski, vol. III (Londo n, 1960), pp . 778-92; J.J. 
Na rozstajach dr6g (Wroc!aw, 1978), pp. 272-85 . 
123 Polskie Siry Zbrojne .•. Ope cit., pp. 910-14 . 
Terej 
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Army resumed its offensive in the spring. Equally, the 
military formations linked with the right-wing National 
Democrats, the National Military Organisation and the NSZ 
had in general opted-out of 'Tempest', scattering their 
troops and burying their organisation in deep conspiracy. 
In spite of Okulicki's calls for unity, the endeks were 
gradually detaching themselves from the AK and in November 
the National Military Union (Narodowy Zwitzek Wojskowy -
NZW) was created, envisaged by its founders as a rival 
framework for the nationalist forces. Even the extreme 
National Radical NSZ were relatively quiet in 'Lublin 
Poland', though in German-occupied territory they continue d 
their war with communist and Soviet partisans. 124 
The ascription of the overwhelming difficulties of the 
PKWN in late 1944 to underground activity had then very 
limited validity; such difficulties had their origin in th e 
objective weakness of the PPR and the narrowness of its 
125 influertce, rather than subversion or sabotage. Never-
theless, the case for striking at the AK while it was 
weakened and the Russians were at hand was persuasive and 
this consideration may have lain behind much of the mili-
tancy drummed up in October. 
The Counter-Attack 
The Lublin counter-attack, as Gomu~ka had defined it, 
lasted until May 1945. While continuing to employ the 
rhetoric of the national front, the communists in fact 
unleashed a campaign of terror designed to destroy the 
same underground forces which a few weeks before they had 
been courting. By early 1945 Party propaganda was equating 
the AK with the Gestapo. 
The 'October turn' was viewed in various ways by the 
124 On 8 September the NSZ killed nearly 100 Soviet and 
AL partisans at Rz~biec, powiat W~oszczowa Walichnowski 
op. cit., p. 133. 
125 Za~uski op. cit., pp. 459-63; Majecki op. cit., p. 46. 
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different sections of the Party. For the militants it 
represented the final abandonment of a tactical stance 
dictated by international considerations but which seemed 
to them to have little relevance to the situation on the 
ground or basis in revolutionary Marxism-Leninism. The 
indications are, though, that for the leadership, the turn 
was intended as a short-term tactical detour within rather 
than a departure from the national front strategy. It was 
assumed that a further attempt to reach agreement with 
'London' would take place when this suited Soviet foreign 
policy and when 'Lublin' had strengthened its internal pos-
ition and weakened that of its rivals. Meanwhile , the 
emphasis would be on 'capturing the majority of the working 
masses', especially the peasants through land reform, 
'from below. 'Combinations from above' with the bourgeois 
parties could await more favourable circumstances. 126 This 
was the intention, but the 'October turn' had a momentum 
of its own which was to sweep the Party rapidly into 
positions quite incompatible with the national front . 
The attempts to reach agreement with the leaderships 
of the underground parties and in particular Miko~ajczyk ' s 
SL.' ROCh' gave way to a policy of prising the rank-and - file 
of these parties away from those leaderships, a tactic 
which hitherto had been applied chiefly in order to exert 
pressure on party chiefs to compromise, but was now aimed 
rather at breaking up the 'London' organisations . On the 
surface the communists' stance towards a deal with 
Miko~ajczyk did not change immediately. On 17 October 
Bierut held unofficial talks with him in Moscow and as late 
as 3 December the Politburo reaffirmed its public position 
of favouring Miko~ajczyk 's entry into the PKWN . 127 But 
the true feeling of the Party leadership was revealed in 
126 Protok6~ konferencji sekretarzy komitet6w powiatowych 
i aktywu PPR z teren6w wyzwolonych , 10-11.10.44, 
Pierwsze kroki •.• OPe cit., p. 380 . 
127 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee 
3 December 1944, Polonsky and Drukier Ope cit ., p. 391. 
Bierut's remark to Stalin on 12 October that 'we want to 
reach an understanding (with Miko~ajczyk - J.R. '), but 
128 
would prefer that it takes place later'. By mid-
99 
December, after Stalin had remarked that MiRo~ajczyk wo uld 
not be allowed to return as long as the Red Army remained 
in Poland, the PPR line hardened and a deal seems to have 
129 been ruled out for the foreseeable future. 
By this stage Stalin was ready to show his support f o r 
the PKWN more openly. At the end of the year he sanctio ned 
the transformation of the PKWN into a Provisional Govern-
ment and granted it official diplomatic recognition . This 
seal of approval was all the more significant since it was 
accompanied by a sharp weakening of the position of the 
Government-in-Exile at the international level. On 24 
November, Miko~ajczyk resigned, unable to carry the maj o -
rity of his cabinet with his policy (which had the strong 
support of the British) or compromise with the Soviets 
and Lublin. A new governrrent under the SOCililist , Tomas z 
Arcis~wski , was sworn in, but it had o nly the form a l 
backing of the British and Americans . The f ormer , in p a r-
ticular continued to pin their hopes of a deal on 
Miko~ajczyk and his supporters who now moved into opposi-
tion. 130 Within the underground political leadership in 
Poland, in which Miko~ajczyk's Peasant Party followers 
continued to exert a considerable influence, the change 
of government was received unfavourably. The return of 
the Peasants to the government was regarded unanimously by 
the underground parties as ' very urgent and important' .131 
The SL pressed strongly for a vote of no confidence in 
Arciszewski and the resumption by Miko~ajczyk o f his 
128 Przygonski Ope cit., p. 327. 
129 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Commi t t ee 
Polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., pp . 394 95. 
130 Polonsky 'The Great Powers .•. ' OPe cit., p . 37. 
131 APUST t .16 L.dz.K 595/45 Sobol (J a nkowski) to President 
and Prime Minister, 28.12A4 . 
100 
premiership with a determined policy of seeking agreement 
with the Soviets even at the cost 'of very heavy conces-
sions in the east,.132 
The conununists diagnosed these developments as symptoms 
of ' d h d ' ,133 a eep and lethal crisis amongst t e Lon on emlgres 
but they were not ready to renew their efforts to win over 
Mikorajczyk. In place of a political alliance with the 
peasant movement the conununists now concentrated on mobil-
ising the peasantry as a social class around the PKWN. 
Land reform was seen as the means to win over the alle-
giance of the rural population and undermine the base of 
the SL'ROCh'. 'The quicker the land is divided, the 
weaker will be the position of Miko~ajczyk', as Gomulka put 
it.
134 
This political consideration was given priority 
over both the economic argument that the new plots should 
not be inefficiently small and the claims of the landless 
estate workers to preferential treatment in the apportio n-
ment of the land. The Party leadership repeatedly and 
categorically insisted that the benefits of the reform 
should be spread as extensively as possible and in partic-
ular that small and middle peasants should benefit. Local 
Party activists who showed a tendency to exclude these 
groups threatened, in the opinion of the Central Conunittee 
'to sow conflict ••• between small-peasants and agricultural 
labourers, between middle-peasants and poor peasants •••. 
(This) will assist the work of the reaction amongst the 
middle-peasant masses,.135 In some cases where the reform 
had deviated from central instructions the Party demanded 
132 APOST L.dz.K 516 and 517/45 Walkowicz{A. Bie~) to 
President and Prime Minister, 25.1.45. 
133 Gomu~ka Artyku~y ••• vol. I OPe cit., p. 144. 
134 Protokol konferencji sekretarzy komitetow p owiatowych 
i aktywu PPR z teren6w wyzwolonych, 10-11.10.1944, 
Pierwsze k k' 't 381 
135 
__ ......;.;,..::...;;;:...::.......:..:.=r...:::o:::,· l=..!..~.~. op. C 1 ., p. • 
~nstrukcja KC PPR w sprawie zadart organizacji party-
Jnych w walce z wypaczeniami reformy rolnej 25.10.1944, 
PPR ..• viii 1944 - xii 1945 Ope cit., p. 82. 
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that the land be redivided and in a few instances those 
136 
responsible were arrested. This uncompromising res-
ponse stemmed from the leadership's awareness that it was 
the middle peasants who carried the most political weight 
in the villages and had to be won over if 'London's' rural 
base was to be broken. 
The policy of by-passing the traditional peasant 
movement was also reflected in the communists' new attitude 
to the 'Lublin SL'. Until October this party, small 
though it was, had em~raced certain genuine sections of the 
traditional movement. Witos, Kotek-Agroszewski and others 
in its leadership, while prepared to work with the PPR did 
not tamely accept its hegemony. In the new atmosphere 
such independence was no longer tolerated. According to 
Bierut 'reactionary-kulak elements' had been allowed into 
the S L 1 d h . 13 7 h th 1 f ea ers lp. As we ave seen, e remova 0 
Witos from the PKWN, followed shortly by that of Kotek-
Agros~wski, heralded the hardening of the PPR line. On 
22-23 November along with other independently-minded 
activists they were expelled from the SL leadership. The 
new leadership, which had been cleared with the Politburo 
. 138 / ln advance comprised less troublesome figures: Maslanka, 
Janusz, Czechowski~ Grubecki etc. who it was thought 
could be relied upon to follow the communists' lead. How-
ever, within a month the Politburo was concerned at the 
inactivity of this group and decided to delegate some of 
its own cadres to strengthen it. The communists also en-
visaged a much more limited role for the SL. Gomu~ka 
warned that if the SL expanded as a mass organisation it 
would be exposed to penetration by Hik01:'ajczyk's followers. 
136 Z materia~ow listopadowej konferencji PPR w Lublinie 
w 1944r, Z pola walki 1959 nr.2 (6), pp. 139-43; 
S1:'abek Polityka agrarna ••• op. cit., pp. 230-33. 
137 Minutes of the PPR Central Committee (extracts), 9 
October 1944, Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., p. 300. 
138 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee 
9 November 1944, ibid., p. 364. 
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Berman went further and questioned whether the SL would 
be needed at all much longer. By this time the communists 
were pinning their hopes of capturing mass support in th e 
countryside not on the Peasant Party, however tame, but o n 
a new organisatiDn, the Peasant Self-help Union (Zwipzek 
Sarnopomocy Ch~opskiej - ZSCh), formed in December to link 
together those peasants who had been drawn under Party 
influence during the land reform. 139 
However, the political gains of the land reform could 
only compensate in small part for the Party's failure to 
achieve an alliance with the peasant movement. The reform 
had only got underway in earnest in mid-October. By mid-
November it was one third complete and by the 15 December, 
when peasant delegate congresses were held in each of the 
provinces, it was completed. In total some 212,084 hec-
tares had been distributed between 110,000 households, 
creating 33,000 new holdings and expanding 77,000 existing 
ones.
140 About 14 % of the rural populatio n had benefitted . 
It was on this base that the Party was able to rest much 
of its expansion in late 1944, from just under 9,000 
members at the beginning of October to 21,649 by the end 
of December (which together with members still under German 
occupation brought the estimated strength of the PPR up to 
34,000) .141 Zambrowski claimed that more than 100,000 
peasants had taken part in the election of delegates to 
the first Congress of the ZSCh in December 1944. 142 
This was an undoubted achievement and Stalin was reported 
139 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee 
17 December 1944, Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., p. 
397. 
140 S~abek Dzieje ... op. cit., p. 92. 
141 Ko~omejczyk PPR .•. op. cit., p. 275. 
142 W. Gomu!ka, H. Mine, R. Zarnbrowski Przem6wenia na 
rozszerzonym plenum KC PPR w lutym 1945r. (Katowice, 
1945), p. 26. 
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to have been pleased with the progress of the reform. 143 
On the other hand, the Party remained extremely weak in 
most rural districts; over 80% of peasants had not received 
land and despite recruitment of new members they were still 
spread very thinly. In Bia~ystok province, PPR members 
had more than quadrupled between 1 October and 1 January, 
b t 'I 144, h d . d u st~ 1 stood at only 781. The commun~sts a ga~ne 
a small foothold in the countryside, which nevertheless 
remained the domain of SL'ROCh' and the underground. 
The role ascribed by the communists to the 'Lublin PPS' 
also diminished after October. The emphasis moved from 
recruiting former members of the WRN to excluding them 
from political life. At the Socialists' Supreme Council 
on 17 November Drobner warned against these attempts to 
divide the party into its RPPS and WRN wings. 145 However, 
as we have seen, Drobner himself soon came under communist 
suspicion and attempts were made to remove him from the 
/ 146 PPS leadership and force Osobka to purge the WRN. 
There is also evidence to suggest that discussions were 
held within the PPR at this time on the possibility of a 
merger of the two parties. 147 
The radicalisation of the Party's line on land reform 
was paralleled by a change of tactics in relation to owner-
ship and management of industry. The PKWN manifesto and 
Party statements up to October had avoided using such 
terms as 'nati6nalisation' and said little about the role 
of workers in directing the factories. Instead they 
stressed the commitment to early restoration of industrial 
143 Minutes of the politbureau of the PPR Central Commi ttee 
14 December 1944, Polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., p. 394. 
144 Ko~omejczyk Ope cit., p. 275. 
145 Syzdek OPe cit., pp. 79-80. 
146 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee 
3 December 1944; Minutes of the Politbureau o f the PP R 
Central Committee, 17 December 1944; Polonsky and 
Drukier OPe cit., pp. 391, 398. 
147 Sierocki PPR-owska ••• Ope cit., pp. 10-11. 
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148 
concerns to their private owners. Instructions govern-
ing the return of ownership of factories to their original 
proprietors were drawn up by Kotek-Agroszewski ' s Depart-
ment of Public Administration, dated 18 and 23 September. 
However when these were discussed by the PKWN on 7 
October, it was decided that the Department had acted be-
yo d "t d h" " hId 149 n 1 s competence an t e 1nstruct10nS" were seve. 
At the same time, the powers of the workers' own represen-
tatives on the factory councils which had sprung up in 
many branches of industry were broadened. An instruction 
of the PKWN Department of Nat~onal Economy and Finances 
from September 1944 had entrusted factory management to 
three-man provisional committees 
as chairman, a representative of 
a delegate elected by the factory 
comprising the director 
the local authority and 
"I 150 C 1 counC1 • entra 
Committee instructions put out on 2 October proclaimed the 
'great role' to be played by the factory councils in mana-
ging their concerns. Although the powers of the factory 
councils were not defined in law until February 1945, the 
instruction opened the way to what amounted in effect t o 
workers' control of the management of many factories. Thi s 
became all the more evident when the more industrialised 
regions were liberated a few months later. 151 Within a 
148 The PK~m manifesto declared that 'Property stolen by 
the Germans from citizens - peasants, shop~keepers, 
(small) craftsmen, (small and medium-scale) industrial-
ists, institutions and the Church - will be returned to 
its rightful owners', Manifest PK~m (1974 version) OPe 
cit., p. 20. The words in parenthesis are not included 
in the version of the manifesto published by Zenczykow-
ski Geneza ••• Ope cit., p. 167, 
149 H. Srabek Og6lne aspekty polityki PPR i PPS w kszta~­
,tr0;-::w:;-a~n-=i:..:u::.......:n:..:;;;:o.:.:w~y;...;c;;.:h;;..,.....::S:...::t:..:o::.:s~u=-=:n:.;k;..:6::..w:..:.-~p;.:;r:..:z=-e=m~y-=s:..:~=-0=-iw.J.y-:c=.;-:h , Z po 1 a wa 1 k i 
1978 nr. 1 (81), p . 43. Minutes of the PKWN (extracts) 
7 October 1944, Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., pp. 296-
97. 
150 J. Kalirtski i Z. Landau (ed.) Gospodarka Polski ~udowej 
1944-1955 (Warsaw, 1974), p. 82. 
151 See fUrther J. Reynolds Communists, Socialists and 
Workers: Po land 1944-48 Soviet Studies XXX/4 Octo ber 
1978, pp. 519-20. 
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week of the issue of the 2 October instructions Party 
spokesmen were telling local factory activists that offi-
cial policy was that 'the workers take upon themselves the 
entire responsibility for the factories,.lS2 
The new line was also applied in the army , as we have 
noted, and in the administration of local and central 
government. The Party's initial policy was to open wide 
'the gates of the Polish Army to all soldiers and officers 
of the AK' and to employ civil servants regardless of their 
political background provided only that they had not col-
laborated with the Nazis and were not overtly hostile to 
the PKWN. This policy did not long survive the 'turn!. On 
29 October Gomu~ka told the Politburo that 
'the AK, on which not long ago we were deter-
mined to bas~ the expansion of the Polish 
Army, have in the overwhelming majority of 
cases turned out to be a hostile element . 
In view of a possible agreement with Miko~­
ajczyk, this danger is all the greater . The 
Army which we built may become an instrument 
in the hands of the reaction '. 
As for the administration: 'We have power at the top, but 
by no means do we have the whole apparatus in our hands. 
Revolutionary changes will not be brought about with the 
old apparatus,.lS3 A fortnight later the leadership 
assembled the PPR aktyw in Lublin to announce the second 
stage of the new course: the 'democratisation ' of the Army , 
particularly of the officer corps, and of the state appar-
atus. 'Above all', Gomu~ka argued in his speech , 'the 
struggle for a democratic Poland is today a struggle for 
the state apparatus', which he defined as '1) the govern-
ment , 2) the state administration, 3) the armed forces , 
4) the courts and penal system'. Of these ' only one in 
its entirety is in the hands of democracy, i.e. the 
152 B. Ruminski speaking to an industrial conference in 
Praga, . 14 October 1944, quoted in J. GO~lCbiowski 
Nac:bnalizacja przemys~u w Polsce (Warsaw, 1965), p. 112. 
153 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Central Committee 
29 October 1944, Polonsky and Drukier OPe cit ., p. 359. 
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government in the shape of the PKWN. Elements hostile to 
democracy, elements on which the old Sanacja regime rested, 
have penetrated the others to a greater or lesser degree'. 
According to Gomu~ka the problem lay both in the shortage 
of politically reliable and experienced manpower and the 
lack of firm direction from the communists who had been 
placed in charge of trained specialists: 
'Polish democracy ••• was unable to train 
its own cadres as managers and organisers 
of : state power in sufficient numbers. The 
reaction has such managers and organisers •.•• 
This fact enables the reaction to push its 
people into various organs of state, espe-
cially where on some vital section set by 
the camp of Polish democracy, the manager 
loses vigilance and falls into the political 
cretinism of specialism (fachowo$c) '. 
Henceforth political commitment rather than qualification 
and experience was to take precedence: 
'Experts of all kinds are needed, badly 
needed, by democratic Poland. But if a 
speci~list makes use of his skills for the 
purpose of expert destruction, then Poland 
does not need such experts; such experts 
b~long behind bar~. In the place of such 
specialists it is better rather to put a 
good democrat, a good worker, peasant or 
inteligent, even if non-specialist and 
without experience ••• '154 
The first priority was the 'democratisation' of the 
&my officer-corps, where previously the Party had hoped 
to employ widely ex-AK recruits. This policy was now 
reversed as the suspicion that the underground had go ne 
onto the offensive, infiltrating the army with the inten-
tion of capturing control, had been confirmed in the e y e s 
of the leadership and Stalin by the desertions in October.lSS 
IS4 Gomu~ka Referat wyg~oszony na naradzie partyjnej w 
Lublinie, 13.11.1944, Artyku~y •.• vol. I op. cit., pp. 
125-27. 
155 Ibid., pp. 128-30; Meeting of the Po1itbureau a nd 
Central Committee of the PPR, 22 October 1944, Polonsky 
and Drukier . op. cit., p. 3S6. 
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To avert this threat urgent steps were taken to strengthen 
the communists' hold on the army. 500 Party members were 
seconded to the officer corps. Also cadres from the war-
time People's Army that had hitherto largely been sent 
into the Militia were directed into the army political 
apparatus. Finally, it was decided to find 10,000 volun-
teers from amongst the working-class and peasantry to 
'pour a healthy, democratic stream into the ranks of the 
army,.156 It is worth noting that these moves represented 
a strengthening of the influence of the former underground 
section of the Party over the army, eclipsing somewhat the 
position of the emigres who had hitherto dominated the 
political direction of the armed forces. Gomu~ka himself 
took charge of the campaign and a Military Department 
began functioning in the Central Committee. 157 
The obverse of this influx of dependable manpower was 
a purge of the ex-AK element in the forces . Although pub-
licly distinctions were still drawn between the ' democra-
tic' mass · of the AK and their 'reactionary ' commanders, in 
practice former AK members came under more or less indis-
criminate suspicion. We have already seen how instructions 
to political commanders in the army on the treatment of AK 
officer recruits had hardened. The general attitude of 
the communists to the AK after October, both in the army 
and outside was summed up by Gomu~ka a few months later 
as follows: 'in practice, the attitude of our Party orga-
nisations was such that honest akowcy were not distinguished 
from the reactionary parts of the AK. They were put 
15 8 
under arrest, because they were akowcy'. Altho ugh the 
leadership later blamed sectarian elements amongst the 
156 Gomu~ka Referat wyg~oszony na narad z ie partyjnej w 
Lublinie, 13.11.44 Artyku:ry ••• yol . I op . cit., pp . 
133, 135-36; Ok61nik KC PPR ' W sprawie ochotniczego 
zaci~gu do Wojska Polskiego', 22.11.44, PPR .•. viii 
1944 - xii 1945 Op e cit., pp. 83-85. 
157 Ko~omejczyk PPR ... OPe cit., p. 22. 
158 Gomu?ka Referat wygYoszony na I ogolnokrajowej naradzie 
PPR , 27.5.1945, Artyku~y ••. vol. I , OP e cit., p . 281. 
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rank-and-file f6r this extremism, there is clear evidence 
in the discussions held in the Politburo that by October-
November 1944 the leadership was united in equating the 
bulk of the AK with the reaction159 which it now aimed no t 
simply to isolate and neutralise through political means, 
but to 'destroy' by repressive measures. Gomu~ka gave the 
lead in a speech on 10 October which introduced a new tone 
into official Party pronouncements. 'Not only does the 
new democracy', he said, 'not assist the activity and 
development of the reaction ••• but on the contrary, it 
makes the destruction' of fascism and all dark, backward and 
reactionary forces a condition of its existence'. He 
continued: 'the democratic camp and the PKWN will not hesi-
tate to apply these measures which will once and for all 
liquidate (the armed resistance) '. Efforts to win over 
the majority of the nation would be accompanied b y the 
use of 'the severest repression towards the reaction ... 
which is hiding under the cloak of Miko~ajczyk' .160 By 
February 1945 official Party documents, without qualifica-
tion, referred to the AK as the 'armed agency of the land 
owners,.161 With this kind of language emanating from the 
centre, it was hardly surprising when local activists 
'oversimplified their attitude to the AI< by generalising 
hostility to all those who had at some time belonged to the 
AK,.162 
The contradiction between the Party's leadership's 
calls for national unity and the intensified struggle 
159 For example, Gomul"ka said that the 'majority' of the 
AK were 'hostile', Hinutes of the Politbureau of the 
PPR Central Committee, 29 October 1944, Polonsky and 
Drukier OPe cit., p. 359. 
160 Gomu~ka Sytuacja obecna i zadania Partii. Referat 
~gl"oszony na naradzie PPR w Lublinie, 10.10.1944, 
Artykul"y ... vol. I, op · .. . cit., pp. 112-13. 
161 Projekt uchwa~y rozszerzonego plenum KC PPR 0 zadaniach 
partii na wsi, 7.2.1945, PPR ••• viii 1944 - xii 1945 
op. ci t., p. 96. 
162 Uchwata plenum KC PPR w sprawach polityc znych, 26.5.1945 
ibid., p. 141. 
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against the London camp was most keenly felt at local 
level by the PPR aktyw. Not surprisi ngly, significant sec-
tions of the aktyw seem to have considered that the leader-
ship was unrealistic to expect the Party to broade n its 
base substantially and deal with its oppo nents at the same 
time. This view was evident when Gomu~ka descended o n the 
Praga PPR organisation on 25-26 November. Praga, a working 
class suburb of Warsaw, was one of the few areas in 
Lublin Poland where the PPR .might have expected to estab-
lish a base amongst the industrial workers . This had not 
happened however. Gomu~ka, speaking to the local l eaders 
of the Party, 'assessed the activity of the Warsaw organi -
sation of the PPR critically, using extremely severe terms 
in his speech. He said that the provincial c ommittee 
lacked any idea how to work, had failed to break with con-
spiratorial habits, had made little contact with people, 
especially the workers, had a poor growth of membership, 
had not begun to organise cells in work-places as the 
Central Committee had directed, and that it lacked contact 
with the urban intelligentsia'. But for some at least of 
the aktyw, this was asking for the impossible: ' the criti-
cism aroused the dissatisfaction of some of the members of 
the committee. They felt that the Central Committee Secre-
tary was not sufficiently aware of the specific circum-
stances in Praga and that his assessment was not 
objective' .163 
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter , t he 
abandonment of the broad national front left the Party 
with little alternative, but to resort to police methods 
and the direct application of Soviet power to deal wi t h 
its opponents. Inevitably, the work of hun t ing down AK 
SUspects was l arg ely left to the NKVD . As we have seen , 
the Polish security forces were not yet strong enough to 
play more than a supporting role. Gomu~ka hinted at the 
Party'S acceptance of qreater Soviet help in his 10 October 
163 Hillebrandt i Jakubowski Op e ci t ., pp ~ 219-20. See 
a l so Sierocki Warszawska ••. OP e cit ., p. 230 . 
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speech when he said that 'it would not by any means be an 
interference in the affairs of a given country if the Red 
Army is one of those factors destroying fascism everywhere 
where it is to be found ,.164 On 18th Stalin told Bierut 
and Os6bka in Moscow that the Polish forces were unabl e to 
cope with the security problem and the Soviet army would 
have to playa greater role than hitherto. 165 Party his-
torians are largely silent on what this 'greater role' 
involved, but there can be Little doubt that claims of 
mass arrests and deportations are true . In a letter writ-
ten in 1956, General Zygmunt Berling, who had been removed 
from his command of the First Army, but remained a member 
of the PKWN until December, dramatically described the 
situation in the last months of 1944 as follows: 
'Beria's lackies from the NKVD wreaked devas-
tation over the whole country. Criminal 
elements from Radkiewicz's apparatus assisted 
them in this without hindrance. During legal 
and illegal searches the population had its 
property stolen and entirely innocent people 
were deported or thrown into gaol. People 
were shot at ' like dogs . Literally no one 
felt secure or knew the day or the hour. 
The chief military procurator told me on 
returning from an inspection which I had 
sent him on to prisons in Przemys~, Zamos~ 
and Lublin, that over twelve thousand people 
were being held there . Nobody knew what they 
were accused of, by whom they had been arres-
ted or what was intended to be done with 
them,.166 
Modern Party historians mention that from mid -November 
to mid-January the Soviet and Polish forces were deployed 
for what was described as 'offensive operations ' or ' dis-
arming the terrain'. This involved mass identity checks 
164 Gomulka Sytuacja obecna i zadania Partii. Referat 
wygloszony na naradzie PPR w Lublinie, 10.10. 44 , 
Artykuly ••• vol. lop. cit ., p . 98. 
165 Przygonski OPe cit., p . 344. 
166 List Berlinga do Gomu~ki, 20 . X.l956, in J . Nowak 
Sprawa gen . Berlinga, Zeszyty Historyczne 37 (1976), 
p . 39. 
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on males aged between 16 and 50 and the arrest of s u spects . 
It is not possible to gauge accurately the extent of the 
arrests: fragmentary official figures covering three dis-
tricts in the southern part of Lublin province put the 
number of detainees at 664, but, especially where Soviet 
troops were used, it is probable that the round-ups were 
much greater. 167 At the same time, as we have seen, exe -
cutions of AK officers began. 
Although, within a few mpnths the PPR leadership was 
to become seriously concerned over the activities of the 
Soviet and Polish security forces, this was not the mood 
at the end of 1944. On the contrary, the Party leaders 
were satisfied with the results of the measures against 
the AK and favoured stepping up the campaign against the 
underground. On 17 December the Politburo discussed sec-
urity matters at some length, Radkiewicz claiming that 
'the AK is experiencing an internal crisis ••. initially 
the AK fought to win the masses and lost'. His deputy , 
Roman Romkowski, reported that 'we have struck blows in 
the leadership (of the AK) in all the provinces a nd in 
Bia~ystok against the NSZ too'. Gomu~ka argued that ' the 
London base is contracting; the AK leadership has recently 
been decimated'. However, there was agreement that the 
underground still posed a serious threat and was concen-
trating on 'diversionary work of a closed, sectarian char-
acter', and as Berman put it 'up to now in the fig ht with 
the reaction we have been cutting off t he tendrils ; we 
must get at the roots,.168 
This assessment accorded with a general view in the 
leadership that the October turn had paid off. Despite 
the continued elusiveness of the natio nal front, the 
mood of crisis in the Party, so much in evidence a couple 
of months before, had given way to an altogether more 
confident outlook. The agreed view in the leadership seems 
167 Turlejska W walce ••. OPe cit., p. 14. 
168 Minutes of the Politbureau of the PPR Cen tral Committee 
17 December 1944 Polonsky and Drukier OP e cit., p. 399. 
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to have been that initial errors had been corrected ~ nd 
that the modified line had yielded rapid results . l. t 'Nas 
Berman who was the most enthusiastic: ' The proces s fir 
change is going quicker than we had expected .•• in n ~ ho rt 
time we have constructed the aparat i there are SUC C <IH;;e s ~~ 9 
But Gomu<tka too gave an interview published on 7 DOl: 'lrnbe r 
expressing considerable satisfaction with the progt'<I ;i;; 
which had been made, without any of the critical nOl nR 
h " hh 11 d" 170 w ~c e was norma y not averse to soun 1ng. 
By early January 1945 when the Soviet offensive w ~ s 
renewed, the PPR leadership was then in buoyant mond , h av-
ing recovered much of the confidence which h ad de s o t"' ed it 
in October. This mood did not last longi by Apri l II I~ 
Party had again reached an impasse. 
169 Polonsky and Drukier o p . cit ., p . 399 . 
l70 Gomu3:ka Nads zed<t moment u tworzenia rZi(du tymc zil ~~ , lwego . 
Wywiad dla "Rze c zypospoli tej " opublikowany 7 . 1 2 .!.J~, 
Artyku£y ••• vol. I, o p . cit., pp. 1 41-45. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SPRING CRISIS AND THE MAY TURN (January to June 194 5) 
The Red Army resumed its advance on 12 January. 
Warsaw, systematically devastated by the Germans in the 
weeks after the collapse of the upvising, was liberated o n 
17 January, followed by Krakow and Lodz on 19th, Katowice 
on 27th and Poznan a month later. Pockets of resistance -
Gdansk, Szczecin and Wroc~aw - were mopped in the las t 
weeks of the war. 
The rapidity of the advance transformed the political 
situation facing the PPR. Suddenly, the communists found 
themselves with huge expanses of territory to organise and 
govern in central Poland and, after a short period of 
Soviet administration, in the former German western terri-
tories also. Simultaneously, the Lublin regime's protec-
tive Soviet shield moved away westwards. By no means all 
the Russian units pursued the German retreat, but the 
military and administrative resources at the disposal of 
the PPR shrank dramatically just at the moment when the 
demands made upon them multiplied. Compounding this shor-
tage of manpower, the party's radical line left the 
communists isolated within a considerably narrower front 
of allies than the previous summer. Moreover, the defeat 
of Hitler, although initially greeted by a wave of popular 
rejoicing and gratitude towards the Russians, deprived the 
communists of their strongest patriotic asset. Post-
liberation euphoria soon gave way to hostility towards the 
new authorities as Soviet marauding, the use of terror to 
crUsh the unde rground and the dire economic conditions 
became apparent. 
During the spring it became increasingly clear to most , 
though not all, of the Party leadership, that the narrower 
and more aggressive 'democratic national front' strategy 
which had it seemed suited the circumstances of Lublin 
Poland, did not meet the requirements of the new political 
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situation. The crisis was evident in four main areas: the 
campaign against the AK and the underground, the economy, 
the national front itself, and in Soviet-Polish relations, 
both at international level and on the ground in Poland. 
By May 1945 the Party leadership had concluded that the 
direction it had pursued in these areas since October 1944 
was no longer correct. Rather than eliminating the oppo-
sition and widening the base of the national front, the 
Party's policies appeared to be generating opposition, 
leaving the PPR in deeper isolation and dependence on 
Soviet assistance. In May and June the Party line reverted 
in essentials to the broad national front line which the 
Party had abandoned eight months before. 
The Revival of Underground Activity 
The counter-attack against the AK did not abate as 
the front advanced. However, after January, the PPR was 
engaged in an attempt to terrorise the underground forces 
from a position of weakness. Party membership and the 
strength of Militia and security organs mushroomed during 
the first months of 1945, but their political reliability 
remained extremely uncertain. The security apparatus and 
Militia were still riddled with members of the underground,l 
while the Internal Army, soon to be renamed the Internal 
Security Corps, was only partly formed and trained by May 
1945, when Moczar, one of its organisers, stated bluntly 
that it was not yet ready to take on the underground. What 
could happen when ill-prepared troops were deployed was 
mentioned by Gomu~ka: 'three Battalions of the Internal 
Army went out into the terrain and 2,000 ' people deserted,.2 
1 
2 
Several of the best-known anti-communist partisan lead-
ers active in 1945-47: 'ogie6' (J. Kuras), 'Bury ' (R. 
Rajs), 'Wo~Jniak (J. Zdziarski), A. Zubryd, 'Ms cistaw' 
(M. W~dolny), for instance, were in 1944-45 members of 
the army, militia or UB. 
Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20-21 May 1945, polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., 
pp. 435, 440. The first large KBW operation against 
the underground did not take place until February 1946. 
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This vulnerability left the Party very heavily reli-
ant on the remaining Soviet cover and those Polish security 
forces it had at its disposal. The employment of Soviet 
troops against the AK was an embarrassing necessity which 
carne under heavy criticism at the May 1945 Plenum. Even 
Radkiewicz agreed that it was 'unfortunate that two Red 
Army regiments were sent to Bia~ystok; Poles should be 
Used against the AX. The attitude that the Red Army will 
establish order for us here is bad ' • The Central Committee 
was also alarmed by the tendency of some local Party 
chiefs to ignore the Politburo and pursue their own line 
using security organs and the Russians. The UB apparatus, 
conscious of its key role in protecting the Party's hold 
on power, began to slip from beneath Party control. 
Gomulka went so far as to warn 'that a second state is beg-
inning to grow up over our heads. The security organs are 
making their own policy, with which no-one is supposed to 
interfere , • 3 
The round-ups which began in November continued into 
spring 1945 on a big scale. Emigre sources claim that as 
many as 50,000 members of the AK were arrested and trans-
ported to Siberia at this time,4 but there is no way of 
COurse of verifying this figure. Claims that some 8,000 
people were incarcerated in Lublin castle at this time are 
~i~u~lbi~ enoug~ in ~ie~ of official data revealing 1,646 
arrests by the UB and MO alone in Lublin province between 
January and April. In the same operations, over 300 mem-
bers of the underground were killed. 5 Internment camps 
were set up for the AK at Skrobow, Rembertow, Piotrkow 
and elsewhere. But as Figure 1 clearly demonstrates, the 
repression, far from breaking the underground, contributed 
to the massive irruption of armed resistance in the spring. 
3 
4 
5 
To a limited degree this followed from the territorial 
Polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., p. 427. 
Polskie Si~y Zbrojne .•• Ope cit., p. 926. 
APUST File 52 L.dz.K. 2404/45 Korbonski to London , 27 
April 1945. Caban i Machocki OPe cit., p. 97. 
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extension of communist rule to regions where the under-
ground network had not been disrupted by 'Tempest ' and 
Soviet policing, but about two-thirds of political murders 
were concentrated in the areas liberated in 1944~ and the 
Upsurge in guerilla activity peaked in April-June, not 
in January-February when the AK and the communists first 
Carne into contact in central Poland. 
In spite of the repression, the stance of the under-
ground remained generally defensive; resistance was offered 
on a sporadic and unplanned basis. Official historiography 
lays great emphasis on the 'Nie' organisation which it 
credits with an influence and degree of coherence it did 
not pOssess. In fact, the first three months of 1945 wit-
nessed the virtual disintegration of the underground, with 
its leadership endeavouring to pick up the pieces, while 
rapidly corning to ~ the conclusion that some kind of compro-
mise had to be reached with the Russians. Non-recognition 
of the Lublin authorities and the conviction that the PPR 
was merely a Soviet puppet ruled out any direct approache s 
to the Polish communists. 
Okulicki at this time gives the impression of a man 
swept along on an irresistible tide of events. On 19 
January he ordered - to the surprise and puzzlement, it 
seems, of London, most of the AK as well as the communists 
- the disbandment of the AK . Emigre historians claim the 
decision was unpremeditated and conditioned by the mood of 
defeatism within the movement and the urgent need to sanc-
tion its members' flight from NKVD round-ups.7 Party 
historians argue rather that it had been planned in advance 
and was designed to prune down the AK , leaving only the 
dependable cadres of the 'Nie' organisation: the skeleton 
of the new anti-Soviet resistance. 8 Okulicki's order had 
6 
7 
8 
Polegli w walce 0 w~adz~ ludow~ (Warsaw , 1970), pp . 32-
65. In 1945 61 % of assassinations took place in 
Bialystok, Lublin and Rzeszow provinces. A further 14 % 
took place in Warsaw province, partially liferated in" 19~4. 
PObbg-Malinowski OP e cit., pp. 854-55; Korbortski Polskie •.. 
oPe cit., p. 215 . 
Czapla W walce ••• Op e cit., pp. 51-52; Walichnowski OPe 
cit., p. 120. 
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indeed been ambiguous about the next step: 'We do not want 
to fight the Soviets, but we will never agree to live 
except in an entirely sovereign, independent, justly g ov-
erned Polish state. The present Soviet victory has not 
ended the war ••• ' President Radzkiewicz, endorsing 
Okulicki~s : ' order on 8 February, attempted to dispell the 
uncertainty, stating specifically that armed activity had 
ceased. 9 
The order added to the confusion and fragmentation 
reigning in the underground in the aftermath of the Soviet 
advance. Many of the conspirators, like the Russians, did 
not believe the order and simply ignored it, and began to 
repair and regroup the organisation. In Bia~ystok, for 
instance, Colonel Liniarski disobeyed the order and set 
up an independent 'Citizens' AK' ,10 while the nationalists, 
who radically disagreed with the decision to disband, took 
further steps to revive their own military networks. And 
of course Okulicki himself did not cease activity, forming 
a central command for 'Nie', which apart from this never 
really got off the drawing-board. ll 
The centrifugal processes at work in the military arm 
of the underground were matched by fission within its pol-
itical leadership. As we have seen, in November . . 
Miko~ajczyk, ready to settle with the Lubliners on terms 
favoured by the British and Americans, was dumped as pre-
~" I ~1 ~r of the Government-in-Exile and replaced by the in-
transigent Arciszewski • Miko~ajczyk's Peasant Party went 
into opposition and following the commitment of the 'Big 
Three' at Yalta in Feburary 1945 to the creation of a 
Polish coalition government, it succeeded in winning over 
Delegate Jankowski and most of the underground political 
leaders to Mikorajczyk's line. By March 1945 the London 
camp was dividing in two, just as the communists had 
9 POlskie Si~y Zbrojne •.. Ope cit., pp. 925-27. 
10 Majecki OPe cit., p. 113; Pobbg-Malinowski OPe cit., 
~p. 877-78 analyses the extent to which the order was 
19nored. 
11 Ibid., pp. 878-82; Czapla W walce ••• OPe cit., pp. 52-53. 
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intended nine months earlier, with the peasant movement and 
the centre groupings searching for a way out of conspiracy 
and entry into coalition with the PPR, while the intransi-
gents were left isolated. Significantly the former AK, 
as represented by Okulicki, with some reservations, fell in 
with Jankowski. 
The talks held between the Russian military command 
in Poland and the fifteen underground leaders headed by 
Jankowski and Okulicki at the end of March, which termina-
ted with the arrest of the fifteen and their disappeara nc e 
to the Soviet Union where they were put on trial in June, 
demonstrated the risks which the AK and the Delegatura 
were prepared to take to promote a deal. Okulicki had 
at first refused to participate, but finally caved in to 
Jankowski's persuasion and Russian insistence on his 
presence. 12 
The arrests certainly increased the difficulties 
facing the communists and must have significantly c ontri-
buted to the irruption of underground violence in April, 
May and June which brought Poland to the brink of civil 
13 
war. Other factors too prompted the upsurge of guerilla 
activity: the season - spring was suited to partisan wa r-
fare~ the mass arrests, which propelled thousands of young 
men into the forests; and the realisation that Militia a nd 
security posts, or even prisons and internment camps often 
represented easy targets. The use of Red Army units and 
'workers' brigades' to collect contingents from the p e a-
sants also aroused a great deal of conflict. These fac-
tors accounted equally for the activisation of Ukrainian 
nationalist insurgents in south-east Po land. But besides , 
Yalta seemed to promise a new phase and the end o f the 
12 APUST File 52 L.dz.K. 1802/45 Rzepecki to Anders, 5 
April 1945; Korbonski Polskie ••• op. cit., pp. 2 20-22; 
Pobog-Malinowski op. cit., pp. 856-73 discus s es in det-
ail developments in London and within the underground 
leadership, November 1944 to March 1945. 
\ 
13 Aleksander Zawadzki, for example, spoke of the d a nger of 
civil war at the May 1945 r lenum. Extracts of the 
minutes of the plenum of the PPR central committee, 20-
21 May 1945, Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., p. 429. 
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communist monopoly in the administration. The defeatist, 
defensive mood which had weighed on the underground for 
months began to give way to a more offensive and hopeful 
one. 
Soviet attempts to stamp out the resistance continued 
unabated. On 26 April London heard that 
'The pacification has begun of Garwolin, 
Lukow, Lubartow and Zamosc districts. The 
Soviet Army surrounds villages and trans-
ports all the men, other than youngsters 
and the elderly, eastwards. The arrests 
numbering between ten and twenty thousand 
have provoked a mass exodus to the forests 
and the formation of irregular armed units, 
which nevertheless adopt a passive attitude , 
only defending themselves when attacked. 
The Soviet Air Force bombed the Czemiernickie 
forests'.14 
The report, even if exaggerated, indicates accurately 
enough the degree of fear and terror sweeping the country -
side. By no means all the armed units remained passive 
either. On 24 April, guerrillas overran the town of 
Pulawy, massacring the local security policemen . A couple 
of days later the same happened in Janow, then Kozienice, 
then Grajewo. These were sizeable towns. Militia posts 
in the countryside faced an unenviable task - on the night 
of 27/28 March formidably armed and trained UPA (Ukrainian 
nationalist) units simultaneously wiped out the entire 
system of mil ita stations in Lubacz6w and Jaroslaw dis-
tricts, while in 
data, some forty 
Biarystok province, according to official 
Militia offices had been demolished by 
March . lS In May pitched battles took place between 
rity forces and ex- AK units led by 'Orlik' (Marian 
BernaCiak) and ' Bupaszko ' (Zygmunt Szendzielarz) . 16 
secu-
14 APUST File 52, L.dz.K 2313/45 Korbonski to London , 26 
April 1945. 
15 R. Szpa!a Z dziejow MO i SB w pierws zych latach wladzy 
l\ldowej w pow. Bielsk Podlaski WojskowYPrzeg1 gd H~storyczny 1977 nr. 4 , p. 187. 
16 Majecki. OP e cit., p. 121; Turlejska Z walk ... OP e cit., 
Pp. 2~8 et passim. 
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The Party's hard line had weakened and scattered the 
underground without seriously undermining its support and 
prestige amongst the bulk of the population. Mass arrests 
and internment created an atmosphere of tension and hos-
tility to the communists in which clandestine activity 
proliferated and the underground, like a hydra, sprouted 
new members as fast as the security forces picked off the 
old. When the Central Committee Plenum met in May, the 
leadership attempted to reassert its control over a secu-
rity apparatus which had itself lost its grip on the under-
ground. Gomutka concluded the Plenum by saying that the 
existence of 'certain elements of crisis' was undeniable. 
'In the reactionary camp there is a crisis, but we have 
been unable to narrow its base. We are unable to fight 
the reaction without the Red Army. That says something 
about (our) base' .17 
Industry and the Working Class 
The Upsurge in underground activity was primarily a 
protest by the traditional rural communities of central 
and eastern Poland against the new order and indicated how 
shallow were the Party's roots in the villages. In the 
towns and cities the political hold of the authorities was 
more secure and violent opposition limited. Nevertheless 
by the spring the communists had to contend with a wave of 
discontent and industrial disruption amongst the urban 
working class, where they had hoped to find their strongest 
support. 
The Polish economy was in ruins at the end of the war. 
National income, which had stood at 17.7 billion zloties 
in 1938, had fallen by 1945 to 6.8 billion. Industry had 
Suffered particularly badly: some 65 % of industrial pl ants 
had been destroyed. The population had declined from 35 
to 24 million - a loss which disproportionately severely 
affected the skilled labour force, management and 
17 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20 - 21 H'ay 1945 , polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., 
p. 440. 
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technicians. 18 Cities like Warsaw, Wroc~aw and Gdarisk 
had been devastated. The occupation had also left deep 
Psychological scars on those who had survived. The urban 
population had experienced Nazi rule at its most oppres-
sive and had suffered the harshest material hard s hip s . 
The legacy of the underground struggle continued to 
exercise a strong hold on large sections of the popula tion 
for many years to come. This was to be seen in the c o n-
ditioning of a whole generation to violence and fear, 
conspiracy and civil disobedience and in the intense loyalty 
to the memory of the AK and the secret state. In the 
economic sphere wartime habits: the permanent ' go-slow ' in 
production, the sanctioning of pilfering both on patriotic 
grounds and for the sake of survival, and the black market , 
died hard. There were besides specific postwar social 
problems: an influx of untrained and often illiterate 
labour from the countryside to the towns; the existence of 
pockets of extreme poverty , exceeding even the general 
level of hardship, amongst widows, the unemploy ed , the 
Warsaw lumpenproletariat, for instance. 19 Reactivation 
of industry and distribution was hampered by a virtua l 
collapse of the currency in early 1945, as the wartime 
currencies were replaced by Polish z 10 ty. For a time in 
many areas, vodka , spirit or sugar were used as a means of 
exchange to pay industrial workers and even state employees . 
By May 1945 the shortages of currency and credit had given 
way to fears of inflation. 20 with many of the urban 
population living at or below subsistence -leve~, and workers 
receiving pay in kind rather than cash, the slightest 
disruption in the flow of food supplies was critical to 
the maintenace of production, which in any case stood in 
18 F. Ryszka (ed.) Polska Ludowa 1944- 5 0. Przemiany s po~ec zne 
(OSsolineum, 1974), pp. 279, 285 , 341. 
19 Hillebrandt i Jakubowski Op e cit., pp. 376-78, 349. 
20 Kaliriski i Landau Ope cit., pp. 1 46-53. 
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21 April at only 19% of its 1937 level. Absenteeism was a 
great problem, averaging 10~20% daily and in some indus-
tries over 20%.22 In March and April when the material 
conditions of the workers sank to a new low - real earnings 
in the first half of 1945 were less than 10 % of their 
value in 193823 - short strikes became rife. 
For days at a time food was unavailable. The author-
ities had estimated that contingents would provide abo ut 1 
million tons of grain and 1.9 million tons of potatoes 
in the economic year 1944/45. In fact only 681,000 tons 
of grain and 845,000 tons of potatoes were collected. As 
the army and Red Army had priority for such supplies, no 
more than 20% of these stocks could be made available to 
the civilian population in spring 1945. 24 Minc told the 
May Plenum that there had been some 'progress' - ' a month 
ago there was no bread in Lodz, now they're calling for 
dripping,.25 Where such shortages were combined with 
resentment at the favourable treatment reportedly received 
by others as well as political agitation b y oppo ne nt s of 
the government, the Party was unable to restrain t h e 
workers. It is worth quoting at some length a report sent 
from Lodz to the Central Committee by Loga-Sowinski ', the 
PPR secretary there; it covers the period 15 Ap ril - 15 
May. 
'Against the background of food-supply 
difficulties strong tension of feelings 
21 I. Kostrowicka, Z. Landau, J. Tomaszewski Historia gos-
podarcza Polski XIX i XX wieku (Wars aw , 1975), p. 486 . 
22 GO~~biowski Nacjonalizacja ••• op . cit., p. 222. 
23 Ryszka op. cit., pp. 357-58, 367. It is estimated that 
real earnings in 1945 did not rise abov~ 40% of the 1938 
level. See A. Jezierski Historia gospodarcza Polski 
Ludowej 1944-68 (Warsaw, 1971), p. 120. ' 
24 Ibid., pp. 93-94. 
25 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR ce ntral 
c~mmittee, 20-21 May,1945 , polonsky and Drukier op . 
C~t., p. 438. 
in the factories. In the period of this 
report, especially in the past few days , 
a dozen or so brief strikes in Lodz, 
Pabianice, Kortskie ••• The strikes last 
as long as the shop-floor meetings which the 
works councils call immediately the stoppage 
begins •••• Factory cells display complete 
impotence towards the strikes. As a rule 
the meetings are very st~rmy; the workers, 
and especially the women workers, heckle 
the speakers; they should: "Fine , democracy, 
when there's nothing to eat"; "The parasites 
stuff themselves as always, and the worker 
starves", etc •••• We receive letters from 
workers asking why office-workers have good 
dinners with meat, why speculators go un-
punished, why the shops are full of manu- " 
factures, only the government cannot find 
a way to feed the workers .••• It is clear 
that the strikes are initiated by people 
sent in by the Reaction. The resentment 
of the workers over low pay and poor provi-
sioning creates pretty fertile ground for 
strike-mongers .•• '26 
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Loga-Sowinski added that such ' outbursts of dissatisfactio n 
among the workers inspired by the Reaction cannot in any 
way be regarded as a general index of their mood'. However 
as his report shows the authorities were keenly aware of 
the political dimension to these protests and attempted to 
dissociate economic grievances from broader political dis-
content. Sometimes this seems to have been successful. 
'On 24 March', the Party committee in Warsaw reported, ' a 
public meeting of over a thousand people from the opera-
tional groups (organised to clear the ruins of the city -
J.R.) gathered at 24, Zurawa street with the intention of 
dEmCln C: i "ngbread. The direct intervention of the Party com-
mittee prevented a further demonstration and resulted in 
the meeting ending with pro-government slogans ,.27 Emer-
gency measures were taken to overcome the shortages. Th e 
26 S rawozdanie KW PPR w ~odzi za okres od 15.4 do 15.5 
1945r., Sprawozdania komitetow wojew dzkich PPR z 1945r. 
Z pola walki 1971 nr. 4 (56), p. 287. 
27 ~rawozdanie KW PPR Warsaw , 25.4.45, quoted in Hillebrandt 
i Jakubowsk; 't 261 
... op. c ~ ., p. • 
Party press announced that 
'In mid-July, just before the harvest the 
Warsaw PPR Committee was warned that once 
again there was no flour in the city stores 
and that stock-piles were sufficient for 
only 2-3 days. The City Hall proved help-
less. Not having time to organise workers' 
brigades, the Warsaw committee immediately 
sent a team of its own staff to Sochaczew 
district. They brought back 80 tons of 
flour. The next PPR group was sent to Kutno 
bringing further tons of grain and famine 
was again averted'.28 
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In line with the Party's tactics of mobilising the popula-
tion in mass campaigns and to compensate for its own lack 
of manpower, the communists preferred, whenever possible, 
to despatch workers' brigades into the countryside to 
cOllect contingents. Altogether about 100,000 workers were 
said to have taken part in these brigades. 29 
But improvised measures and propaganda could not con-
ceal the political threat posed by the economic difficul-
ties. Mine , speaking to the Central Committee Plenum in 
February, drew a direct link between the regime ' s authority 
and the success of its management of the economy: 
'If the Provisional Government today c omes 
to the newly-liberated regions with autho-
rity as the real administration of the 
country, this has happened because, amongst 
other things, this Provisional Government 
was able in general to overcome the economic 
difficulties in the territory liberated 
earlier ••• it was able ••• to feed the popula-
tion and to reactivate industry more or less 
efficiently ••• it succeeded in introducing a 
rationing system •..• The future of democracy 
and our triumph depends on whether we are able 
to solve all our economic problems'.30 
However, progress up to Hay fell short of the communists' 
28 Hillebrandt i Jakubowski Op e cit., p. 412 . 
29 R. Zambrowski 0 masow~ rnilionow? partir (Warsaw, 1946) , 
p. 12. 
30 Gomu!ka, Mine, Zambrowski Op e cit., p . 17 . 
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hopes. The ~Politburo was especially concerned over the 
continuing low level of productivity in industry which 
Gomu~ka described as 'catastrophic,.31 Moreover, the wave 
of strikes, which one speaker at the May Plenum described 
as 'the 'most important element of the crisis,32 continued 
with stoppages in Silesia, Zag~~bia, Warsaw, Olsztyn, 
Cz~stochowa and elsewhere. 33 
The experiment in 'workers' control' through the fac-
tory councils also failed to produce the expected political 
dividends, but rather heightened the decentralisation of 
management which was in any case unavoidable during the 
first stages of industrial recovery. Factories tended to 
operate as autonomous units, sometimes even refusing to 
distribute their products to other factories in the prod-
uction chain,34 and works' councils, representing shop-
floor opinion, encroached on the already reduced powers of 
management. 
The decree on works councils was passed after four 
months of discussion on 6 February and remained in force 
effectively until the end of May. Works councils were to 
be formed in all concerns employing more than 20 people and 
were to represent the interests of employees in relation to 
the employer, as well as 'watch over the increase and 
improvement of production of the concern in accordance with 
the general guidelines of state economic policy'. In 
factories under state or local government control - the 
vast majority - the works council .was entitled to direct 
representation in the management board, more or ' less on a 
31 Gomulka Referat wyg~oszony na I og61nokrajowej narad zie 
PPR, 27.5.1945, Artykuly ••• vol. I, OPe cit., p. 265. 
32 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20-21 May 1945, polonsky and Drukier OP e cit., 
p. 433. 
33 Sierocki Warszawska ••• OPe cit., p. 171; J~ Kantyka 
POlska Partia Socjalistyczna na SI?SkU i w Zag~~biu 
D?browskim w latach 1944-48 (Katowlce, 1975), p. 185; E. 
Wojnowski Warmia i Mazury w latach 1944-1947 (Ols ztyn, 
1~70), p. 91; J. Naumiuk Poczetki wradzy ludowej na 
klelecczyznie 1944-47 (Lublin, 1969), p. 130; Naumiuk 
PPR ..• OPe cit., p. 359. 
34 Gomurka Referat wyg~oszony na I og61nokrajowej naradzie 
PPR, 27.5.1945., Artyku~y .•• vol. I, Ope cit., p. 267. 
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par with the director. The director was required to con-
sult the council on a continuous basis and such matte rs 
as taking on or discharging workers and treir pay wid. pr ovi-
Sl.'O f" d " 35 ns were or ]ol.nt- eCl.Sl.on. 
The Party leadership seems to have looked to the works 
councils to provide a powerful check on the activities of 
management, which in many cases was suspected of political 
unreliability. At the February 19 45 Plenum Minc stressed 
the wide role to be played by the councils which were to 
be given 'influence over who will be the director of a 
given factory and will be able to say "no, this one's bad 
and this one is good",.36 
The problems posed by this arrangeme nt soon became 
evident. Frequent conflicts arose between director s , to-
gether with specialist technical staff , o n the one hand , 
and the factor councils, on the other. The workers' rep-
resentatives considered that the managements had failed to 
adjust their thinking to the new order in industry and were 
refusing to allow the councils a n adequate say in decisio n 
making. 37 The specialists in return argu ed t hat t he 
councils undervalued their role. A particular bone of c o n-
tention was the councils' tendency to reduce different i als 
and productivity bonuses, and to exclude no n-manual staff 
from a share of the profits. 38 In some cases the Party's 
radical line unleashed a n ultra-radical response from 
the workers which some comme ntators have def ined as 
'anarcho-syndicalist' in character. 39 The Party was 
35 Dekret Rady Ministr6w, 0 utwor zeniu rad zak~adowych , 
6.2.45, PPR ••• viii 1944 - xii 194 5 Op e cit., pp . 267 - 75 . 
36 Gomu~ka, Minc, Zarnbrowski Ope cit., p. 21. 
37 J. GO~~biowski Problemy nacjonalizacja przemystu in 
Uprzemys~owienie ziem polskich w XIX i XX wieku (Wars aw, 
1970) quoting a KCZZ report for April 1945. 
38 Uchwa~a plenum KC PPR w sprawach gospodarczych, 26 . 5 . 45 , 
PPR •.• viii 1944 - xi i 1945 OPe cit., pp. 145-52. ' 
39 W. Gora Polska Rz e czpospoiita Ludowa 1944-19 4 7 (Warsaw , 
1974), p. 129; see also Syzdek OP e /cit. , pp . 261-2; 
Gomulka Referat wyg~oszony na I ogolnokrajowej naradzie 
PPR, 27.5.1945, Artyku~y •.• vol. lop. cit ., p . 268 . 
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critical of these tendencies. Loga-Sowirtski reported from 
Lodz that the workers' councils had 'an incorrect attitude 
to the directors, (there is) a tendency to fight them, 
remove them and put in their place workers. We are not yet 
ready for this' .40 The communists were also against egal~ 
itarianism in pay. In April the PPR-controlled Central 
Commission of the Trade Unions declared that the operative 
principle on wages should be 'equal pay for equal work', 
elaborating that 
'in setting rates for particular categories 
of workers and staff one should be guided 
by their qualifications and professional 
skills •••• Where technical conditions allow, 
a system of ~±ecework should be applied 
which will have a positive effect on the 
increase in production .... Also, where tech-
nical conditions allow, a ' bonus system should 
be put into operation ••• ,41 
Frequently such conflicts had a strong party political fla -
vour. In many factories despite c alls by the PPR l eader -
ship to share power the communists monopolised the works 
councils. This led to conflict with both the legal and the 
underground wings of the Socialist movement. The PPR 
monopolism also extended from the top to the bottom of the 
trade union apparatus. 'In the Central Commission of the 
Trade Unions out of 23 members, 19 were members of the PPR 
and 4 of the PPS. The composition of the unio n executives 
in the largest industrial centres such as Lodz a nd Katowice 
was similar. In Lodz only one member of the PPS sat o n the 
Regional Union Committee, while in Katowice it consisted 
42 
exclusively of members of the PPR.' In Lod z , again 
according to Loga-Sowinski, ' •.• mo nopolist tendencies are 
40 Sprawozdania KW PPR •.• op. cit., p. ' 287. 
41 UChwala w sprawie p~ac zarobkowych KCZZ , 21/22. 4 . 45 , 
~rawozdanie KCZZ (listopad 1944 - li stopad 1945), 
(Warsaw, 1945), pp. 110-12. 
42 H~ Jakubowska Walka 0 jedn61ite zwi?zki zawodowe w 
E~erwszych latach Polski Ludowej, Stud ia i materia~y z 
dziej6w Polski Ludowej Vol . 12 (1978), p. 1 48 . 
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universal. Comrades resist changes to the benefit of the 
PPS in factory councils or national councils, although 
their composition is in this respect blatantly unjust.' 
It proved very difficult for the Party leadership to over-
come this obdunacy. 'Everywhere we hear the same argument: 
we did not work in order to hand them seats now. (There 
is) suspicion and antipathy towards PPS members. Where 
Party directives are carried out it is formally , without 
conviction,.43 As one modern historian has noted, 'despite 
the suggestions of the Central Committee of the PPR ••. 
changes in union leaderships took place very slowly. PPS 
representation in the Central Commission of the Trade 
Unions itself was not extended until the 1st Congress 
(November 1945 - J.R.) ,.44 Central instructions were 
ignored it seems by local Party organisations and the lead-
ership's campaign from May onwards to stamp out monopolism 
was only partially successful. At the December 1945 Con-
gress Zambrowski listed a whole series of unio ns where the 
situation was still unsatisfactory: 'without doubt the 
balance of forces on the executives of these unions, so far 
as the PPR and PPS is concerned, does not correspond to 
the balance of influence at the grassroots , in the 
factories,.45 
Such distortions not only created tension between the 
communists and their Socialist allies, but in some cases 
strengthened the appeal of anti-government Socialists who 
continued to play the role of spokesmen for the workers 
outside the PPR-dominated unions and factory councils. 
According to a report from Warsaw, 'the WRN holds sway in 
a great many PPS factory circles and engages in openly 
reactionary activity ••• our comrades' ultra-leftism exacer-
bates these conflicts: •• 46 • During February and March 
43 Sprawozdania KW PPR ••. Op e cit ., p . 287 . 
44 Jakubowska Op e cit., pp. 149-50. 
45 Zambrowski 0 masow~ ••• Ope cit., pp. 30-31. 
46 Sprawozdanie KW PPR Warsaw, 20.6.45, quoted in Hillebrandt 
i Jakubowski OP e cit., p. 435. 
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the leadership of the WRN under Kazimierz Puzak and Zygmunt 
Zaremba attempted to reactivate their network, issuing 
instructions ordering a boycott of the Provisional Govern-
ment's political apparatus, but involvement in trade 
unions, factory councils and other social and economic 
organisations. The WRN was also to agitate for a fairer 
and more efficient system of food supply and higher wages. 47 
In mid-March Puzak made a tour of industrial Upper Silesia 
and held one meeting inside a By tom coal mine. 48 
In May the Party leadership shifted the emphasis from 
the workers' p~erogatives to the need to improve discipline 
and raise productivity. The experiment in workers' control 
had blurred managerial responsibility, reinforced ultra-
radical deviations from the central Party line and, in 
many cases, fear of losing control of the councils had res -
ulted in the alienation and exclusion of potential allies 
rather than the broadening of the Party's appeal. 
The National Front 
The third area where by May 1945 the Party's strategy 
had reached an impasse was within the national front itself. 
The communists' monopolist tendencies and conflicts with 
the Socialists in the trades unions and factories were 
symptomatic of more general strains within the governing 
coalition. After October the Party's attitude to its 
allies had reflected the underlying ambiguities in its 
strategy. On the one hand its continuing commitment to 
constructing a national front required the existence and 
growth of the 'Lublin' Socialist and Peasant Parties to 
rally SUpport for the Provisional Government and draw off 
the rank-and-file from the 'London' parties. On t he other 
hand the narrowing of the front and offensive against the 
47 On the activity of the WRN see: K. Puzak Wspomnienia 
1939-45, Zeszyty historyczne 41 (1977), pp. 128-34; Z . 
Zaremba Wojna i konspiracja (London, 1957), pp. 305-06; 
Syzdek OPe cit.~~ pp. 83-84; Reiss OP e cit., pp. 213 -1 4 ; 
Kantyka PPS na Sl~sku ••. Op e cit., pp. 161-62. 
48 PU2ak OPe cit., p. 130. 
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underground meant in practice that the Party was more 
assertive in enforcing its 'leading role'. This meant 
keeping tight control of its allies' organisations and 
strict filtering of recruits to prevent pro-London elements 
taking over. 
The trade-off between safeguard.ing PPR hegemony and 
broadening the base of the regime reappeared sharply in 
early 1945 as the legal parties expanded rapidly in the 
newly-liberated territories. As Table One demonstrates, 
the very rapid growth of the PPR up to April was followed 
by an equally dramatic shedding of members during the 
following months, so that by June the marked imbalance in 
the size of the three main government parties, evident in 
Lublin, had given way to near equality. Such global figures 
Table One Membership of the PPR, PPS and SL in First Half 
of 1945 49 
PPR PPS SL 
1944 December 21,649* 7,663* 5 , 000* 
1945 January 69 , 239 
February 176,337 
March 262 ,6 52 
April 301,695 124,428 
May 255,904 
June 206,510 156,832 200 , 000 
July 188,904 
* Figure for liberated territories only . 
give only a rough " indi6ation, of course , of the re l ative 
organisational strength of the parties, but they do show 
that alongside the PPR, two mass parties had emerged which 
in some areas at least presented the communists with real 
c ompetition. In Krak6w , Katowice and Gdansk, for instance, 
49 Ko~omejczyk PPR ••• op . cit., pp. 275, 277; Reiss op. 
cit., pp. 69, 119, 189; Przygonski op . cit., p. 315; 
Halaba Stronnictwo ••• op . cit., p. 83. 
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th PPS bl th " t 50 e was a e to outpace e commun~s s. 
Moreover, the manner of the expansion of the PPR was 
assessed very critically by the Politburo which at the end 
of April put the process into reverse. 51 In circulars 
i?sued on 7 May, the Central Committee stated that expan-
sion had led to 'a series of negative phenomena', singling 
out the absence of any selectivity in signing-on recruits 
which had allowed corrupt, careerist and 'ideologically 
foreign elements' to join the Party, thereby discrediting 
. 52 ~t and assisting its opponents. The 'open doors' recruit-
ment policy operated during the first weeks after the end 
of the German occupation placed virtually no restrictions 
on new members who were 'registered', often before cells 
had been organised, without any investigation of their 
views or background. The Central Committee was particu~ 
larly disquieted by the massive expansion in Poznan pro-
vince " l' tl . t t d ' . 53 d , a reg~on w~th very It e communlS ra ltlon an 
an old stronghold of the Nationaland C~ristian ~emocrats. 
50 In Krakow (June 1945), the PPS had some 31,000 members 
in the province as a whole to 21,000 for the PPR. In 
the city itself (May 1945) the PPS had over 11,000, 
the PPR 5,000. In Gdansk province the PPS led the PPR 
by 4,000 to 2,000 (May 1945) and in Katowice province 
by 23, 000 to 20, 000 (June 1945). See Z. Kozik Partie i 
stronnictwa polityczne w Krakowskiem 1945-1947 (Kr ak6w , 
1975), p. 23; Reiss op. cit., p. 189; Kol"omejczyk EPR ... 
op. cit., p. 277; R. wapinski Pierwsze lata wl"adzy 
ludowej na wybrzezu gdanskim (Gdansk, 1970), p. 31; K. 
Cwik Problemy wsp6ldzialania PPR i PPS w wojewodztwie 
krakowskim 1945-48 (Krak6w, 1974), p. 51. 
51 Minutes of a meeting of the secretariat of the PPR cen-
tral committee (extracts), 24 April 1945, Polonsky and 
Drukier op. cit., p. 423. 
52 ok61nik KC PPR 'w s rawie u orz dkowania rz nalezno~ci 
p~rtyjnej i oczyszczenia szereg w partii z element w 
n~epoi4dnych (7.4.45) PPR ... viiL1944 xiL1945 _op . cit., 
PP. 12 -31. 
53 Ibid., p. 125. In 1944 Gomulka had described Poznart 
province as 'a blank page for the Party', PPR national 
conference (selected minutes), 12-13 November 1944 
POlonsky and Drukier op. cit., p. 386. 
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Between the end of February and the beginning of May mem-
bership there rose from under 2,000 to over 60,000. During 
May this figure was pruned back to 27,000. 54 Such wild 
fluctuations suggest that the real level of recruitment to 
the Party was much less than the official figures indicated 
and that in very many cases recruits lacked any deep poli-
tical commitment to the PPR. Material and career consider-
ations undoubtedly motivated a large part of the new 
membership as Zambrowski admitted some months later: 
'admittance to the Party took place in 
contravention of all the principles 
obligatory in our Party ••• (members) were 
not admitted, but signed-up, or as it 
was called at the time - registered. 
Anybody who applied was registered and 
amongst them tens of thousands of people 
were registered who joined the Party to 
get a job, to get some work, to get into 
the Militia ••• '55 
In the countryside the second stage of the land reform 
which began in February and benefited altogether 262,000 
families was accompanied by mass recruitment. In the towns 
too the ' Party had considerable patronage at its disposal . 
In LOdz, for instance, in March and April the Party dis-
tributed nearly 9,000 housing units. 56 
In such circumstances it was not difficult to enlarge 
the formal membership without significantly alleviating 
the Party's basic weaknesses unc even intensifying some of 
them. The shortage of reliable cadres remained. Alexander 
Zawadzki complained to the May Plenum that 'we are trying 
to fill every position with a PPR member, but we do not 
57 
have enough people who will follow the Party line'. The 
54 Ko~omejczyk PPR .•• op. cit., pp. 98-99, 277. 
55 Zambrowski 0 masowg ••. op. cit., p. 54. 
56 Koromejczyk PPR •.• op. cit., p. 95. 
57 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20-21 May 1945 polonsky and Drukier op . cit., 
p. 428. 
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influx of members without any previous association with the 
Communist movement did not in many cases dilute the secta-
rian tendencies of Party veterans -; rather the opposite. 
'Careerist elements' were accused 6f ultra-leftism and an 
incorrect attitude to allied parties. 58 The rapidity of 
the expansion had also resulted in a loss of organisational 
coherence by increasing the remoteness of the central 
Party apparatus from local cells. 59 Above all, the major~ 
ity of the leadership does not seem to have considered that 
the Party's growth indicated any real advance in broadening 
the base of the Provisional Government, the continuing 
narrowness of which lay behind the lack of political stab-
ilisation and symptoms of crisis. 60 
As we have remarked, the 'Lublin PPS' was in no posi-
tion to challenge PPR hegemony effectively in 1944 and in 
spite of disputes within the government coalition, the 
communists found it easier to impose a subordinate - status 
on the PPS than on the Peasants. However, from early 1945, 
the PPS gained strength despite the boycott declared by the 
WillI and succeeded in capturing a foothold in traditional 
Socialist strongholds. Although only a handful of the more 
prominent pre-war figures in the party, most notably Adam 
Kuryrowicz, Henryk swi~tkowski, Henryk Wachowicz and a 
little later J6zef Cyrankiewicz and Kazimierz Rusinek, thre w 
in : their lot with the new organisation, at local level it 
proved easier to win over activists and members. 
The communists viewed this process with some apprehen-
sion. In February, even before it was properly underway, 
the sharpest dispute to date between the two parties devel-
oped as the communists attempted to prevent what they 
argued was an influx of WRN supporters into the PPS which 
58 Uchwa{a Plenum KC w sprawach organizacyjnych (26.5.45), 
PPR •.• viii 1944 - xii 1945 op. cit., p. 154. 
59 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., 
Pp. 430-31, 433. 
60 Ibid., pp. 431, 439-40. 
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the communists feared would return to its old ideological 
stance. 61 In the Central Committee Aleksander Kowalski 
warned against exaggerated suspicion and confusing 'real 
62 PPS-ites' with 'enemy agents', but the Politburo was 
inclined to stress the danger. Gomu~ka's report displayed 
the ambiguity in the Party's strategy: its commit~ent to 
the national front combined with hints to the aktyw to keep 
tight checks on potential recruits linked with 'London': 
Our Party sees and realises the benefits 
that the existence of the national front and 
co-operation with the PPS, the Peasants and 
the Democrats bring to the cause of rebuild-
ing Poland and laying the foundations of 
democracy. Our Party draws a distinction 
between those Socialists standing for the 
unity of the democratic camp and those WRN 
elements, alien to socialism, which squeeze 
into the PPS with the aim of pushing it onto 
the wrong course. We consider that decidedly 
hostile WRN elements ought to be excluded 
from political life ••. '63 
Within the PPS leadership only Matuszewski and his 
group accepted the communists' analysis wholeheartedly. 
Matuszewski went so far as to insist that 'People from the 
WRN have no place in the reborn party and their ideology 
64 
must be ruthlessly combated'. But other speakers at the 
PPS Supreme Council on 25/26 February favoured a more lib-
eral attitude to the WRN rank-and-file as well as towards 
the pre-war traditions of the party, taking the view that 
the threat of a WRN take-over was exaggerated and that the 
rignt could be contained. 65 But behind the discussion of 
the WRN and party traditions lay the question of the role 
of the PPS in the government coalition and the general 
61 Gomu~ka Referat wyg~oszony na rozszerzonym plenum KC PPR 
6.2.1945 r., Artyku~y ••• vol lop. cit., p. 215. 
62 Hillebrandt i Jakubowski op. cit., p. 434. 
63 Gomu!ka Referat wyg~oszony na rozszerzonym plenum KC PPR 
6.2.1945r., Artyku~y .•• vol lop. cit., p. 215. 
64 Reiss op. cit., p. 106. 
65 Sierocki PPR-owska op. cit., p. 12. 
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political situation. As usual Drobner did not mince his 
words, complaining that 'in grassroots circles of the PPR 
there is a conviction tha~ only the PPR has the right to 
govern'. It was necessary, he went on, 'to dispel fear 
amongst our members, to make them aware that we are not a 
department of another party, but that we are an equal, sove-
reign party,.66 Such sentiments were supported by Kury~o­
wicz, Obr?czka, Motyka and others, in many cases linked 
with the Krak6w PPS organisation. 67 Between the Krak6w and 
Hatuszewski wings of the party, OS6bka-Morawski's group 
still dominated the leadership. Of the twelve Central 
Executive members elected in February, 8 had belonged to 
the pro-KRN RPPS. Kury~owicz and Matuszewski were included 
too, but not Drobner, who was replaced as chairman of the 
Supreme Council by swi~tkowski from the pro-communist 
'left,.68 The resolutions passed also represented a rejec-
tion of Drobner's stance. 69 Nevertheless, Osobka-Morawski, 
with greater circumspection than the Krakow activists, was 
working towards the expansion and increased independence o f 
the PPS, calling, for instance, on ex-Socialists to leave 
the PPR and join his party.70 Talks were also started in 
February between the PPS leadership and WRN leaders from 
/ • 0 71 Krakow associated with zygmunt Zu~awskl. 
The strains in communist-Socialist relations at the 
top were paralleled by much sharper conflicts at local 
level. In Krak6w, according to Aleksander Kowalski, ' an 
atmosphere of intrigue and suspicion reigned betwee n the 
PPR and pPS. (W~odzimierz) Zawadzki (the local PPR 
66 Bardach 0 dziejach .•• OPe cit., p. 688. 
67 C ok Wl OPe cit., p. 49. 
68 Syzdek OPe cit., pp. 107-8, 453. 
69 Reiss OPe cit., p. 109. 
70 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
c ommittee, 20-21 May 1945 polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., 
p. 435. 
71 Kozik OPe cit., p. 32. 
138 
secretary - J.R.) told the PPS leadership to their faces 
that he had his people amongst them and knew what resolu~ : 
tion they passed,.72 In Upper Silesia Socialist meetings 
b k ' 73 h'l' h were ro en up by the communlsts, w 1 e ln May t e 
Ministry of Public Security had to issue instructions not 
to arrest members of the PPS and Peasant Party without 
clearance from above. 74 
Similar processes were at work in the legal SL . More 
than the PPS, its expansion rested on members of the under-
ground party who now left the conspiracy without revising 
their outlook or abandoning their allegience to Wincenty 
Witos and Miko~ajczyk, the pre-war and wartime leaders of 
h 75 t e movement. The resumption of legal activity by for-
mer 'ROCh' members, and indeed whole organisations, was 
made easier by the rift between Miko?ajczyk and the London 
government after his resignation as premier. The party in 
Poland supported his position and attempted to force London 
to retreat from its intransigent stance with threats to 
76 
withdraw from the underground apparatus . 
However, the leadership of the SL remained in the 
hands of the pro-communists. After the liberation the 
'Wola ludu' group took over from the executive installed in 
Lublin and this change was endorsed, with some dissent from 
Matlanka and others, at the Supreme Council held in Lodz 
on 25-26 March. 77 But a more significant conflict emerged 
72 Ibid., pp. 41-50; Extracts of the minutes of the plenum 
of the PPR central committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky 
and Drukier OPe cit., p. 429. 
73 Kantyka PPS na Sl~skU ••• OP e cit., p . 157; Bardach 0 
dziejach .•• Op e Clt., p. 688. 
74 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20-21 May 1945 polonsky and Drukier OP e cit ., 
p. 437. 
75 Halaba Stronnictwo •.. OP e cit.~ p . 84 . 
76 Buczek SL ••. OPe cit., p . 378 . 
77 A. Wojtas Kr z ka "Rocha". Powstanie 
S L " \'10 1 a 1 :':u:'::d;-Oul."t;:., L.::;~::-=-.::::...:;/c=...:~'=""-='~7-:::-:--;~=-=:-:n::-o::-:;:t--:g:-:i;-:v::-::-e-=n:-,-""1i""n9"'j7:-;::6""-, ....;...=. 
p. 165. 
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between Batczyk, the party president, who inclined towards 
a compromise with 'ROeh' and Kowalski, his deputy, who 
represented the communists' line. On this occasion the 
Kowalski faction was able to shape the resolutions passed 
and Baticzyk's followers were heavily outnumbered on the 
newexecutive. 78 But although the PPR could still ensure 
that the SL leadership was controlled by its nominees, the 
movement at local and even provincial level was to a con-
siderable degree under 'ROeh' influence. By May, the poli-
tical tension in the country generally was reflected in 
the growth of open opposition in the SL to the communists 
and the government which the leadership found increasingly 
difficult to restrain. At a congress of the peasant youth 
organisation, 'Wici', and again at a meeting of SL deputies 
to the KRN, fierce attacks were made on the communists and 
their management of the government, while anti-communist 
feeling in the provincial organisations prompted the lead-
ership to issue a special circular which called for party 
discipline and underlined the need for co-operati o n with 
the PPR. 79 
By May 1945 the PPR tactic of constructing the national 
front 'from below' had met only very limited success. 
Although it had been possible to embrace memberships of 
many thousands within the framework of the allied parties 
and place at their head executives dominated by pro-
communists, it had proved far more difficult to break old 
allegiances and win the loyalty of the new members for the 
government coalition. The difficulty was heightened by 
the resistance of many local Party activists to working 
with organisations which they considered were riddled with 
underground and reactionary connections. 
78 A. Wojtas op. cit., p. 166; Halaba Stronnictwo .•. op . 
cit., p. 81. 
79 Ibid., pp. 102-3; S. Jarecka-Kimlowska Zwi~zek M~odziezy 
Wiejskiej "Wici". Walka 0 oblicze ideowe i nowy model 
organizacyjny 1944-48 ' (Warsaw, 1972), pp. 92-94. 
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By May the communists judged the situation in the PPS 
to have-improved since February when they had feared that 
it might slip from under the control of the pro-communist 
group. However, the PPR concluded that it was because the 
Socialist leadership was not automatically subservient to 
80 the PPR that this improvement had taken place. The 
situation in the SL was, on the other hand, extremely un-
stable, the communists concluded, because it was led by 
'our people' who had very little contact with the rank-and-
file members. The domination by pro-communists at the top 
had turned out to be an obstacle which stood in the way of 
winning over the mainstream of the movement. The treatment 
of the SL as 'an annex of the PPR' and as 'an appendix 
which had to be tolerated' had been mistaken. As Gomu!ka 
put it, a new course was required, 'so that the SL c an 
become an independent party, with equal rights in the coal -
ition ••• there are many peasant activists within our grasp 
who we have yet to win over' .81 
The Question of Sovereignty 
'Our central problem is state sovereignty ', declared 
Edward Ochab at the May Plenum, ' the war is over, the Red 
Army shoUld leave Polish territory ••• ,.8 2 The Soviet pre-
sence was indeed a crucial ingredient of the political 
crisis, casting doubt not only on Poland's sovereignty, but 
also on the sovereignty of the Party leadership within 
Poland and even within the Party itself. 
The lesser problem was the relationhip between the 
Politburo and the Kremlin. Berman and Finkielsztajn, who 
were both closely involved with Soviet-Polish liaison, 
agreed at the Plenum that Stalin respected the right of the 
Poles to direct their own affairs . According to Berman, 
'S talin stands for Poland's sovereignty and knows what the 
80 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Drukier op . cit., 
Pp. 431-32. 
81 Ibid., p. 427. 
82 Ibid., p. 430 . 
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PPR understands by sovereignty'. The problem arose at a 
lower level of the Soviet apparatus, as Finkielsztajn 
pointed out: 'There is a difference between the positio n o f 
Stalin on sovereignty and how the Soviets in the terrain 
conceive this matter'. He added that the fault also lay 
with the over-cautiousness of the Party itself: 'Poland's 
foreign policy must cotncide with the principles of the 
Soviet Union's policy, but within the framework of that 
policy we are able to defend our own interests; there is a 
lot of room for independence. We have not exploited these 
po . b . l' . b' ,83 ss~ ~ ~t~es, we have not een act~ve • 
Uncertainty over Soviet policy towards Germany caused 
disquiet in the Party leadership and was considered to b e 
one area where Poland would need to assert its claims more 
energetically. It was feared that if Moscow decided to 
court German opinion it could be at the expense of Poland ' s 
cl ' t d . 84 h f a1m 0 the territory up to the 0 er-Ne~sse. Suc ears 
were heightened by delays in the hand-over of administratio n 
of these territories to the Poles. The sudden resumptio n 
in mid-May by the Russians of administration in Szczecin , 
which had earlier been transferred to the Provisional 
Government , was 
strong protest, 
especially worrying . Ochab demanded a 
'it is a political defeat , an alarm signa l. 
And now there are rumours about Wroc~aw .•. '. 85 
But the need to press Polish interests more vigorously 
than hitherto during the peace settlement was a less imme-
diate problem than putting a 'stop to the pOlitical interfe-
rence and marauding of Russian officers and troops stationed 
in Poland. The lawlessness of some Red Army units was 
having very damaging effects on public opinion . According 
to Aleksander Zawadzki 'the population in Silesia was 
enthusiastic towards the Soviet Union. Today its attitude 
is decidedly unfavourable ••. the debauchery of Red Army 
83 Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., pp. 434, 436. 
84 Ibid., p. 425 . 
85 Ibid., p . 430. 
142 
troops returning from Soviet territory, marauding and 
outrages ••• alienate the nation from the Soviet Union,.86 
Plundering took place both in the form of individual 
'trophy-hunting' as well as on an organised basis. In 
May, despite decisions taken during Bulganin's latest visit 
many factories and much of the transport system remained 
under Soviet administration and its dismantling and removal 
eastwards continued. 87 As we have seen, the Red Army was 
also widely used to liquidate the AK. According to a 
report from Bia~ystok province, 'up to now the partial 
destruction of the bands has been carried out mainly by the 
Red Army (not enough Polish Army); this has had a negative 
effect on the mood of the population,.88 Soviet 'advisers' 
also played a major role in the UB, where Radkiewicz 
a d h 1 b d . 89 gree t at their impact had recent y een amaglng. But 
it was the Soviet commanders stationed in the localities 
who were considered by the Party leaders to have created 
the most trouble with their interference in affairs outside 
their competence which often cut rtght across the PPR 
line. According to Zambrowski, 'not only the Central Com-
mittee makes Party policy. The military commanders do as 
well. In Lodz, for example, they summon precinct commit-
tees without the provincial committee knowing and send them 
to rallies; Red Army troops campaign for kolkhozy ... ' .90 In 
Malbork and Kwidzyn the Soviet authorities prohibited the 
f 91 ormation of PPS, Peasant and Democratic Party branches. 
86 Polonsky and Drukier op. cit., p. 429. 
87 Ibid., pp. 424, 429 . 
88 Sprawozdanie KW PPR w Bialymstoku za lipiec 1945r., 
Sprawozdania KW PPR .•• op . cit., p. 293 . 
89 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20-21 May 1945 polonsky and Drukier o p. cit., 
p. 437. 
90 Ibid., p. 432. 
91 S. Przywuski PPS w woj. Gdanskim 1945-48. Powstanie, 
organizacja i formy dzia~ania Z po1a wa1ki 1978 nr. 1 
( 81) • 
143 
The tendency of some local party organisations to 
fOllow the lead of the Soviet and security organs rather 
than central directives was particularly disturbing to the 
Central Committee. The inexperience of local cadres, the 
danger and often isolation in which they worked, the ultra-
radical euphoria which gripped much of the aktyw and esp-
eCially the KPP veterans during the first months of power 
not to mention the calls from above for greater vigilance 
and tough measures against the reaction lay behind this 
tendency. Local cells looked to the real sources of their 
strength: the Soviet presence and the security forces and 
the Party's hold on the state apparatus rather than the 
uncertain and frequently ineffective assistance of the 
allied parties, or even of the central Party network itself. 
This was one of the main counts against Wrodzimierz 
Zawadzki who was removed as Party secretary for Krakow on 
16 April. Gomu~ka accused him of followfung hfus own line 
'which sUbstituted Security for the Party's policy', while 
Berman categorised his deviation more precisely: 'Jasny 
(Zawadzki) formulated the theory that every problem in 
Poland may be solved by the aid of the Red Army. This is 
92 a Trotskyist theory of revolution carried on bayonets'. 
Zawadzki seems to have been made a scapegoat for what was 
a more general phenomenon. His running of the Krakbw orga-
nisation accorded with the feelings of much of the aktyw 
there and there was some dissatisfaction at his sacking. 93 
Indeed such was his popularity with the communist veterans 
at grassroots level in the city that in November they 
rebelled against the Central Committee and elected him as 
a delegate to the Party Congress. The leadership responded 
by expelling him from the Party.94 
92 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20-21 May 1945 polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., 
pp. 426-27, 434. 
93 Kozik OPe cit., p. 50. 
94 Central Party Control Commission resolution of 28 
November 1945 concerning Zawadzki, W~odzimierz (Jasny) 
and Minutes of a hearing with W~odzimierz Zawadzki, 26 
November 1945, Polonsky and Drukier OPe cit., pp. 450-51; 
~rotok6! z pOSe Sekretariatu KC w dniu 15.XI.45, Proto-
~oly KC (1945) Zeszyty Historyczne 24 (1973), p. 147. 
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The degree to which the Party leadership had lost 
control of internal events was highlighted by the opening 
of negotiations between the Soviet military authorities and 
the leadership of the underground at the end of March, 
which as we have seen, concluded with the arrest of the 
fifteen London delegates and subsequent trial in Moscow. 
While much has been published in the West about this epi-
95 
sode, we know nothing about the motives of the Russians 
in seizing the Poles or how and at what level the decision 
to do so was taken. However, it seems clear that the 
Polish communists did not participate in any of the prelim-
inaries leading up to the 'talks', nor in the charade on 
27-28 Barch which seems to have been executed by the NKVD 
without any outside assistance. It is difficult to recon-
cile the coup with the Party's wider efforts to establish 
its national credentials and stabilise the political situ-
ation and it seems unlikely that the Politburo would have 
allowed what was an embarrassing affront to its authority 
to have oCcurred if it had had any influence on the deci-
sion. Probably the communists were presented with a fait 
accompli. This was the view of the underground leadership 
which replaced the arrested delegation . The new Delegate, 
Stefan Korbonski, informed London that 'Lublin government 
circles consider the arrest of the fifteen by the Soviets 
a great mistake. They themselves are washing their hands 
of it ••• ,.96 It is worth noting that Wincenty Witos was 
also arrested on 31 March by the NKVD and driven to Brzes6 
on the Polish-Soviet border and then, mysteriously, driven 
back and released. Although Witos apparently thought it 
was his poor health which cut short this strange journey, 
95 See for instance: Puzak op. cit., p. 134 et passim; K. 
Baginski Proces szesnastu w Moskwie Zeszyty Historyczne 
4 (1964): . Z. - Stypulkowski Iftvitation t6 Mos cow (Londo n, 
1951); Korbonski Polskie .•• op. cit., pp. 220-22 ; Polish 
Plotters on Trial. The Full report of the trial of :' 
Polish Diversionists in Moscow , June 1945 (London, 1945). 
96 APUST File 52, L.dz.K. 3346/45, Korbortski to London, 
received 11 .6. 45. 
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it seems more probable that it was political intervention, 
perhaps with the Soviet government, or perhaps from the 
Polish leadership.97 
By Mayall sections of the leadership of the PPR seem 
to have been agreed on the urgency of sharply reducing the 
role of the Soviet forces and asserting the Party's pri-
macy in directing affairs in Poland. Gomulka summed up 
this feeling with the remark that 'the masses ought to see 
us as a Polish party. Let them attack us as Polish commu-
. 98 n~sts and not as an agency' The strategy of using the 
Red Army to crush 'London' while the Party established a 
political base and consolidated its hold on the state appa-
ratus had failed. The repressive measures of the Soviet 
forces had proved an obstacle to stabilisation, had rein-
forced the communists' isolation and fuelled the opposition . 
The May Turn 
Between mid-April when Zawadzki was ousted (Gomu~ka 
I 99 ca led his dismissal 'the first warning step' ) and early 
June, the Party line was put into reverse. Although he 
claimed _that there was no '180 degree turn; only a "recog-
nition of deviations"', Gomu!ka at the same time demanded 
that 'a real, fundamental turn in the policy of grassroots 
organisations' should take place. His claim that 'the line 
from the occupation, the line of the July manifesto, remains 
in force', was disingenuous since October 1944 a very dif-
ferent line had been pursued in practice. IOO The London 
97 
98 
99 
S. W6jcik Stanowisko W. Witosa w 1945r., Zeszyty 
Historyczne 34 (1975), p. 200. 
Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR Centra l 
committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Drukier, OP e cit., 
p. 426. 
Gomulka Referat wygloszony na I ogolnokrajowej naradzie 
PPR, 27.5.1945r., Artykuly ••• vol. lop. cit., p. 283. 
100 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Drukier OP e cit., 
p. 428. 
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was in no doubt that the Party was following a new course, 
on 12 June Korborlski informed London that 'During the past 
few days a sudden and fundamental change has been executed 
in the Lublin press and tactics,.lOl 
The essentials of the new line were unveiled at the 
Central Committee Plenum held on 20-21 May and annolIDced t o the 
top Party aktyw at a special conference a week later. As 
Usual ythe turn was accompanied by a redefinition of the 
Party's strategic formula. In October the twin tests of 
support for the national front were active commitment to the 
destruction of the opponents of the PKWN and the establish-
ment of a 'democratic' Poland. Ih Mayall that was req- " 
uired was recognition of the authority of the Provisional 
Government and compliance with its decrees. Thus, the 
'democratic national front' of 'struggle with the domestic 
reaction for a strong, democratic Poland,102 of October, 
gave way to the more inclusive broad or united (wsp61ny) 
'democratic national front' embracing 'all those groups 
and political activists who recognise the Provisional 
Government of the Polish Republic ••• (and) express a 
readiness to assist the implementation of all state instruc-
tions' .103 Gomu~ka elaborated for the aktyw what this 
meant: 'We are not opening the doors for everybody. We 
have one basic criterion. We say: we will co-operate with 
those groups and political element~ which above all recog-
nise the Provisional Government as the only authority 
operating in Poland on the basis of the national will and 
••• undertake to co-operate with the government in rebuild-
ing the country. Provided these conditions are fulfilled, 
we consider both discussion and criticism as possible if 
it does not conflict with the fundamental principles of 
101 APUST File 52 L.dz.K. 3439/45 Korbonski to London, 
12.6.45. 
102 Gomu~a Referat wyg~oszony na naradzie PPR w Lublinie 
lO.lO.1944r., . Artyku~y •.• vol. lop. cit., p. 115. 
103 Uchwa~a plenum KC PPR w sprawie politycznych, 26.5.45 
PPR ••• viii 1944 - xii 1945 OPe cit.," p. 141. 
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the democratic front ' .104 In the terminology of one Warsaw 
historian, the formula applying from late 1944 to spring 
1945 of 'he who is not with us is against us' or even 'not 
everyone who is with us is with us', was now replaced with 
the same criterion in force the previous summer : 'he who 
105 is not against ~s in for us'. 
The turn~around was most evident in a revision in the 
Party's attitude to the AK . The blanket condemnation of 
the AK 'from beginning to end, without distinction between 
leaders and led',106 was now replaced with a policy of dis -
tinguishing the 'honest AK ' from ' the reactionary part of 
the AK '. It was admitted that unjust arrests of AK members 
h d d . ., 107 d' a rlven others back lnto consplracy. Accor lng to 
underground reports to London, posters with the slogan 
'Down with the AK and NSZ cut-throats' disappeared and in 
their place it was confirmed 'in all the press and official 
statements that the AK are heroes,.l08 On 30 Maya partial 
amnesty was ordered covering those arrested for co nnections 
with the AK who had not actually participated in armed 
resistance to the new authorities and had not held command 
Positions in the AK. The same order instructed the use of 
propaganda to persuade 'as many people as possible to 
leave the forests,.109 
Methods of combating the partisans changed too . Prio-
rity was given to deploying Polish units rather than 
104 Gomu~ka Referat wyg~oszony na I ogolnokrajowej naradzie 
PPR, 27.5.l945r., Artyku~y •.. vol . I OP e cit ., pp . 284 
lOS Za~uski OP e cit., p. 460 . 
106 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of t he PPR central 
c?mmittee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Orukier OP e 
Clt., p. 432. 
107 Gomu~ka Referat wyg~oszony na I ogolnokrajowej naradzie 
PPR 27.5.1945r., Artyku~y ... vol. I Op e cit., pp . 281 - 82 . 
108 APOST File 52 L.dz. K. 3439/45 Ope cit.. 
109 Walichnowski OPe cit ., p. 135. 
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RUssians against the underground. On 24 May the Internal 
Security Corps (KBW) was formed from the existing Interior 
Armies and some regular units, and the 1st, 3rd and 9th 
Infantry Divisions were ordered to eastern Poland for dut-
; . h . 11 110 A h' 1 d ~es aga~nst t e guer~ as. new emp as~s was pace 
on the political aspect of operations too. An all-party 
-'Supreme Political Commission to Combat Banditry' was cre-
at d d h . h' III d . l' . e un er Gomu~ka's c a~rmans lP, an specla agltpro p 
groups' were attached to anti-insurgency units. The 
instructions issued to these groups stressed the need to 
deprive the guerillas of their popular base and prestige. 
They were depicted as 'bandits' who 'murder peasants, sol-
diers and militiamen, steal from the population and state 
property, want to prevent the country's reconstruction •.. 
and Poland benefiting from the blessings of peace'. Group 
members were to avoid parading their party allegiances , but 
appear as 'representatives of the population, of the demo-
cratic camp'. The key to military success was 'the com-
plete isolation of the bands from the population , and the 
resistance of the population to the bands'. Assurances 
were also given that partisans and deserters who gave them-
selves up to the authorities would not be punished. 112 
The change of tactics resulted almost immediately in talks 
opening between the authorities and guerilla units in some 
areas. 113 
Industrial policy too underwent a marked transforma-
tion. Its keynote now was the improvement of productivity 
and labour-discipline and an end to the radical experimen-
tation and improvisation which had reigned in the factories 
over the previous months. 
110 Walichnowski op. cit., pp. 136-37. 
111 
112 
Protok6~ posiedzenia G~6wnej Komisji Politycznej dla 
spraw Walki z Bandytyzmem, 8 .6. 45~ Z pola walki 1965 
nr. 3 ( 31) pp. 196- 200 • 
Instrukcja KC PPR 0 zadaniach grup agit-prop . przy jed-
nostkach WP prowadz~cych walk~ z bandami reakcyjnymi , 
June 1945, PPR ••• v~ii 1944 - xii 1945 op. cit., pp. 
174-78. 
113 Protok6~ pos. GKP •.• op. cit. , pp. 198-200. 
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The problem of raising productivity was considered by 
the Politburo to be of foremost significance in achieving 
economic recovery and political stabilisation. 'The situ-
ation which exists today in this area is not just unsatis-
factory, but one must ~ay, outright alarming, outright 
catastrophic. If we do not solve the problem of increasing 
labour productivity then we will not solve any of the 
problems which stand before us in this both economically 
and politically difficult situation, we will not maintain 
d' ,114 h' , f emocrat~c power in Poland.... T ~s was a v~ctory or 
the view of Minc's Ministry of Industry, so it seems, over 
trades union representations. As early as 2 April Mi nc 
had issued instructions on measures to raise productivity 
which ignored the role of the trade unions and works 
councils. llS The trades unions had, on the other hand, 
still argued that the subsistence of the workers was ' the 
deciding question' determining their productive capacity 
in a resolution of 22-22 April . 116 
The first step taken to bring about this improvement 
in productivity was a marked curbing of the powers of the 
works councils in favour of the management. In May the 
wide role which the councils had played in practice in the 
factories for some months received legal regulation as the 
February decree carne into force . At the same time instruc-
t ; , f 1 1 ' 117 h 
.ons were issued on hold~ng orma e ect~ons . At t e 
May Plenum however the leadership carne down strongly in 
favour of 'the increased and strengthened authority of the 
director, engineer and foreman ', which was spelt out as 
114 Gomu~ka Referat wyg~oszony na I og6lnokrajowej naradzie 
PPR, 27.S.1945r., Artyku~y ••. vol I op . cit., p . 265 . 
115 Kalinski i Landau op . cit., p. 84. 
116 Uchwa~a KCZZ w spr. aprowizacji, 21-22.4 . 45, Sprawoz-
danie KCZZ ••• op. cit., pp. 121-22. 
117 The decree carne into force on 20 May • . Election arrange-
ments were governed by an order of the Ministry of 
Labour, 7 May . Ryszka op . cit., p . 313n. 
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meaning that while the management and works council ought 
jOintly to decide questions concerning the employment and 
laying off of workers as " well as housing, rationing and 
other material and social needs of the workforce, 'the 
director alone decides all matters relating to the economic 
and technical management of the concern as well as matters 
related to bonuses,.118 On 1 June Minc's Ministry issued 
instructions limiting the role and powers of the councils 
119 
'in the name of efficient economic management'. This 
move was discussed at a National Industrial Conference held 
on 2-3 June. 120 As Go~~biowski has commented 'in conse-
quence of the decisions taken the works councils and 
labour-force were deprived of direct influence on the 
121 
economic management of concerns'. Thus just as elec- ' 
tions got underway and the membership of the councils was 
broadened, they lost their hold on the factory purse -
strings. 
Complementing these changes there was a further cen-
tralisation in the overall management of the economy . 
Individual concerns were brought more closely under central 
d · . 122 1rect10n, and 'the emergency measures reminiscent of 
Soviet war communism (in 1918-21 - J.R.) ' by which the 
economy had been run since mid_1944 123 began to be tempered 
by the first moves towards systematic planning. On 8 June 
. 124 M1nistries received instructions to draw up plans. 
118 Uchwa~a plenum KC PPR w spr. gospodarczych, 26.5.45, 
PPR ••• viii 1944 - xii 1945 Ope cit., p. 147. 
119 Ryszka OPe cit., p. 313n; see also Gomulka Wywiad dla 
redakcji czasopi sma "Trybuna Zwiezkowca" , 1.6.45, 
Artyku~y ••• vol. I OPe cit., pp. 288-92. 
120 Kaliriski i Landau OP e cit., p. 83. 
121 Ibid., p. 83. 
122 Ibid ., p. 83. 
123 J.M. Montias Centr~l Planning in Poland (2nd ed ., 
Westport , Conn., 1974), p. 52. 
124 C . k . W 1 op . C 1 t., p. 108. 
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On pay, the Central Committee reaffirmed its rejec-
tion of egalitarianism in favour of linking wages to 
productivity and skills, with non-manual employees receiv-
ing a share of profits. Wage-rates were to be reformed 
throughout industry during June. Simultaneously prices 
were to be revised so as to increase the profitability of 
industry while avoiding large price rises in basic consumer 
goods, manufactures for agriculture and industrial raw 
materials. Transport and service charges were to cover 
costs, with reduced fares for certain groups, especially 
for workers. 125 
Even before the Plenum steps had been taken to speed 
up the reprivatisation of small and middle industry under 
temporary state management. An Act of 6 May embodied 
fairly liberal terms governing the restoration of factories 
to their original owners and an Industry Ministry circular 
of 15 May was designed to accelerate this process. 126 At 
the Plenum itself Gomulka complained that the Party had 
not been able to revitalise the private sector , and called 
for a far bolder POlicyl27 and the economic resolution 
demanded a greater iole for 'private initiative' and trade . 
With some reservations the Central Committee gave its back-
ing for a large-scale expansion of "Spo:tem", the main 
established co-operative organisation in Poland , grafting 
the ZSCh co-ops onto this network. 128 This represented a 
retreat, for the time being, by the communists who had 
hoped to set up the Union as a separate co-operative move-
ment under their influence. It was also a concession to 
125 Uchwata plenum KC PPR w sprawach gospodarczych, 26 . 5.45 , 
PPR ••• viii 1944 - xii 1945 op. cit., pp . 147-8. 
126 Kalinski i Landau op . cit., pp. 86-89 ; Ryszka op . cit., 
p. 315. 
127 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR 
central committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Drukier 
op. cit., p. 424. 
128 Uchwa£a plenum KC PPR w sprawach gospodarczych, 26.5.45, 
PPR .•• viii 1944 - xii 1945 op. cit., pp . 147 - 48 . 
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the Socialists who had strong links with "Spolem". In 
early May Minc had severely criticised the 'old co-operative 
movement', arguing that its structure did not suit the 
new political and economic regime. This had aroused a 
stout defence of existing arrangements from the Socialist 
co-operators led by Jan terkowski, president of "Spolem". 
By the time of the co-op 'parliament' in Lodz on 10 June 
these differences had been resolved, largely to the satis-
faction of the PPS. Minc abandoned his critical stance 
and fell in with the decision not to create a separate 
new movement. 129 
Within the Party leadership the question of the role 
of the co-operatives was bound up with deeper programmatic 
problems. Its economic standpoint remained ill-defined 
and although Mine took the lead in attempting to systema-
tise the Party's improvisations into a model his a nalyses 
still lacked precision and were not e n s hrined as official 
positions. At the February 1945 Plenum he had devoted s ome 
attention to theoretical matters, concluding that the 
present stage was characterised by the struggle between 
'private capitalism', which was 'unrestrained, uncontro lled 
Unregulated, without a bridle, collar or mu zzle ' . and 
'state capitalism', which involved the handing-over by 
capitalism of a 'part of its profits to society', and the 
removal 'of its most venemous speculatory fangs ' ,130 In 
May he commented on the view that Poland was experiencing 
an NEP-style co-existence of private and state sectors, a 
view he described as 'thoroughly wrong and dangerous '. He 
argued that Poland was in fact 'a capitalist system under-
going a democratic revolution', and that this was differ -
ent. 131 Some members of the leadership were prepared to 
129 S. Jare cka-Kimlowska Z problemow spoidzielczosci 
wiejskiej w Polsce w latach 1944-57 (Warsaw , 1977), pp . 
27-29. 
130 Gomulka, Minc, Zambrowski Ope cit., p. 20. 
131 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR 
central c ommittee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Drukier 
oP e cit., p. 438. 
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consider very unorthodox solutions to the problem of 
defining Poland's unorthodox economic arrangements. Ochab 
suggested the concept of 'Co-operative Republic', but 
Zambrowski spoke against this. 132 
In practice May 1945 saw the i.1ntroduction of the 
'three-sector model' in which state, co-operative and pri-
yate sectors existed side-by-side. For the Socialists this 
model was looked upon as a satisfactory long~erm arrange-
ment. The ' communists, on the other hand, viewed it as a 
transitional stage suited to the initial years of economic 
recovery and consolidation of power, but from 1947 pressed 
for its transformation towards socialism, by which they 
meant the clear supremacy of the state sector over reduced 
and dependent co-operative and private elements. 
The emergence of the tripartite economic model was 
paralleled by the institutionalisation in May and June 1945 
of the multi-party system based on the PPR, Socialists and 
Peasants. In addition, two smaller organisations: the 
Democratic Party, representing the urban intelligentsia and 
trade, and the Party of Labour (Stronnictwo Pracy - SP) 
representing Catholics, were allowed to organise. The 
National Party, the anti-communist wing of the PPS and 
former AK circles were prevented from organising their own 
legal parties and either joined the legal 'opposition ', 
ceased political activity or operated in conspiracy. The 
communists were not of course prepared to allow the other 
parties to threaten their hegemony within the government 
coalition or their control over the key instruments of 
state power: the army, security, police and penal system, 
upper levels of the administrative apparatus and t he media. 
Nevertheless it is fair to say that from mid-1945 until 
early 1947 a genuinely pluralistic party system functioned 
in Poland in which the communists could not automatically 
rely on their allies to follow their lead as was to be the 
132 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR 
central committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Drukier 
oP e cit., pp. 430, 432. 
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case by 1948-9. 
The development of this system followed from the 
communists' decision in May to broaden the national front 
and, in particular, to relax their hold on the leadership 
of the Peasant Party and allow the recruitment of members 
of ~ROCh' on a large scale. At the Plenum the use of 
'plants' to direct the policy of the SL leadership was 
heavily criticised and it was decided that particularly 
discredited figures such as Janusz (the deputy-premier) and 
Bertold (Minister of Agriculture), should be removed. How-
ever the use of plants 'for information purposes' was 
continued. 133 The communists seem to have hoped t ha t even 
without their direct intervention the bulk of 'ROCh' could 
be contained within the existing legal SL and that the 
minority of the party committed to .co-operating with the 
PPR would be able to keep Miko~ajczyk, on his return , in 
check. 134 Zambrowski speaking confide ntially in August 
said that the Party's initial tactic s had been to force 
Miko~ajczyk to join 'a single, uni ted party, on t he plat-
form of the existing SL, in which the SL would have a 
majority,.135 Confident that the pro-communi st factions 
would continue to guide the direction of the SL and PPS , 
the Politburo was prepared to envisage a wide range of 
free debate among the coalition parties, pledging itself 
to the 'principle of equality, of discussion and agreement 
of the more important resolutions and steps ••• the encou r -
agement of debate and admission of cri t ici sm , and also 
oPPosition, as long as it does not clash with t he ba s i s 
133 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR 
central committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky a nd Drukier 
op. cit., p. 441. 
134 Minutes of a meeting of the secretariat of the PPR 
central committee (extracts) I 23.6.45 Polonsky and 
Drukier op. cit., p. 449. 
135 Protok6~ z posiedzenia Sekretariatu KC odby tego w 
d niu 8.8.1945r., Protoko~y KC (194 5 ), op . cit., p . 
132. 
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itself of the coalition ••. •• 136 
The Party's attitude to the PPS also changed from 
May 1945. The campaign of February to prevent an uncon-
trolled expansion of the PPS by playing on the alleged WRN 
menace was discontinued and the question of merging the 
two parties was placed on ice in favour of an indefinite 
P . d . 137. . I . er~o of partnersh~p. Th~s spec~a partnersh~p of the 
workers' parties, the 'united front', was given a new 
emphasis. With the way open for Mikotajczyk 's return and 
the emergence of an independent Peasant Party, the Social-
ists assumed a pivotal role in the government coalition. 
Even before the Plenum the PPR leadership had been applying 
pressures on its local organisations to allow the Social-
ists a larger share of posts in industry and the adminis-
tration and this was accompanied by policy concessions to 
the PPS - especially in the economic field . An example of 
this was the~communists' volte- face on co-ops. And while 
the Party declared its 'aspiration' to the leading role in 
the national front, the Politburo made it clear to the 
aktyw that this role would have to be earnt through poli-
tical work and could not : be claimed as of right . 138 The 
136 Uchwata plenum KC PPR w spr. polityc z nych, 26.5.45, 
PPR ••• viii 1944 - xii 1945 Op e cit., p. 142. 
137 Gomu~ka Przemowienie wygtoszone na XXVI Kongresie PPS, 
29.6.1945r., Artykury ..• vol. I, OP e cit., p . 303. 
138 When addressing socialist audiences, the communists 
stressed the joint leadership of the government coali-
tion by 'the working class' - i.e. by the PPR and PPS , 
ibid., pp. 302-3. Internally, however, the PPR contin-
ued to calIon its activists to work to achieve a l ead -
ing role for the Party. Party members were instructed 
to work to 'ensure the. leading role of the Party in the 
work of the state apparatus and among the Polish natio n 
by strengthening the authority, activity and initiative 
of the Party and not through patronage and administra-
tive means!. Uchwata plenum KC PPR w sprawach polity-
cznych, 26.5.45, PPR ••• viii 1944 - xii 1945 OPe cit., 
p. 142. Gomu~ka in his commentary on the resolutions 
of the May Plenum said that 'the PPR ••• has the aspira-
tion to lead in the democratic national fr o nt and in 
. the Polish nation'. He added that ' the tasks which the 
Plenum of the KC PPR has placed on all Party organisa-
tions can be carried out only by arduous, self-sacrif~ 
icing , day-in-day-out work by al l members of the Party . 
con td •••• 
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PPR had been forced to recognise that the Socialists could 
no longer be treated as a ' department ' of the Party, but 
would have to be handled as a coalition ally which was 
aware of its value to the communists which steadily rose as 
Mikorajczyk moved into open opposition a nd the elections 
drew closer. 
The May Plenum also introduced fundame ntal changes in 
the Party's attitude to its relationship with the Soviet 
government. The Politburo accepted the criticisms by 
Central Committee members of infringements of Polish sove -
reignty, and the unassertiveness of foreign policy hi therto . 
New emphasis was placed on Poland's sovereignty and inde-
pendence and Party propaganda disclaimed any intention of 
, . " Sov1et1s1ng' the country. In the foreign policy sphere , 
Gomu~ka, concluding the Plenum's deliberations , went so far 
as to state that 'the Soviet Union's cha nge of course to-
wards Germany should not bind us', adding that 'the problem 
of so . 1 t' th d' . , 139 Vere1gnty was correct y pu 1n e 1SCUSS10n. 
This determination to fo llow a more indepe nde n t for -
eign policy was expressed in the occupation o n 19 June by 
Zymierski 's troops of Zaolzia , a border area ov er which the 
Polish and Czech governments were in dispute . The us e of 
military force to press the Polish cl aim against t h e Soviet 
Union's close ally can hardly have pleased Moscow . Without 
contd •••• 
Our Party will be able to take its rightful place and 
will become the leading party of the na tion '. Gomu~ka 
o uchwa~ach plenum KC PPR , Maj 1945, Artyku~y .•• Vol. I 
op. cit., _p. 235 • . In contrast, at the February 194 5 
Plenum he had emphasised that the Party ' s leading role 
was well - established and followed from its Marxist 
character: 'the correctness of our Party ' s assessment 
of political events and its political far-sightedness , 
which follows from the ·Marxist character of the Party , 
also contributed to the fact that the PPR was from the 
beginning the leading party of the democratic front ... ' 
Gomu~ka Referat wygtoszony na rozszerzonym plenum KC 
PPR, 6.2.45, ibid ., p. 202. 
139 Extracts of the minutes of the ple num of the PPR 
central committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Drukier 
op . cit., p. 441. 
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resorting to such dramatic gestures, the Russians were 
persuaded at the beginning of July to hand over the admin-
istration of Szczecin. 140 Also in August, the Poles rejec-
ted Stalin's proposal for joint-companies to exploit the 
Lower Silesian coalfield. 141 
The problem of reducing the Soviet presence in Poland 
had been considered at length during the Plenum and it had 
been decided to pursue with greater vigour efforts to per-
suade the Russians to adopt a less provocative profile. 
Soviet military administration was largely withdrawn in 
July and August. 142 Polish calls for tougher measures 
against Red Army marauders also brought a response. By the 
end of the year court martials and in some cases the public 
execution of offenders had resulted in a significant reduc-
t · . . h 1 1 l' 143 B ~on ~n outrages aga~nst t e oca popu at~on. ut as 
Gomu~ka candidly admitted there was no point in demanding 
a departure of all the Soviet forces; 'we would not have 
144 
enough of Our own forces to put in their place'. The 
hand-over of policing operations to the Polish Army seems 
to have continued into 1946. As late as the first half of 
1946 Soviet fatalities in clashes with the underground were 
still running at around 10 % of those suffered by Polish 
pro-government forces and civilians, a proportion much the 
same as it had been during the first half of 1945. 145 
140 H. Rybicki Powstanie i dzia~a1nosc wradzy ludowej na 
zachodnich i p6tnocnych obszarach Polski 1945-49 (Poznart 
1976), p. 48. The ' port of Szeczecin remained under 
Soviet administration until September 1947. 
141 W.T. Kowalski Walka d lomat czna 0 mie 'sce Polski w 
Europie 1939-45 Warsaw, 1966), p. 753; H. Bartoszewicz 
Polsko-radzieckie stosunki gospodarcze Z po1a walki 1977 
nr. 1 (77), p. 28l. 
142 Rybicki oPe cit., p. 29. 
143 Sprawozdanie KW PPR Pomorza zachodniego (Kos za lin) za 
~rudzien 1945r. i pierwsz~ dekad@ stycznia 1946r., 
Sprawozdania KW PPR ••• OPe cit., p. 336. 
144 
145 
Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR central 
committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Drukier op.cit.,p.440 
Calculated on the basis of a sample of data from Polegli 
w walce ••• OPe cit. The proportion of Red Army personnel 
as a percentage of the total number of government 
contd .•.• 
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Nonetheless, from June 1945 the army was Polonised as 
Russian officers seconded during the war returned home . 
According to Zymierski, speaking in September 1946, some 
14,000 Soviet officers, including 40 generals had depar-
ted. 146 The British embassy in Warsaw detected a maj or 
reduction in the presence of Soviet troops in Poland at t he 
tUrn of 1945/46 and the Ambassador, Cavendish-Bentinck was 
inclined to accept as true a statement by the Polish 
Government of 30 January 1946 that the number of Soviet 
troops had been reduced to 250-300,000. 147 
Finally, the May plenum heralded the transformation 
of the Provisional Government into the Provisional Govern-
ment of National Unity following agreement at talks held 
in Moscow between the Warsaw Poles and Miko~ajczyk o n 21 
June. The three Allied Powers ha d agreed on a formul a f o r 
the reconstruction of the Provisional Government months 
before at Yalta. The communique is s u ed on 11 February at 
the close of the conference had stated that: 
Contd .•. 
'A new situation has been created in Poland 
as a result of her complete liberation b y 
the Red Army. This calls for the establ i s h-
ment of a Polish Provisional Government which 
can be more broadly based than was possible 
before the recent liberation of western Poland. 
The Provisional Government which is now fun c-
tioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised 
on a broader democratic basis with the inclu-
sion of democratic leaders from Poland itself 
and from Poles abroad •••• This Polish Provi-
s .ional Government of National Unity shall b e 
pledged to the holding of free and unfettered 
elections as soon as possible o n t he basis of 
universal suffrage and secret ballot. I n t hese 
elections all democratic and anti - Nazi parties 
shall have the right to take part and to put 
forward candidates'. 
supporters and officials killed was, accordi ng to th i s 
source, as follows: 194 4 (Jul-Dec ) 18.8%; 1945 (Jan-
yun) 10. 7% ; 1945 (Jul-Dec) 14. 1% ; 1946 (Jan- Jun) 9.3 %; 
1946 (Jul-Dec) 3.8%. 
146 E. Rea le Raporty: Polska 1945-4 6 (Paris , 1968), pp.247-53. 
147 ~ F0371 56438 N54 11. 
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Mo lotov , Har r iman and Clark Kerr were authorised as a 
commission to consult members of the Provisional Government 
and ' other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and 
abroad , .148 
The wo rk of the commission proceeded :: slowly . The 
stumbling b l ock was Miko~ajczyk . The British and Americans 
regarded his inclusion in the reconstructed Government as 
essential. However , at Yalta Stalin and Molotov had stated 
149 that Miko~ajczyk was unacceptable to the Warsaw Poles. 
Molotov , again took this line at a meeting 'of the commis sion 
on 27 February . 150 Polonsky suggests that pressure from 
the Polish c ommunists may indeed have prompted the Soviet 
veto on Miko~ajczyk . l51 If so, it seems likely that as in 
October 1944 (cf . Chapter Two, p. 99) the advice from 
Warsaw was that the time was not yet ripe to deal with 
Miko~ajczyk, rather than such a deal was unacceptable in 
principle . 
Sometime in April or May the Soviet and Polish autho -
rities seem to have decided that it would be safe to run 
the risk of Miko~ajczyk ' s return. In a letter of 7 April 
to Churchill , Stalin had offered to use his influence with 
the Warsaw Poles to make them withdraw their objections to 
Miko~ajczyk, provided he declared his acceptance of the 
Yalta decisions on poland. l52 Miko~ajczyk did this on 15 
April. lS3 However , it seems unlikely that the Poles 
shifted their ground before the May Plenum. None of the 
speakers at the Plenum referred to the possible implica-
tions of Miko~ajczyk returning; indeed there was no 
148 Communique issued at the end of the Yalta conference 
(extract) , 11 February 1945 , Polonsky The Great Powers .. 
oPe cit. , pp . 249-50. 
149 Ibid., pp . 242 nl, 245 n . 3 . 
150 Ibid . , p . 2S4 n.2. 
151 Ibid. , p. 41. 
152 Ibid., p. 263n . 
153 Ibid., p. 263. 
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discussion at all on the reconstruction of the Gove~nt .154 
It was left to Gomu~ka in his summing up to state that the 
Party aimed to form a democratic coalition and that it was 
in its interest to solve the problem of the Provisional 
Government along the lines of the Yalta decisions as soon 
as possible. 155 Ten days later, during Harry Hopkins' 
placatory trip to Moscow, Stalin finally agreed to the 
resumption of talks with Mikorajczyk . 
In executing the May 'turn' it seems, therefore, 
unlikely that the Party was simply falling in with decisions 
already taken in Moscow to allow Miko1ajczyk ' s return . The 
absence of discussion on reconstructing the Government 
indicates that this was not the Central Committee's prin-
cipal concern. Moreover , all the indications are that , in 
contrast to October 1944, Stalin had not given a firm lead 
to the Politburo. The discussion at the Plenum was remark-
ably frank and members of the leadership openly disagreed 
in their interpretation of the political situation. 
When Stalin was mentioned, it was to make it clear 
that he understood and supported the Party ' s wish to ass -
ert its sovereignty and independence. 
The communists recognised that Miko1ajczyk ' s return 
was the price they would have to pay to achieve early 
tvestern recognition of the Provisional Government. Western 
recognition was important both in order to secure aid for 
Poland 's economic recovery and to ensure maximum Polish 
influence at the forthcoming peace conference which was to 
determine the extent of Poland's territorial gains in the 
north and west. 156 The discussion at the May Plenum 
focussed on the problem from this specifically Polish per-
spective and these Polish interests appear to have been 
154 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR 
central committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Druki e r 
op . cit ., p. 440 . 
155 Ibid. 
156 Polonsky Communique issued at the end of the Yalta 
conference (extract), 11 February 1945 The Great 
powers .•. op . cit., p. 251 . 
paramount in the leadership's decision to seek an early 
deal on reconstructing the government. 
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Although international considerations clearly played 
a part in the May 'turn', the speeches made at the Plenum 
were dominated by internal concerns: the economy , the 
underground, relat10ns with the allied parties and the 
Soviet role in Poland. The communists regarded interna -
tional recognition of the Provisional Government as 
important but a lower priority than the question of power 
in Poland. Gomu£ka made this clear a few weeks later in 
Mos cow when he told Miko~ajczyk 
'if we do nbt reach agreement we shall re t urn 
home without you. You may be certain that 
in two or three months time our government 
will be recognised by the Western Allies ...• 
But even if it happens that we have to wait 
longer - then we shall wait, but we shall 
never hand over power' .157 
It was then above all the progress of the Party ' s 
efforts to consolidate its position and broade n its mass 
base, which determined the extent and timing of its change 
of course in May. The hard line democratic national fro nt 
adopted in the previous October had, in the view of the 
majority of the Party leadership, served its purpose of 
securing the Party's hold on power and was now propelling 
the country towards a political crisis which would find the 
PPR isolated and totally dependent on the Russians . It was 
this spectre which most concerned the May Plenum and con-
vinced the Central Committee that a major change of tactics 
was required. The reorientation was not confined to a 
revision of policy towards the Miko~ajczyk Peasants, but 
extended widely to take in other political groupings, secu-
rity policy , industrial ownership and management, the 
economic model, Poland's national sovereignty and intra-
Party matters. One section of the Party argued that the 
157 
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modification of the line should not go so far. This inclu-
ded KPP veterans like W~odzimierz Zawadzki who wanted to 
step up the use of the Red Army and security forces 
against the underground, or Konopka who warned of a right-
ist deviation in the Party threatening its leading role. lS8 
This group was easily isolated as 'sectarian', but within 
the leadership Berman too expressed a minority view. 
Though he rejected Zawadzki's 'Trotskyism ' and recognised 
that the Party must 'first complete the bourgeois revolu-
tion', Berman argued from Soviet experience that the Party ' s 
narrow base signified great difficulties, but not a crisis . 
He viewed the increase in underground activity as the res-
ult not of a revival in popular support for London, but of 
the work of reactionary elements and claimed that ' what we 
see as a danger is .(in fact) the excessively slow tempo of 
Our ownacti~ity in relation to changes taking place. We 
have failed to follow up our own successes '. According t o 
Berman, sectarianism was not a reaction to the crisis, but 
rather an 'illness ' arising from the Luxemburgist traditio n 
of the old KPp. lS9 The implication 6f this was that the 
existing line was basically correct and major adjustments 
unnecessary. But Gomu~ka's group and most of the ex-
emigres for whom Zambrowski emerged as the main spokesman , 
but including Aleksander Zawadzki, Ochab, Wierb~owski, 
Finkielsztajn and Radkiewicz, carne down decisively for a 
change of direction, justifying it by stressing the seve-
rity of the crisis. The position of Bierut, Minc and 
Spychalski is difficult, on the evidence available, to 
assess. Gomu~ka had the majority behind him in conclud ing 
that it was 
' undeniable that there are certain elements 
of crisis. It is a crisis when the base 
158 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR 
central committee, 20-21 May 1945 Polonsky and Druki e r 
oP e cit., pp. 426-27 . 
159 Ibid ., pp. 433-44 . 
narrows .••• If our base was growing sec-
tarianism would not occur. If the SL 
executives could build a real SL, the SL 
problem would not arise •••• In the reaction~ 
ary camp there is a crisis, but we have not 
been able to narrow its base. There is a 
lack of corifidence in the Provisional Govern-
ment. We cannot fight the reaction without 
the Red Army. That says something about 
(our) base ••• ,.160 
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He added, in an undoubted reference to Berman's 
speech, that 'some people say that it took a long time for 
Soviet authority to be established. The comparison is 
incorrect. We are not establishing a Soviet system. We 
want t b . d . 1'" 161 1 o esta l~sh a emocrat~c coa ~t~on • In May 945 
the majority of the PPR leadership believed that the 
political crisis demanded the formation of such a broad 
based democratic coalition and that the Party's hold o n the 
key areas of power was sufficiently secure to allow it to 
run the risks involved. The next nine months were to con-
vince the PPR that those risks were still too great. 
160 Extracts of the minutes of the plenum of the PPR 
central committee, 20-21 May 19 45 Polonsky a nd Drukier 
op. cit., pp. 439-40. 
161 Ibid., p. 440. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
NATIONAL UNITY? (June 1945 - February 1946) 
On 23 June Roman Zambrowski reported to the Central 
Committee Secretariat on the outcome of the Moscow talks 
with Miko~ajczyk: 
'The formation of the National Unity 
Government is a success. Its core is 
the Provisional Government. Five ministers 
out of 21 ate from the London Government, 
which means that the (existing) govern-
ment has been extended, not replaced . We 
have not made political concessions to 
London. The trial of the Sixteen (under-
ground leaders arrested in March - J . R.) 
cuts off the retreat of Miko1:"ajczyk and 
Stanczyk (one of the leaders of the emigre 
PPS - J.R.) to the London reaction,.l 
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The deal with Miko~ajczyk indeed appeared to be a 
major success for the communists. The terms of the agree-
ment left the framework of the Provisional Government , and 
within it the dominant position of the PPR , intact. More -
over, the regrouping of the London camp which the communists 
had sought fruitlessly in 1943-44 had c ome about at last. 
They had driven a wedge between the London ' democrats ' led 
by Hiko:t'ajczyk, and the diehards, who regarded any deal 
with the Lublin camp as capitulation. The results of the 
regrouping were evident in a general stabilisation of the 
Political situation and a marked fall-off in underg r ound 
activity after June (see Figure 1, p. 118 ). The co nsequen-
ces of Western recognition of the provisional covernment 
were SOon evident also. The flow of economic aid from 
UNRRA (primarily that is from the USA) began in September . 2 
1 
2 
Minutes of a meeting of the Secretariat of the PPR 
central committee (extracts) 23.6 . 45 Polonsky and Drukier 
op. cit., p. 448 . 
Jezierski op. cit., p . 109. 
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And at Potsdam in July the Polish delegation which included 
Bierut, Miko~ajczyk, Gomu~ka and OS6bka-Morawski secured 
de facto recognition by the Great Powers of a Polish fron-
t ; d "1" 3 
.er on 0 er-Western Ne1sse 1ne. 
However, the communists were aware that despite this 
success, the return of the London 'democrats' and the 
lower Soviet profile in Polish affairs would place the 
Party's hegemony within the government coalition at risk. 
Zambrowski pointed to the danger in his report to the Cen-
tral Committee Secretariat: 
'the entry of Statczyk, Zu~awski, Witos , 
Miko~ajczyk and Kiernik into the Govern-
ment and KRN represents a strengthening 
of anti-PPR elements, sowing distrust 
towards the Soviet Union. There is a 
danger of the London elements blocking 
together as well as of attempts to form 
a PPS-SL bloc against the PPR. The ques -
tion of a fifth party arises with the 
invitation to Popiel (leader of the 
Catholic Party of Labour - J.R.) .... It 
is essential to strengthen co-operatio n 
with the PPS and SL. The leadership 
group in the SL is weak and fissile , lacks 
wide support and will find it difficult 
to prevent Miko~ajczyk , Kiernik and Witos 
returning in triumph ... • 4 
The period from June 1945 to February 1946 was a 
testing-time when the communists sought to consolidate and 
make permanent the advantages they had won at t he confer-
ence table in Moscow and at the same time avert the inher-
ent dangers to them in the new political situation . The 
legalisation of the mainstream peasant movement and the 
elections, expected for the first half of 1946,5 cast 
3 
4 
5 
V . Mastny Russia's Hoad to the Cold '"lar (tJew York, 
1979), pp. 299-300. 
Minutes of a meeting of the Secretariat of the PPR Central 
Committee (extracts) 23.6.45 Polonsky and Drukier O Pe 
Cit., p. 449. 
At Potsdam Bevin had obtained from nierut the statement 
that elections would be held not later than early 1946. 
R. Buczek Udzia~ dele ac"i 
damskiej w 1945 r. ~Z~e~s~z~y~t~y~~ ____ ~ __ __ 
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a shadow of uncertainty over the communists' hold on power. 
As Gomu~ka put it , 'the elections are the last resort 
which the reaction wants to win and around which it con-
6 
centrates all its hopes and forces' The Party was under 
no illusions about the likely outcome of a contest: it 
must be expected that if the PSL (Miko~ajc zyk ' s Pol skie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe - J.R.) fought the elections indepen-
dently ••• as well as if the democratic parties split over 
the elections - the PSL would have a serious chance .•.. We 
as a party must ••• pursue those tactics which will e nsu re 
us electoral victory,.7 
Until February 1946 those tactics were to secure t he 
integration of the London ' democrats ', and in par ticular 
Miko~ajczyk 's followers in the peasant movement, into the 
national front, or more specifically, a singl e electoral 
bloc of the six coalition parties. Alth ough the communists 
were at no stage prepared to concede their l eading role in 
such a bloc, they continued to regard the mainstream pea-
sant movement, in more or less its ex i sting form, as the 
foremost potential partner for themselves a nd the PPS in 
the 'worker-peasant alliance' and the principa l mean s to 
extend the base of the national fro n t in to the countryside. 
In essence, they aimed to put into practice t he conception 
of the broad democratic national front which t hey had 
sought without success to achieve i n 1943-44 and had re -
turned to in May 1945. 
However, Miko~ajczyk and the overwh elmi ng majority of 
contd •..• 
6 
7 
Gomutka told the Central Committee Plenum of 10.2 . 46 
that 'we wish to hold the elections more or less in the 
first half of this year '. Svt\H~c4? poli tyczna a sprawa 
~bor6w do Sejmu Ustawodawczego z referatu Sekretarza 
Generalnego KC PPR na plenum KC PPR dnia lO . 2.l946r. Z 
p.ola walki 1964 nr. 2 (26), p . 7. Hikol"ajczyk told the 
British early in 1946 that he expected ' that the elec-
tion w~l l take place at the end of J une or beginning of 
July and that it wil l not be poss ib le for the Communist 
Party to postpone the elections beyond that tim~' PRO 
F0371 56432 (conversatio n 14 .1. 46 ). 
J . Borkowski Pertrakcje ... op. cit., p. 424 . 
Sy tuacja po lityc z na ... op. ci t ., p . 9 . 
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his party were not prepared to accept t he bloc o n t he terms 
that the PPR demanded. Miko~ajczyk recognised t h e neces-
sity of working closely with the PPR,8 but he was not 
prepared to accept an electoral blo c which would preserve 
the communists' leading role in the coalitio n. Nor did h e 
believe that the PPR was sufficiently strong to force him 
to do so. Although he had little confidence that the 
elections would be free and unfettered, he considered that 
the size and organisational strength of t h e peasant move-
ment and the configuration of internatio na l forces were 
such, that he could capture the l eader s hip of the govern-
ment coalition from the communists and himself dictate the 
terms on which his party would co-go vern with the PPR . 
On his return to Poland following the Mos c ow talks , 
Miko~ajczyk proceeded to put this strategy into effect 
with immediate and conspicuous success . In August hi s 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) was legalised and wi thin a few 
months had a mass membership consider a bly larger than that 
of communists and their allies taken together . The pro-
communist SL almost ceased f unctioning as its members went 
over en masse to the PSL. By spring 1946 the PPR leader-
ship, though significantly no t its PPS allies , had all but 
abandoned hope of bringing the PSL into the natio nal fr o nt 
and were convinced t hat u rge nt and aggressive measures were 
needed to recover the political initiative and fe nd off 
Miko~ajczyk's challenge. As in October 1944, t he c ommu-
nists decided that the question of power had to take prio-
rity over the quest for a mo r e broadly-based national fro nt. 
'The Worker-Peasant Allianc e ' 
The communists considered that there were o nl y two 
COurses open to Miko~aj c zyk and hi s followers in the new 
political situation which had arisen as a resul t of the 
Mo scow agr eement. The first was for the ' London ' Peasants 
to assume the role of a subordinate partner to the ' Lublin' 
8 Polonsky Averell Harriman to Acting Secretary of State 
Grew : Telegram ~~os cow 28 Ju ne 1945 The Great Powers .. . 
oP e cit., p. 277. 
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parties in the national front, taking their place as one 
arm of the 'worker-peasant alliance' under the hegemony 
of the w~tkers' parties and, in particular, the PPR. On 
condition that they accepted the leadership of the PPR in 
the coalition once and for all, the communists were prepared 
to concede to the Peasants a greater share of influence in 
the government apparatus and even allow them some freedom 
to express loyal opposition from within _the national front. 
In the longer term the PPR believed that, cast in such a 
role, the peasant movement would evolve into an importan t 
prop for the future social and economic transformation of 
Poland. 
The only alternative for the 'London' Peasants, i in the 
communists' view, was that of outright opposition to the 
'democratic camp' in tacit alliance with the anti-communist 
underground. This the PPR would not tolerate. If the 
Peasants took up such a stance, the communists made it 
clear that they would use force to dismantle the movement's 
organisation and make it impossible for Peasant activists 
to operate in the open. The communists would look else-
where for a partner in the 'worker-peasant all iance'. 
In the .period from mid-194S to February 1946 the PPR 
sought to force Miko~ajczyk to make a clear choice between 
these alternative courses. The communists seem to have 
decided from the start9 that the acid test of Miko~ajczyk's 
true intentions would be the PSL's 'attitude to the ques-
tion of the worker-peasant alliance and to the problem of 
10 
uniting in a joint electoral bloc'. However, their 
allies in the leadership of the PPS did not accept this 
approach until November, when, at least formally, it was 
the Socialists who took the initiative of inviting the 
PSL to join an electoral bloc. Under strong pressure from 
the two workers' parties, the PSL leaders finally entered 
9 Borkowski Pertrakcje ... op. cit., p. 424. 
10 Gomu~ka Referat wyg~oszony na zebraniu aktywu organi -
Z~cji warszawskiej PPR, 21.l0.l94Sr. Artyku~y ... Vol . l o p. 
c1t., p. 392. 
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negotiations in February 1946. 
Despite increasing tension between the communists and 
the Peasants as 1945 wore on and pessimism as to the pos-
sibilitY ' of winning the consent of Hikol'ajczyk and his 
supportersll to an electoral bloc, until February the 
preference of the PPR leadership was to keep the PSL within 
the national front. Gomu~ka made this clear at the 
commencement of the negotiations in a spee~h delivered to 
the Central Committee on 10 February which provides the 
fullest statement of the Party's view on the choice which 
lay before the PSL: 
the creation of an electoral bloc is 
the main objective of our Party .•.. We 
are endeavouring to form a bloc of the . six 
political parties (i.e. including the PSL -
J.R.). Why do we want this and what shall 
we gain by it? .• 
Above all we shall guarantee the hegemony 
of the political line which commenced with 
the policy of the KRN and later the PKWN. 
By forming this bloc of six we shall dis -
appoint all the hopes of our domestic 
reaction for a change of government in 
Poland .... All those reactionary elements 
which are today pinning their hopes on the 
PSL would be, quite clearly, profoundly 
disappointed and would of necessity be 
forced to alter their attitude to the PSL . 
By achieving the bloc of six we could est-
ablish political stabilisation in the 
country ..•. The creation of a bloc of six 
is beneficial not only from the point of 
view of our party , but from t he national 
point of view .... The bloc is a state 
imperative .•• ,12 
11 Gomu~ka told the February 1946 Plenum that the opponents 
of the bloc were 'very numerous': ' Above all the PSL 
leaders themselves with Miko~ajczyk in the fore do not 
wish to form an elec'toral hloc. wi thin the leadership 
of that party there is virtually nobody who is a sincere 
advocate of the conception of the electoral bloc ..•. In 
the grassroots too there are strong anti-bloc currents '. 
He added that after the first round of talks with the 
PSL 'we came away with the general impression that an 
agreement is unlikely ' Sytuacja polityczna ..• OP e cit., 
Pp. 11-12. 
12 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
The Politburo considered that it would be worth making 
limited, but not insignificant political concessions to 
win PSL compliance: 
'We must realise and say clearly that we 
would have to make certain concessions to 
the PSL in the state apparatus without how-
ever handing them hegemony .••. However 
strengthening the PSL in the state apparatus 
within the bloc of six would not in fact 
be dangerous since the bloc of six. must 
strengthen the leftist tendency and forces 
in the PSL. If the PSL joined us in the 
bloc it would be combated by the entire 
reaction •.•• A strengthening of the PSL 
in local government would also have to fol-
low. The question of local government 
elections on different principles would 
then arise'.13 
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The Party leadership continued to see within the PSL 
considerable social potential as a partner in the 'worker -
peasant alliance'. Although he considered that the ideol-
ogy of the PSL leadership was basically 'bourgeois - liberal ' 
in character and that 'as the party furthest to the right ' 
it had inevitably attracted support from ' reactionary , 
fascist elements', and had become 'the defender of the 
social interests of various capitalist strata, above all 
kulak, business and speculating layers', Gomu~ka warned the 
Central Committee that: 
'We must not close our eyes to t he fact 
that a substantial number of people who 
are gathered within the PSL ought not to 
be there considering its character - above 
all poor peasant elements •.•• However t his 
should be seen as a temporary phenomenon 
and the poor amongst the PSL rank-and-file 
should be looked at as a factor which should 
cause centrifugal tendencies to grow inside 
the PSL. The interests of this poorer lay er 
are diametrically opposed to the interests 
of the kulaks and speculators and we must 
recognise that there exist real possibilities 
of these centrifugal tendencies increasing'.14 
13 ~tuacja polityczna .•• OPe cit.p. 11. 
14 Ibid., p. 8. 
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However, if the PSL refused to enter the bloc, thus 
disputing the hegemony of the PPR by contesting the elec-
tions as an independent force, 'or more precisely', as the 
communists saw it, 'in a bloc with the reaction and t he 
illegal organisations',15 it would no longer be c ombated 
tolerantly as a loyal opposition, but would be treated on 
a par with the outlawed 'reaction': 
'If the PSL does not go along with the 
bloc of six, it places itself not just 
in opposition to the government, but 
makes its party a factor splitting the 
unity of the democratic front. Therefore 
we would conduct our struggle with the 
PSL primarily from the angle not of a 
struggle against an opposition, but with 
those who smash and disrupt democratic 
unity'.16 
Gomu~ka had spelt out rather more explicitly what thi s 
meant in a speech he had made a few months before , when he 
had said that for those determined to provoke a n electoral 
confrontation 'the Polish Workers ' Party has o nly one 
reply: with opponents and enemies of democvatic Poland we 
17 
speak only in the language of struggle '. 
If such aggressive tactics became necessa ry , the bloc 
parties would continue to look for the support of the pea-
sant masses which had hitherto followed Miko~aj c zyk . But 
instead of the evolutionary approach of integrating the 
bulk of the PSL into the gove rnment front and prodd ing it 
steadily leftwards, the PSL would be broken up . Its 'reac -
tionary' elements would be suppressed a nd the rank-and-file 
gathered into a new mass party b ased on the rump of the 
'Lublin SL'. As Gomu~ka put it: 
' our main task would have to be to work for 
15 Sytuacja polityczna .•. OPe cit., p . 9. 
16 Ibid., pp . 12-13. 
17 Gomu~ka Referat wyg~os zony na zebraniu aktywu organ i -
zacji warszawskie j PPR 21 .10.19 45r ., Artykuty .•. Vol . I 
oP e cit., p. 393 . 
a clear differentiation inside the PSL so 
that it will be possible to detach from 
it the democratic elements which are in-
disputably to be found within the ranks of 
that organisation. These democratic ele-
ments must be linked and mobilised with an 
electoral bloc of the four democratic 
parties •••• The (Lublin - J.R.) Peasant 
Party .•• has great potential influence on 
the poor peasantry amongst the PSL r a nk-
and-file' .18 
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Thus the communists were uncompromising in defending 
the two crucial advantages which in their view they had 
gained in Moscow: their hegemony in the state aparatus and 
the separation of Miko~ajczyk and his followers from the 
London diehards. As late as February 1946 the Party was 
endeavouring to transform the Moscow deal into a deeper 
alliance, its aim on terms naturally, with the PSL as a 
whole , or at any rate its major part. Simultaneously , it 
indicated that any attempt by the PSL to challenge these 
two essential points, by f orcing an electoral contest , 
would not be tolerated. 
Miko~ajczyk and the Tactics of the PSL 
Until 1947 to a very large degree, Miko~ajc zyk domin-
ated the tactical directio n of his party . Witos , the 
ailing elder statesman o f the mov~ment died in October 1945 
having played little more than a symbolic role in the 
party during the last ~onths o f his li fe . 19 The third 
major figure of the interwar years active from 194 5 was 
W!adys~aw Kiernik, a cautious and flexible politician with 
none of Miko~ajc zyk 's wartime prestige. Despite some ear-
lier doubts, it was not until after the 1947 e l e ctio ns tha ~ 
Kiernik and the leaders of the wartime undergou nd ' Roeh ' 
organisation, Jozef Niecko and Czes~aw Wycec h, began openly 
18 Sytuacja polityc zna ••• OP e cit., p . 13 . 
19 There is some controversy over Witos' stance in 19 45 . 
See J. Borkowski Ksz ta~towanie si~ antymiko~ajczykows ­
kie' 0 oz c'i w k i erownictwie PSL 1946-47 Polska 
!:.udowa 1962/1, pp,. 86 - 88 , S . W jcik Stanowis ko ... OP e 
cit. 
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to dispute Mikotajczyk's leadership. 
Stanis~aw Miko~ajczyk was born in 1901, the son of a 
peasant who had emigrated to work in the Westphalian 
coalfield. Later the family returned to Poznania, where 
Miko~ajczyk's father bought a small (6 hectares) farm near 
Krotoszyn. Miko~ajczyk took part in the Wielkopolska 
Uprising in 1918/19 and the Russo-Polish War in 1920. 
After elementary school, he completed his education with 
short courses at agricultural college. He was a fairly 
sUccessful farmer and in 1930 he was able to buy a 20-
hectare farm near W~growiec. 
Miko~ajczyk began his political activity in 1922 when 
he joined Witos' 'Piast' Peasant Party. In 1927 he helped 
to found the youth section of 'Piast' in Wielkopolska and 
was its chairman from 1928-30. After 1930 he was effec-
tively leader of the Poznanian peasant movement and won 
prominence in the national leadership of the unified Pea-
sant Party. He sat as deputy to the Sejm between 1930-35 
and was secretary of the Sejm club and the Supreme "Council 
of the SL. By the mid-1930s, he had emerged as a leading 
domestic spokesman of the section of the moveme nt which 
favoured active opposition to the Sanacja regime (many of 
the older leaders of the party, ·e.g. Witos, Kierni k and 
Bagi~ski were in exile). Miko!ajczyk was in effective 
charge of the SL during the violent confrontations which 
took place with the authorities between 1936- 38 , when mass 
demonstrations, a boycott of government directives , t he 
organisation of 'self-defence' groups in the villages and, 
above all, peasant strikes were used to press for the re-
storation of representative government. 
In the September Campaign, Miko~ajczyk fought as a 
private soldier and then escaped via Hungary to France where 
he became chairman of the Foreign Committee of the SL and 
vice-chairman of the National Council (i. e . the Polish 
Parliament in exile). He was one of Sikorski's main allies 
in Paris and London and from September 1941 to July 1943 
was deputy-premier and Minister of Internal Affairs in the 
Government-in-Exile. " On Sikorski's death he became Prime 
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Minister. 20 
The considerable political reputation which Miko~ajczyk 
enjoyed when he returned to Poland in 1945 was entirely 
destroyed by his defeat and subsequent flight from the 
country in 1947. Many Western accounts of the postwar 
struggle for power in Poland, including his own which was 
published in exile in 1948, depict him as a simple, 
straightforward - not to say naIve - liberal democrat who 
made the mistake of believing that the PSL would be allowed 
to win the elections, or if not, that the West would inter-
h ' 1 ' 21 vene on is behalf at the crUCla Juncture. 
In reality, Miko~ajczyk was by 1945 a seasoned poli-
tician with a wide range of experience both in government 
and opposition. His background was, in many ways, parti-
cularly appropriate for the political circumstances of 
postwar Poland. In the 1930s he had led the SL at a time 
when its scope for activity within the parliamentary arena 
was severely limited and the movement had been forced 
'increasingly to resort to extra-parliamentary and e c o nomic 
opposition to the authoritarian military governments of 
Pi~sudski and Rydz-Smig~y. Although he had no direct 
experience of the underground struggle against the Nazi 
occupation, he had played an important role in its organi-
sation from abroad as Minister for Internal Affairs between 
1941-43 and Prime Minister in 1943-44. His premiership had 
also given him a considerable insight into the workings of 
Great Power diplomacy. 
This experience had taught him to be a realist. Per-
haps more than any other Polish politician, he had under-
stood that Poland's future depended not on solemn treaties 
and undertakings, but on the real interests of the Big 
Three. He also recognised that the success of his party's 
bid for power would not depend on its popularity alone, but 
20 ,Polski S~ownik Biograficzny t.XXI/l z .88, pp. 152-54. 
21 S. Miko:taj'czyk The Pattern of Soviet Domination (London , 
1948); N. Bethell OPe cit., pp. 108, 122; A. Bromke 
Poland's Politics. Idealism vs. Reality (Cambridge , 
Mass., 1967), p. 51. 
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crucially on its organisational strength and capacity to 
withstand the repressive measures which the communists 
would undoubtedly use against it. He understood that the 
elections would not in themselves decide the struggle for 
~>Jer and that the Soviet Union _, not the Western Powers, would 
settle the issue. In his view, therefore, the key to the 
situation lay in demonstrating that Poland was ungovern-
able without the peasants and thereby convincing the Soviet 
Government that its interests would be best served by a 
Poland in which his party was allowed to playa full role. 
In the longer term, Miko~ajczyk did not regard the 
prospects as unhopeful. Two days after the Moscow agree-
ment, Averell Harriman reported that: 
'Miko~ajczyk does not expect the full free-
doms which he would like for Poland and the 
Polish people. On the other hand he is 
hopeful that through the strength of the 
Peasant Party a reasonable degree of free-
dom and independence can be preserved now 
and that in time after conditions in Europe 
become more stable and Russia turns her 
att~ntion to her internal development con-
trols will be relaxed and Poland will be 
able to gain for herself her independe nce 
of life as a nation even though he freely 
accepts that Poland 's security and foreign 
policy must follow the lead of Moscow ' . 22 
In the international sphere l1iko~ajczyk had nothing 
but contempt for the London diehards who while ' apparently 
giving up nothing, had lost everything,.23 In his view 
reality demanded that Poland accommodate herself to her 
passage into the sphere of Soviet military power. He 
excluded the possibility of an armed clash between East 
and ~est which might, as the diehards hoped, reverse this 
22 Averell Harriman to Acting Secretary of State Grew : 
Telegram Hoscow , 28 June 1945, Polonsky The Great 
powers ... Ope cit., pp. 276 -77. 
23 S. Miko~ajczyk Na drodze czynnej i konstuktywnej 
Eolityki Jutro Polski 27 . 5 . 45 . 
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24 development. Rather he expected the alliance against 
Hitler to continue in the postwar world, with both Poland 
and the Soviet Union relying heavily on Western aid for 
years to come in order to reconstruct their ruined econo-
mies. This economic constraint on Stalin and the Polish 
communists would allow a compromise solution to the Polish 
question: Poland would ally itself closely to the Soviet 
Union in foreign policy and internally anti-Soviet groups 
would be excluded from political power, but the constitu-
tional and economic order would be modelled on the Western 
pattern. The Peasants, as the largest party, would lead a 
representative coalition government which would include 
the communists. The aim of the PSL leaders was to achieve 
the kind of relationship with the USSR which was taking 
shape in Pinland. 25 
His acceptance by the Russians was crucial to 
Miko~ajczyk 's strategy. He aimed at nothing less than 
supplanting the communists in their role as the main bene-
ficiary of Soviet confidence and as protector of Soviet 
interests in Poland. In a speech delivered shortly after 
his return, he explained the kind of alliance he was 
seeking: 
The need for a Polish-Soviet alliance is 
understood by the peasants •.•• What in 
essence does the polish-Soviet alliance 
rest upon? On mutual respect for the sove-
reignty and socio-economic systems existing 
in these states and on mutual non-interference 
in internal affairs •••• At the highest levels 
we have never met with the denial of one of 
these basic points .•. on the contrary , we 
have always met with complete good will ..•. 
We consider that neither for Russia, nor for 
Poland would it be good if the question of 
confidence, collaboration, of sincere 
24 Report of a speech by Miko~ajczyk in Pozna6, 7 . 10.45 . 
Ch~opski Sztandar 21.10.45 . Miko~ajczyk said that 
there were 'trouble-makers .who whisper about the possi-
bility of a new war ..•• We do not want one, we must 
not wish for one and there will not be one'. 
25 J. Borkowski 'Dziaralnosc PSL w latach 1945-47' Rocznik 
dziejow ruchu ludowego 1960 nr. 2, p. 89. 
co-operation and friendship were to rest 
on only one or two parties. We feel that 
the more we can convince our eastern neigh-
bour that co-operation and the alliance is 
supported by the widest possible groups in 
society, the more long-lasting will be its 
ties. The great extent of PSL influence 
amongst the peasant masses will play an 
important and positive role in shaping the 
co-existence of these two states' .26 
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This policy may have appeared naIve in the light of 
later events, but until mid-l946 the p0rtents for its 
Success seemed favourable. Official Soviet pronouncement s 
were very moderate in tone in accordance with the stance 
of respect for Polish sovereignty and of disengagement 
from internal affairs on which the communists had since May 
1945 also based their strategy. In February 1946 Stalin 
in a speech made in Moscow indicated that this Soviet 
mode t . . 27 h . 1 . b' d' ra ~on would cont~nue, w ~ e ~n Warsaw Le ~e ~ev, 
the Soviet ambassador, expressed his 'complete confidence 
in Miko~ajczyk himself,.28 The British advice to Miko~a­
jczyk was to take Stalin's assurances at face value a nd 
proceed on that premise. Rumours that the Russians would 
not accept Miko~ajczyk as premier were ascribed to PPR 
sources and were thought to have little fou ndation. 29 
tfuile only limited significance could be attached to spee-
ches and rumours, the landslide victory of the Hungarian 
Smallholders' party in Soviet-supervis ed elections in 
November 1945, as well as the continued reduction in the 
size of the Soviet military presence in Poland seemed to 
bear out Miko~ajczyk's assessment of Russian intentions. 
He thought that the Russians would not provide the Polish 
communists with the kind of support they would require to 
prevent the PSL winning the elections. In c onversation 
26 S. Hikoj:'aj czyk My a pans two Jutro Polski 28.10.45. 
27 Wielka mowa Stalina Gazeta Ludowa 11.2.46. 
28 ~ F0371 56434 N.2648. 
29 Ibid., 56432. 
with the British ambassador, Cavendish-Bentinck, in 
January 1946 he said he 'was certain that the Communist 
leaders would think out other plans to remain in power 
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when the elections go against them .•• ' but that it would be 
difficult for them 'to remain in office without the active 
Support of the Russian Army for which purpose it will be 
necessary for the Soviet High Command to increase their 
forces in Poland; he added that these had been further 
reduced during the past few weeks'. In reply to Cavendish-
Bentinck's enquiry whether the communists would be able to 
use the Polish army to retain power, Miko~ajczyk said 
'that if it came to a clash between the Army and the people 
the Polish soldiers would refuse to act' .30 
The role of the \'/estern powers in Miko-3:"ajczyk' s think-
ing was less prominent than most accounts suggest. His 
experience as premier of the Government-in-Exile had taught 
him better than anyone that Britain and the United States 
were determined not to become embroiled in a confrontation 
with the Soviet Union over Poland. His private contacts 
with Western diplomatic circles confirmed the limited scope 
of their support but this did not deter him. 3l The value 
of his connections with the West was twofold. First, he 
hoped that Anglo-American diplomatic, and more important, 
economic, pressure on the communists and the Soviets would 
act as a constraint and check the use of overt repressive 
measures against his party. Secondly , his popular image as 
a statesman with the solid backing of the Western powers 
30 ~ F0371 56432. 
31 In February 1946 Miko~ajczyk sent his e nvoy , W. Zaremba , 
to London, to sound out the Foreign Office view on the 
elections and the extent to which Great Britain was 
prepared to support the PSL's opposition to a si ngle 
list. Warner, the British official wit h whom Zar emba 
spoke affirmed British support for free elections, but 
was careful to avoid giving any undertakings as to the 
future (ibid. 56434 N.2154). British policy was in fact 
under review at this time. Bevin had suggested that it 
might be 'relying too exclusively on Miko-3:"ajczyk ' and 
~hat this was encouraging him 'to take up an unduly 
~ntransigent attitude' on t h e elections (ibid. 56434 
N .2624) • 
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added greatly to his credibility and the credibility of the 
peasant opposition. The widespread popular assumption that 
the Western Powers were ready to intervene on Miko~ajczyk's 
behalf gave him a major psychological advantage over the 
communists and his rivals in the PSL. He actively cUltiva-
ted his image as a man of the West, for example making a 
visit to the United States in November 1945, where he saw 
Truman. Even the communists did not sense how shaky was 
the reality behind the reputation: in February Gomu~ka told 
a Party audience that 'the Anglo-Saxon states are very 
widely committed ••• in recent times we are witnessing sev-
erer forms of pressure on us .•• abroad great significance 
is attached to the elections,.32 
In the domestic sphere the lynchpiM of Miko~ajczyk ' s 
strategy was, as we have mentioned, the mobilisation of the 
peasant movement in order to demonstrate that political 
stabilisation and effective government depended on the 
peasants' continued support for and participation in the 
coalition. In Miko~ajczyk 's eyes the Moscow agreement had 
proved the indispensibility of his party to the communists. 
His objective was to return to Poland and capitalise on 
this indispensibility. In a revealing remark made in a 
speech delivered in Poznan in October 1945, he tried to 
make it clear that the hard bargain which the communists 
had forced on him in the Moscow negotiations on the share-
out of ministries in the Provisional Government resulted 
not from his naIvety or the communists' negotiating skill, 
but rather from his belief that the detailed terms of the 
agreement were of little importance in c ompar ison with the 
Underlying strength of the forces which had made the 
agreement: 
'I know how to accommodate myself to reality 
without running to the law. I shall not cry 
if undertakings are not kept . I could recit e 
the Moscow agreement . But if the SL which 
came out into the open in Lublin (i.e. the 
pro-communist Peasant Party - J.R.) had 
32 Sytu.p.cja polityc zna.:. Ope cit., pp. 6-7. 
sufficed alone there would have been no 
need to extend the (regime ' s) political 
base by forming the Government of National 
Unity ' .33 
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He was confident that regardless of the communists ' 
c ontrol of the levers of government i n Warsaw , his party 
would be able to capture control of local government in 
the countryside , thereby frustrating at the grassroots any 
attempt at wide - scale falsification of the election res-
ults. He a c cepted that such attempts would take place, but 
believed that in the rural areas at any rate the communists 
would lac k t h e resources to make these effective unless 
they resorted to extreme measures which would create inter-
national difficu lties and destabilise the situation at 
home, neither of which would suit Stalin . Apart from the 
elections , Miko~ajczyk thought that the needs of economic 
reconstruction and the supply of food for the towns would 
force the communists to make political concessions to the 
peasants . This economic leverage was already brought into 
play by autumn 1945 when the communists had to face both 
strikes over food shortages in the towns and problems in 
obtaining quotas from the peasants. The attitude of the 
PSL leadership in this crisis was ambivalent . 34 These 
two planks of Mikolajczyk's strategy conditio ned his 
reaction ' to, the communists ' and Socialists' electoral 
proposals . 
First , his aim was not to achieve a modus vivendi with 
the Lublin parties , but to outflank them and win Stalin's 
33 Chlopski Sztandar, 21.10.45. 
34 Mikolajczyk indicated his party ' s position on agricul-
tural contingents in his speech in Poznart , 7.10.45: 
' . .• the peasants must deliver quotas regardless of 
whether it hurts them or not . .• I calIon yo u to fulfil 
this duty. On the other hand , if someone criticises the 
organisation of quota-collection itself , that is not 
quite anti - state activity '. Ibid . , According to a c om-
munist source , ' Kiernik's position at a meeting in 
Grodzisk virtually amounted to this: give quotas , but 
as they give you industrial products for the same 
prices ' Sprawozdanie KW PPR Warsaw, 1 . 8-15 . 9.45, Sprawoz -d' - ( -an~a KW PPR . . . OP e cit . , p. 298. 
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confidence. Until this were done, in his view, no deal 
35 
made with the communists would have any substance. His 
attitude to the Socialists was almost as sceptical, com-
bining long-standing mistrust of the reliability of the PPS 
from pre-war and wartime days with disbelief in the auth-
enticity and independence of the 'Lublin' Socialists. 36 
The key consideration was the question of 'hegemony'. 
Mikorajczyk certainly did not share the communists' view 
that their hegemony in the coalition had been agreed in 
Moscow and he was totally opposed to an electoral deal 
which would institutionalise their advantage. Wbjcik, the 
PSL secretary-general expressed the party's position in a 
speech bo the KRN in January 1946: 'We have always endea-
voured to maintain the very best possible worker-peasant 
co-operation ••• on one condition, that the political 
representation of our working class brothers gives up its 
37 desire for supremacy over the peasant movement'. The 
strong agrarian tendency in the PSL, with which Miko~ajc zyk 
sympathised, aimed at establishing the hegemony o f the 
peasant movement itself, with the workers' parties playing 
second fiddle in the coalition. 38 However , even the more 
cautious wing of the party rejected PPR hegemony and hope d 
for a sizeable PSL contingent in any future government and 
in the Sejm to act as a brake on the communists. Kiernik 
inclined to this view. After a conversation with him in 
January the British ambassador reported to Lo ndon that 
Kiernik and a few older members of the PSL 
35 In mid-1946 the First Secretary of the British Embass y 
asked Miko~ajczyk what assurances Britain might demand 
of the Polish government. Miko~ajczyk 'smiled sadly a nd 
replied that no assurance given by Bierut had any 
value, unless we took measures to ensure its impleme n t a-
tion '. PRO F0371 56444 N.10l42 . 
36 Interview with Franciszek wilk (London , 2 February 1977) . 
37 Ch~opski Sztandar, 6.1.46. 
38 A. Dobieszewski i Z. H~mmerling Ruch ludowy w Wielko-
Eolsce 1945-1949 (Warsaw, 1971), pp . 100-1. 
'would be prepared to advocate consenting 
(to the bloc) if they could obtain terms 
which would break the present hegemony of 
the Communist Party •.• as they fear that 
despite all precautions the elections may 
not be free and unfettered, and that even 
if they are free and the PSL win, the Com-
munist Party will not quietly abandon 
power ••• Kiernik frankly admitted as a 
further reason that if the PSL were victo-
rious at the elections and formed a Govern-
ment, such a Government would soon lose 
popularity as the Polish people are at 
present expecting that the change of 
Government will work wonders •.• ' .39 
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But for this group too the question of hegemo ny was cru-
cial as Kiernik made plain in a speech in his constituency 
some months later: 'we cannot allow the PPR which is in a 
minority to obtain hegemony over us •.. ,.40 
Secondly, Miko~ajczyk's conviction that his party was 
indispensible and that the communists lacked the strength 
to sustain themselves in power by force, meant that he did 
not take the threatening undercurrent of their propaganda 
very seriously. He was anxious to delay as long as pos-
sible and minimise the attack on his party organisation 
which he expected would take place during the immediate 
run-up to the elections. However, he hoped to turn a ny 
increase in political tension to his own advantage by dem-
onstrating the strength of popular backing for the PSL and 
the communists' inability to counter it. He correctly 
reasoned that a rise in the political t emperature would 
intensify the pressure not only on the PSL but o n the 
communists and their allies too. In fact, as the commu-
nists alleged, Mikorajczyk's agreement to participation in 
the talks on the electoral bloc was purely tactical. In 
mid-January he confided to Cavendish-Bentinck that 'his 
object in not refusing outright the request of the Commu-
nist and Socialist parties for a single list is to reduce 
the period between open refusal by his party to agree to a 
Single list of candidates and the elections and thus to 
39 PRO F0371 56432. Conversation 23.1 .46. 
40 Kozik op . cit., p. 214. 
aVoid as long as possible open hostilities with violent 
repressions on local leaders of his party ••. ' .41 
The Rise of the PSL 
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Both the communists and tHkoJ:'aj czyk were thus pursu-
ing strategies which assumed that worker-peasant co-
operation should continue but collided on the issue of 
which side was to be the dominant partner. MikoJ:'ajczyk was 
determined to break the hegemony of the communists and 
aspired to establish his own. Until early 1946 it was the 
PSL which held the initiative and the communists who were 
on the defensive and, naturally, MikoJ:'ajczyk had no inten-
tion of abandoning tactics which seemed to be working. It 
was rather the strategy of the PPR which was undermined by 
internal developments during the latter half of 1945. 
We have seen how at t he international level MikoJ:'aj-
czyk was able to maintain his reputation as a statesman 
enjoying full Western confidence and support, while Stalin ' s 
intentions remained inscrutable but not discouraging f o r 
the PSL. Domestically the PSL was advancing on all fronts . 
By early 1946 it had captured large sections of the commu-
nists' hard-won rural base, penetrated deeply into the 
local administrative apparatus and generated a series of 
strains within the parties of the former Lublin coalition. 
At the same time the communists' hopes that Hiko1:'ajczyk ' s 
return would bring about an evaporation of the popular 
discontent which had disrupted industrial production and 
fuelled armed violence in the countryside during the spring 
were disappointed. The political climate remained unstable 
despite the relaxation, a combination of circumstances 
Which caused increasing alarm within the PPR. 
Miko~ajczyk's first major success was within the pea-
sant movement itself. It was tacitly assumed during the 
Mos c ow talks that 'ROCh' and the 'Lublin SL ' would merge 
to form a single united party once the coalition governmen t 
was formed and seats in the new cabinet were allocated on 
41 ~ F0371 56432. Conversation 14.1.46. 
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this premise. The communists initially hoped to force the 
'London' Peasants into a united party dominated by Lublin 
elements, according to the same plan which was executed 
more or less successfully in the case of the Socialists and 
42 the Catholic Party of Labour. Miko~ajczyk's followers, 
who clearly had a much sounder appreciation of the situa-
tion in the movement, proceeded from the start to activate 
their own organisation based on the wartime and pre-war 
leadership which held a conference in Warsaw on 8 July and 
constituted itself as a provisional party executive. At 
this meeting the question of tactics towards the existing 
SL was discussed. A couple of days previously the strength 
of support for Miko~ajczyk within the 'Lublin SL' had been 
clearly demonstrated when its Poznaii' organisation (with the 
approval of the national executive) had elected Miko~ajczyk 
as its president. This confirmed the confidence of the 
'ROCh' leaders that in Kiernik's words, ' t h e liquidation 
of th h · h . . 1 .. . t bl ' 43 e ~t erto f~ct~ona SL 1S 1neV1 a e . 
The pro-communist element in the leadership of the SL 
which was led by W~adys~aw Kowalski had been t hrown off 
balance by the strength of pro-Miko~ajc zyk feeling amongst 
the rank-and-file as well as many of the provincial acti -
vists. The so-called 'centrists' in the party led by 
Stanis~aw Banczyk and Boleslaw Scibiorek seized the oppor-
tunity to force Kowalski's resignation as party vice-
president, reinstate several suspended critics of the lead-
ership and open talks with Miko~ajczyk.44 Miko~aj czyk 
42 Zambrowski defined the tactics of the PPR at a meeting 
of the Party Secretariat in August 194 5 : ' I n the first 
phase our tactics rested on playi ng on the case for unity 
and giving the support of the democratic camp to the 
existing Peasant Party on forcing Miko~ajczyk to form 
one united party on the platform of the existing SL in 
~hich the SL would have the majority'. Protok6~ z po s -
1edzenia Sekretariatu KC odbytego w dniu 8 . 8 .194 5r ., 
Protoko~y KC (1945) OPe cit., p. 132. 
43 Borkowski Dzia~alnotc •.. Ope cit., pp. 79-80; J. 
Borkowski 0 powstaniu PSL i uks zta~towaniu si~ jego 
naczelnych w~dz Polska Ludowa 1964 nr. 3 , p. 62. 
44 Halaba Stronnictwo •.. Ope cit., pp. 117-18; J. Borkowski 
Rola i dzia~alnosc Miko~ajczykowskiego PSL (19 45 - 47) 
unpub. doctoral thesis (1958), Ch . 2 . 
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responded by offering the 'Lublin SL' a one third share of 
seats on the national executive. The 'centrists ', at first 
held out for more, but a month 
mise on Miko~ajczyk's terms. 45 
communists had changed tactics. 
later put forward a compro-
By this time however the 
At the end of July they 
and Kowalski decided that in any merger the 'Lublin' ele-
ment would be submerged beneath the MikoYajczyk majority 
and that it would therefore be preferable to keep a separ-
ate 'left' SL in existence. On 5 August attacks on Miko-
~ajczyk began in the SL press,46 and on the 8th Zambrowski 
informed the PPR Secretariat that: 
'since up to now the situation has developed 
towards the outnumbering of the present SL 
by the Miko~ajczyk group •.. (which has) 
revealed itself to be alien to the political 
line of the democratic camp and ••. which 
basically aims at restoring the pre-l926 
(the year the parliamentary system was over-
thrown - J.R.) system, we have recognised 
that there is no possibility of uniting 
these two parties; the existing poor and 
middle-peasant one, with democratic bloc, 
worker-peasant alliance and Soviet alliance 
traditions - and the middle-peasant and 
kulak pre-war Piast-type one. Our task is 
to give our peasants support ... to instill 
them with a sense of the grandeur of their 
political heritage, to accentuate clearly 
the line of division between the Miko~ajczyk 
group and the existing SL'.47 
The BanczYk-Scibiorek compromise was thrown out by the 
leftists on the executive and on 22 August Miko~ajczyk 
grasped the opportunity to legalise his own independent 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) . 48 
The troubles of the pro-communists in the SL now 
45 Borkowski Dzia~alnos6 ••• Op e cit., pp. 80-81. 
46 Borkowski 0 powstaniu PSL ... Op e cit., pp. 64-65. 
47 R. Halaba Z zagadniet wsPd~pracy politycznej PPR z 
radykalnym SL w okresie lipiec 1945 - styc zen 1946 
Rocznik dziejow ruchu ludowego 1962 nr. 4 , p. 78n . 
48 Borkowski 0 powstaniu PSL ... Op e cit., p. 66. 
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began in earnest . One after the other the local and pro-
vincial organisations of the party declared for Miko~ajczyk 
while within the rump of the party Banczyk and Scibiorek 
won wide support for their conc ept of a united, centrist 
49 Peasant Party . The Socialists were particularly well 
disposed to the prospect of the emergence of such a party 
which would be a potential partner for the PPS in a 
Socialist-Peasant alliance of the sort which had been com-
mon in the 1920s. On the other hand , the Kowalski faction, 
with a narrow and shaky majority on the executive, took an 
uncompromising pro-communist line and its relations with 
the Socialists were marked by strong mutual antipathy.50 
The final split between the ' centrists ' and the 'left' took 
place on 23 September at a meeting of the party Council. 
/ Banczyk attempted to use his wide support on the Council 
to reorganise the executive, while Kowalski and his suppor-
ters attempted to oust Ba6czyk and co-opt their sympathi-
sers to the Council . Amid stormy scenes Ba~c zyk , who 
claimed the support of 32 of the 76 Council members, led 
his followers in a walk-out from the meeting . 51 Attempts 
by the PPR to heal the split failed and on 25 September 
20 members of the 'centrist ' group were expelled by the 
' left' faction . 52 
The pro - communists' victory had been a Pyrrhic one. 
They had kept control of the central organisation in Warsaw 
49 Ba~czyk told a party meeting on 15 Septembe r ; 'There i s 
a fear that we would be outnumbered by the PSL in a mer-
ger; that we might go too far to the right . .. the SL can 
be neither right nor left, but centrist , close to t he 
left-wing , since that is the mood of t oday ' ibid., p. 68 . 
50 At a meeting of the Supreme Council of the SL o n 11 
February 1946 sections of the leadership of the PPS 
were heavily criticised for an 'incorrect attitude to 
the SL' and for 'favouring the reaction'. Halaba 
Stronnictwo .•• Ope cit. , p . 190. 
51 Borkowski Dzia~alnos6 ••• Ope cit . , pp . 81-82; 0 powsta-
niu PSL •• • OP e cit., pp. 69-70 . 
52 Borkowski Dziaralnos6 . . . Op e cit., p. 81. 
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but without difficulty Miko~ajczyk had captured the bulk 
of the grassroots network. Ma~opolska (Krakdw, Rzesz6w, 
Katowice) and Wielkopolska (Pozna~, Bydgoszcz) traditio n a l 
bastions of the movement went over tb , ~ the : 'PSL more or les s 
en masse, while in Warsaw, Lublin, Lodz, Kielce, Gdarlsk 
and Wroc~aw provinces the PSL captured a large part of th e 
53 
organisation. By November it claimed 200,000 members. 
The p osition in Warsaw province, described in a PPR r e p ort, 
was typical: 
'All except two members of the Provincial 
Executive have declared for the SL. However 
in the counties things are much worse ••• ,The 
PSL are extraordinarily active ••• the SL 
behaves completely passively. Not only do 
they not care about their position, but one 
gets the impression that they want "to be 
taken over" •••• At present they are waiting 
••• "at ease" while the PSL meanwhile cleans 
up the organisation from under the ir noses .•• '54 
No reliable figures are available which would allow us to 
estimate the extent of the collapse of the 'Lublin SL' with 
precision. The party claimed 300,000 members in August 
1945 but no further figures are available l."efore 1947. Neve r-
theless, there is no reason to dispute S~abek's statement 
that 'at the turn of 1945/46 the SL organisation went over 
to the PSL virtually in its entirety,.55 So wea k was the 
SL in early 1946 that it was not included in the t a lks on 
the electoral bloc - to the intense chagrin of its leaders 
who feared that the communists had, like the Socialists, 
decided that in the future it would have little role to play. 56 
53 Borkowski Dzia~alno£6 ••• Ope cit., p. 82. 
54 Sprawozdanie KW PPR Warsaw, 1.8 - 15.9.1945 Sprawozdania 
KW PPR .•• OPe cit. p. 305. 
S5 H. S~abek Wp~ywy partii wsr6d ch~op6w ziem dawnych 1944-
~ Z pola walki 1974 nr. 2 (66), p. 51. 
56 At a meeting held with the leaderships of the PPR and 
PPS at the request of the SL on 11.2.46 Korzycki argued 
that 'the low-point of the crisis in the SL was after 
Septembe r •••• If both workers' parties assist, the SL 
will grow and strengthen. The PSL cannot be counted on 
for anything'. Halaba Stronnictwo ••• Ope cit., pp. 172-
73. 
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The loss of the Banczyk 'centrists' had been a severe 
setback. Amongst them were men such as Bronisraw Drze-
wiecki and Franciszek Litwin who like Banczyk had added 
Some authenticity to the pro-communist SL and had been 
linked with it since the "Wola ludu" group was formed in 
early 1944. Apart from a few veterans of the pre-war KPP 
peasant 'fronts' (Kowalski, A. Korzycki, M. Gwiazdowicz), 
the main prop of the leadership were the so-called 
'Kadzich~opi', a group of somewhat discredited former Sejm 
deputies who had been active in the 1920s on the left of 
the peasant movement and had later opposed Witos' leader-
ship of the SL to the extent of lending support to the 
Sanacja ~egime in the late 1930s (J. Putek, S. Fidelus, 
A. Langer, S. Wrona, A. Waleron, H. Wyrzykowski). This 
group was naturally anathema to the mainstream movement and 
did little to widen the base of the party . 
The Banczyk group, following its secession , attempted 
during September-October to legalise itself as a third 
'centrist' Peasant Party. This added to the communists ' 
discomforture since the PPS lent vocal support to the ',pro-
posal. The differences of view between the PPR and PPS 
over the future of the peasant movement were revealed at a 
joint-meeting of their leaderships on 27-28 September. 
Os6bka-Morawski, speaking for the majority of the 
Socialist leadership, set out the case for a 'centrist ' 
solution: 
the PPS differs from the PPR in its 
assessment of the problem of the SL. The 
PPS stands for greater tolerance towards 
the Peasants than does the PPR . The Pea-
sants do not understand the situation . With 
a tolerant course it would be possible to 
win them over. For various reasons the 
influence of the SL hitherto has been mini-
mal. If Banczyk, Drzewiecki and the others 
were to drop out of the SL, that influence 
wil l decrease to a minimum, damaging our 
camp and strengthening Miko!ajczyk . An 
agreement between the SL and Ba6czyk and 
Drzewiecki would be the best way out , but 
if that turns out not to be possible - the 
formation of a third party would be a 
lesser evil than if Banczyk and Drzewiecki 
joined Mikorajczyk l • 57 
Gomu!ka replied for the Politburo oD the PPR: 
I ••• the PPS accuses us of pursuing the 
wrong policy towards the Peasants since 
Lublin times. Already we have explained 
that it was then not possible to apply 
a different policy from the one we adop-
ted ••.• We shall agree with comrade 
Os6bka-Morawski and there will be no 
divergence between us in relation to the 
Peasants if as a basis for the worker-
peasant alliance we choose a real and 
simultaneously democratic force in the 
countryside ...• Today perhaps the PSL 
constitutes the greater real force, never-
theless it is not sincerely democratic. 
The SL is a lesser real force, but it is 
genuinely democratic. If we choose the 
real force and support it despite its 
anti-democratic potential that would be 
the wrong course and could lead to unfor-
tunate consequences •... A third party based 
on Batczyk, which the PPS wo uld back with 
enthusiasm, is objectively speaking 
unnecessary and harmful. Logic teaches 
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that factions struggle against one ano -
ther. If that minority which left set up 
a party, it would conflict with the radical 
majority which was left. And ideologically, 
after all , this group inclines towards 
the PSL •.• , 58 
Although the Socialists subsequently abandoned their 
support for Bartczyk ' s group, which in November joined the 
PSL, the PPS leaders had little confidence in the ability 
of the pro-communist SL to rally support to the national 
front from the mainstream of the peasant movement. The 
communique at the end of the September meeting indicated 
clearly that the Socialists looked beyond the SL for 
allies: the PPS whole-heartedly supports the left SL 
and all Peasants who unreservedly a nd loyally work towards 
the pOlitical aims of the Government of National Uni ty ,. 59 
57 Halaba Stronnictwo •.. Op e cit., pp. 130-31. 
58 Halaba Z zagadniert ... OP e cit., pp. 79-80. 
59 Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the PPS , 
28 . 9.45, cited in Syzdek Op e cit., p. 326 . 
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For the present as we have seen the communists had not 
ruled out an alliance with the PSL and favoured an elec-
toral agreement with Miko~ajczyk . However while the c om-
munists regarded such an alliance as desirable, pro vided 
that their leading role was preserved, the Socialists reg-
arded an agreement with the Peasants as essential and t h ey 
were prepared to go further than the PPR in making conces -
sions to achieve it. In particular, the Socialists 
themselves now questioned the hegemony of t he PPR and saw 
an alliance with the Peasants as a way to strengthen their 
own position in the national front. OSbbka stated at the 
September meeting that until a short time before 'there 
existed the conviction that the PPR leads and has to lead 
in Poland. Now we must .•• emphasise that the working 
class leads' .60 As Gomu~ka told the Central Committee ' the 
PPS would like to be as it were in the middle of the con-
figuration of forces in Poland, with the PPR o n one side 
and the PSL on the other ,.6l 
Miko~ajczyk 's success in rally ing the peasant movement 
was a major setback for the communists. Not only had the 
PSL drawn off a very large part of the organisation and 
rank-and-file membership of the SL, it had even won back the 
/ Banczyk group which had broken with ' ROCh ' in 1944. In the 
process it had brought to the surface strains between the 
PPR and the Socialists. 
As the Peasants went over en masse to Miko~ajczyk , 
much of the infrastructure of government in the countryside 
also fell under PSL control. In the villages the c ommunists 
relied heavily on the SL to man local government , the 
administration of agriculture and mass organisations such 
as ZSCh and 'Wici', the rural youth movement . In local 
government in November 1945, the SL held 25 % of seats o n 
Provincial National Councils, 31% at district level and 50 % 
at commune level. 62 Switches of allegiance amo ngst these 
60 Sierocki Warszawska ... op . cit., p. 254. 
61 H. Rechowicz Pierwsze wybory 1947 (Katowice, 1963), ~ . 15 . 
62 Halaba Stronnictwo ... op. cit., p . 1 54 . 
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councillors allowed the PSL to make rapid inroads into 
local administration. In Krakow province, for example, by 
the end of the year the PSL had 25 % of seats at both dis-
trict and commune level. 63 This was just the start of a 
process which continued for most of 1946 and enabled the 
PSL to establish a dominant position in the lower tiers of 
local government across much of rural central Poland (see 
pages 238-241). In the villages the communists lacked the 
strength to halt this trend. In the Peasant strongholds of 
Krakow and Rzeszow, Kiernik as Minister of Public Adminis-
tration was even able to install PSL members as provincial 
governors. 64 
Wherever possible, the PPR used its influence at 
central government level to halt the PSL advance. 65 In 
local government the 'Lublin' parties continued to dominate 
the Provincial National Councils which nominated members to 
the KIDl. The PSL was therefore prevented from securing 
more than a small minority of seats in parliament (see Table 
Two). Nevertheless, the communists were in a minority in 
the KRN also and were heavily dependent on the PPS and 
their other allies to keep the PSL in check. 66 
63 Cwik OPe cit., pp. 309, 320. 
64 Kozik OPe cit., pp. 176-77; Olszewski Pocz~tki ... Op e 
cit., pp. 172, 190-91. Z. Robel, a PSL sympathiser, was 
Governor of Krakow province until December 1945. R . 
Gesing, a member of the leadership of the PSL, was 
Governor of Rzesz6w province, 1946-47. 
65 Thus, for instance, on 13 November 1945 responsibility 
for the administration of the new western and northern 
territories was transferred from Kiernik's Mi nistry of 
Public Administration to a new Ministry for the Recovered 
Territories under Gomu~ka. Subsequently the PSL was 
largely excluded from local government in this area. 
66 For example, the PSL twice almost defeated the PPR during 
discussions in committee of the KRN on the Nationalisation 
Law in early 1946. The PSL attacked the principle of 
compensating former owners and won support from spokes-
men of the SL, PPS and SO. Shortly afterwards the PSL 
backed an SL amendment to give co-ops control of the 
food industry. In each case the support of the Social-
ists enabled the PPR to vote the PSL down . See S!abek 
Ogolne aspekty •.. OPe cit., pp. 52-55. 
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Tab le Two Party Representation on the KRN 1945-46 
August 1945 67 December 1946 68 
PPR 100 139 
PPS 77 112 
SL 56 60 
PSL 3 55 
PSL ' Nowe Wyzwolenie ' 2 
SD 16 38 
SP 8 
Non-party/ others 31 30 
.. --
Total 283 444 
The communists ' loss of influence in the rural bureau-
cracy was accompanied by a general contract ion of their 
base of Support in the countryside. Apart from t h e defec-
tion to Miko~ajczyk of most of the peasant movement the 
Party itself lost members during the summer . In August 
1945 it had 61,000 peasant members but by September this 
figure had fallen to 53 , 800. Although it had climbed back 
to 66,000 by December,69 recruitment in rural areas was 
markedly slower than in the towns. The proportion of pea-
sant members in the PPR in the spring had been 37 %; by 
December 1945 it had fallen to 28 %. 70 The continuing 
activity of the armed anti-communist underground was blamed 
for this . 71 It seems more likely that the real reaso n was 
thatinkany country areas the Party ' s organisa tio n was too 
weak to withstand the emergence of the PSL as the dominant 
67 Syzdek OP e cit., pp . 249-50 . 
68 PPR . Rezo lucje , odezwy, instrukcje i okolniki komitetu 
centralnego i.1946 - i.1947 (Warsaw, 1961), p . 214 . 
69 Ko !omejczyk PPR . . . Op e cit. , p . 290. 
70 Ibid. , pp . 287, 290 . 
71 Ibid ., pp. 118-23 . 
force in the villages. Zambrowski indicated the Party's 
concern over this problem and in particular the Party's 
lack of good peasant cadres at the First Congress of the 
PPR in December 1945: 
' ••• provincial and district committees 
treat our Party's 60,000 members in the 
countryside as second-class members of 
the Party. The needs of rural cells are 
worst served, they meet least often, they 
are least looked after. The abundant, com-
mitted and authoritative aktyw which came 
forward in the ranks of the PPR during the 
implementation of land reform has for the 
most part been squandered and incorrectly 
spread around the state administration, 
behind desks and so on •••• We must achieve 
••• a shift back to work on a mass scale 
in the countryside,.72 
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The position in the Peasant Self-help Union, which 
with over half-a-million members was an important channel 
of Party influence in the countryside, was said by September 
to have reached a crisis. An internal Party report commen-
ted that the 'Union's members have stopped paying their 
subscriptions. In those districts where SL executives have 
been taken over by the PSL, the Peasant Self-help offi c es 
have been as well. Self-help co-operatives are vegetating 
without any possibility of growth' - kept dow n it was said 
by the (PPS-dominated) "Spo~em " co-ops and the (PSL-
dominated) Land Offices. 73 Miko~ajczyk 's followers suc-
ceeded in capturing many local branches of the Union and 
even the provincial sections in Poznan and Gdansk. Only 
concerted efforts by the PPR, including the arrest of PSL 
delegates, prevented the PSL securing a majority at the 
national Congress of the ZSCh in March 1946. 74 
72 Zambrowski 0 masow~ ••• Ope cit., p. 40 . 
73 Sprawozdanie KW PPR Warsaw, 1.8 - 15.9.45 Sprawozdania 
KW PPR ..• OPe cit.p. 306. 
74 Halaba Stronnictwo ... Ope cit., pp. 174-76; Montaz 
Zj~Zdu Samopomocy Jutro Polski 14,21,28.4.46. Zambrow-
sk1 had told the First Congress of the PPR: ' we must dam 
the further penetratio n of the PSL into the ZSCh ', 
Zambrowski 0 masow~ •.. Op e cit., p. 41 . 
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The PPR was powerless to prevent 'Wici', the 400,000-
strong peasant youth movement from falling into PSL hands. 
Its congress in December 1945 has been described as ' a 
huge pro-PSL demonstration' and the president and his dep-
uty (J. Dusza and M. Jag~a) were both members of the PSL 
Supreme Council. 75 A few days before the PSL had captured 
control of the Polish Teachers' Union at its first postwar 
congress. Of 1,500 delegates it seems that only about 30 
were communists. 76 The paucity of PPR influence within the 
teaching profession had been a cause of leadership concern 
for some time. In September 1945 the Party launched a 
campaign to expand its following in the schools,77 but a 
few months later Zambrowski lamented over the 'pa thological 
opposition towards our democratic system of a large part 
of the teaching profession,.78 A number of factors limited 
the appeal of the PPR amongst teachers, including the gen-
eral anti-communism of the intelligentsia and their 
depressed material conditions. Moreover the Peasants had 
great influence within tte profession. The SL ' ROCh' had 
largely organised the underground schools system during the 
war and one of the leading wartime educational activists, 
Czes~aw Wycech, a prominent member of the PSL , was fr om 
1945-47 Minister of Education. 
To sum up, the legalisation of the mainstream peasant 
mov ement in mid-1945 did not so much extend the government's 
base in the countryside, rather it allowed the traditional 
political structure of the villages to re-surface . In the 
spring, despite their numerical weakness, the communists 
had held the levers of power in their hands by monopolis-
ing local government and the ZSCh , excluding their oppo-
nents from the 'Lublin SL' and ' Wici ' and employing the UB 
75 Jarecka-Kimlowska ZMW "wici" ••. OP e cit., pp . 109-10. 
76 J. Jakubowski Polityka PPR i PPS wobec ZNP 1944-48 Z 
pola walki 1973 nr. 4 (64), p. 41 . 
77 O~olnik KC · PPR w sprawie pracy partyjnej wsrod nauczy-
C~eli PPR •.. viii 44 - xii 45 Op e cit., pp . 201-3 . 
78 Zambrowski 0 masow~ ••. Op e cit., pp . 40-41. 
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to overcome political obstacles. However, by the e nd of 
1945 the PSL was running the villages. 
The Illegal Opposition 
Despite the concessions in the political apparatus 
the communists had made to the other coalition parties , 
the stabilisation of the political and economic situation , 
which had been one of the main objectives of the ' May turn', 
was only very partial. Underground activity, lawless ness , 
strikes and protests persisted. For the communist s this 
continuing climate of uncertainty and their failur e to gen-
erate any marked shift in popular feeling towards them-
selves was unexpected and troubling. For Miko~ajczyk, o n 
the other hand, the absence of stabilisation bore o ut hi s 
claim that only the PSL could provide Stalin with a secure 
and friendly Polish government. 
Despite the regrouping of political forces in 1945, 
the underground remained one of the main o bstacles t o 
stabilisation. The formation of the Provisional Gover nmen t 
of National Unity in effect mar ked the end of t h e under-
ground state formed in 1939/40, which had survived, bat-
tered, Until mid-19 45. At a meeting in Krak6w o n 27 June 
the political leadership of the movement formally disba nded 
79 and announced this publicly o n 1 July. 
The military underground, c ommanded since Okulicki ' s 
arrest b y Colonel Jan Rzepecki , had been reorganised in 
April as the Armed Forces Delegat ion (Delegatura Si~ 
Zbrojnych - DSZ), in part because t h e ' Nie ' organisatio n 
wa s known to the Russians, hut also it seems as a more 
strictly military formation than its predecessor , firmly 
subordinated to the political l eadership of the underground .80 
Ivhile setting itself the task of 'l iquidating particularly 
harmful persons' and ' armed resistance to t he nation's 
destructio n as well as the depopulation and devastatio n of 
79 Uchwa~a Rady Jedno£ci Narodowej z dn . 1 VIr 1945 r . in 
T . 2e~czykowski Dramatyc zny rok 1945 (Londo n, 1981), 
pp. 216-23. 
80 Y.orbo~ski Polskie ... OP e cit., pp . 229 - 30 . 
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81 the country', the DSZ sought to curb unco-ordinated 
resistance and two appeals were issued in May to this 
effect. 82 The DSZ succeeded in gathering together rather 
more of the old AK network than had ' Nie ', but a consider -
able part, including the National Democrats, remained out -
side, and its organisation was still far from complete i n 
August 1945 when following the dissolution of the under-
g d . d' 83 roun state 1t followe SU1t. 
However, only about 44,000 people took advantage of 
the amnesty of August~September 1945. For the most part 
these were members of the Peasant Battalions. Old loyal-
ties and mistrust of the authorities dissuaded most of the 
AK/DSZ and nationalists from revealing themselves. 84 
According to estimates of the Ministry of the Interior, 
which must be very approximate , some 80 ,0 00 people remained 
active in the underground in 1945 a nd about 60,000 in 
1946. 85 
As Figure One (p. 117) shows , although the peak of 
anti-government violence in spring 1945 fell off sharply in 
June-July, it thereaf te r remained almost constant at a 
level of about 200 assassinations of officials a nd govern-
ment supporters every month - a considerable number . In 
some areas , in particular most of wester n Poland a nd t he 
urban ised regio ns, armed resistance was sl i ght . But across 
much of central Poland it persisted on a wide sca l e , while 
in the r emo ter parts of the east a nd south of the country 
government forces were confined to t he towns, under virtual 
siege. 
Two main underground networ ks active in 1945/46. 
' Freedom and Independence ' (Wol noS'C' i NiezawistoS'c - WiN) , 
81 Pol:og Hal{nowsk i op. cit., pp . 882- 83 fn . 274 . 
82 Ibid ., p. 884 . 
83 Czapla W walce ... Op e cit., pp. 53 - 59 , 64 . 
84 Gbra Po1ska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa •.. Op e cit., p . 161 . 
85 Wal ichnowski OP e cit. , p . 332 . Th is source suggests 
that the figures are probably underestimates . 
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established in September 1945 was based on the former mem-
bership of the AK/DSZ. The National Military Union (NZW) , 
the armed wing of the underground National Party, was 
formed as we have seen in November 1944, and by mid-1945 
had absorbed much of what remained of the NSZ. There wer e 
also regional organisations such as the Conspiratorial 
P~lish Army 'Lasy' (Lodz province), or that of 'Ogi e n' 
(Podhale) and '~upaszko' (Pomorze). These networks sus-
tained a considerable degree of organisational coherence 
until late 1946. 86 In addition, the Ukrainian nationalist 
movement, active along the south-eastern border, was par-
ticularly well-organised and effective. 87 
Apart from the full-scale insurgency by the Ukrainian 
nationalists, the Polish guerillas too were capable o f 
inflicting considerable damage to the authority of the 
government. On 4/5 August 1945, for instance, some 250 me n 
equipped with seven lorries, occupied Kielce, captured its 
key points and stormed the prison to release 376 priso-
88 
ners. A month later a smaller group, again transpor t ed 
in lorries, attacked Radom prison, allowing the escape o f 
292 prisoners. 89 Early in 1946 NZW 'Special Actio n' unit s 
86 On WiN see: Czapla W walce •.. op. cit., pp. 64-76; S. 
Kluz W potrzasku dziejowym WiN na szlaku AK: Ro zwazani a i 
dokumentacja (London, 1978). On the nationalist under-
ground see: Czapla W walce .•• op. cit., pp. 78-105; J. 
Pilacinski NSZ - kulisy walki podziemnej 1939-46 (Londo n, 
1976); Z.S. Siemaszko Narodowe Si?y Zbro j ne (London, 
1982). The activity of the KWP 'Lasy' is described in 
Turlejska W walce ... op. cit., pp.315-65; 'Ogien' is 
dealt with in Turlejska Z walk ... op. cit., PP. 170-237; 
J. Kozlinski podziemie na Pomorze 1945-47 (Gdynia, 1959) 
and By~y zo~nierz AK 5-ta Brygada Wilenska AK mj r. 
Eu~aszki Zeszyty Historyczne 21 (1972), pp. 136-44 con-
ta1ns material on 'bupaszko'. 
87 On the Ukrainian nationalist underground see: A. Szcze s-
niak i W. Szota Oro a do nik d. Dziala1nosc OUN i ' e' 
likwidacja w polsce Warsaw, 1973); Y. Tys-Krokmaliuk 
UPA Warfare in Ukraine (Society of Vete r a ns of Ukraini a n 
Insurgent Army, USA, 1972). 
88 Czapla W wa1ce •.. op. cit., pp. 326-27. 
89 Siemaszko Grupa Szanca ... ,op. cit., p. 24; J. Kowal 
Letter to the editor Zeszyty Hi s tor yc z ne 22 (1972), 
Pp. 152-53. ' 
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carried out a 'pacification' of pro-government White Russian 
villages in Bielsk Podlaski bistrict which had delivered 
quotas on time. Forty-six inhabitants were killed. 90 
Such incidents, accompanied as they were by a host of 
less dramatic shootings and attacks, had as we have seen a 
disastrous effect on Party morale and support in the coun-
tryside. It is clear from'reports to the Central Committee 
that the security problem remained serious during the 
second half of 1945: 91 
'Security in Kalisz district is beneath 
cri.ticism. Chocz commune and in part 
Koscielec are almost continuously under 
the terror of the bands' (Po znart , July-
August). 'The activity of the terrorist 
bands has decreased significantly. There 
are nevertheless districts such as Ostr6w 
Mazowiecki, Ostrot~ka, Garwolin, where 
up to now it has not been possible to ven-
ture outside the towns. Militia posts have 
been withdrawn; in the communes our autho -
rity does not in reality exist. ' (Warsaw, 
August-September). 'The wrecking on two 
occasions of the prisons in such strate-
gically vital places as the towns of 
Kielce and Radom and their virtual occu-
pation has undoubtedly strengthened the 
reaction' ••• 'Party work in some districts , 
such as Kozienice, Sandomierz and Pinczdw, 
encounters immense difficulties' ... due to 
the marauding bands .•. (In Pinczbw) Party 
activity literally exists only in conspir-
acy . It is impossible because of the 
intense terror of the bands .•. to conduct 
activity in the terrain' (Kielce, September-
October). ' •.. in Zawiercie district our 
Party has been unable to expand since as 
a result of the activity of the bands, 
fi~e of our commune committees were forced 
to suspend activity' (Katowice, December). 
The communists' lack of resources to combat the underground 
and the pervasiveness of the mood of uncertainty is shown 
by a report from Rzeszow for October-November: 
90 Majecki OP e cit., pp . 147-48. 
91 §prawozdania KW PPR ••• Ope cit., pp. 305-6, 321, 324-25 , 
329 , 338~ Pierwsze lata w~adzy ludowej w dokumentach 
PPR (1945-46) Z pola walki 1974nr. 2 (66) , p . 320 . 
'Since the unfortunate close of the London 
conference of Foreign Ministers (11.9.- . 
2.10.45 - J.R.) we have observed a steady 
growth in the impact of reactionary rumours 
that a third world war will break out. 
This has caused a steady increase in anti-
Soviet, anti-PPR, anti-democratic feeling 
as well as of the reactionary terror. In 
a number of districts the appearance of 
new terrorist bands or the expansiono£ 
old ones and their increased activity has 
been evident •.•• In some of the districts 
it is difficult to master the situation 
in view of the inadequate strength of the 
Militia and Security forces and the limited 
possibility of employing local army garri-
sons (lack of political training) •..• 
(There are) frequent refusals by whole units 
to take part in operations. Many of the 
officers (display) decidedly unfavourable, 
not to say hostile feeling ..•. The Party 
has in some districts to a large extent 
been forced underground'. 
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In many rural areas the underground was clearly capable of 
countering the c ommunists ' police resources. The PSL was 
allowed a free run, while the Party was forced into hiding. 
Clandestine organisations were active in the towns 
too, where they mounted protests and circulated anti-
government literature. Although armed resistance was much 
less common than in the countryside there was much unrest. 
Working-class protests were frequent and often it seems 
took an anti-Semitic turn. In August Endek elements , so 
it was claimed, provoked a pogrom in Krakow and attempted 
to do the same in nearby R<lbka, Chrzanbw and Miech6w . 9 2 
Strikes in the Lodz textile mills the following month were 
blamed by the communists on 'reactionary elements ' and 
anti -Semitic overtones were once more evident . 9 3 ' Very 
strong anti-Semitic feeling' was reported amongst the 
employees of the Rzeszow aircraft factor y in No vember . 94 
92 Kozik OP e cit., p. 118; Rohotnik 15.8.45. 
93 Protok6~ z posiedzenia Komitetu Centralnego z dnia 
20.9.1945 r., Protoko~y KC (1945) Op e cit., pp . 137-38. 
94 Sprawozda~ie KW PPR w Rzeszowie za o k res od 15.10 . do 
15.11.1945 r ., Sprawozdania KW PPR •.• op. cit., p . 328 . 
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Students for the most part were vociferously anti-communist 
and the Endeks retained some of their pre-war influence in 
'" /' 95 the universities, especially in Krakow and Poznan . But 
student rebelliousness was evident in Lodz too where in 
December following demonstrations some 100 students were 
96 
arrested and the university closed early. 
As we have said, the communists were determined to 
keep in place the wedge they had driven between t-1ik01:"aj czyk 
and the 'reaction'. They feared that a situation might 
develop in which underground activity would complement 
Mikorajczyk's legal opposition. Following the October 1945 
Plenum the communists renewed the 'class struggle' against 
the 'reaction'. This they hoped would complete the des-
97 truction of the underground. At the same time they 
launched a propaganda campaign to warn Miko1:"ajczyk against 
taking advantage of the situation. They did not at this 
stage accuse him of allying his party with the 'reaction ', 
but rather of ambivalence: 
' .•. the reaction would like to assign to 
Miko~ajczyk the role of a trojan horse ... 
This raises a basic question: what attitude 
does the other side take to these plans? .• 
Today it is still too early to give a defi -
nitive reply to this que?tion. All the same 
it is striking that Miko~ajczyk and his group 
do not repudiate the reaction in a conclu-
sive way, but maintain a discrete silence ... 
and what is worse there are even t hose in 
the PSL who do not hide that they would 
willingly take the help offered to them by 
the other side ' .98 
Miko~ajczyk had in fact commented just a week before 
that ' peasants know how to count .•• t here are so many of 
95 Kozik op. cit., pp . 273-74. 
96 ~ F0371 56432. 
97 Gomu~ka Referat wyg~oszony na zebraniu aktywu organi-
zacji warszawskiej PPR 21.10 . 1945 r. Artykuty ... Vol . 
lop. cit., p. 376 . 
98 Ibid ., pp. 38G-8l . 
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us ... that we do not need to look to any help from the 
reaction,.99 But he did not accept the communists' all-
embracing definition of the 'reaction'. He applied the 
term only to former Sanacja circles and right-wing Nation-
alists, traditional enemies of his party who regarded him 
as the betrayer of the Government-in-Exile and now looked 
to the armed overthrow of the coalition government or a 
third world war. 100 The fact that moderate sections of the 
AK and the National Party remained underground and that 
popular outbursts took place was in the view of the PSL the 
consequence of communist repression and excess e s rather 
than mass support for the diehards. lOl 
Nevertheless leaving aside the Sanacja and NSZ extre-
mists there was indeed a great deal of affinity in terms o f 
short-term political objectives as well as the social base 
of the legal and illegal oppositions. Apart from Bia!ysto k 
province where the Peasants were weak and the underground 
numerous and particularly uncompromising, the two movement s 
both drew the bulk of their support from the same s ocial 
groups in rural central and eastern Poland . Most of the 
rank-and-file of the underground were peasants, as were 
many of its officers, while others were often drawn from 
the rural intelligentisa, especially from among teachers. l02 
Despite their political differences, in most areas the PSL 
supporters had far more in common with their former AK 
colleagues than with their official allies from the PPR. 
There was also much in common between the political 
outlook of the PSL and much of the underground. The right 
wing of the underground based its strategy on the assump-
tion that armed conflict would sooner or later break out 
between the West and the Soviet Union and directed its 
99 Ch~opski Sztandar 14.10.45. 
100 This seems to have been the view of some sections o f the 
i National Party at first. See Kozik OPe cit., pp. 171-73. 
101 S . Banczyk Domagamy si~ wyborOw w dniu 28 lipca (spe ech 
to X session of the KRN) Gazeta Ludowa 28.4.46. 
102 Turlejska W walce ••. Ope cit., pp. 268-70; Walichnowski 
OPe cit., pp. 248-49 . 
energies to preparing for a rebellion inside Poland when 
this happened. The ~SL was, especially at first, viewed 
with hostility by this element. However, as Miko~ajczyk 
moved into opposition its general attitude shifted to one 
103 
of non-aggression if not active support. However, the 
stronger current in the underground geared its tactics 
closely to those of the legal opposition. WiN in particu-
lar seems to have been conceived by its founders as a kind 
of underground party which would provide a moderate rally-
ing point for former members of the AK who might otherwise 
by drawn to the Endek extremists. 104 Its 'ideological 
guidelines' of September 1945 closely paralleled PSL 
thinking, apart from the demand by WiN for a renegotiation 
of the eastern frontier settlement. The guidelines called 
for the restoration of civil rights, drastic curbs o n the 
powers of the security forces and full Polish sovereignty . 
WiN viewed free elections as 'the only correct way' to 
achieve this, and although it did not intend to contest 
such elections, it declared that it would ' exert every 
effort so that (the seats) would be found in the hands of 
genuine Polish democracy', and to e nsure that the results 
were not falsified. The guidelines welcomed the programme 
of the Government of National Unity 'in many of its f unda-
mental features', but criticised the distortion of the 
programme to serve 'the political objectives of one party'. 
The decision of the previous undergro und leadership to co-
operate with the coalition government in ' open struggle f or 
its aims' was greeted as 'sensible and courageous', and 
WiN considered that the legitimacy of the Government-in-
Exile had ceased and called on the emigration to return 
horne. Although the movement aimed at 'f reedom and inde-
pendence as conceived by Anglo-Saxon society' it recognised 
that 'the maintenance of good political relations and 
103 Borkowski Miejsce PSL w obozie reakc ji (19 45-47) Z 
pola walki 1959 nr. 2 (6) I pp. 70-72. 
104 
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economic co-operation with the Soviet Union' was 'necessary 
and positive'. Armed activity was not ruled out, but WiN 
disassociated itself from 'the anti-democratic activity of 
extreme groups' and admitted that 'self-defence' had often 
taken 'too severe a form,.lOS There is evidence that the 
rank-and-file members of the underground regarded the emph-
asis on the political character of WiN sceptically and 
tended to see it as a straightforward anti-communist 
'l't .. 106 . m~ ~ ary organ~sat~on and changes in ~ts command during 
107 1946 reinforced this tendency. Nevertheless, the elec-
tions remained at the centre of WiN activity and the 
movement's raison d'etre was largely removed by the defeat 
and collapse of the PSL in early 1947. 
The fact that in Poland, alone amongst the East 
European satellites, the underground anti-communists con-
tinued to play a significant role through 194 5-46 had 
obvious implications for the viability of the Party's stra-
tegy. First, it hindered the communists' efforts to 
escape their political isolatio n and gather a mass follow-
ing. This was particularly so in the remoter country areas 
where armed attacks made it difficult for the communists 
to establish even the rudiments of an effective organisa-
tion. But even in the towns it was not easy for the Party 
to break the remnants of wartime solidarity, the prestige 
of the AK and the widespread popular view t hat Party 
me~ership was tantamount to collaboration with an occupying 
power. Secondly the communists' insecurity and suspicion 
105 Deklaracja programowa wiN ~ dn. 2 .IX.194 S r. 0 Wolnosc 
Oblwatela i Niezawis~osc Pans twa (Wytyczne ideowe) in ~enczykowskiDramatyczny rok •.• op. cit., pp. 229- 33. 
106 Caban i Machoc~i op. cit., pp. 48-49; Turlejska W 
walce .•• op. cit., pp. 262-63. 
107 Following his arrest in November 1945, Col . Jan Rzepecki 
the first 'President' of WiN, publicly called for an 
end to underground armed activity. His s uccessor Fran-
ciszek Niepok6~czycki who led wiN until he in turn was 
arrested in late 1946 was a former follower of Pi~sudski 
fr om the eastern kresy and a more conservative and 
military figure. See S. Lis-Koz~owski HTeodor H 
Zeszyty historyczne 38 (1976), pp . 180-9 2 ; Polski 
S~ownik biograficz ny t.XXIII/l, z .96. 
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towards potential allies was greatly intensified by the 
continued activity of political conspiracies and guerilla 
groups. They were acutely aware that their hegemony in the 
government was shaky and saw clearly the danger of a c om-
plete loss of control if it was relaxed. Thirdly, the 
activity of the underground gave teeth to the whole opposi -
tion movement and reduced the effectiveness of the 
communists' control of the state apparatus, the security 
forces, censorship and the media. Miko~ajczyk could point 
to the long-standing conflicts between his party and the 
forces which composed the underground, but by fuelling the 
atmosphere of instability and paralysing the political 
machine of the PPR, the underground enhanced the viability 
of the Peasant opposition. Unlike the legal 'bourgeois' 
parties elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the PSL did not feel 
compelled to avoid confronting the communists. Its leader-
ship felt that it could emerge victorious from such a 
showdown because the alternative would be to slide to civil 
war which the Russians would not allow. 
The Mood in the PPR 
Although Gomulka and the leadership continued to c on-
demn 'sectarianism' within the Party and to argue for the 
line adopted in May 1945, the growth of the Peasant oppo-
sition and the persistence of clandestine activity prompted 
ca~ls for a harder line from the aktyw. The formation of 
the Government of National Unity had not been popular with 
many activists. A report from Warsaw province for August 
described the mood at a series of meetings of the aktyw: 
'A characteristic feature noticeable at a ll 
these meetings was the serious disquiet and 
disorientation aroused in the Party's ranks 
by the formation of the Government of National 
Unity, the audacious stunts of the reaction 
and at the same time the contraction (in 
the role of the PPR - J.R.). Such cries as: 
"We need a Dzier~yriski" i "Put an end to 
Kerensky-ism"i "Enough talk: when do we be-
gin to fight the reaction?", were to be heard 
at the meetings. The report on t he political 
situation, the call to organise struggle with 
sabotage and the reaction and to turn 
a blind eye to (PSL) ministerial and 
procuratoral decisions - brought a sigh 
of relief' .108 
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In November the same tendencies were revealed at the 
conferences preceding the Party Congress. Kasman reported 
to the Secretariat of the Central Committee that: 
'In general the conferences took the form 
of serious debates ••• Comrades raised the 
subject of the struggle against the reac-
tion and the call for strong government. 
It was apparent that there was concern 
amongst the Party rank-and-file that the 
system of power of People's democracy should 
be safeguarded. The tendency to overcome 
difficulties by . administrative pressure 
was fairly widely in evidence. At several 
conferences a number of speakers put for-
ward the slogan of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in various forms, which met with 
applause ••.. The sectarian tendencies .•. 
result in general from an inability to 
overcome the difficulties which we encoun-
ter in the struggle for influence amongst 
the masses, as well as from KPP traditions 
mechanically carried over to present cir-
cumstances. The sectarian mood results not 
from an oppositionist attitude to the Party 
line but rather from a failure to under-
stand and digest it ..•. At numerous 
conferences in small-town working-class 
centres, which ought to be strongly linked 
with the countryside, the issue of the 
worker-peasant alliance was dealt with weakly 
or not at all ..• '109 
Kasman mentioned rebellions which had taken place against 
the Party line at conferences in Krak6w and Lodz. In the 
former, where W~odzimierz Zawadzki still enjoyed consider-
able popularity, the conference had demanded a change of 
policy, rejecting the national front and calling for the 
d" · , . 110 ~ctatorship of the proletariat. Although Ochab doubted 
108 Sprawozdanie KW PPR Warsaw, 1.8. - 15.9.45, Sprawozdania 
KW PPR ... Ope cit., p. 309 . 
109 
110 
Protok6~ z posiedzenia Sekretariatu Centralnego Komi-
tetu odbytego w dniu 15.11.1945 r ., Protoko~y KC (1945) 
oP e cit., p. 147. 
Ibid. 
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Whether 'the general ultra-leftist tendency' would give 
rise to an organised left faction at the congress, he did 
think that it was necessary for the leadership to speak 
out . h' dIll agalnst t 1S tren . 
In fact Ochab was one of those given a rough ride by 
the left at the congress. As one of the delegates from 
Lodz later reminisced, Gomu~ka had to answer hardline cri-
tics of the Party's moderation towards the intellige ntsia 
who had interrupted Bie~~owski's speech with such cries 
as 'Down with the reactionary professors! '. Gomu~ka also 
had to reply to Daniszewski and others who argued that the 
PPR lacked a clear conception of where it was heading and 
had departed too far from the traditions of its r1arxist 
predecessors. But the sharpest attack o n the leadership 
was led by Maria Kamirtska, second secretary of the Pozna~ 
committee and a prominent figure in the KPP in the 1930s: 
'In her speech she delivered a crushing 
condemnation of the work of the Land Off ices 
as hotbeds of the landlords and their s up -
porters, of the land comm i ssioner s of the 
Ministry of Agriculture for indole nce; she 
criticised the State Repatriation Office 
for sluggishness and poor organi sation of 
r epatriation, lack of energy i n combating 
the PSL and the reaction etc . However it 
was no t only the c o ntent, but the form which 
was decisive. She spoke with such fluency, 
so suggestively and convincingly ..• t hat she 
carried the entire congress with her. Time 
and time again the audience responded with 
bursts of applause or made shouts of approval 
Later in Edward Ochab's summing-up it 
turned out that on a number of ma tters 
Kaminska had been wrong. Ochab , replying to 
Kami~ska, argued t hat according to her every-
body, especially t hose a/t t he top , were at 
fault, except the Poznan committee . He 
pointed out that a great many of t h e weak-
nesses of the Po znan party organisation resul-
ted from the poor work of the provi ncial 
committee : that it was necessary to go to t h e 
peasant, to tre countryside , combat t he 
reactionary elements, but no t to look to 
111 Protok6~ z posiedzenia Sekretariatu Centralnego Komi-
tetu odbytego w dniu 15.11.1945 r., Protokoly KC (1 945 ) 
p. 149. 
, 
Warsaw, to the security forces, to think 
that decrees solved everything. But h e 
spoke less convincingly, perhaps even too 
monotonously, so that the conference -ha ll 
received his speech rather reservedly ' . 112 
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Unfortunately the proceedings of the February 1 946 
Central Committee Plenum, with the exception of parts of 
Gomu~ka's opening speech from which we have already q uoted , 
have never been published. The resolution adopted suggests 
that the Plenum backed the ieadership's preference for a 
bloc of six and a deal with the PSL but without really 
expecting that this would transpire. 113 The co nflict be-
tween the tactics of the PPR and Miko!ajczyk was increas -
ingly apparent. He had captured the peasant movement and 
Won control of much of the rural p o litical infrastructure . 
The Lublin coalition had been seriously weake ned : the SL had 
virtually collapsed, recruitment to the PPR h ad slowed down 
and divergences in o utlook between t he PPR a nd the PPS had 
come to the surface. Unde rgr o und activity continued o n a 
wide scale and there was growing d isconte nt amongst the 
Party aktyw . No doubt all these factors weig hed o n the 
discussion. Aleksander Zawadzk i was do ubtless not alone in 
admitting that the Party ' s line had yet to y ield dividends: 
' At present we find ourselves i n a more dif-
ficult situation than at the beginning whe n 
we crossed with our army and t h e Red Army 
(into Pola nd). The liberation of t h e c ountry 
pushed everything else into the background ... 
A year has passed. People have looked u s over , 
have got down to work. And at the same time 
the reaction has regenerated and beg un to 
activate ' .114 
112 L. Kie s zczy nski Moja dzia~alnos6 w Bodzkiej Dzielnicy 
PPR - Gorna Prawa, styczeh-czerwiec 1945 Z pola wa lki 
1974 nr. 2 (66), pp. 296-97. 
113 U~hwa~a plenum KC PPR w sprawie Bloku Wyborczego Stron-
n~ctwo Demokra ty c zny ch, PPR ... i. 46 - i.47 op . cit ., 
pp . 33-34. 
114 GO~¥biowski Pierws ze lata 1945-1947 (2nd ed ., Katowice , 
197 4), p . 327. 
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With such thoughts in mind, the Plenum placed the Party in 
readiness for a probable change of course: a move away 
from version of the national front which had prevailed 
since May. 1945 and the adoption of a more aggressive policy 
towards the PSI,. 
The Church and the Catholic Camp (I) 
In many ways the Polish Catholic Church, a l ways o ne 
of the strongest in Europe, emerged from the Se cond World 
War with its prestige and position as the defender of 
Polish nationhood enhanced. The patriotic stance a nd s u f -
fering of the vast bulk of the clergy during the German 
occupation and the transformation of Poland from a state 
populated not only by Roman Catholics, but by Greek Cath o -
lic, Orthodox, Jewish and Protestant c ommunities into a 
homogenous Catholic one, led in the later 1940s to a cer-
t '. h' 1 d 115 a~n rena~ssance of the Churc ~n Po an . 
For the communists the Church represented a spiritual 
and social force with which it was difficult to fi nd a 
common language, but which nevertheless they rec ognised as 
being too deeply-rooted and resilient an institutio n to 
attack directly. Until 1949-50 when relations degenerated 
into open confrontation, the Party 's policy towards the 
Church was generally correct and respectful. While in the 
long-term, the communists assumed, the influence of the 
Church would gradually wither, for the present the politi-
cal neutralisation of the Church was their main goal . At 
the Central Committee Plenum of June 19 46 , t h e Party 
defined its attitude as follows: 
115 
'The Central Committee of the PPR ... stead-
fastly stands for full religious toleration, 
respect for religious feelings and tradit i o ns 
as well as Church institutio ns, demandi ng 
at the same time c omplete respect fo r t he 
laws and regulations of the authorities of 
the Republic as we ll as that religious feelings 
H. Roos A History of Moder n Poland (Londo n, 1966), 
p. 238. 
must not be made use of in political 
disputes'.116 
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The Government's repudiation of the Concordat in September 
1945 seems to have been motivated by this same outlook that 
Church and State should operate in different spheres, 
rather than by any hardening of policy towards the Church. 
At the same time Catholicism had for many years bee n 
a political as well as a social and religio us force . In 
interwar Poland the two main Catholic political groupings , 
the Christian Democrats and the National Workers' Party had 
merged in 1937 to form the Party o f Labour (SP) led by 
Karol Popiel. This party remained small and assumed a 
position of liberal opposition in the Sanacja regime. In 
the wartime underground its influence grew somewhat si nc e 
Sikorski was closer to the SP than to any oth er of the fo ur 
main conspiratorial parties. Other Catho lics were d rawn to 
the right, to the National Democrats and the San a cja, while 
on the left the Peasants and Socialists drew much of their 
support from the Catholic masses despite certain a n ti-
clerical currents amongst their activists a nd leaders. 
Af ter the war the PPR d isplayed a good deal of hesitancy 
towards t he idea o f allowing the re-emergence of a Catholic 
political movement. Though such a mo v emen t would clearly 
be a gain for the na t ional front, it would be difficult to 
prevent it moving to the right a nd forming a pote n tially 
very dangerous opposition centre . 
The attempt by the c ommunists to cultivate the neu-
trality of the Church and to generate support amongst 
Catho lics for the government continued througho ut the per-
iod. But by mid-1946 the r elative s uc c ess hitherto of this 
strategy began to reverse and two processes became observ-
able: one was the narrowing of government influence amongst 
Politically active Catholics; the other was the increasing 
e ng agement of the Church hierarchy o n behalf of the opposi -
tion . Thereafter a slow but steady deterioration in 
116 Uchwa ~a ple num KC PPR w sprawie g~osowania ludowego , 
2 .6. 46 , PPR •.. i.46- i.47 op . cit., p . 119 . 
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relations between Church and state t ook place until by 1948 
the Church itself had assumed again its traditional ma ntl e 
as the protector of the nation against its rulers. 
From 1944-46 the communists achieved some success in 
their efforts to win the constructive neutrality of the 
Church. Considerable attention was paid to reassuring the 
faithful that the Party posed no threat to re ligio us free-
dom. Chaplains were attached to Polish Army uni ts , Church 
lands were excluded from the Land Reform, the Catholic 
University in Lublin was re-activated, the c ommunist mayor 
of Krak~w made a courtesy visit to the Archbishop, Bierut 
attended Church and through Jer zy Borejsza, t he c ommuni st 
publishing overlord, in particular, the Party sough t c o n-
tact with Catholic circles. One outcome of these soundings 
was permission for the Kr ak6w Catholics to begin in April 
1945 publication of a weekly paper, Tygod nik Powszechny . 
Later the same year a group of t~arsaw Catholics started 
another weekly, Dzis i Jutro. Even London circle s admitt ed 
that this campaign had y iel ded results. I n J une 1945 in a 
report to the Government-in-Exile, Korbonski , t he acting-
Delegate, wro te: 
' As for the situation of the clergy in Pola nd , 
we observe a flirtation by t h e Lublin Commit-
tee with the m, including Sapieha (Archbishop 
of Krak6w - J.R.). Priests and their prop-
erty are not touched and the Committee 
endeavours to win the support of the clergy , 
which in part they have succeeded in doing ' .117 
The authorities do indeed seem to have established a 
modus vivendi with the Krakbw Curia quite early. This was 
of particular va l ue since duri ng the wartime ex ile of the 
Primate, Cardinal Hlond - an absence which aroused some 
criticism - Archbishop Sapieha of Krakbw effectively led 
the Polish Church and was its most respected fig ure. 
Sapieha a nc t he circ le of Catholic journalists and acade-
mics around him, though undoubtedly c o nservative in their 
117 APUST File 52 L. dz . K 3567/45 . 
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general outlook, took a typically Galician pragmatic 
attitude, rejecting either a boycott of or confrontation 
with the new authorities, and advocated instead a policy of 
involving themselves in public life and attempting to 
influence as much as possible the changes taking place. As 
one Catholic writer has put it, they ' inclined to stabili-
sation and some sort of engagement in what had arisen, . 118 
It was this philosophy which Tygodnik Pows zechny put 
forward . 
Following the formation of the Government of National 
Unity and the return of Hlond in mid-1945, the Episcopate 
began to take a more assertive stand against materialism 
and for the reconstruction of Poland on Christian princ~ 
iples. At their conference in Jasna G6ra in October 1945 
the Bishops expressed their regret at the government's 
repudiation of the Concordat, stressed the incompatibility 
of Christianity and materialism and called on Catholics to 
vote in the coming elections 
'according to their Catholic conscience, in 
other words to elect the candidates of those 
parties which undertake to realise a social 
and political programme in agreement with 
Christ's teaching •.• under our modern demo-
cratic constitution ..• the overwhelming 
Catholic majprity in the country has the 
right to be represented in the Sejm by parties 
suited to its religious convictions and 
ethical principles,.119 
The Bishops seem to have concurred o n the whole with 
the viewpoint of Hlond, which was more uncompromising than 
that of the 'Sapieha bloc'. Hlond, who became Primate in 
1926, had a reputation as being on the political right . 
Before the war he had attracted criticism for his amenable 
att ;t d : . 120 d h' 11 d . 
• u e to the Sanac]a reg1me an 1S a ege ant~-
118 Kozik op. cit., p. 85. 
119 Komunikat z plenarnej konferencji Episkopatu Polski, 
~asna G6ra, 4 . 10.45, Listy pasterskie episkopatu Polski 
1945 -1974 (p ar is, 1975), pp. 23- 2 4 • 
120 Polonsky Politics ... op. cit., p. 438 . 
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Semitism. 12l After 1945 he took the view - at least in 
conversation with the emigre circles with whom he main-
tained contact - that Poland was experiencing a temporary 
phase which would soon be transformed by intervention from 
the West or the collapse of Soviet power. After discu s -
sions with Hlond in Rome late in 1946, the 'Londo n' ambas-
sador to the Vatican reported back to the Government-in-
Exile that 'his (Hlond's - J.R.) conviction as to the 
terq::orary and provisonal character of .. the Warsaw "governmen t " 
revealed itself very clearly' .122 Hlond was inclined to 
emphasise the gulf between Christian teaching and communist 
materialism. In his first major address in Pozna~ in 
October 1945, he bluntly stated that despite certain points 
of agreement 'in fundamental matters there is such a vast 
difference between Christianity and materialism that it is 
not possible to reconcile them t~eoretically' .1 23 A year 
later, en route to the Vatican, he spoke with a represen-
tative of the Government-in-Exile who reported Hlond ' s 
views as follows: 
at present, j ust as last year , he takes 
the position that a temporary cease-fire 
is possible between the c ommunist world and 
the world of western culture and Christianity 
but there is no possibility of compromise. 
Such a deep ideological conflict must sooner 
or later lead also to a clash in t he realm 
of material forces ..• ,1 24 
Working from these assumptions Hlo nd was much less inclined 
than the Krak6w Cathol ics to seek a long-term modus vivendi 
with the new order. Not only did he studiously avoid 
121 P. Lendvai Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe (Londo n, 
1971), p. 213. 
122 ~ Ambasada RP Vatykan A.44.2 (1947), 2 . 
123 Koscio~ kato licki w Polsce wobe c zagadnien chwili , 
28.10. 45 , Listy pasterskie episkopatu ... op o cit ., 
p. 140 
124 G.SHI Ambasada RP Paryz A. 46 . I (1945 - 46 ) 0 
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a ff " 1 ' h d' , , 125 b ny 0 ~c~a contact w~t government ~gn~tar~es, ut he 
was lukewarm towards the idea of a Catholic Party operating 
126 under the present political arrangements. 
At the Moscow talks of June 1945 it had been agreed 
that Karol Popiel would return to Poland and, tacitly, that 
his Party of Labour would resume legal activity. Miko~a­
jczyk, whose relations with Popiel were not good, broadly 
favoured the reactivisation of the SP but did not regard 
this as a priority and, in Popiel's view, had not done 
enough for his party in Hoscow.1 27 The Socialists, Os6bka 
and Szwalbe hoped to see the SP emerge as a conservative 
centre party which would tend to keep the Peasants on the 
centre-left. 128 The PPR though was quite determined to 
pr t th f t ' '" 129 even e emergence 0 a conserva ~ve oppos~t~on~st SP. 
In this until spring 1946 they were relatively successful, 
executing the same manoeuvre which failed so dismally in 
the case of the PSL. This involved grafting onto the lead-
ership of the underground (Popiel) SP a group of individuals 
committed to close collaboration with the PPR. 
In early 1945 Gomu~ka had made contact with Zygmunt 
Felczak and Feliks Widy-Nirski, the leaders of a small, 
leftist splinter of the Party of Labour called the Zryw 
Narodowy. After talks Widy-~Hrski was appointed Governor 
of Poznan and Felczak Deputy-Governor of Pomorze provin-
ces.
130 
Felczak, who led the ~ group until his death 
in July 1946, was a genuine catch for the communists. He 
had been a prominent figure on the left of the National 
125 ~ F0371 56443 N9185. 
126 tv. Buj ak Historia krajowej dzia:talnosci SP 1937-1950 
(unpub. doctoral thesis, Jagiellonian University , 
Krakcw, 1971), pp. 208-9. 
127 K. Popiel Od Brzescia do "Polonii" (London, 1967), 
p. 89. 
128 Bujak OPe cit., p. 212. 
129 Ibid., p. 213. 
130 Ibid., p. 195. 
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Workers' Party and then the SP in Pomorze during the 1930s 
and had vociferously opposed the Sanacja. During the war 
he had been one of the chief organisers of the underground 
Party of Labour and for a spell was its leader and repre-
sentative in the political leadership of the wider under-
ground movement. But in late 1942 the left lost control of 
the SP and Felqzak split away to form zryw . 131 Widy-Wirski 
who before war had been active in both pro-Sanacja 
student circles and then in 'Popular Front' organisations 
was a little-known figure who was prepared to comply closely 
with PPR wishes. 132 Zryw viewed Catholicism as only a very 
loose framework for its political ideas and seems to have 
have almost no contact with the Church hierarchy. Its 
influence was largely confined to the left-wing of the for -
mer National Workers' Party in western Poland and was in 
any case very limited. Felczak hoped to see the emergence 
of an independent SP, working in alliance with the commu-
nists and based chiefly on the Catholic workers . 1 33 
Although Zryw represented only a small minority of the 
Party of Labour's membership, the communists succeeded in 
forcing the Popiel-ites to accept a fifty-fifty split on 
the party's national executive. Popiel's supporters had 
begun organising a legal party immediately following his 
return, but the authorities refused1esalisati on until a 
compromise had been reached with the Zryw-ites . An attempt 
was made to form a separate Christian Party of Labour , 
just as Miko~ajczyk had set up the PSL independent of the 
'Lublin SL', but this too was denied legalisation . In 
November 1945 the popiel-ites gave way and accepted merger 
with Zryw . Only popiel's casting-vote as chairman gave them 
Control of the evenly-divided executive. 
This was a favourable outcome for the c ommu ni sts . 
They had secured the establishment of a party which through 
131 G~os ludu 5.7.46. 
132 Bujak OP e cit., p. 200. 
133 Ibid ., pp. 198-99. 
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the Popiel-ites had good contacts with influential sections 
of the Church, especially the Krak6w Curia, and the support 
of these quarters, but in which the pro-communist faction 
would check any opposition tendency and influence the dev-
elopment of the party. The Popiel majority had accepted 
these terms confident that they could rapidly erode the 
position of the Zryw group by activating the party locally 
and then calling a national congress to elect a new leader-
ship would would reflect more accurately their overwhelming 
support amongst the rank-and-file. The communists were 
equally determined to prevent any disturbance of the status 
guo. 
Quite apart from the Zryw group, the communists had 
some success in cultivating the active support of elements 
of the Catholic intelligentsia in close contact with the 
Church with a political background very far removed from 
communism. In Warsaw a group of 'radical Catholics' led 
by Boles~aw Piasecki and dominated by his followers from 
the pre-war fascistic Falanga movement offered their 
assistance to the communists. It seems certain that 
Piasecki had won the support of the Soviet security forces 
for the initiative. 134 In a memorial presented in July 
1945 this group argued for close collaborat i o n between 
Catholics and Harxists around a programme of radical re -
fo d o 135 I N b h rm an national reconstructlon. n ovem er t e group 
was allowed to begin publication of its own journa l , Dzis 
i Jutro and became perhaps the most committed ally of the 
comrnu 0 t SOt 0 t to 10 n Poland .136 nlS s and the pro- OVle orlen a lon 
The Dzis i Jutro circle had at this stage reasonably good 
relations with the Episcopate. Hlo nd even gave a donatio n 
137 to assist in the costs of launching the paper , while 
134 For the text , see J. ~~6jcik Spar 0 postaw{, (vJarsaw, 
196 9), pp. 51- 5 2 . 
135 R. Zambrowski Dziennik Krytyka no . 6 1980, p. 86 . 
136 L . Blit The Eastern Pretender. The Story of Boleslaw 
Piasecki (London, 1965) i Bromke OPe cit., pp. 81-85 and 
Ch . 11. 
137 ~~6jcik Sp6'r ... Op e cit., p. 60. 
one of the circle described Sapieha's attitude as ' fair 
to the end' .138 In 1945-46 the Church seems not to h ave 
taken the hostile attitude to the 'radical Catholics' it 
was to assume subsequently. 
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A separate, even smaller, current of pro-gove rnment 
Catholic opinion was represented by Aleksander Bochenski, 
who in 1947 was elected for Krakbw as one of the three 
'Progressive Catholic' deputies in the Sejm, and 
Pruszynski, a well-known journalist and writer. 
Ksawery 
Their 
'd / 1 eas were an elaboration of the Krakow school of positi-
vist conservatism, which rejected the romantic tradition 
in Polish history and proclaimed the need for realism a nd 
the l ' , 1 d 139 acceptance of the new po 1t1ca or er e 
The communists attached considerable significance to 
courting sympathetic Catholics; Gomu~ka and Bierut appear 
to have been directly or indirectly involved in contacti ng 
such circles and Jerzy Borej sza, the Party 's publishing 
overlord was particularly active in this f ield . 140 
Although it would be wrong to exaggerate the extent of the 
Catholic elements they won over, it was true nonethel ess 
that these groups exercised an influe nce beyond their num-
bers and at the turn of 19 4 5/46 prov i ded t he communists 
with a bridge to the wider Catholic political movement and 
to the Church itself. 
138 Koz ik OPe cit., p . 237. 
139 Ibid., p. 86; Bromke Ope cit., pp. 71-74. 
140 Kozik Ope cit., pp. 84, 86. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE DEHOCRATIC BLOC AND THE REFERENDUM (Fe bruary to 
September 1946) 
The period from spring to autumn 1946 was marked by 
increasing political polarisation and tension as the parties 
prepared for the coming elections. The long-awaited nego-
tiations between the communists, Socialists and PSL on the 
proposal to form an electoral bloc broke down o n 22 February 
1946. In reply to the workers' parties' offer of 20 % of 
the seats in the next Sejm for the PSL (as against 70 % 
for the 'Lublin' parties), Miko~ajczyk had dema nded that in 
any bloc representatives of the countryside (i.e. t h e PSL 
and SL) should have 75% of the seats. l The failure of the 
talks was followed by the postponement of t he elections , 
expected in the first half of the year , until the autumn 
and then the winter of 1946/47. 2 In their place, a refer -
endum held at the end of June provided a n inco nclusive 
opening round to the c o ming battle. 
As we have seen, in the months after the formation o f 
the Government of Natio n al Unity , t h e PPR had sought to 
force Miko~ajczyk to make a clear choice between f ull align-
ment of the PSL with the nationa l front ( a nd hence tacit 
acceptance of communist hegemony ), and outright opposition 
'in a bloc with the reac tio n and the illegal orga ni sations '. 
1 
2 
Borkowski Pertrakcje ... op . cit., p. 431. 
Miko~uj.czyk told the US ambassador at the end of Febru-
ary that the PPR had decided to postpone t h e electio ns 
for 6 to 8 months. In April , the Polish Foreign Minis -
ter told the US ambassador that September would be the 
earliest practical date for the elections and the prime 
minister informed the KRN that the elections would be 
held in autumn. In the f irst hal f of October Miko~ajczyk 
told t he British ambassador that t h e electio n date 
would be fixed when the PPR and PPS finalised their 
agreement and said that J a nua ry 19 - the date eventually 
chosen - had been mentioned. PRO F037l 56434 N2654 , 56437, 
N44 75, 56438, N5 700, 56447 N131 36 . 
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The outcome of the talks was seen by the PPR as final 
proof that Miko~ajczyk had chosen the latter path. The 
Party concluded from this that an accommodation with the 
PSL in its existing form and under its existing leadership 
was no longer realistic and that the time had c o me to c om-
mence open struggle with the opposition. Pre paratio ns for 
'the elections should ensure that the PSL was preve nted from 
mounting an effective challenge for power. 
In terms of the national front strategy, this repre-
sented a decisive turn away from the conception of a broad 
national front embracing the mainstream of the peasant 
movement which the PPR had with more of less consiste nc y 
sought to achieve since 1943 , and which in mid-1945 had 
appeared briefly to have corne to fruition. The emphasis 
which the Party had hitherto placed on drawing the peasant 
movement as a whole away from the 'reac tion ' now gave way 
to propaganda which aimed to establish ' links between the 
PSL and the reaction'. The communists no longer l ooked to 
the PSL for partners in the ' worker-peasant alliance', but 
to the rump of the 'Lublin' SL and any ' democratic ' e l e -
ments which could be persuaded to break with the PSL ' fr om 
below'. 
The crucial strategic question was h ow a n d with what 
resources the PPR would neutrali se the PSL a nd manage the 
elections: Miko~ajczyk believed that the communists would 
be unable to crush the PSL unless the Russians intervened 
directly on their behalf. However, as we have see n, such 
a course would have been c o ntrary to the c o ncept i o n of 
Poland 's development held by Gomuika and a signi ficant sec-
tion of the Party leadership. This aimed to establish a 
balance of forces within Poland which would enable the 
national front to defeat its o ppo ne nts with its own int-
ernal resources. Those elements in the leadership which 
in 1944/45 had inclined t o an external solution to the 
question of power had been silenced by the damage done to 
the Party by its close dependence on the Soviet forces i n 
the period between October 1944 and May 194 5 . In a ny case , 
the indicatio ns were that 'Stalin was equally anx i ous to 
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avoid direct intervention and the costs this would entail 
in terms of Soviet relations with the West . Also, as we 
shall see, there is evidence that at this stage Stalin may 
not yet have been convinced that a satisfactory deal with 
the PSL was unattainable. 
However, the internal resources at the disposal of the 
Communists in 1946 were still very limited . In spite of 
the expansion of the Party and the secur ity forces over the 
previous year, in many parts of the country the communists 
lacked sufficient reliable manpower to hold the opposition 
and the underground in check and administer t he elections . 
The army was an important additional source of manpower, 
but in early 1946 the political allegiance of many of the 
troops was an unknown factor. The 'Lublin SL' and the 
splinter-groups detached from the PSL during 1946 were far 
too weak to reinforce significantly the narrow base of the 
national front in the countryside . 
These circums t ances underlined the vital importance of 
the Socialists within the nat ional front . The PPS was by 
19 4 6 a mass party with considerable popular appeal among 
Polish society. It played a major part in the apparatus o f 
central and local government and the administration of the 
economy where the communis ts were heavily dependent on the 
So cialists to ensure that key posit ions of power were kept 
in t he hands of their allies. The PPR was acu tely aware 
that the SUpport of the PPS was essential to defeat Miko~­
ajczyk's challenge. For its part, the left- wing leadership 
of the PPS was convinced that t he workers' parties must 
remain united to provent Miko~ajczyk gaining power and to 
secure the c o ntinuation of the political programme of t he 
Lublin c oal i tion: however, it d id not share the view of 
the PPR that a deal with t h e PSL was no longer realistic . 
Indeed, it regarded furthe r concerted efforts to achieve an 
electoral agreement as essential , both in terms of the 
national a nd its own party interest. It considered that a n 
open confrontation with the PSL after the February talks 
was premature a nd that it might be possible to avoid a 
clash altogether if the left parties pursued a more flexible 
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Course. 
As the PPR went onto the offensive, these differences 
came into the open. During the summer, the Socialists 
launched a wide-scale campaign to reverse the increasing 
polarisation in the country and restore national unity. 
Particular emphasis was laid on the special role which the 
PPS might play in any future coalition government. The 
communists were deeply alarmed by what they feared was an 
attempt by the Socialists to supplant them at the head 
of the national front. However, constrained by the need 
to preserve the united front with the PPS and possibly 
unsure of Soviet wishes, they did not openly oppose the 
campaign. 
For Miko~ajczyk the developments of spring and summer 
1946 appeared to bear out his conviction that the commu-
nists would be unable to prevent the PSL from winning a 
substantial number - if not a majority - of seats at the 
coming elections. Despite the increase in tension and the 
repressive measures applied against the PSL after February, 
the communists' attacks did not develop into the decisive 
showdown which he had expected. His party was not 
expelled from the Government and in many areas was able to 
continue to operate and expand its influence without ser-
ious hindrance until late 1946. Within the PSL Miko~a­
jczyk's leadership and policy remained virtually unques-
tioned while the divisions in the nati ona l front were 
evident for all to see. The referendum, held in the midst 
of the dispute between the PPR and the PPS, demonstrated 
the capacity of the opposition to frustrate the communists' 
efforts to fabricate the results and the continuing nar-
rowness of popular support for the PPR camp. At inter-
national level, there was no sign despite increasing East -
West tension of a major hardening of Soviet policy or any 
slackening of Western support for his cause. The Catholic 
Church ruled out a compromise with the communists and ind-
icated its tacit commitment on behalf of the opposition 
more and more clearly. 
Miko~ajczyk therefore saw no reason to respond 
-ID II) -
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Positively to the Socialists ' overtures. He did not reg a r d 
the PPS as a genuinely i ndependent force and was no t 
attracted by a compromise in which the Socialists wou ld 
i n effect o c cupy the pivotal position. In the end it was 
the PPS wh i ch was forced to give way. Its efforts t o r e -
vive the b road national front of mid - 1945 collapsed in 
September/Oc tober when it became apparent that ne ither the 
PPR nor the PSL were prepared to conced e on the fundame n tal 
question of leadership in the future government . Ln 
September , t h e PPS leadership accepted the inevitabili ty 
of a bloc of four parties and concentrate d its e ne r g i es o n 
maximising Socialist influence on the government to b e 
formed after the elections . The failure of the Socia lists ' 
bid to reconstruct the broad national f ront opened t h e way 
for the communists to begin in earnest the o ffe ns i ve 
against the PSL . within a matte r o f week s , t hi s o f fensive 
destroyed the oppositio n as an effective fo rce a nd se cu red 
once and for all that the c ommuni s t s would determi ne 
Po land ' s future developme nt . 
' Ge neral Storm ' 
As we have seen , the ground fo r t he Pa rty ' s ch a nge o f 
course in February had been prepared at the Cen tral Com-
mittee Plenum on the lOth. The Par ty l eadership began t o 
organise the offensive agains t the PSL i mmed i ately after 
the collapse of the negoti a tio ns o n t h e b l o c o n 22 
Fe bruary . 3 The campaign was launched at a mass meeti n g of 
the PPR and PPS aktyw in Warsaw o n 27 Feb r uary . By the 
beginning of March headline s in Gazeta Ludowa , t h e organ 
4 
of the PSL, told of a ' gene ral sto rm ' o n t h e party . 
Gomu~ka's speech to t he Wa rsaw meeti ng o n 27 February 
Signalled the main lines of attack o n the PSL which were 
to be developed in t he follow ing weeks . Th e first was t o 
3 The Secretari a t o f the Ce nt r al Commit tee of the PPR met 
o n 22 Fe bruary to p lan t he c amp a i g n . See Borkowski 
Pe r t rakcje ... Ope ci t . , p . 432. 
4 Gazeta Ludowa 2.3 . 46 . 
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identify the PSL with the 'reaction'. According to 
Gomu~ka, by rejecting the bloc, the PSL leadership had 
'chosen co-operation with the reaction,.5 This co-operat i o n 
was to be seen both in the political support given by the 
underground to the PSL and cases of alleged participatio n 
by PSL members in illegal organisations. 6 The second line 
of attack was to encourage internal opposition to Miko~­
ajczyk within the PSL. Gomu~ka drew a clear distinction 
between the policy of the leadership group in the PSL a nd 
the wishes of the mass of the peasantry, including many of 
the rank-and-file members of the PSL. At this stage, the 
communists hoped that it would be possible to mount a s i g-
nificant anti-Miko~ajczyk faction within the peasant move -
ment.
7 
Thirdly, Gomu~ka stressed the importance of 
unifying the democratic bloc, and in particular strengthen-
ing the alliance of the PPR and the PPS, in preparatio n 
for the elections. 
In terms of the Party's strategy, the new course 
marked a clear shift away from t he 'broad nati o na l front'. 
Although the communists still aimed to split t h e peasant 
movement, after February they saw no real possibili ty of 
averting an open clash with the PSL if t hey were to keep 
power. They regarded Socialist hop e s that a more moderate 
course might still win the PSL away from the ' reactio n' as 
a dangerous illusion. In a speech delivered o n May Day in 
Ka tOWice, Gomu~ka claimed that: 
5 
6 
7 
'Two forces, two political blo cs are at 
work in the nation .•.• The first is the 
d emocratic bloc with the working class 
parties at its head, the second ... is the 
reactionary bloc, which the PSL has in 
reality joined •.• Let nobody t hink t hat 
Gomu~ka Przem6wienie wyg~oszone w Warszawie na wsp6lnej 
konferencji aktywu PPR i PPS 27 . 2.1946 r ., Artyku~y ... 
Vol . II, op . cit., p. 31. 
Ibid., pp. 44-47. 
Borkowsk i Pertrakcje ... o p. cit., pp. 432 , 434 . 
there is some third road. There is no 
third road'. 8 
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As political tension increased and the : hoped-for split in 
the PSL failed to materialise, the identification of t he 
PSL as a whole with the 'reaction' became steadily more 
pronounced in PPR propaganda. In a speech made in Warsaw 
on 30 April, Gomu~ka accused the PSL l eaders of corrupting 
their organisation and of 'inculcating their supporters 
with a fratricidal spirit' as well as being 'linked by a 
great many ties with the reaction'. He claimed that: 
'The difference between the PSL and the 
illegal fascist organisations is beginning 
to disappear in some areas •.. many local 
PSL organisatiQns have become the cover 
for hotbeds of diversionaries and bandits. 
Many of these organisations are deeply 
corroded and controlled by these eleme nts . 
The organisers and executers of fratricidal 
murders and criminal diversionary acts stood 
(and doubtless stand) at t he head of certain 
PSL organisations ..• '9 
The same speech contained a clear warning t hat the PPR was 
contemplating outlawing the PSL - i.e. a reversion to the 
situation that had applied before mid-1 945 : 
8 
9 
' The time has corne to say to the PSL leader -
ship that ••• in accordance with the Yalta 
and Potsdam conference resolutions, only 
democratic, anti-fascist organisations may 
conduct legal activity. Our system, o u r rule 
of law in reconstructed Poland is democrati c. 
But there is no democracy in the world which 
would allow the forces of conservati s m to 
indulge in acts of bloody viole nce , terror 
and anarchy . Therefore our democracy will 
also respond to such acts with r e pression 
Gomu~ka Przemdwienie na manifestacji pierws zomaj owej 
w Katowicach, 1.5.1946 r., Artyku~y •.. Vol . II op . cit ., 
p . 108. 
Gomu~ka Przembwienie na akademii pierwszomajowej w 
~varszawie , 30.4.1946 r., Artyku:ty ... Vol. II o p. cit ., 
Pp . 91-93 . 
and will regard this reply as proof of 
the rule of law. The leaders of the PSL 
should pay attention to all this,.lO 
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Although the PPR no longer regarded the broad national 
front as viable, Gomu~ka made it clear that the Party would 
deal with the opposition with its own internal resources. 
He alluded to this in his speech on 27 February with the 
remark that 'we are a sovereign state and we do not want 
foreign help with the elections, since we do not need it' .11 
And on 30 April he reiterated that the natio nal front was 
capable of defeating its opponents: 'Polish democracy with 
the parties of the working class at its head will find 
sufficient strength to thwart the plans of the reaction' .1 2 
Despite the differences between the two parties o n 
policy and tactics, the Party regarded the united front of 
the PPR and the PPS as the cornerstone of its strategy in 
the period up to the elections. Gomu~ka, in particular, 
laid special stress on the importance of the united front , 
claiming that 'all the social reforms and gains by the 
working people achieved so far are above all the result of 
the united collaboration of the working class. Th e united 
front is a great achievement'. He admitted, however, that 
many within the PPR and PPS did not yet share this view. 13 
According to Gomu~ka, the alliance with the Social is ts 
would be the key to victory over the PSL: 
'We need fear no opposition as long as 
the working class is united , as long as 
Our decisions, all our moves against our 
10 Gomu~ka Przemowienie na akadernii pierwszornajowe j w Wars -
zawie, 30.4.1946 r., Artyku~y ..• Vol. II op. cit., pp . 
93-94. 
11 Gornu~ka Przemowienie wyg~oszone w Warszawie na wsPblnej 
konferencji aktywu PPTI i PPS, 27 .2.1946 r., Artyk uty ... 
Vol . II op. cit., p. 48. 
12 Gomu~ka Przem6wienie na akadernii pierwszornajowej w ~lars ­
zawie , 30.4.1946 r., Artykuty ••. Vol. II op . cit., p . 94 . 
13 Gomu~ka Przem6wienie wygroszone w Warszawie na ws p61nej 
konferencji aktywu PPR i PPS, 27.2.1946 r., Artykuty ... 
Vol . II op . cit., p. 53 . 
opponents and also all our ste ps in the 
direction of the reconstruct ibn and dev-
elopment of Poland are agreed and executed 
jointly. That is the basis, the foundation 
of our victory ' . 14 
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The practical consequences of the Party's ne w offens-
ive course were felt straight away. The ZSCh Congress held 
in Warsaw on 1 0-12 March, provided the occasion fo r the 
first major confrontation. As we have seen (page 19 3) , the 
PSL had captured control of much of the local network of 
the ZSCh in the second half of 1945. To prevent the PSL 
taking control of the national organisation - thereby eli -
minating the most important remaining source of c ommuni st 
influence over the peasants - the PPR used every means in 
its power to exclude PSL delegates and pack the Congress 
with its own supporters. During the opening session Miko~­
ajczyk staged a walk-out at the h ead of some 700 of the 
delegates in protest at the irregulari t i es . Later the same 
day the security forces made their first raid on the head-
quarters of the PSL in Warsaw, making 6 arrests and con-
f . 15 iscating var10US documents. 
Violence against PSL members increased markedly from 
February. Such attacks were not of course a new develop-
ment and there had been a number of notorious killings of 
PSL activists in 1945 . 16 However , t he atta cks b e came more 
Common during spring 1946. At least 21 PSL members were 
murdered between February and April a nd at leas t 25 were 
killed in May alone. 17 The PSL ascribed the attacks to 
14 Gomu~ka Przem6wienie wygBbszone w Warszawie na wspolnej 
konferencji aktywu PPR i PPS, 27.2.1946 r . , Artyku!y •.. 
Vol . II op. cit ., p. 53 . 
15 ~ . Socha Interpelacje pos16W PSL Krytyka 6(1980) , pp . 
155-58. 
16 For example, the murders of W. Kojder , a leadi ng activist 
from Krak6w province and member of t h e natio nal executive 
of t~e PSL, in September 1945 , and of B. SCibiorek , 
secretary-general of 'wici ' in De cember . 
17 F. Wilk Slownik biograficzny ofiar terroru PSL Zes z yty 
Historyczne 6 (1964), pp . 7-15. 
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the security forces, and produced many eye-witness accounts 
, , 18 ~n SUpport of these allegat~ons. It seems certain that 
in many cases members of the UB were indeed implicated, 
although the evidence that there was an organised campaign 
of terror is thin.19 Nevertheless the PPR leadership 
bluntiy rejected the claims of the PSL and gave strong pub-
1 " "" f h "f 20 ~c support to the act~v~ty 0 t e secur~ty o rce s . 
Arrests amongst the opposition also became common-
place. One source - referring to Silesia - notes the con-
tinual arrests of members of the PSL accused of co-operatio n 
'th h "I d 21 w~ t e underground from Apr~ onwar s. In the same 
region, the activity of the Party of Labour , which had 
considerable local support, was virtually paralysed by 
, d '1 22 " sweep~ng arrests in March an Apr~ . Censorshlp of the 
PSL press was also tightened at this time and in May the 
Ministry of Public Security for the first time banned PSL 
branches in two districts. 23 A furt her seven were banned 
24 
within the next month. 
At the same time, there was a general activisation of 
the security forces aimed primarily at stamping ou t t h e 
underground. In February the KBW was deployed in Bia~stok , 
Warsaw and Lublin provinces for its first maj o r operation 
against the underground. Some 10,000 troops took part , 
detaining 6,000 suspects, over 300 of whom were shot after 
18 Socha Interpelacje ... Ope cit. ; pp. 151-55 and Protoko~ 
przes~uchania swiadka pp . 159-64. 
19 Dokument MBP z 1945 r. , Krytyka 6 (1980), p. 147. 
20 Gomu!ka Przem6wienie wyg1:"oszo ne w t'lars zawie na wsp61nej 
konferencji aktywu PPR i PPS, 27.2.1946 r ., Artykuty ... 
Vol . II OPe cit., pp. 45-47. 
21 Rechowicz Pierws ze wybory •.• Op e cit., p . 49 . 
22 T . Potomski SP na Gornym Sl~sku w latach 1937- 50 
(Katowi ce, 1969), p. 68; Bujak OP e cit., pp . 246 - 50; 
Popiel Ope cit., p . 169. 
23 CWik OP e cit., p. 1 45 (W~oszc zowa a nd Grojec ). 
24 PRO F0371 56441 N7860 . 
summary court martial. 25 On 29 March ~ymierski announced 
a nationwide offensive against the underground and a State 
Security Commission, paralleled by provincial c ommitte es 
was set up to co-ordinate the campaign. In all betwe e n 
150-180,000 soldiers and militiamen were put a t the d i s -
posal of the security committees, chiefly in eastern 
Poland. 26 Soon round-ups of suspects resume d o n a cons i-
derable scale. In Kielce province, for e xample, 1,600 
'suspects' were arrested in a UB-Army operatio n betwee n 
12-15 April. 27 
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However, despite the increasing bellige r e nce of th e 
communists, in spring 1946 the PPR was not ye t stro ng 
enough to launch an all-out effort to crush the oppos ition . 
Its hold over the apparatus of central and local g overnme n t 
remained weak in many areas and the organisat ion o f t h e 
security forces as a reliable arm of the Pa r ty was far from 
complete. 
On paper, at least, the PPR was no bigger th a n i t had 
been in spring 1945. On 1 Janua r y 19 46 i t s me mbersh ip was 
235,300; by June 19 46 this had increase d t o 3 47,10 5 ( t he 
28 
membership in April 1945 was 302,000). Al tho ug h t he 
Party's organisatio n had been improved a nd the numbe r o f 
cadres had grown, these gains had been v e r y uneven a nd i n 
many rural areas where support f o r the PSL and t h e under -
ground was greatest, there had been li tt l e or no progress . 
Table Three shows that the expansion of Par ty membersh i p 
was concentrated in the western and No rthern te r r i tor i es 
and in the major cities whe re the PPR was ab l e to exerc i se 
firmer control over e c o nomic admini s t ration and l o c al 
25 Czapla KBW w latach 1944-65 Woj skowy p r zeg l~d History-
c z nl 1965 nr. 3, p. 84; Turlejska W wal c e ... Op e cit ., 
pp. 21-24 gives slightly diffe r e nt f i gures . 
26 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
27 Naumiuk Po c z?tki ... OPe cit., p. 197. 
28 PP R ••. viii 194 4 - xii 1 945 OPe c i t ., p . 391 ; PPR ... i 
19 46 - i 1 9 47 Ope cit., p. 212 . 
Table Three 
Rate of Expansion of the Membership of the PPR by Region 
(January to June 1946)29 
PPR Membership Index of increase 
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ProvinCE/city January 1946 June 1946 (January 1946 = 100) 
i Old territories 
KrakeS;.; province 
Lublin province 
Kielce provinCE 
Lcdz provinCE 
Rzeszow province 
Warsaw province 
'Ibta1 
ii Mixed territories 
Bia~stok provinCE 
'" Slctsk-Dctbrcwa province 
Poznan province 
Bydogszcz province 
Gdansk province 
Total 
iii New territories 
01sztyn provinCE 
Vlrod:aw province 
Szczecin province 
Total 
iv Cities 
Wdz city 
Warsaw city 
Total 
2J.,196 
12,155 
24,295 
16,515 
5,646 
25,896 
105,703 
2,581 
35,589 
26,779 
24,207 
5,244 
94,400 
2, 560 
9,965 
4,109 
16,634 
8,984 
9,729 
18,713 
OVERALL TOTAL 235 , 450 
22,571 
14,379 
29,194 
19,969 
6,856 
33,356 
126,325 
3, 579 
50 ,278 
39,847 
35 , 978 
11,647 
141 , 329 
6,169 
26, 363 
12,533 
45 , 065 
15 ,048 
19, 348 
34,396 
347 ,115 
29 PPR ••• i 1946 - i 1947 Op e cit., p. 212 . 
106 
118 
120 
121 
121 
129 
120 
139 
141 
149 
149 
222 
150 
241 
265 
305 
271 
167 
199 
184 
147 
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government. 30 
In terms ~f mass membership, the PPR fell short of the 
PSL and was only slightly ahead of the PPS. In January 
1946 the PSL claimed 540,000 members and the PPS 194,000. 31 
Of course, these figures give only a general idea of the 
relative strengths of the parties; new members were often 
simply registered en masse and the number of active , paid-
up members was considerably less than the total . However , 
this was true for all the parties and as we shall see in 
many rural areas at least, the PSL was a match for the 
communists in terms of its organisation as well as the si ze 
of its membership. As Table Four shows, the PSL was by far 
the largest political force in the provinces of central and 
eastern Poland - Krak6w , Rzesz6w, poznan, Kielce, Warsaw, 
Lublin - and even in Szczecin and Olsztyn amongst the ne w 
western and northern territories. This ascendancy was 
overwhelming in comparison with the peasant membership of 
the PPR. Elsewhere , particularly in the urban areas o f 
Warsaw , Lodz , Gdansk, Krakdw , Rzesz6w and Wroc~aw provin-
ces, the membership of the PPS outstripped that o f the PP R 
(see Table Five) • 
Only a relatively SMall propo rtion of the total Pa r ty 
membership was suitable for responsible political wo r k . 
The shortage of reliable, experience d and capable cad res 
remained acute. In December 1945, Zambrowski stated that 
the Central Committee 's records of me mbers ho l d ing r espon-
sible posts in the party and state app a ra t us a nd those 
with higher education, contained only 6 , 358 na mes . 32 
30 Thus Kowalik , writing about Lowe r Silesia , a dmi t s that 
' Party activists occupied the top positions in l o cal 
government (and) in every kind of commission which had 
direct contact with settlers . Sometimes the allo catio n 
of houses, farms , cows or horses depended o n the pa r t y 
membership of the settler '" A. Kowalik Z dZ ie jbw Po ls-
kiej Partii Robotniczej na Dolnym Sl~s ku w latach 194 5-
1947 (Wroc£aw, 1979) pp . 38-39 . 
31 Borkowski Dzia~alnos6 •.. op. cit ., p . 82 ; Reiss o p. 
cit., p. 317 . 
32 Zambrowski 0 masowg •.• op. cit., p. 59 . An analys i s o f 
the composition of the aktyw is g ive n in Ko~omejc zyk 
PPR ••. op . cit., p. 296. 
Table Four 
MembershiE of the PPR, PPS and PSL by Province l 
guarter of 1946 33 
b -PPRjDecember 1945 _~ -
Province PPS Derembera Total Peasants PSL 
1945 
BiaJ:ystok 860 2,581 813 6,000c 
Bydogszcz - 20,362 24,207 7,753 ? 
Gdansk 8,735 5,244 1,367 6,069d 
Katowice 22,486 35,589 3,684 35 ,000e 
Kielce 12,344 24,295 6,920 50,000f 
Krak~ 35,500 21,196 5,625 100,000g 
IDdz 10,529 16,515 5,134 ? 
IDdz city 12,873 8,834 ? 
Lublin 3,464 12,155 7,774 24 ,000h 
01sztyn 1,766 2,560 988 8,000i 
Poznan 13,042 26,779 8,468 70,000j 
Rzesz6.v 8,152 5,646 2,159 70,000:) 
Szczecin 4, 000 4,109 1,600 18,000i 
WarsCM 14,543 25,896 9,905 65 ,000g 
WarsCM city 11,014 9,729 ? 
Wrocl'aw 14,700 9,965 3,664 50 ,000i 
'IDI'AL 194,107 235,300 65,854 502 ,069+ 
33 Sources : 
a Reiss op . cit., pp. 301 , 313, 317; 
b Ko~omejczyk PPR ... op . cit., pp . 289-90; 
c Majecki op. cit., p. 144; 
d Ivapinski op. cit., p. 100; 
first 
Date 
ii/iii 
i '46 
i '46 
iii ' 46 
i '46 
i '46 
iii '46 
mid '46 
i ' 46 
ii ' 46 
xi '45 
vi ' 46 
e GO~rbiowski pierwsze lata ... op . cit., v. 332; 
f Naumiuk PPR ••• OPe cit., pp. 348-49; 
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'46 
g Borkowski Rola i dzia~a1no£6 ... op . cit., gives a 
figure of 170,000 members of the PSL in Ma£opolska 
(i.e. Krakbw, Rzesz6w and part of Katowice provinces) 
for Janaury 1946. Olsz ewski pocz?tki •.. Op e cit ., p . 
173 gives an estimate of 70,000 for Rzesz6w province 
alone for May 1946; 
h Caban i Machocki op. ci t., p. leS ; 
i Pasierb Ruch Ludowy ... op . cit ., p. 143; 
j Dobieszewski i Hemmerling op . cit., p. 106 says that 
the figure of 70,000 members is mentioned in PSL and 
PPR sources. Paid-up membership was 20 , 362 in 1945 and 
39,725 in 1946. 
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Table Five 
PPR and PPS Membership in Urban Areas (turn of 1945/46)34 
Province/city 
Bia:tystok 
Bydgoszcz 
Gdansk 
Kielce 
Krakow 
Lublin 
Lodz (province) 
Lodz (city) 
Olsztyn 
Poznan 
Rzeszow 
Szczecin 
,; 
Sl<tsk-D?browa 
Warsaw (province) 
Warsaw (city) 
~vroc1:"aw 
Total 
PPR membership in 
urban areas* 
(December 1945)a 
508 
6,060 
1,794 
6,054 
5,813 
1,277 
1,595 
8,834 
267 
3,745 
638 
337 
15,566 
1,352 
9,729 
1,702 
65,271 
PPS membership in 
urban areas+ 
(December 1945/January 
1946)b 
c. 400 
5,727 
3,978 
c . 4,000 
18,260 
c.l, 500 
c.l,127 
12,873 
250 
4,425 
c.3,000 
c. 500 
c.7,742 
11,014 
3,035 
c.77,831 
* That is members of town committee s (komitety miej skie) 
of the PPR. 
+ 
That is members of the PPS in provincial towns (miasta 
~dzielone) . 
34 Sources: 
a Ko~omejczyk PPR ... Ope cit., pp. 309-16; 
b Reiss OPe cit., pp. 316-17 . 
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Although these records were not complete, it was clea r that 
the aktyw available to the Central Committee was far from 
sufficient to satisfy the Party ' s needs. Even in critica l 
areas , such as the training of organisers for the e l e ctio n s 
(which incidentally began only at the beginning of 1946), 
provincial committees of the PPR found it difficult to 
find appropriate people. A Central Committee circular dated 
February 1946 complained that despite instruc t i o ns, some 
of the provincial committees had sent 'people e nti rely at 
random, without suitable qualifications ' to the first course 
. 1 h 35 organ~sed by the Party ' s Centra Sc 001. 
The PPR leadership was particular ly concerned a bout 
the weakness of the Party organisation in the c o unt ryside . 
Exhortations to the local aktyw to extend their activity 
outside the country towns seem to have had little effect . 
A Central Committee circular 'on mass Party work in t he 
countryside ' issued on 1 April admitted that: 
'the majority of Party organisations have 
yet to make a start on enacting the Party 
Congress resolution on the expansion of 
mass activity in the country side. In p a r-
ticular the Central Committee c onsiders that 
communes and villages are not adequately 
served by the Party aktyw and have up to 
now remained outside the scope of ou r Party's 
mass activity . The run-up to the elections 
demands from us the extension of mass acti-
vity to the countryside. Party organisations 
cannot therefore confine themselves to gather -
ing peasants in country-towns, but ough t to 
focus on a systematic campaign of mass -meeting s 
in the communes and villages '. 
This campaign was to begin immediate ly a nd be give n special 
priority, with the 'best aktyw . .. regardless of position 
held ' being mobilised to organise it. 36 The Party also 
paid special attention to the organisations of protests 
35 Okolnik KC PPR w sprawie II kursu ag itator6w i organi -
zator6w wyborczych , PPR ... i 1946 - i 1947 op . cit., p . 45 . 
36 Okolnik KC PPR w sprawie masowej p racy partyjnej na 
tere nie wsi , PPR •.. i 1946 i 1946 op . cit ., pp . 60 - 61 . 
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against Miko~ajczyk and the PSL during celebrations of 
~ 37 
"Zielone SWi2ta" the traditional peasant holiday in May . . 
Efforts were also made to revive the pro-communist 
Peasant Party. This had been virtually moribund at l ocal 
level in most areas since the formation of the PSL. In 
provinces where the peasant movement was traditionally 
strong, its membership was insignificant in c omp a ri son with 
that of the PSL. In Kielce in March 1946 it claimed 3,700 
members (compared with 50,000 in the PSL); in Rzes zow in 
June 194 ) 38 f b 6: 3,680 (PSL: 70,000. Many 0 these mem ers 
were only loosely attached to the party. In Poznah, for 
instance, out of 5,000 SL members in March 1946, only 656 
39 
actually held party cards. The leadership group in the 
SL remained weak and divided - some elements , it seems , 
inclined towards an alliance with the PSL. 40 The c ommun-
ists apparen~yconcluded that the relative indepe ndence 
they had allowed the SL leadership in running the party 
after May 1945 had failed. Gomulka told the J une 1 946 
Plenum that 'in practice our approach ... was t o let the SL 
grow by itself. It has not grown. Th e conditions are r i ght 
for it to become established as a powerful force , but we 
must help it •.. ,.41 
The Party's control over the upper levels of the army 
and security forces was secure, but allegiance of the lower 
ranks in a clash with the opposition was uncertain. As we 
have seen, Mikolajczyk was convinced that the army would 
r efUse to act on behalf of the communist s in a confro n ta-
tion with the 'people'. And indeed army units did refuse 
37 Okolnik KC PPR w sprawie obchodow SWirta Ludowego , 
15.5.1946, PPR •.. i 1946 - i 1947 op . cit., pp . 92-96 ; 
Instrukcja KC PPR w sprawie obchodow ~wi~ta Ludo ~egq , 
15.5.1946, ibid., pp. 98-100. 
38 Naumiuk PPR .•. op . cit., p. 349; Olszewski Poc zetk i ... 
op. cit., pp. 260-61. 
39 DObieszewski i Hemmerling op . cit., p . 133 . 
40 ~ F0371 56435 N2 521, 56434 N2476 . 
41 Halaba Stronnictwo ... op . cit ., p . 19 3 . 
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outright to take part in operations against the underground 
. , . 42 1n Rzeszow prov1nce. The Militia was often unreliable 
too. Gomulka claimed that the anti-communist undergro und 
had succeeded in penetrating the Militia and that for a 
43 time had agents in the Supreme Command of the MO . In 
Warsaw province the communists reckoned that a large part 
of the MO was on the side of the opposition. 44 WiN was 
allegedly active within the MO command in Olsztyn province.45 
A major purge of the Militia which had led to the dismissal 
of 20,000 officers in 1945 continued throughout 1946. 46 
The Party's hold on the UB was more secure , although even 
here the leadership considered that it was inadequate. 47 
Also, by no means all UB functionaries were PPR members. 
Figures for Warsaw UB in 1946 show that 63 % belonged to the 
PPR, 4% to the ZWY-, 3% to other parties and 29 % were non-
party.48 Nationally , it has been estimated that at the 
turn of 1945/46 87.6% of UB officers and 73 . 3% of Militia 
officers belonged to the PPR. 49 
As the likelihood of a showdown with the PSL grew , the 
PPR took urgent steps to reinforce the security forces at 
its disposal. In February, just as the talks o n the block 
reached breaking-point, the government took the decision 
to form ORMO - the Militia Voluntary Reserve (Ochotn icza 
Rezerwa Milicji Obywatelskiej). Its function was to pro-
vide 'a fighting force, capable of c ombating banditry in 
42 See page 198. 
43 Gomul1<a Przem6'wienie wyg-:toszone w \-larszawie na wSp61nej 
konferencji aktywu PPR i PPS, 27 .2. 1946 r ., Artykuty ... 
Vol. II OPe cit., p. 45 . 
44 Sprawozdanie KW PPR za okre s 1 viii do 15 ix 1945, Spra-
wozdania KW PPR •.• OP e cit., p . 304 . 
45 Wojnowski OPe cit., p. 139. 
46 Gazeta Ludowa 4 .10.1946. In Gdartsk province more than 
half the Militia were dismissed between October 1945 and 
April 1946, see Wapinski Ope cit., p. 118. 
47 Zambrowski 0 masowg ••• OPe cit., p . 52. 
48 Hillebrandt i Jakubowski Ope cit ., p. 399. 
49 W. G6ra Ced .}. PPR w walce 0 niepodlegJ:'o~6 i wl"adzE(, ludu 
(\-larsaw, 1963), p . 108. 
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the defence of order and democracy'. Recruits were drawn 
from the PPR and the PPS and 'the better elements amongst 
the SL and the SD'. The Party was told to accept recruits 
from the PSL only if they were 'democratic in outlook ,. 50 
In practice, the PSL played no part in ORMO which in many 
areas was a paramilitary extension of the PPR, and to a 
much lesser degree of the pPs.5l By mid-March the new o rg-
52 
anisation had 40,000 members and by the end of 1946 over 
100,000. Two-thirds of these were members of the PPR or 
. 53 1ts youth movement. 
However, it was to be some months before om10 was 
ready for action against the underground. In the meantime , 
the security operations in the countryside and the increase 
in political tension led to a marked upsurge of violence 
which showed that the armed underground remained a real 
threat to the communists in many rural areas of the country . 
In some provinces the break-down in security reached crisis 
proportions. Kozik , writing about Krakow , comments that 
'the state of security deteriorated with each successive 
month , despite counter-measures and the season of the year 
which created unfavourable conditions •.. the situation in 
the province, as other authors agree , can be defined as 
approximating to a state of civil war ' .54 Figure Two 
illustrates how the level of violence against government 
supporters increased in spring 1946. 
As in spring 1945, the tougher line against the oppo -
sition and the underground provoked a backlash which in 
many areas the Party and security forces were hard- pressed 
to cope with . 
One of the communists' main lines of attack after 
50 Okolnik KC PPR w zwi51zku z utwor ze ni em OP1·1O, 8.3 . 46 , 
PPR ... i 1946 - i 1947 Op e cit., pp . 47-49. 
51 Syzdek OPe cit., p. 256fn. 
52 E. Olszewski Polska Partia Robotnicza na Lubelszczyznie 
1942-1948 (Lublin, 1979), p. 281 . 
53 Plikas OP e cit., p . 255 . 
54 Koz ik OP e cit., p. 249 . 
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February was the campaign to reduce the influence of the 
55 PSL in central and local government. As Tables S i x , 
Seven and Eight show , by 1946 the PSL h a d secured a s ubstan-
tial presenc e in both the representative and e xecu t i ve arms 
of local government , especially at the lower leve l s . At 
the upper levels of the b u reaucracy a nd in t he tow n s a nd 
regions, such as Siles i a, where the PPR wa s re lative l y num-
erous, the PSL was given only token r e pre s e ntatio n or 
excluded altogether . Its gains elsewhere re fl e c ted i ts 
Own organisational strength and popular support and t he in-
~bility of the PPR to man the administra tive app a r atu s at 
grassroots level . The weakness of the PPR and its all i es 
was also reflected in the extensive d e p e nd e nce on 'no n-
party ' representatives on national c o uncil s . I n B ia~ystok 
province 90 % of commune national c ounci l members at the e nd 
56 o f 1945 were ' non-party '. 
Table Six 
PPR , PPS and PSL Membership of Natio n a l Council s (August 
1946)57 
Nat i o nal Council PP R PP,S PSL 
Provincial 314 226 1 21 
District 1,6 23 1, 035 1, 213 
Commune 5 , 209 2 , 322 7, 6 0 0 
The scale of the PSL presence in the lo c a l bureaucracy 
wa s clearly a thr e at to the communi sts ' c apacity to admin-
i ster t he electio ns i n the i r f avou r . It also unde r lined 
t he i mp ortance of t he alliance be t wee n the PPR a nd the PPS , 
\ 
which wa s the third s i g ni f ica nt fo rc e in loc al government . 
55 Bo r kows k i Pertrakcje • • . op. ci t ., p . 432 . 
56 Majec k i o p . ci t . , p. 1 38. 
57 Go l~b iows k i i Gor a op. ci t ., p . 84 . 
Table S e v e n 
PPR a nd PSL Strength on Vario u s District a nd Co mmune 
Nat i ona l Co u nci l s (19 46) 58 
Provinc e Distr ic t N. C . Commune N. C. s eats 
seats 
---
(date ) PPR% PSL% PP R% PSL % 
Krak6wa (i
'
4 6) 27. 2 2 0. 9 24 . 4 20.5 
(x 14 6) 20.8 3 7. 2 11. 8 51. 9 
P "b o z n a n (v ' 46) 27 .6 3 0. 1 21. 8 33 . 2 
Rzeszbw c (vi ' 4 6) 1 5 . 4 3 7 .1 5.8 54 . 3 
Kielc e d (v i 146) 28.6 3 0. 6 20 . 8 38 . 8 
Hrocl:'aw e (ii
'
4 6) 3 0. 2 0. 5 ? ? 
Katowice f (xi i ' 45 ) 21. 6 0 2 8 . 0 2 . 6 
Tab l e Eight 
Role of PSL i n Loc al Government Adminis t r at i o n (1 946/47 ) 
(Percen tage of Posts Held by PSL)59 
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Province S t aros towie Burrnistrzowi e Wojtowie So:rtysi (date) (Prefect) (Mayor) (Comnune (Village 
Adrninis - Mminis -
trat or ) trator) 
Pozna n' (vi
'
46 ) a 17 . 5 3 . 4 38 . 5 25 . 0 
Katowi c e 
(vii ' 46 ) b 0 0 5 . 1 12 . 6 
Krakow (iii ' 46 ) c 20 . 0 7 .9 38 . 1 52 . 6 
01szty n ( iv ' 46 ) d 11. 7 3 5 . 3 38 . 1 ? 
Rzes z6w ( iii
'
4 7) e ? ? 42 . 1 44 . 9 
Gdarisk (vi
'
46 ) f , 0 - - - - - 1 2 . 3- - --- ? 
58 So urces : a . Cwik o p . cit., pp. 310-1 3 ; b . Dobieszewski i 
He mmerli ng op . cit ., p . 110; c . Olszewski Pocz?tk i op . 
c i t ., pp . 1 82- 83; d . Naumiuk Po c z? t k i op. c it ., p . 1 9 1 ; 
e . Kowalik op . cit ., p . 97 ; f . J . Kantyka Na drodze do 
iednosc i (Katowice , 1973 ) , p . 183 . 
59 Sources : a . Dobies zewski i Hemme r li ng o p . ci t ., p . 111 ; 
b. Ha1aba Stronnictwo .•• o p . c i t ., p . 20 3 ; c . Go r a PPR 
w wa1ce • •. op . cit ., p. 11 6 ; d . ~vojnowski o p . cit ., p. 
109 ; e . Ols zews k i Po c z c( tk i o p . ci t . , p . 181 ; f. ~vapir\ski 
op . cit. , p . 118 . . 
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Urgent steps were taken to improve the organisation of 
the Party in local government. The Party leadership had 
been critical of provincial and district committees for 
poor organisation in this area for some time . Zambrowski 
complained to the Party's First Congress that PPR members 
of national councils 
' ••• are not always sufficiently active .•• in 
most (national councils), especially at the 
district and commune level, they do not form 
groups or meet as groups, they do not prepare 
themselves for meetings of the council, they 
show insufficient initiative •••• Comrades in 
provincial, district and town committees tole-
rate a state of affairs where inter-party 
consultative committees discuss and decide 60 
matters which belong to the national councils .. 
In ~larch the Central Committee set up departments in each 
provincial committee to deal with administrative and l o cal 
government affairs and to activate PPR councillors and 
local officials. 6l At the same time a purge of PSL suppor -
ters in the local administration began .. A Central Commit -
tee circular issued in March stated that 
'the apparatus of state and local government 
ought to be an effective instrument in t he 
hands of democracy in the struggle with the 
reaction. National Councils .•• should play 
a decisive role in that struggle and in the 
purging of the state and local app~5atus of 
hostile and destructive elements '. 
Wojcik , the secretary-general, informed t he executive of 
the PSL at its sitting on 10/11 April of the effects of the 
purge. He reported that, for example, in Lower Silesia 17 
60 Zambrowski 0 masow~ •.• OPe cit., p. 49 . 
~ 
61 Okolnik KC PPR w sprawie pracy administracyjno-samorz?-
dowe' na tereni~ owiat6w , ' A riI 1947 , PPR . Rezolucje , 
odezw , instrukc 'e i ok Iniki komitetu centralne 0 
~ 1947 - xii 1948 Warsaw , 1973), pp . 72-73 . 
62 Okblnik KC PPR w sprawie pracy partii na odcinku 
administracyjno-samorz2dowym , March 1946, PPR ..• i 1946 
- 1947 OP e cit., p . 52 . 
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out of 18 PSL prefects (starostowie ) had been sacked within 
a period of two weeks , along with a considerable numher of 
lesser officials . 63 
Overall, however , tr.e policy of squeezing the PSL out 
of state apparatus fell well short of its objectives. 
As Tables Six , Seven and Eight show, the PSL maintained a 
strong position in local government in many areas after 
Spring 1946 . Table Nine below, based on data for Krak6w 
and Kielce provinces, suggests that the PSL c o n tinued to 
make inroads until the e nd of the year . 
Table Nine 
Party Representation on Commune a nd District Natio nal 
Cou ncils in Krakow and Kielce Provi nces , 1946* 
Province (date) District Natio nal Commune Natio nal 
Councils Councils 
PPR% SL% PSL% PPR% SL % PSL % 
/ 64 Krakow (i . 46) 35 . 1 15.3 27.0 29 . 9 28 . 4 25 . 1 
(vi. 46) 28 . 9 6.0 44 . 3 
(x . 46 ) 25.5 8 . 8 45 . 5 1 5 .0 5 . 9 66 . 1 
(i.47) 19 . 2 13 . 6 52 . 2 
Kiel c e 65 (vi . 46 ) 30 . 4 20 . 1 32.6 24 . 8 20 . 6 46.5 
(xi.46) 29 . 8 19 . 1 31. 5 22 . 5 10.6 58 . 2 
*~: fig ures include o n ly PPR, PSL, PPS a nd SL members . 
There seem to have bee n a number of reasons for this . 
The PPR wa s not yet ready organisationally to undertake a 
thoroughgoing purge of local governmen t . A yea r after t hey 
had been formed the Central Committee admitted that the , 
local government departments of the provincial commit tees 
of the Party were still not in a position to extend their 
63 Borkowski Kszta~towanie si~ . . , Op e cit . , p . 96 . 
64 Ryszka OP e cit. , p . 263 ; Cwi k Op e cit . , p . 310 . 
65 Naumiuk Pocz~tk i. .. OP e ciL , pp . 191, 231. 
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66 
activity to rural communes. Also, three PSL ministers 
continued to sit in the government and although their 
powers were gradually whittled away, they were still able 
67 to achieve local victories in the state apparatus . Per-
haps the key factor preventing an all-out purge was the 
attitude of the .Socialists who until the autumn still 
sought a compromise with the PSL. It was only after the 
PPS leadership accepted the inevitability of a confronta-
tion with the PSL that the elimination of the influence of 
the opposition in the state apparatus began in earnest. 
The signal for this was expulsion of the PSL from the net-
work of all-party consultative committees that in effect 
decided the distribution of political appointments and the 
'party key' in the administration. This did not take place 
until late SeptemQer. 
The PSL: Weathering the .Storm 
Miko~ajczyk seemed to the British and US ambassadors 
'highly worried and very nervy' about the communists ' off -
68 
ensive against his party . He feared the expulsion of the 
PSL from the government and 'the formentation of disorders 
throughout the country' as a pretext for requesting Soviet 
intervention, followed by rigged elections in which the 
PSL would be suppressed by the security forces. 69 Never-
theless, he was not deflected from his strategy. He was 
determined not to compromise on the question of the bloc. 
In reply to Cavendish-Bentinck's observation that he had 
perhaps 'been opening his mouth a bit wide ' in demanding 
66 Okolnik KC PPR w sprawie pracy administracyjno-samorzp-
dowej na terenie powiat6w, April 1947, PPR ... i 1947 -
xii 1948 op. cit., p. 72 . 
67 For example , Wycech appointed a PSL sympathiser to run 
Krakow education authority, a position which a ccording 
to the communists he used to limit their influence. See 
Kozik op . cit., p . 202 . 
68 ~ F0371 56437 N439 6, N1893 • 
. 
69 Ibid ., 56433 Nl893. 
75% of seats on a joint-list, Miko~ajczyk admitted 
'that he had done so on purpose as he was 
determined that there should not be a joint 
list of candidates ••• he feared however that 
the other parties would insist on a resump-
tion of inter-party negotiations as they were 
bent on achieving a single list' . 70 
243 
Critics within the PSL of his conduct of the negotiations 
were silenced by a unanimous vote of approval for his stand 
at a specially-called national conference of provincial 
71 leaders of the party on 2 March. 
In fact, Miko~ajczyk decided to meet the 'general 
storm' head-on. He believed that the confrontation with 
the communists could be turned to his advantage and that 
in any case his party would lose more by entering the bloc 
than by continuing the struggle outside of it . He assumed 
that the PPR would use intimidatio n and falsification of 
the results in the elections to achieve a majority in their 
favour. 72 However , he expected that despite the repression 
the PSL would still be able to use the elections as a dem-
onstration of its strength and capture enough seats to 
obstruct changes to the constitution. 73 His mai n o bjective 
was to force the PPR to the limit to ensure that in o r der 
to obtain a majority 'the efforts which the Communist 
leaders will have to adopt to secure t his result will show 
the t h . . ,7 4 s rengt of the Opposltlon . 
Miko~ajczyk hoped that as the struggle between the 
communists and his party intensified, external pressure o n 
the PPR would increase. At a sitting of the executive of 
the PSL on 25 May he argued that 'i f Polish society holds 
70 ~ F0371 56434 N24 76. 
71 Borkowski Pertrakcje •.• op . cit ., p . 432 ; Gazeta Ludowa 
3 .3.46. 
7 2 ~ FO 371 56 4 41 -n 78 60 • 
73 Ibid ., 56447 N12480 , 56452 N16279 . 
74 Ibid ., 56441 ~N7860. 
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out, counting on its own strength, it may also r e c eive 
f . , 75 ore~gn help • No doubt most of his colleagues took this 
to be a reference to diplomatic and economic pressure b y the 
Western Powers and indeed Mikotajczyk endeavoured to ex-
tract the maximum political leverage from this s ource . 76 
However, he also continued to work for an accommodation 
with the Russians and this may have bee n the real signifi-
cance of his remark. He hoped that the Russians would 
ultimately be persuaded by the extent of popular support 
for his party to throw their weight behind a compr omise . 
On 12 May Miko:taj czyk told 'Cavendish--Bent inck of his hi ther-
to abortive attempts to arrange 'a confide ntial a nd unoffi -
cial talk' with Lebiediev, the Soviet ambassador , adding 
that 'sooner or later the Soviet Government are likely to 
find themselves faced with the alternative e i t he r of hav-
ing to occupy this country militarily or a cquies cing in a 
Government headed by himself. He believed they would choose 
the latter .•. ' .77 A few days later (probably 15 May) he 
75 Borkowski Kszta~towanie sir'" Op e cit ., p . 98. 
76 For example, Miko~ajczyk informed the Americans in con-
fidence that he regretted their agreement in April 1946 
to provide a $50m credi t for the purchase of US war sur -
plus and a $40m trade loan to buy locomotives and c oal 
cars. He suggested that a loan to help Pol i s h agr icul-
ture would have strengthened hi s position, but that the 
credits had been given in a form which gave ' the impres -
sion that the pres e nt Polish government can obtain credit 
from the US and is not viewed with disfavour by the US 
Government'. On 11 May , after Bli ss Lane had flown to 
Paris to persuade Byrnes to suspend the credits, the 
State Department announced they had been froz en. The 
British Foreign Of f ice, which had been hi ghly c~itical 
of the US decisio n to grant the loans , was give n to unde~­
stand that 'whilst they (the State Department) d id not 
directly speak of financial sanctions in the event of 
the Polish Gove rnment resorting to terro~ist methods 
agai nst Miko:tajczyk and the oppositio n , the threat was 
implicit and fully appreciated '. See PRO F0371 56438 
N5 700, 56440 N6828; Bliss Lane Op e cit ., pp . 193-97 . 
77 ~ F03 71 '56439 N62 06. 
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at last obtained an interview with Lebiediev and tried to 
convince him that a PSL-led government would bolste r t he 
POlish-Soviet alliance. He warned that the Sovi e t Unio n 
would be blamed if bloodshed bro k e out. 78 Altho ug h Le bed i ev 
was 'not particularly responsive', Miko~ajc zyk does not 
seem to have been discouraged and it appe ars t ha t a f u rthe r 
79 
meeting took place on 31 May. The s e appro aches were 
doubtless linked with the talks which Stalin he ld i n Moscow 
between 23-26 May with Lebiediev and the l e aders o f t h e PPR 
and pPS. The outcome of these talks, a s we shall see , 
suggested that Stalin had not finally r uled out a deal with 
the PSL. 
Internally too, Miko~ajczyk s ought to 6utf l a nk the 
communists and Socialists rather than to f ind a compromise 
solution. His response to the communists' of f e ns i ve was to 
launch a protest campaign of mass mee tings, starting early 
in April with a tour of Silesia whe r e he a ddressed l arge 
crowds in Katowice and opole. 80 Th ese mee tings - t he last 
to be granted offici a l permits - we r e me t by co unter -
demonstrations from the PPR and we re fo l lowed by attacks on 
PSL activists. Neverthe l e ss, t h e campa i g n co ntinued wi t h 
demonstrati ons of PSL strength a t g a the rings held to ce l e -
brate public holidays, at funerals of mu rdered PSL acti -
vists, at dedications of PSL b a nners a nd eve n at an 
international football match 'and a s cout ra l ly . 8 l 
The campaign was character i sed by a n overt appe a l to 
urban working-class support, a s t h e cho i ce of the i ndus -
trialised cities of Silesia for M iko~ajczyk ' s first tou r 
indicated. He is reported to have dec la r ed in Ka t owice 
that 'the workers' partie s hav e no mo nopo l y o n t he workers ' 
and to have urged the PSL a ktyw to ' go amo ngst t h e ra nks of 
the workers' .82 Despi te t h e doub t s of t h e agrarian wi ng of 
78 PRO F0371 564 40 N7l39. 
79 Ibid., 56 445 N10 45l. 
80 Ga zeta -Ludowa 10,11,12. 4 .46. 
81 Mi kolaj cz y k The Pat t e rn ••• op. c it ., pp . 1 73 - 79 . 
8t Re chowic z Pie r ws z e wybo r y •.. op. cit ., p . 49 ; Gor~biowski 
Pierws ze l a ta •.• op. ci t ., p. 331. 
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the party who feared that PSL recruitment in the towns 
83 
would lead to an influx o f Endek elements , from late 1945 
the party seems to have undertaken the f o rmatio n of urban 
circles on a wide scale. In December 19 45 the PSL h ad 800 
members in Ursus, an industrialised suburb of Warsaw; a fe w 
months later it had 1,353 members in poznan city - abo ut 
half of them orga ni sed in factory circles. 84 Miko ~a j c zyk 
believed that the PSL would be able to mobilise working-
class support against the c ommunists if they attempted t o 
crush his party. Following a conversation with Miko~a j c zyk 
on 12 May, the British ambassador reported to Londo n tha t 
he 'gathered .•• that if he ( Miko~ajczyk ) is ejected from t he 
Government he will try to cause a n y resultant distubance s 
to take the form of strikes nominally for higher wages 
rather t han a political outburst' . 85 
The political a nd economic situation in t he t owns 
favoured the PSL campaign. Discontent, g e ne rated by t he 
harsh e c onomic conditions a nd the general inc r ea s e in poli -
tical tension , was widespread . As in early 1945 , t h e 
government fa ced severe difficul t ies in ma intaining b a sic 
food supplies and preventing shar p price r i ses in t he win-
ter months of 19 46 . Against this backg r o und , a wav e of 
strikes took place in the spring , notabl y in the Lodz tex-
tile industry , the Gdansk- Gdynia d ocks, t he Silesian coal -
field and in Warsaw , Radom, Kielce and c z ~stochowa . 86 
Generally , the strikes were brief protes t s a rising o ut of 
food shortages or suspicions that the avail able foo d wa s 
being distribu ted unfairly. Usually the wo rke rs r e sumed 
produ c tio n once extra rations we r e i ssued . Bu t ofte n t h e 
83 Borkowski Kszta~towanie si~ .•. OPe ci t ., pp . 91-9 3 ; 
Dobie szewski i Hemmerling OP e cit ., pp . 10 9-1 0 . 
84 Ibid ., pp . 108-9; PRO F0371 56432 . 
85 Ibid ., 56439 N6245 . 
86 Robotnik 19. 4 . 46 , GO~~biowski pi e rws ze lata ... OP e c it ., 
~ . 331 ; Na umiuk Po c z ~tk i ••. Op e cit ., p . 1 81 ; Hi lleb r andt 
1 Jakubowski Op e cit. , p . 369 ; PRO F0 3 71 564 3 9 N5886 , 
N6901 , N7266. 
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strikes also had anti-government overtones and were attri-
buted by the communists to the continuing influence of 
87 
'reactionary' elements amongst the working class. In 
Some cases the PSL may have been involved. The communists 
blamed the PSL for organising strikes in Warsaw on the eve 
of May Day and short stoppages which took place on the 
railways, in the 'Schicht' factory and among the telephone 
employees. 88 The situation was regarded with alarm by the 
PPR and PPS which issued a joint declaration warning that 
they would oppose 'any attempt by PSL wreckers to split 
the working class with every means at their command,.89 
Urban unrest was also expressed in demonstrations against 
the government. The most serious took place on Constituti on 
Day, 3 May, when despite a last-minute ban on processions, 
large-scale protest marches occurred in Krak6w , Katowice, 
Gliwice, Sosnowiec, By tom, ' Lodz and numerous other towns. 
In Krak6w and Gliwice rioting broke out after clashes be-
t d l ' 't 90 ween emonstrators and po ~ce un~ s . 
Mikotajczyk 's readine ss to rise to the c ommunists' 
challenge and his determination not to enter the bloc con-
ditioned his attitude to the attempts of the PPS leadership 
to find a compromise. He and the great majority of the PSL 
leaders regarded the PPS as little more than a stalking 
horse for the PPR and believed that its following in the 
country and many of its activists would swing behind the 
OPposition rather than accept a joint-list wi t h the commu-
nists. The PSL gave open encouragement to the anti-blo c 
faction of the PPS lead by Zygmunt zu~awski , 9l which was 
87 See further: Reynolds Communists ••• op . cit., p. 524 . 
88 Hillebrandt i Jakubowski OP e cit., p . 369 . 
89 Ibid., pp. 429-30 . 
90 Gazeta Ludowa 4 .5. 46 ; PRO F037l 56439 N7266; Koz i k OPe 
cit., pp 203-4; Go~~biowski pierws ze lata ..• OPe cit., 
p . 374; Kantyka PPS na Sl~sku ••• Op e cit ., pr . 251-52; 
Naumiuk Pocz~tki ••• op . cit., p. 202. A detailed account 
of events in Gliwice appeared in Jutro Polski 8.12:46. 
91 Gazeta _Ludowa 9.3.46; Kozik op . cit. , pp . 308-9 ; CWik 
oP e cit., pp. 137-39. 
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fiercely opposed to the 'centrist' leadership of the par ty 
around OSbbka, Cyrankiewicz and Szwalbe . 
By May, the tension and doubts which had b ee n ev i dent 
in the PSL leadership when the communists began their off -
ensive, had given way to a mood of greater confide nce and 
unity. Cavendish-Bentinck found Miko~ajczyk ' in better 
spirits than I have seen him for some time pas t ,. 92 The 
PSL had weathered the 'general storm'. The party had not 
been ejected from the government and, as we have seen , had 
generally maintained its position in the state apparatus. 
Kiernik and a few others who had questioned Mikotajczyk ' s 
uncompromising line on the bloc had rallied b e hind hi s 
leadership,93 which clearly had the overwhelming s upport of 
the rank-and-file. Despite the increase in repressive 
measures against the PSL its popularity was und imini s hed . 
Finally, it was clear that the PPR and PPS were sharply 
divided on strategy and tactics . 
The PPS: ' The Third Road ' 
Although the leadership of t h e PPS fell in with the 
PPR offensive against the PSL , i t d i d not s hare the c ommu-
nists' view that Poland had split fi nally into two camps 
and that a clash with the PSL was now unavoidable . The 
dominant 'cen t rist' faction in t he PPS, led by Osobka , 
Cyrankiewic z , S zwalbe, Rusinek a nd Hochf e ld, d i d not accept 
that the failure of the February talks s hould deflect the 
workers ' parties fr om the broad natio nal front strategy and 
t heir efforts to forge an alliance wi t h the mainstream pea-
sant movement. It considered that the ' obstacle to form ing 
an electoral bloc, to a chiev i ng f ull worker -peasan t unity , 
is above all that relatively narrow group of activists 
which was connected with the London Governme n t Dele~ 
gat ion' .9 4 The Socia lists argu ed that ' ... We ought not 
92 ~ F0371 56.939 N6206. 
93 Borkowski Pertrakcje •.. op . ci t ., p . 434 . 
94 Robotnik 2 . 3 . 46 . 
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to describe the whole of the PSL as reactionary and by 
doing this estrange its healthy elements from positive co-
operation ••• a wise policy will assist the process of their 
coming closer to us,.95 The PPS favoured a tougher line 
towards the PSL - and the rhetoric of the Socialists was 
often more menacing than that of the PPR96 - but such lan-
guage was intended to force the PSL, or at any rate its 
more pragmatic leaders, back to the negotiating table . 
Even as the February talks collapsed, Os6bka asked the PSL 
spokesman to reconsider and offered them a week to withdraw 
fro th ' .. 97 m elr posltl0n. 
These accounts were muted at first : by May and June, 
as tension in the country grew and the PPS became seriously 
alarmed at the communists' increasing bel ligere nce , they 
grew louder. Initially, however, the PPS leaders were more 
concerned to preserve the united front wi th the PPR and 
defeat the anti-bloc f actio n in the party led by Zygmunt 
Zulawski, which had considerable influence amongst the 
rank-and- file . 98 Despite t heir differences with the PPR , 
95 Robotnik 26.8.46. 
96 During the February talks , Cyrankiewicz described part 
of the cons t i t uency of t he PSL as ' pathologically ill ' 
and in need of 'educational measures '. Borkowsk i 
Pertrakcje •.• Ope cit., p. 429 n. In June 1946 he call ed 
fo r 'ru thless struggle until the fasc i st source of 
infection is entirely destroyed '. Robotnik 7.7.46. 
97 Borkowski Pertrakcje ..• Ope cit., p . 432 . 
98 ZUlawSki was a major figure in t he leadership of the PPS 
between the wars and was chairman of the party ' s Supreme 
Council in 1939. After Yalta he favoured t h e cessatio n 
of underground activity by the PPS and its unificatio n 
with the 'Lublin ? PS'. Ta lks b etween Zulawski and the 
' Lublin PPS' were held during mid-1945, but broke down 
in the autumn, whereupon Z u~awski and h is followers 
formed a separate ' Polish Social Democratic Party '. How-
ever , permission to legalise this organisation was re -
fused . In December Zu~awski a nd hi s followers were 
admitted to the PPS o n an individ ual basis and at the 
~eeting of the supreme Council on 31 Marchll April 1946 , 
Z u~awski and five of his group were co - opted as members . 
~ee further: Reiss OP e cit ., pp . 216-74; L . Cohn Zygmunt 
ZUlawski Krytyka 6 (1980 ), pp. 184- 89 . 
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the 'centrists' were determined at all costs to maintain 
the hegemony of the workers' parties within the government. 
They accepted that if a bloc of six parties with the PSL 
was not achieved, the PPS would collaborate with the commu-
nists to defeat the PSL in a bloc of the four 'Lub lin' 
parties. For the 'centrists' this was the overriding prio-
rity, as Osobka made clear: 'the most important problem is 
to maintain political power in the hands of the world of 
labour •••• Therefore the four democratic parties ••. must 
win a majority even without the PSL .•• ,. 99 They feared 
that the alternative would be a regeneration of right-wing 
forces which the communists and the Russians would crush by 
force : 
'We are certain that having once handed over 
power, we would have to wrench it back from 
the hands not of conservatives, but fascists , 
not through the ballot box, but by force ••.. 
We are genuinely afraid of unleashing ele-
ments which will either have to be crushed 
with Cromwellian fanaticism , or will rule 
out the possibility of a peaceful develop-
ment towards socialist democracy in Poland 
We are afraid of the spread of atti-
tudes which might justify the Soviet Union ' s 
lack of confidence towards Poland •.. ' lOO 
The 'centrists' believed that only through the united front 
could they exercise a moderating i nfluence on the c ommu-
nists and avoid a narrowly-based, forced construction of 
so 0 1 0 0 hO d 1 101 C~a ~sm ~n Poland on t e Sov~et rno e . 
99 Robotnik 2 .3. 46 . 
100 J . Hochfeld List do towarzyszy z Labour Party Przeglpd 
Socjalistyczny 1.4.46. 
101 Szwalbe set out the evolutionary approach of the PPS 
thus: ' according to the PPS we are not constructing a 
socialist system now or in the present historical per-
iod . Nevertheless , we want to arrange matters in such 
a way that the foundations of the new Poland created 
now will not have to be demolished whe n circumstances 
and the will of the majority of the nation calls - as 
we believe it will - for a socialist economy '. 
Robotnik 10.8.46. 
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Despite the strength of opposition to the alliance 
with the PPR in the provincial organisations of the PPS in 
~ 102 Krakow, Warsaw , Katowice and elsewhere , the ' centrists', 
supported by the left , had no difficulty in outvoting t he 
Zu~awski group at the party's Supre me Council o n 31 March -
1 April . l03 The Council reaffirmed the party ' s commitme nt 
to the united front and the bloc and agreed that the PPS 
should put forward a proposal to hold a referendum before 
the elections. l04 Having removed the t hreat from the right , 
the 'centrists' turned their attention, with growing 
urgency, to their efforts to reverse the polarisation 
between the communists and the PSL. At a sitting of the 
party executive on 14 May , the left : Swi~tkowsk i , Matuszew-
ski and , in particular, Stanis~aw Skowronski, accused the 
' centrists' o f wavering and demanded closer co-operation 
with the PPR against the PSL . However , the majority deci -
ded in favour of a concerted attempt to reach a c ompromise 
with the Peasants . Startczyk , on the right of the party , 
went as fa r as to argue that ' if we do not achieve a bloc 
105 
of six , we could have a revolution o n o u r hands' . The 
' centrist ' position was set out in a n article by Szwalbe , 
the party president, entitled 'For a correct evaluation 
of t he attitude of t he PPS to the PSL and the Party of 
102 The PPS leadership encountered considerable opposition 
to the block with t he communi sts at t he provincial con-
fere nce of the PPS in Krak6w o n 16/17 March . Zu lawski , 
who had led the critici s m, was elected to the provincial 
committee with two of hi s followers . See Kozik OP e 
cit., pp. 308-9. At a meeting of secretaries of local 
committees of the PPS in Upper Silesia in April , 19 o u t 
of 23 speakers considered that party members were oppo-
sed to the bloc. Kantyka PPS na Sl?sku •.• Ope cit ., 
p . 245 . See also Sierocki Warszawska .•• OP e cit., p. 
266 . 
103 Reiss OP e cit ., pp. 270-72iBardach 0 dz iejach .•. OP e 
cit ., pp . 688-92i GSHI Kol . 97/30 (Arciszewski papers) 
Rada Nac zelna FPPSWdn . 31 III i 1 IV 1946 r .i PRO 
F0 371 56437 N4832 . 
104 Syzdek OP e ci t ., p. 336 . 
lOS F . Baranowski Z dZ i ejow ..• op . cit ., p. 36i T . Sierocki 
Dysuksje nad e~ogramem PPS w latach 1945- 47 Z eo1a 
walki 1971 nr . 4 (56), p . 157. 
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Labour', which appeared in 'Robotnik' on 24 May . Szwalbe-
no doubt with Gomu~ka's recent Warsaw speech (see P.223) in 
mind - bluntly contradicted PPR claims that the situation 
had polarised to the point where the legality of the PSL 
was in doubt: 
' ••• "private " farmers and businessmen have 
their own economic interests and must have 
their own political representation to ex-
press these economic interests. All those 
comrades who, oversimplifying the situation, 
consider that there is no place for politi-
cally moderate parties in contemporary demo-
cratic Poland are mistaken. There is such a 
place and in the interest of the normal 
development of Poland's political situation, 
this place must remain. All thought then of 106 
delegalising such parties would be fanciful ... ' 
The article concluded with a clear offer to resume negotia-
tions to reach a compromise around an all-party bloc: 
' ••• We shall fight the PSL more and more 
sharply •.•• But at any time if the PSL 
agrees to the maintenance of government by 
democracy ••• in the way that we conceive it 
(which does not exclude struggle over social-
ism) ..• then the PPS, doubtless in full agree -
ment with the PPR, will propose substituting 
conflict with an internal pact of the six 
parties which would be so beneficial for Poland, 
an agreement based on the principle of recog-
nition of the true role of the PKt'lN parties 
in general, and the workers' parties in par -
ticular, in sustaining, deepening and contin-
uing genuine d~mocracy, not the formal democracy 
of Chjeno-piast times (i.e. the right-centre 
coalitions between Witos' followers and the 
Christian Oemocrats in the 1920s - J.R.) or 
from before September 1939, but the new demo-
cracy founded on the social reforms decreed by 
the PK~ and the KRtJ and the new style of 
government in Poland ' .107 
The timing of the Socialists ' offer was probably gover ned 
by the hope that it would influence the PSL executive which 
106 Robotnik 24.5.46. 
107 Ibid. 
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in the referendum . met on 25 May to decide its tactics 
The PSL leaders, though fully aware 
. 108 t d f promote a compromlse, vo e or 
of the PPS attempts to 
a contest. 
However, such tactical considerations were not para-
mount. In fact, by this stage the disagreements between 
the PPR and the PPS over strategy were such that Stalin had 
become involved. Between 23-26 May a Polish delegation 
including Gomu~ka, Dierut, Szwalbe and OSbbka made a publi-
cised visit to Moscow to discuss Soviet cred i ts and t he 
general political situation. No details of the discussions 
are available, but it is apparent that Stalin did not veto 
the PPS campaign to re-open talks, which c o nt i nued with 
renewed vigour on the delegation's return . Rather , it 
seems that Stalin's attitude prompted the communists to 
soften their line and accept - at l east formally - t hat a 
fUrther attempt to draw the PSL into the bloc should be 
made before the elections . On his return , Gomutka war ned 
the Central Committee at its Plenum held o n 2 June of the 
likelihood of new talks with the PSL : 
' The PPS is convinced that a s i x -party 
electoral bloc is possible, real , immediate . 
Our view is different. We consider that 
the six-party bloc will not come about . All 
the same, it cannot be excluded that be c ause 
of the p ositio n of the PPS , we shall , as it 
were , be forced tactically to take certain 
steps which will help to c onvince the PPS 
of its illusions . Thi s mea n s being able , on 
the basis of some sort of experience with the 
PSL, to convince the PPS that its calculatio ns 
are mistaken'.109 
In its resolution th~ Plenum stated t hat dec id ed opponents 
of Miko~ajczyk within the PSL could expect to f ind ' a 
c ommon tongue with t he Polish democratic parties , despite 
ideological and p rogrammati c differences ' and ' forms of 
108 Miko~ajczyk told the executive t hat t h e PPS had told 
him that ' they aimed at us being i n t he bloc '. Borkow-
ski Kszta~towanie si~ . .• op . cit. , p . 432 . 
109 Borkows ki Per trakc je •.. op. cit ., p . 432 . 
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1 1 . . ,110 oya , construct1ve co-operat10n • This was a distinct 
moderation of the Party's public stance. 
The Socialists put their own gloss on the c ommuni sts ' 
very limited retreat and pressed on with their efforts to 
achieve an agreement. On 8 June Szwalbe published a f ur-
ther article in 'Robotnik' entitled 'More o n the attitude 
of the PPS to the PSL'. This reiterate d the Socialists ' 
commitment to the broadest possible alliance ' of th e e n tire 
working countryside with the entire labouring population of 
the towns ••• an understanding not o nly with the " red " coun-
tryside, but also with the "green" as well as the " red and 
white" (colours of the peasant movement and the Polish 
national flag - J.R.) and not only with th e SL'. While t h e 
political battle with the PSL would continue , the PPS was 
determined to seek 
'a way through to those masses organised in 
the PSL movement which in reality agree with 
the new orde r in Poland and genuinely wis h 
to improve or influence its f uture development , 
even if in the spirit of their own "moderate " 
ideology. The resolutions on the PSL of the 
Plenum of the Central Commit tee of the PPR 
on 2 June deal with this i ssue in the same 
way . Despite rumours, the PPR , s harp l y att-
acking the reactionary and negative att i t ude 
of the PSL to the Polish system , also explici tly 
spoke of the possibility of finding a c ommon 
tongue with Peasant-d emocrats ••. '.111 
The PPS leadership was much encouraged by t h e forma -
tion of the ' Nowe wy zwo lenie' group which opposed Mikota-
jczyk's tactics in the refere ndum and was expe lled fro m the 
PSL in June. The PPS saw t his as a potent ial third peasant 
party of the sort which they pad hoped t h e Banczyk group 
would form the previous Sep tember; such a party would be a 
natu 1 1 h . l' 112 H 0 I'bk ra a ly for t e SOC1a 1stS . owever , as so a 
110 UChwata plenum KC PPR w sprawie gtosowania ludowego , 
2.6.46, PPR ... i 1946 - i 1947 Op e cit ., p . 119 . 
III Robotnik 8.6.46. 
112 In 1948, in a speech denouncing t h e polic y of t h e party 
in 1946-47 which he had been prominent in shapi ng , 
Cyrankiewicz said that t he PPS ' right ' had e ndeavoured 
to ' g alvanise such a group as ' Nowe Wyzwole nie ' .•. (in 
order to have its own pawns to play in t he countryside '. 
See Przegl~d So cj al istyc z ny October/December 1948 . 
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made clear in a speech on 9 June, the PPS aimed to win over 
not only the dissidents, but also those remaining inside 
th P h d d b b M . k .,.. k ' . 113 e SL w 0 ha ou ts a out ~ o~aJczy s tact~cs . On 
19 June he appeared to go even further in a speech which 
proclaimed the need for national unity and flatly de n ied 
the identification by the communists of the PSL with the 
Opponents of the national front: 
'if someone asked me the ques tion what we 
most need, I would reply - na tional unity 
Today not only the four political 
parties which founded the KRN , but .also 
the SP and the PSL, accept in p r inciple all 
the political and programmatic assumptions 
of our camp ••. ,114 
Convinced as they were that the Socialists ' hopes of 
a deal with the PSL were illusory, with t h ereferenGUill only 
a matter of days away, the communists had no choice but to 
fall in with the PPS whose collaboration would be crucial 
to producing a favourabl e result when the votes were 
counted. 
The Referendum 
The failure o f the talks o n the electoral blo c placed 
a question mark over the timing of t he election. In early 
April the PPS, supported by the PPR , put forward the pro-
posal , which had b ee n in the air for s ome months , llS that 
a referendum should , be held before the elections . The pro-
posal was accepted by the KRN at the e nd of April and the 
date of the referendum was fixed for 30 Ju ne . The electo-
rate were asked to vote on three issues: abolition of the 
113 Robotnik 13.6. 46. 
114 Robotnik 21 .6. 46 . 
115 Wester n journalists had hea rd by January 1946 that a 
referendum was under consideration , PRO F0371 56434 
N2 028. Gomu~ka mentioned the possibility of a refer-
e ndum in his speech on 27 February, Przemowie nie 
wyg~oszone w Wars2awie na wsp61nej konferencji aktywu 
PPR i PPS 27 . 2 .1 946 r ., Artyku~y ... Vol . II OP e cit ., 
p . 51. 
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Senate (the upper chamber of the Polish parliament); appro-
val of the economic reforms provided for in the Land Reform 
and the 1946 Nationalisation Law; and approval of the new 
frontiers of Poland. For the PPR the referendum was a 
convenient way to delay the elections , which were now 
expected to take place in the autumn. 116 It would also 
place the PSL in a political dilemma. If the vote was 
unopposed, the communists could claim the result as a vote 
of confidence in the government. On the other hand, the 
Peasants were long-standing critics of the Senate and would 
have to reverse their policy to oppose the communists o n 
this issue. A contest on the economic reforms or the new 
frontiers would compromise Miko~ajczyk's progressive and 
pro-Soviet stance. For the Socialists, the referendum had 
the additional advantages of providing further time to seek 
a compromise with the PSL and reassuring the PPS rank-and-
file over the postponement of the elections. 
At first , it seemed that the PSL would not c o ntest the 
referendum. Its executive met on 10/11 April and decided 
to accept the referendum as the price for f i x ing the date 
of the elections. When it was suggested that the PSL might 
force a contest, both Miko~ajczyk and Kiernik were 
opposed.l1 7 Miko~ajczyk's view was that ' if , prior to the 
referendum, he and his party could feel sure that the elec-
tions will be held and these will be reasonably free .•• his 
party would not advise members as to how to vote ... as , if 
, 
the elections are in fact held, it will later on have no 
importance .•. ,.118 However, during May opinion in the PSL 
leadership hardened in favour of a contest. The majority 
favoured recommending members to vote 'no' to question o ne 
'116 Modzelewski , the Polish Foreign Minister, told Bliss 
Lane in April that September would be t h e earliest prac-
ticable time to hold the election, PRO F037l 56437 
N44 75. 
117 Ibid. , 56439 N6206; Borkowski Kszta~towanie si~ •.• op. 
Cit., p. 97 and Pertrakcje ••• op . cit ., p. 425n. 
118 PRO F 0 3 7 1 56 4 3 9 H6 2 0 6 . 
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(abolition of the senate) and 'yes' to que stio ns two a nd 
three. Some favoured an even toughe r line (a boycot t or 
'no' votes on questions one and two). Th e par t y Counc i l 
on 26-27 May gave overwhelming support f or the f irs t for -
mula. Only 10 out of 128 Council me mb e rs vote d f o r t he 
'three times yes' formula which would have a vo i ded a c o n-
119 test, and 3 voted for a boycott. Miko ~ aj c zyk expla i ned 
to the British ambassador after the Co uncil that : 
' ••• at first he had thought the C( e n t r a l) 
C(ommittee) of the P(olish) P( eas a n t ) 
P(arty) should not give any a dvice to its 
members as to how to vote in the refere nd um 
but should regard this as unimportan t a nd 
should concentrate on pre p arator y wo r k fo r 
the elections. However, he s ub sequ e ntly 
changed his mind ••• for the fo llowing r ea-
sons. If the ref e rendum p roduced a majority 
in favour of the abolition o f t he Se na t e , 
this would result in the e l e ctio n o nly 
being for one chambe r ins t ead of two . Shou ld 
this one chambe r have, as a res u lt o f the 
elections being rigg ed , a two t hi rds majority 
prepared to ob ey the o r ders of t he Commu nist 
leaders, it would b e po s sib le for the latter 
to change the constitutio n fort hwi t h a nd 
turn this country into a tota li tar i a n Com-
munist state. On the oth er h a nd with 2 
chambers the operat io n would be more d if -
ficult. Moreover, a lar ge negative vote 
on the proposed abolitio n of t he Se nate 
would help t o show the s trength o f the 
opposition .•. ,.120 
Despite the c ommunists ' e f forts to generate i n ternal 
oPPosition to Miko~ajc zyk within t h e PSL , o n ly a sma l l 
minority dissente d f r om the decisio n to f o r c e a co n test . 
The most prominent critics of a 'no ' vote : Zygmun t Za~~ski , 
Kiernik and Kazimi e r z Bagins k i were opposed largely f o r 
t a ctica l reasons a nd fe ll in wi t h t he maj o rity o nce the 
d . . 12 1 e Cl s l o n was take n. A ha ndf u l of lesser figur e s , led by 
119 Bo r kowski Ksztattowa ni e s i ~ .•. op . cit ., pp . 97- 99 and 
Pe rtrakcj e ••. op. ci t ., p. 435n . 
1 20 ~ F0371 56440 N71 27. 
12 1 Bor kowsk i Pertrakc je ••• op. cit ., p . 43 5 . 
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Tadeus~ Rek , deputy-secretary of the party , came out pub-
licly against the decision and were immediately expelled . 
Although this group began publishing its own newspaper 
(with the help of the bloc parties) and formed a new party , 
the PSL ' Nowe Wyzwolenie ', it was unable to win over any 
significant support from the grassroots of the PSL. It was 
widely viewed as a communist 'front' , though as we have 
seen , its orientation was closer to the PPS. 
The official results of the referendum were not issued 
until 12 July . According to these figures, the results of 
the voting were as follows: 
Table Ten 
Official Results of the Referendum, 30 June 194 6122 
Question % votinsr ' yes ' % voting ' no ' 
I (For abolition of the 
senate) 68 . 2 31. 8 
II (For the land reform and 
nationalisation law ) 77 . 3 22 . 7 
III (For the new frontiers) 91.4 8 . 6 
The turnout was 85 %. Mi ko~aj c zyk , who produced evidence o f 
widespread irregularities in the voting arrangements and 
the count, issued separate fig ures covering just under 30 % 
of t he polling districts where PSL sympathisers had succee -
ded in witnessing the count . Accordi ng to these returns , 
2~770 , 35l (83 . 5%) voted ' no ' to question one i n these 
areas . 123 
Generally the vo t ing seems to have been conducted cor -
rectly. 124 . b However, even at t hl s stage some latant 
i rregularities took place . One PPR electoral official fr om 
the Che~m region re counted in memoirs published i n 1974 
making of f across the meadows with the ballot box in one 
122 G~os Ludu 12 . 7 . 46 . 
123 Jutro Polski 28.7 . 46. 
124 PRO F03 71 56443 N8598 . 
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hand and a pistol in the other, :several hours befo re voting 
. 125 in a pro-PSL village was due to close. It was during 
the count that the communists intervened to falsify the 
results. Instead of the votes being counted locally, as 
provided for in the regulations, the count took place at 
district level, in most cases without PSL scrutineers 
present. 126 
Although the communists claimed victory, it was clear 
that the referendum was a major setback for the Party , both 
in political and organisational terms. According to the 
British ambassador, the communists were 'appalled a t the 
127 
small vote they secured'. Even the official results 
betrayed the continuing failure of the PPR and its allies 
to capture public support. A heavy vote for the oppositio n 
had been expected in the countryside, where political bri-
gades often required protection from the army and Oru10 
. t h . h' 11 128 un1 s w en they ventured 1nto t e V1 ages . However, 
in the towns they had expected that a combination of econ-
omic and administrative pressures on government employees 
and support for the left amongst the u rban working-class, 
would produce a respectable vote. In fact , t he outcome in 
many of the towns appears to have been disastrous fo r the 
bloc. In Krak6w city, according to the official figures , 
the vote on question one was ' yes': 23,162; 'no ': 120,840 
129 (84 %) • In Kielce , Cz~stochowa and Radom t he official 
returns did not conceal ' ye s' votes a nd tur no uts well below 
average. 130 Apart from Krak6w , Poz na ri ( 53 %), Rzesz6w (79 %) 
125 A. Kraszewski To by~y tylko trzy ~ata •.. Z pola walki 
1974 nr. 3 (67), p. 118; S. W6j cik PSL w walce z komun-
istami 1945-47 (typescript, n. d .), p . 24. 
126 Ibid., pp. 24-25; PRO F03?1 5 6443 N8598 . 
127 Ibid., 56443 N8 983. 
128 I. Blum Z dz iej6w GZP WP 1944-56 Wojskowy Przegl~d 
Historyczny 1963/3-4, p. 226. According to t his source 
25,700 Militia, 28,070 ORMO , 11, 315 UB , 8 ,3 70 KBW and 
36,400 Polish Army troops were deployed duri ng t he 
referendum. 
129 Nowe \'iyzwo1enie 13 . 7 . 46 ; Cwik Op e cit ., pp. 162 -64 . 
130 Naumiuk Pocz~tki ... Op e cit., p . 223 . 
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and Stalowa Wola (80 %) voted 'no' to question one on t he 
official figures. The last two, both industrial towns , 
also voted against nationalisation and the land reform o n 
question two by majorities of 73 % and 68 % re spect ive l y .1 3 1 
There were rumours of a landslide vote against th e govern-
ment in Katowice and there was open talk in communi st cir-
cles about the fiasco in Lodz, which had been regarded as a 
132 PPR stronghold. 
Apart from the voting itself, the strength of hos ti -
lity to the communists revealed in the campaig n preceedi ng 
the referendum came as a sharp jolt to the PPR. According 
to Hillebrandt and Jakubowski, writing of Warsaw , the Party 
had little experience of campaigning amongst the public . 
Canvassers 'sometimes met open hostility to the Party •.. 
there were cases of assaults on canvassers, t hey were whis-
tled at and pelted with rotten fruit '. This reception was 
unexpected: 
contact during the pre - referendum cam-
paign with the broad mass of t he population 
in Warsaw enabled the party to ascertai n more 
accurately the mood of groups with which it 
had hitherto not been in touch: the unempl oyed , 
small craftsmen, the petit-bourgeoisie , house-
wives. Their mood was , according to reports 
of the PPR Provincial Commit tee , worse than 
expected. It had not been realised t ha t there 
was so much unemploymen t , espec i ally amongst 
women and the young . The univer sal fear of 
losi ng homes, shops, sheds or small workshops 
with which owners were it was supposed threa -
tened and which made them hostile or susp icio us 
towards the new authorities , came as a sur-
prise. Canvassers also con~irmed that strong 
prejudice towards the new government as well 
as hopes of a change in the political system , 
pinned chiefly on the PSL and the person of 
Stanis~aw Miko~ajczrk , still ex i sted in many 
neighbou r hoods ... '. 33 
131 J. Zasada Referendum w wOjewodztwie poznanskim 
30.VL1946 (Po znan, 1971), p. 90 ; Olszewski Pocz<}tki ... 
op. cit., p. 242. 
132 PRO F0371 56445 N10451 , 56443, N8998 . Acco rding to the 
PSL ' s f igures, there was a 90 % vote against the commu-
nist camp in working-class centres. Jutro Polski 15.12 . 46 . 
133 Hi11ebrandt i Jakubowski Ope cit., pp . 373 - 74 . 
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The referendum had made abundantly clear how f ar the PPR 
was from achieving a broad base of popular support for the 
national front, or even winning the allegiance of a signi-
ficant section of the urban working-class . 
The referendum had also demonstrated the ineffective -
ness of the Party's organi~atio~ in many areas . Despite 
the measures taken to produce a positive result , in Krakow 
and elsewhere the bloc had been unable to p reve n t t h e oppo-
sition scoring embarrassing local victories. These upsets 
seemed to confirm Miko~aj czyk 's convictio n that the commu -
nists lacked the organisational resources and manpower t o 
prevent his party winning a substantial number of seats at 
the elections. 
The machinery for counting the votes h ad been set up 
in mid-May. Central Committee instructions issued at the 
time made no bones about the fact that local Party c ommi t -
tees were to ensure that these electoral commissions were 
manned by 'people who have demo nstrat ed a c tively their all -
egiance to the democratic camp and who des i re thema in ten -
ance of People's poland,.134 This meant the wholesale 
exclusion of the PSL from the electoral apparatus . At 
provincial level, the PSL forced its representatives onto 
only three commissions (Poznan, Lodz , Krakow ) o ut of seven-
t ee n and in the polling districts its representatives were 
present on only about 3,000 of the 14,000 commissions . 135 
But where the PSL was strong , it was able to breach the 
monopoly of the communist bloc . In Poznan city 5 of its 
members were c ommission chairmen, in Jaros~aw five c ommis -
sions were composed entirely of PSL m~bers and in Lubac zow 
nearly all were. 136 In Krak~w province , all 30 commiss ion 
chairmen in D~browa District , 23 out of 28 in Limanowa 
District , 46 out of 75 in Bia~a District a nd 20 out o f 6 2 
134 Okolnik KC PPR w sprawie referendum - g~o sowan ia ludo -
wego r May 1946 PPR •.• i 1946 - i 1947 op . cit ., p . 87 . 
135 Woj cik PSL w walce ... op . cit ., p . 22 . 
136 Zasada op. cit ., p. 58, Olszewski Pocz~tki ... op . ci t ., 
p . 230 . 
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in Nowy Targ District, belonged to the PSL. Out of 560 
commission members in Nowy Targ, just 12 were in the PPR; 
in Limanowa only 2 out of 280. 137 
The communists' grip on the electoral machinery was 
shaky not only in the Peasant strongholds, but also in the 
towns where the PPR was heavily dependent on the Social-
. 138. . l' ~sts. The att~tude of the Soc~a ~sts seems to have been 
the decisive factor governing the efficiency of the manage-
ment of the results. In Kielce province where the leftist 
leadership of the local PPS co-operated closely with the 
PPR, the Socialists played a big role on the electoral com-
missions. Despite the local strength of the PSL s ucceeded 
in producing voting figures that were better than aver -
age. 139 In Rzesz6w and Stalowa Wola the PPS vote was 
thought to have gone against the government, while in Krak6w 
not only did Zu~awski tacitly support the oppos itio n, but 
the ever-present friction between the local PPS and PPR 
had been sharply exacerbated by the summary replacement o f 
the Socialist chairman of the provincial electoral c ommis-
sion by a communist. 140 The referendum underlined the fact 
that the communists would have both to intensify measures 
against the PSL network in the villages and secure greater 
co-operation from the Socialists if they were to arrange a 
satisfactory outcome to the elections. On their own they 
were still not ready organisationally to take o n the 
137 Cwik op. cit., pp. 150-51. 
138 In ~varsaw 44.4% of chairmen of loca l electora l commis-
sions during the referendum belonged to the PPS , see 
Hillebrandt i Jakubowski op. c it ., p. 375. In Katowice 
province 31.2% of the chairme n belonged to the PPS, see 
Kantyka PPS na Sl~sku •.. op. cit., p. 254. 
139 Naumiuk Pocz~tki ••• op. cit., pp. 206-7. In Kielce 
province 35.6% of c omm i ssio n chairme n were PPS members , 
compared with 41.1% belonging to the PPR . 
140 Olszewski Pocz~tki •.• op. cit., p. 242; Cwik op . cit ., 
pp. 149-50, 157-58, 162. The petiti o n draw n up by the 
left-wing of the PPS in August 19 46 attributed the 
refe rendum result in Krak6w to the ' complete paralysis 
of t he united fro nt', Bardach 0 dziejach ... op . cit ., 
p. 693. 
263 
opposition. 
After the Referendum 
The summer months of 1946, between the referendum and 
the unleashing by the PPR in the autumn o f the offensive 
which dispersed the PSL and the underground and enabled the 
bloc parties to manage successfully the elections whe n they 
were finally held in January 1947, offered the last oppor -
tunity to return to the compromise of June 1945. By this 
stage, the chances of agreement were slight. The two main 
protagonists: the majority of the PSL led by Miko~ajczyk, 
and the PPR, were determined to join battle. It was t he 
Socialists and a minority within the PSL led by Kiernik and 
Wycech which endeavoured to avoid the clash. 
The communists, shaken by their failur e to win wider 
SUpport in the referendum, took the ir retrea t from the 
broad national front line of mid-194 5 one step further. 
The 'general storm' in the spring had failed to fragment 
the PSI or curb its influence large ly because the Socialists 
had been unwilling to co-operate in applying more t han lim-
ited pressure on the opposition. After the referendum, the 
PPR leadership gave priority to strengthening the alliance 
with the Socialists as the springboard for a much more 
intense and effective offensive against t h e PSL . The pur-
pose of the offensive would be to el imina te the bulk of the 
PSL from further political activity. In the communists' 
view the referendum had shown that only a small part of the 
PSL could be drawn into the 'democratic' c amp, the majority 
led by Miko~ajczyk being irredeemably linked with the 
, reaction' • 
Gomu~ka set out the Party's positio n in his first 
post-referendum speech, delivered at a meeting of the PPR 
a nd PPS aktyw in Warsaw on 6 Ju ly . While claiming that t he 
bloc had won a great victory , hi s conclusions betrayed the 
failure of the Party's ear lier strategy . He argued that 
t he referendum had co nfirmed the PPR view that the PSL was 
incapable o f playing a c e n trist role b etween the communi sts 
and their a llies, o n t he one hand , a nd t h e anti - commun ist 
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underground on the other. It had also shown the c o ntinuing 
strength of the 'reaction', which was ' even stronger than 
we had thought'. Gomu~ka based this interpretat ion o n the 
following analysis of the results. The r efere ndum h ad pro-
vided a 'straightforward and clear-cut line of division 
between democrat and reactionary'. Among those who had cast 
negative votes, a small number, about 10-12%, h ad followed 
PSL instructions (i.e. 'no' only to question one ). This 
section of the electorate could be considered as ' t h e right 
wing of the democratic camp' which had ' demonstrated its 
distaste for the present government while accepting the 
basis on which democratic Poland rests. This group i s in 
opposition to the government, however that opposition is 
within the framework of democratic Poland'. The PPR was 
not friendly to th~s element, but was not hostile either 
and had no intention to persecute it or hinder its activ-
ity. On the other hand, the remainder of the opposition , 
the 'reactionary , fascist Miko~ajczyk PSL', embracing all 
those who had cast more than one negative vote (i. e . a 
large majority of the voters in some areas) were to be eli -
minated from political life. Gomu~ka ended hi s speech with 
a call for 'a mighty , lightning offensive ••. agai nst t h e 
reaction, against the Polish fascists , agai ns t the bandit s 
and diversionaries ••• ', the success of which , he stressed , 
would depend on the cohesiveness of the united front . 14l 
The implication was that the referendum had co nfirmed 
the conviction of the PPR leadership t hat there was no 
possibility of achieving an electoral bloc with t he PSL or 
even a substantial part of its following . Indeed , the PPR 
and PPS could only hope to retain power at the elections by 
means of a ' mighty offensive ' against t he PSL a nd t he 
underground . In effect this would require the suspension 
of the broad national front which t h e communists had sought 
to construct with varying degree s of c o nvictio n since May 
1945 and its substitution by what amounted to a temporary 
141 Gomu~ka Przem6wienie wyg~oszone w Warszawi e na zebraniu 
aktywu PPR i PPS, 6 . 7.46 , Artyku~y .•. Vo l . II op . cit ., 
pp . 1 58-76. 
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proletarian dictatorship of the united front of the PPR and 
the pPS. 
Miko~ajczyk and the majority of the PSL leadership a nd 
activists were not deflected from their course by t he out-
come of the referendum~ rather the opposite. The official 
results had come as no surprise. It had been apparent to 
Miko~ajczyk for weeks before the vote and indeed before the 
PSL decided on a contest, that the communists planned to 
142 
manage the results very carefully. However, according 
to the British ambassador, Miko~ajczyk was 'so encouraged 
by the real results of the referendum which far exceeded 
his expectations,.l43 Opinion on the PSL executive a nd 
Council was strongly in favour of his opposition line and 
there is little doubt that grassroots party members would 
have resisted any compromise with the communists, even if 
the leadership had agreed to join a single list. 144 Miko -
~ajczyk was ready to discuss limited local electoral pacts 
providing they formed part of a broader political under-
standing and did not leave the PPR hegemony intact . How-
ever, he was opposed to any discussion of a nationwide 
bloc. As in February, his real objective in any negotia-
tions was to extract a firm date for the elections which he 
W d t . . 11 .. 145 as e ermlned would be baslca y competltlve. 
Mikolajczyk 's general strategy was unaltered . He was 
still optimistic that the PSL could capture leadership of 
the government coalition by winning the confidence of the 
Russians , enlisting western diplomat ic and economic pres-
sure , holding together the PSL electoral organisatio n and 
sustaining a mood of resistance and uncertainty in the 
country. His aim as reported to the British ambassador 
remained: 
142 PRO F037l 56441 N7641. 
143 Ibid ., 56443 N88 04. 
144 Miko~ajczyk thought that 'he would lose all influence 
with the rank-and-file of his party ' if he joined the 
bloc, ibid., 56447 N12480 . 
145 Borkowski Pertrakcje .•. Ope cit ., pp . 437-8n. 
'yictory for his party secured by inter-
national supervision, followed by the 
formation of a coalition Government: 50 % 
of the Ministries being reserved for his 
people. His policy then would be to go 
slow, avoid antagonising the Russians, 
prevent as far as possible any reprisals, 
avoid a purge and concentrate on keeping 
agriculture and industry going. He was 
convinced he could get on with the Russians 
and that the immediate result would b e an 
all-round relaxation of tension'. 
266 
The only alternative, he told the British, woul d come abo u t 
if Poland were abandoned by the West and would involve 
'the continued suppression of his p arty , 
rigged elections ••• and the affirmation 
of a totalitarian Communist regime. This 
would throw the people into despair, vio-
lence would increase, more and more people 
would take to the woods, public security 
would be reduced to nothing, the Governmen t , 
unable to control the country with its own 
resources (he does not think the Gover nment 
can rely on the militia) would call in more 
Soviet police and troops, and a state of 
smouldering civil war wo uld e nsue ' . 146 
He seems to have put much the s ame argume nts to Lebiediev 
during a long conversation in early July dur ing which he 
. . 147 
agaln asserted that the RUSSlans needed the PSL . 
Internationally circumstances still seemed to favour 
his approach. The British were, it was true , averse to hi s 
idea of international supervisio n of the e l e ctio ns , c hiefly 
on practical grounds, and the America ns, to t h e a nnoyance 
of the British and the US ambassador, Bliss Lane, were 
prone to lapses in their support for Miko~ajczyk , as for 
example in their decision o n the eve of t he referendum to 
unf . 1 48 reeze credits to the Pollsh Government . However , 
t heir basic attitude wa s underlined by the delivery to the 
Poles o n 19 August of strong no tes demanding a decis i on on 
1 46 PRO F0371 56444 NI0042. 
147 Ibid ., 56444 N9822 . 
148 Ibid., 56443 N8804 . 
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the date of the elections. 149 In September Miko~ajczyk 
sent his emissary, Kulerski ("Mr. Carter"), to London to 
sound out the Foreign Office. The outcome was satisfac-
tory. When Kulerski informed the British that Miko~ajczyk 
'earnestly hoped that we would pursue our policy of linking 
economic help to political questions and get the Americans 
to do the same', he was told that this was precisely what 
was being done. 150 The attitude of the Russians was at 
this time more puzzling than at almost any other time. Not 
only were there, as we shall see, clear signs that Stalin's 
confidence in the PPR was at a low ebb and that he was 
ready to look elsewhere to achieve stabilisation in Poland , 
but Molotov's overt appeal to German opinion in a speech on 
10 JUly151 highlighted the shakiness of the communists' 
claim that they were the best guarantors of Polish inter-
ests and showed the risks involved if the pro-~vestern wing 
of the government, represented by Miko~ajczyk, was forced 
out of office. 
Internally PSL tactics altered little either . Despite 
growing repression, mass demonstrations continued. On 28 
July Miko~jczyk addressed 10,000 peasants at Krotoszyn 
and delivered a strong attack on the government's economic 
and political policies. On 4 August he spoke at a rowdy 
meeting in Gdansk. 152 However, after the referendum empha-
sis was placed on developing a more disciplined , semi -
conspiratorial cadre-organisation. In effect , the party 
stepped back towards the underground it had left in 1945 in 
an effort to counter infiltration, avoid the repressive 
measures taken against its a ctivists by the authorities, 
and ensure that an organisational network remained intact 
149 PRO F0371 56450 N14980. 
150 Ibid., 56446 N12336. 
151 D. Yergin Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold 
War and the National Security State (London, 1978) , p . 
230. 
152 Gazeta Ludowa 31.7.46, 7.8.46. 
\ 
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for activisation during the elections. 153 In sum , the PSL 
during summer 1946, far from modifying its oppositionist 
stance, was digging in for the coming battle. 
In the aftermath of the referend um the minority in t h e 
leadership led by Kiernik a nd Wycech and supported by 
Za~~ski and Niecko, which had reservations about Miko~a~ 
jczyk's tactics pressed hard to keep ope n the possibility 
of a compromise. But although alarmed by the obvi o us 
determination of the PPR to go to any l e ng t hs to retain 
power and the general increase in tension which had found 
bizarre expression a few days after the referendum in a 
pogrom of Jews in Kielce and the surrounding district , 154 
153 PPR reports for August 1946 noted that the PSL 'has 
recently changed course and is tending to set up illegal 
circles', Hillebrandt i Jakubowski Ope cit., p . 429 . I n 
Olsztyn province a commissioner with 17 ins tructors was 
sent from party HQ to reorganise the local PSL . There 
followed a gradual disappearance ' of the normal organ-
isational network ••• and its replacement b y a network 
of secret delegates ••.. The most committed individuals 
(were) withdrawn from active work and formed into the so-
called second team •••• There was even talk of the exis -
tence of two provincia l leaderships: t h e official and 
unofficial'. Wojnowski OP e cit., pp . 159-60. In Pozna~ 
province, in accordance with central instructions, ' the 
whole election campaign was run o n conspiratorial lines ' 
Dobieszewski i Hemmerling op. cit., p . 145 . 
154 On 4 July 1946 a mob attacked a te nement in Kielce 
inhabited by Jews. In the ensuing violence 34 Jews were 
murdered and 6 Militia men killed . I n t h e days follow-
ing, a further 31 Jews were murdered in the surrounding 
district. The trial of the alleged instigators of the 
pogrom was held within a week and nine of the twelve 
defendents , who included Militia men, were sentenced to 
death. Both the local UB and Militia commanders were 
briefly arrested in the aftermath of the incident. The 
Party 's version of events , repeated at the trial , was 
that the pogrom was organised by NSZ a nd Anders suppor-
ters . However , the PSL maintained that the pogrom had 
been inspired by the c ommunis ts to divert attention 
from the r efere ndum fiasco (s ee Miko~ajczyk OP e cit . , 
pp . 186-88). An evaluation of t h e evidence by the 
British Embassy do ubted this interpretation and attri-
buted the p og r om to a right- wing provocation against a 
background of small-town provincial a nti- semitism , the 
incompetence of t he security forces a nd t he indifference 
of the l ocal Church authorities (P RO F0371 56444 N9871 ) • 
See further : M. Ch~cirtski Poland : -COmmunism , Nationalism 
Anti -S emitism ( ~ew York , 1982), pp . 21 - 34 ; K. Kersten 
Kielce - 4 lipca 1946 roku Tygodnik SOlidarnosc 4 . 17. . 81. 
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this group was only prepared to consider a n electoral bloc 
in which the PSL had 40-50 % of the seats and the hegemony 
155 
of the PPR camp was broken. 
The 'centrist' leaders of the Socialist Party: Osobka-
Morawski, Cyrankiewicz, Szwalbe and Rusinek also felt that 
the referendum had demonstrated the corre ctness of their 
calcu~ations. On the one hand, it had shown that the hold 
of the left on power was tenuous and would not long survive 
a split in the 'united front' of the kind advocated by 
Zu~awski and others on the 'right' of the party. And on the 
other, it had underlined the acute danger of drift away 
from the national unity platform of the PKWN and the coali-
tion government towards a virtual dictatorship of t h e pro -
letariat in which there would be little place for the PPS . 
They pointed to the need to avoid a recurrence of the mis -
takes of early 1945, fearing that t he same indiscriminate 
condemnation of the London camp which had occurred then 
might now be applied to the PSL. 156 The Socialists were , 
desp ite the intransigence of the communists a nd much of the 
PSL, not to mention the PPS hardliners led by Hatuszewski , 
determined to make one further, serious , concerted attempt 
to bring the Peasants into a bloc . 
The strains within the uni ted front apparent before 
the referendum were heightened in its aftermath by sharply 
d ivergent interpretations of its significance. The Social-
ists emerged as defenders of the national front conception, 
while the PPR adopted a line whic~ a year before its own 
leadership had denounced as 'se c tarian'. The divergence 
arose from the difference in t he parties ' assessment both 
of the Viability of the broad governing coalition a nd the 
extent and character of the opposition. While Gomulka 
argued that the referendum had provided a clear-cu t diViding 
line betwee n 'democracy' and ' reaction', t he PPS view was 
altogether more liberal. Rus inek , speaking for the Socia-
lists at a sitting of the trade union execut ive in early 
155 Borkowski Pertrakcje ••. o p. ci t ., p . 437. 
156 Robotnik 11.8.46. 
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July, argued that ' those who regard all the "no" votes as 
the votes of fascism and black reaction over-simplify the 
situation ' and suggested that apart from right-wing and 
conservative elements, the " no " vo te rs included a l so 
' those objec tively dissatisfied , the homeless , 
the poorly-paid , the hungry and ill-clothed . 
It was not calculated opposition or class-
hostility to the new political system which 
they expressed, but only despair at t heir 
material condition, the social inequali ty 
which they see, at injustices , sorrow a nd 
disappointment experienced e very day , .lS 7 
In Socialist eyes the ' reaction' was much less threatening 
and all-pervasive than the communists claimed in proposing 
drastic counter-measures . Rather the uni ted front should 
remain on the course it had adopted a year before. As 
Os6bka-Morawski put it to the Council of the PPS on 2S 
August : 
the referendum confirmed our political 
position ' regarding the policy of t h e six-
party bloc • •. • At the present histor ical 
stage only the policy of close agreement of 
the six parties is beneficial for Poland .. .. 
~'lhoever causes the break-up of the six-party 
bloc will carry a great responsibility before 
history and the nation . Of course, if a six-
party bloc does not c orne abo ut, there will be 
a five - party or four-party o ne and I am con-
vinced that it will be v ictoriou s . .• . Only 
it is a shame that this same victory would 
have to be bought at the cost of serious 
conflict and undue sacrifice which with luck 
might be spared , .lS8 
Renewed talking on forming a six-party blo c began al -
most immediately after the referendum and continued o n a nd 
off until early October whe n the PSL Council declared fin-
ally for a separate list . The discussions we n t thro ugh 
t hree distinct phases . During July the negotiatio ns were 
held chiefly between Wycech and Kiernik, from the PSL , a nd 
lS7 Gazeta Ludowa 13 . 7.46. 
158 Robotnik 26.8.46. 
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representatives of the PPR. In August i t was the PPS lead-
ership which took the initiative with a rather more serious 
and determined attempt to achieve an understanding. During 
September it became apparent that this effort had failed 
and the PPS reluctantly moved back into line with the PPR , 
while Miko~ajczyk's critics within the PSL fell in with the 
uncompromising stance of the majority of the party. 
The first round of talks in July revealed the wide gap 
between the two sides . Miko~ajczyk had agreed to Kiernik 
and Wycech holding discussions only with the proviso that 
' th . f bl , 159 Th . ere could be no questl0n 0 a oc. e commun~sts 
for their part were not prepared to consider any other 
electoral arrangement or to go beyond giving t h e PSL (with 
' Nowe Wyzwolenie') 25 % of the seats in s uch a bloc . In 
addition , the exclusion of Miko~ajczyk was to be a condi-
tion. 160 When the PSL executive met on 27 July to decide 
its attitude to these proposals, Wycech and Kiernik were 
unable to attract any support for a motio n rejecting the 
bloc while leaving open the door for talks on a more limi -
ted electoral agreement . Miko~ajczyk ' s motion insisting 
d 1 . 1 161 o n a separate PSL list was passe a most unan~mous y , 
and on 2 August the p arty activists from the provinces gave 
his line their backing. 162 The same week h e renewed host-
ilities with speeches in Krotoszyn and Gda rtsk . The PPR 
which had agreed to participate in the talks chiefly to 
convince the Socialists that a deal was impossible also 
resumed physical and propaganda attacks o n the PSL at the 
end of JUly.163 In t heir view the time for talking was 
ver, the time to launch an offensive to disperse t h e 
159 Borkowski Pertrakcje • .• op. cit. , p . 436n . 
160 Jutro Polski 15.12.46. 
161 Borkowski pertrakcj e .• . op . ci t . , p . 437 . 
162 Borkowski Miejsce • •• op . cit. , p. 77. 
163 Gazeta Ludowa 26 . 7.46 . In June/Jul y about 7 members 
of the PSL were murdered ; in the period August/October 
1946 at least 30 were killed, see ~-Hlk SJ:'ownik ... op . 
cit. 
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opposition had arrived. 
The 'Banner of National Unity' 
For the Socialists, however, this point h ad not yet 
been reached. 164 Adamant on the need f o r a bloc with the 
PSL, the PPS 'centrists' considered that greater determi n-
ation was required to bring this about and that the commu-
nists would have to offer concessions to attract t h e PSL . 
these should include dropping the demand for Miko~ajczyk ' s 
exclusion . 165 On 29 July 'Robotnik ' c arr ied the f irst of 
a cycle of articles by Osobka-Morawski under t h e title 
' Who will raise the banner of National Unity? '. This 
marked the beginning of a concerted drive by the PPS lea-
ders to achieve a compromise in which their party would 
166 playa key role. In the view of the Socialists, what 
was required was internal peace a n d not t h e further polar -
isation advocated by the c ommunist s and their own left 
wing: 
'today, when we need unity so much and when 
that unity is so lacking, the PPS ought to 
make every effort to construct it as broadly 
and quickly as possible. I consider that 
the PPS is suited to this role . In order to 
achieve success in the area of national 
unity two basic things are necessary : to 
genuinely want it and to k now how to achieve 
it. That the PPS wants it ought not to 
arouse any discussion or doubts '. 167 
164 Miko~ajczyk later acknowledged the role of t h e PPS in 
restraining the PPR . He told the PSL Supreme Counci l 
in October that after the referendum ' it was decided 
to take the nation by the throat and pay i t back for 
voting as it did . This did not come a b out . Here we 
must give credit to the Polish Soci a lis t Party , wh ich 
d i d not wish to take upo n itself the respo ns ibil ity f o r 
wha t would fo llow '. Ju tro Polski 1 5 . 12 . 46 . 
165 Jut r o Polski 15 . 12 . 46 . 
166 RObotnik 29.7. 46, 2 . 8.46 , 5 . 8.46, 6. 8 . 46 . 
16 7 Robotnik 29.7 . 46. 
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The PPS was inclined to concede considerable ground to t h e 
PSL to win its accession to the bloc. They were ready to 
open talks with an offer of 33 % of Se j m and Cabinet seats 
and some, such as Szwalbe and Wachowicz were willing to go 
as far as 40 % - a figure which would have satisfied Kiernik . 
Os6bka st'ated publicly that his party envisaged ' s uch a 
balance and procedure in parliament, t hat without the 
agreement of PSL and SP members, (the Constitution) c ould 
168 
not be passed'. 
The PPS moves provoked a profound crisis in relations 
betwee n the two workers' parties. The communists were 
deeply alarmed by the Socialists' open advocacy of a recon -
struction of the government coalitio n so as to deprive them 
of their leading role. In their determination to preve nt 
this , the PPR leaders seem to have contemplated abandoning 
the basis of the alliance with the PPS wh ich had been cen-
tral to their strategy since May 1945 . Th is would have 
marked the end not only of the ' worker - peasant alliance ', 
but also in effect of the ' united front ' as well . 
First , the communists attempted to oust Os6bka-
Morawski from the premiership . In April , i n order to reas -
sure the PPS as repression against the opposition was 
stepped-up, Henryk Wachowicz , leader of the Lodz PPS , was 
appoi n ted deputy-Minister of Public Security . On 1 August , 
just t hree days after the publication of Os6bka ' s cal l for 
national unity, ' Robotnik' though not the PPR press , 
announced that Wachowicz had resigned . The 'reason for this 
/ 169 
was that Wachowicz, probably with Osobka ' s approval had 
ordered the release from arrest of a veteran Socialist , 
Anto ni t'l~sik; Radkiewicz, the communist r-U nister of Public 
Security , on heari ng of his had ordered W?sik ' s re - arrest .170 
W~s ik was not an important figure and doubtless the 
168 Robot nik 2.8. 46. 
169 Miko~aj czyk The Pattern .•. OP e cit ., p . 188 . 
170 Gomu~ka Nasze stanowisko . Artyku~ o publikowa ny w 
'G~o s i e Lud u' , 18.8 . 46 , Artyku!y ... Vol . II OP e cit ., 
pp . 194-95; Jutro Polski 8 . 9.46 . 
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communists' main purpose was to reassert absolute control 
over security matters and indirectly to undermine Os6bka ' s 
position as prime minister. 171 On 5 August the Socialists 
replied to this pressure for Os6bka's removal with what 
amounted to a show of force in Warsaw. Large crow~s of PPS 
supporters marched through the city and loudly demonstrated 
in favour of Os6bka outside the prime minister's office . 17 2 
Cyrankiewicz stoutly defended the PPS line in his speech to 
the marchers: 
' ••• we are an independent party and we are 
an equal party and we have every political 
and moral right to fight for that equality . 
A great campaign to consolidate society has 
been undertaken by Comrade Osobka-Morawski 
in the name of the PPS. We need internal 
peace. A broad coalition of democratic 
parties, guaranteeing each other mutual co-
participation in government and excluding 
all aspirations to mono-party rule, is req-
uired. The attempt has once more been under-
taken to assure Poland peace through an 
understanding of the parties ... ' 
He added the observation that ' amongst the perpetual sus-
picions that someone else has mono-party tendencies ... lie 
frustrated hopes for one's own monopoly of power. This 
must end' .173 
Without it seems informing the Socialists , Gomu~ka , 
Bierut and Minc had in the meantime flown to Moscow for 
further talks with Stalin (2-7 August) .174 Stalin ' s advice 
did not however settle matters; Os6bka remained as premier, 
but the PPR remained firmly opposed to f urther talks with 
the PSL. On 13 August the Secretariat of the PPR Central 
Committee assessed the differences between the Miko~ajczyk 
171 Bardach 0 dziejach ... op . cit., p. 696 . 
172 Robotnik 6.8.46. 
173 Robotnik 7.8.46 (emphasis as in the original ). 
Cyrankiewicz was later to repud iate what he described 
as 'certain tendencies to pseudo -national demagoguery ' 
in the leadership of the PPS in the period 1946-47, 
Robotnik 18.3.48. 
174 PRO F0371 56445 NI0598. 
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and Wycech-Kiernik groups in the PSL and concluded that 
these were 'insignificant .•• on the critical issues they 
are entirely at one. They (Kiernik and Wycech - J.R.) have 
set their demand in the election at 40 %, which shows there 
is no possibility of negotiating with this group' 175 At 
the same time the Central committee seems to have given its 
approval , and assistance to an attempt by the 'left ' fac -
tion in the PPS to capture the leadership of the party and 
put an end to the 'centrists' overtures to the PSL. 176 
This episode was the subject of fierce debate at the 
time and agajn more recently amongst historians of the PPS 
in Poland. 177 According to the 'centrists' the Matuszewski 
group attempted a putsch which was intended to remove the 
leadership by force. The 'left'claimed that its activities 
aimed only at organising internal opposition to the ' cen-
trist' line of the party. Strains between the two factions 
had been apparent before the referendum and during July 
the 'centrists' did not prevent changes in the leadership 
of local party organisations which strengthened the ' right ' 
178 
at the expense of the 'left'. On 29 July, the same day 
that OSdbka launched his campaign, Stanis~aw Skowronski , 
the most outspoken 'leftist' in the leadership and secre-
tary of the Kielce organisation was expelled from the 
179 party over protests from the PPR. On 9 August the 
' left ' responded by circulating amongst the aktyw a 
175 Borkowski Pertrakcje ..• Ope cit., p. 437 . 
176 Bardach 0 dziejach ••• Ope cit., p. 696. 
177 See: Bardach 0 dziejach ..• OP e cit.; F . Baranowski W 
~wi~zku z artyku!em Juliusza Baracha ' 0 dziejach powo-
Jennej PPS' Kwartalnik Historyczny R. LXXX , z . 3 , 1973 , 
pp. 668-71; J. Bardach 0 wewn trzn m zroznicowaniu w PPS w 
latach 1944-1946 ibid.; Baranowsk1 Z dziej W ••• OP e 
cit .• A commentary by E. Os6bka-Morawski, Uwagi do 
artyku~u F. Baranowskieyo pt. '2 dziej6w nurtu lewico-
wego powojennej PPS' has been placed in the Party ' s 
Central Archive (CA KC PZPR sygn . 4063 ), but has not 
been published, see Z pola walki 1978 nr. 3 ( 83 ), p . 342 . 
178 For example, in the Rzesz6w provincial organi sation, 
see Olszewski Pocz~tki •.. Op e cit., p . 251. 
179 Robotnik 2.8.46; Bardach 0 dziejach ... OP e ci~, p . 696n . 
276 
petition, signed by 28 leading figures in the party which 
warned that as the result of ' an offensive by hostile WRN 
elements the danger had arisen of ' a distortion in the 
political-ideological face' of the PPS which cast it in the 
role of a 'champion of compromise with the PSL and Miko~a­
jczyk'. The petitioners denied t he need for ' serious and 
unjustified concessions' . to the PSL and declared their 
support for the communist conception of an offensive against 
the opposition. They also demanded the co -option of more 
'leftists' to their inner leadership of the party (i. e . 
S t · . . 1 . ) ISO h' . ecre ar~at and Po1~t~ca Comm~ttee • T e centr~sts ' 
were not deflected however. In the provincial Socialist 
press Drobner and Wachowicz published articles supporti ng 
the 1eadership181 which drew a polemical reply from 
GOmu~ka,182 while Cyrankiewic z made a d irect approach to 
Mikolajczyk , proposing talks. lS3 
At this stage, some of the 'leftists ', including 
Skowronski and perhaps Matus zewski , planned and possibly 
attempted the putsch. Hochf e ld, one of the l eadi ng ' cen-
trists ' gave his version of events to Denis Healey of the 
International Section o f the Labour Party i n a c o nversati o n 
a few weeks later, which Healey reported as follows : 
'the Communist Party told the PPS t hat Moscow 
had forb idden them to approach Miko~ajczyk 
again. The PBS refused to accept t he instruc-
tions , so one of its own national executive 
members, Matuszewski , the Minister of Inform-
ation, began to organise the control of the 
executive by crypto-communists , the expulsion 
of Cyrankiewicz and the others , a nd t h e f usion 
of the PPS with the Communist Party , all t his 
to take place at the next meeting of the 
executive,.l84 
180 Bardach 0 dz iej a ch ..• Op e ci t ., pp . 693 -9 4 . 
l SI B . Drobne r Nasze poli tyczne oblicze , Naproz6d 16 . S . 46 , 
H. Wachowicz List do przyjaciela z PPR , Kurier Popu-
larny 11,12,13. 8 . 46. 
lS2 G~os ludu lS.8. 46 . 
183 Borkowski Pertrakcje ••. OP e cit. , p . 237 . 
184 PRO F0371 56446 letter D. Healey to M. Phillips , 
12.9.19 46 . 
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OSObka-Morawski, speaking to the PPS Council on 25 August, 
made the same claim: 'We have proof that a putsch was 
attempted, the take-over by force of the editorial offices 
of "Robotnik" and the Central Executive Committee •.. ,1 85 
According to Hochfeld's version, the Socialists outflanked 
this coup by appealing direct to Moscow: 
Cyrankiewicz heard of the plot and deman-
ded to see Stalin. Stalin agreed, so Cyrankie-
wicz Szwalbe and Osobka-Morawski flew to Moscow 
to ask Stalin two questions: 
1) Does Stalin want a single-party state in 
Poland? If not, the PPS must be left indepen-
dent within the limits of Soviet Foreign 
Policy, and given greater representation in 
the Polish Government in proportion to its 
greater mass support than the CPo 
2) Does Stalin want civil war after fake elec-
tions, or will he agree to an attempt to per-
suade Miko~ajczyk to enter common lists with 
a fairer proportion than suggested before? 
Stalin gave way on both points. The PPS 
is to have a larger representation in the 
government after the elections, and r-1iko~a­
jczyk is to be approached again with a genuine 
offer of collaboration ,.186 
The circumstantial evidence supports this descripti o n 
of events. The PPS leaders seem to have made a trip to 
187 ~oscow on 18/19 - 21 August. It was Berman, the Polit-
buro member chiefly responsible for Kremlin-Party liaison, 
who according to os6bka ordered t h e 'leftists ' to call off 
th ' 1 d h . 188 . 1 elr pans to seize the lea ers lp. Certaln y , the PPS 
behaved after their supposed visit to Moscow with renewed 
185 Bardach 0 dziejach ••• op. cit., p . 696. According t o 
one source, the leftist plotters planned either to inti-
midate the Supreme Council of the PPS, using an armed 
gang from Skowrortski's organisation in Kielce , or to 
split the party and form a second organisation which 
would claim to ba the PPS, see J. Holzer ('W. Partski ') 
Agonia PPS, Socjalisci Polscy w sojuszu z PPR 1944-
1948 (Warsaw, 1981), p. 15. 
186 PRO F0371 56446 letter D. Healey to M. Phillips , 
12.9.1946. 
187 Ibid., 56446 NII074; L.M. Oak Free and Unfettered 
(Newtown , Montgomery , 1947), pp . 22-23 . 
188 Bardach 0 dziejach ... op . cit., p . 696 . 
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confidence. The same day Os6bka had a lengthy c onversation 
with the US ambassador189 and on 25 August he hald a ninety 
minute talk with Cavendish-Bentinck in which he 'made a 
strong plea that HMG should support the P(011sh) S (ocialist ) 
P(ary) on the ground that his party constituted a moderate 
element, and that if supported by HMG and (the ) us Govern -
ment (it) would have less reason to look to (the) Soviet 
Union'. Os6bka added that 'the elections would make no 
difference, and that it was necessary that Poland should 
be governed by a coalition of Communists, Socialists and a 
Peasant group, all of whom would have equal power but that 
the Socialist party, which would gain in strength, would 
together with the Peasant group, be able to control the 
C(ommunist) P(arty) '.190 On 23 August t h e PPS re-opened 
talks with the PSL, offering 25 % each for t h e PSL and the 
PPR, with 20 % of the seats in the bloc for themselves and 
30 % for the other three partie s . This formula came very 
191 
close to breaking c ommunist hegemony. ~ext , at a meet-
ing of the party Council on 25/26 August t he leadership 
moved against Matuszewski and his group which had been left 
at its mercy b y ~he turn of events. A purge of the 'left-
ists' was instituted, Matuszewski was suspended from the 
party and the leadership's efforts to achieve a bloc were 
- , 192 g1ven a vote of approval. 
The PSL followed the dispute between the workers ' 
parties closely and at its h eight on 18 August decided to 
hold a special congress on 15 September to decide election 
tactics, a move which may have e ncouraged t h e Socialists to 
1 89 Robotnik 22.8.46. 
190 ~ F0371 56446 N10853 . 
191 Borkowski Pertrak c je ••• op. cit ., p . 437 ; PRO F0371 
56446 Nll074. Under this formula the PPR with t he SL 
and SO would have had less than half the seats in the 
bloc: 45% (not 50 % as envisaged in the February offer ) 
and the PSL with the SP would h ave had more than o ne 
t hird (35% as agai nst 30% offered in February) , i.e . 
e nough seats to block constitutional changes . 
192 Syzdek op. cit., pp. 355 , 358 . 
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press on with their campaign. However, Mikorajczyk did 
not waver in his refusal to consider a bloc. He informed 
the PPS on 28 August that his party might agree to limited 
local pacts, but insisted on competitive elections in most 
193 
areas. Two days later he told his executive that since 
the Socialists' offer was confined to a general bloc, it 
was 'unacceptable' and that he was opposed to any further 
discussion of such a bloc, although some looser agreement 
giving a 'decisive majority' to the PSL, PPS a nd Popie l SP 
might be considered. 194 The same sitting decided that be-
cause of the postponement of the KRN due for 31 August at 
which the election ordinance and date were to have been 
195 
settled, the PSL special Congress would also be put off . 
The same evening Miko~ajczyk in what appeared to the Socia-
lists to be a calculated affront, left the country for 
three weeks (30 August to 19 September) to attend a con-
196 ference of theF.A.O in Copenhagen . From there he sent 
a secret emissary , 1'7i told Ku1erski ("Mr. Carter"), who 
told the British thnt 'there was as yet ... no strongly led 
movement among leading Socialists which could be relied 
on ,.197 
The final round of the campaign to draw the PSL or 
part of it into the bloc took place in early September . 
After fUrther consultations with the Russians, the PPS , 
this time jointly with the PPR, repeated the offer of 25 % 
of the seats in the next Sejm for the PSL and ' Nowe I'ly zwo-
lenie'. The PSL was given until 11 September to respond . 1 9 8 
Kiernik again indicated a readiness to compromise i f the 
193 Borkowski Pertrakc je ... Op e cit. , p . 437. 
194 Jutro Polski 15.1/..46. 
195 Gazeta Ludowa 1.9.46. 
196 Stenogram obrad Niezale:!nej l·l:t-odziezy Soc jalistycz nej 
w dniu 18 IX 1946 r ., Krytyka no. 4, 1980, p. 59. 
197 ~ F0371 56447 N12741 . 
198 Borkowski Pertrakcje ... Op e cit., p . 438 ; Steno gram 
obrad NM S .•• Op e cit ., p . 59. 
PSL were given 40 %,199 but Miko~ajczyk i g nored the offer 
t ' 1 200 en lre y. 
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The communists considered that with the passage of the 
11 September deadline, the time h ad c ome to begin the offe n-
S ' , h SL 201 H th' t ' ' 1 d lve agalnst t e P. owever, e cen r~st ea ers 
of the PPS, despite their growing conviction that a deal 
with the PSL was unattainable,202 managed to keep the offer 
of a compromise on the table a little longer . On 13 
September the workers' parties published a joint open let -
ter to the PSL which in the redraft demanded by the 
Socialists once again called on the Peasants to respond to 
th f ' bl 203 e proposals or a slx-party oc . 
The Socialists did not wait for the PSL ' s formal reply 
which was decided at the party's Supreme Council meeting o n 
6-7 October. On 26 September at a conference of the four 
bloc parties, Cyrankiewicz for the PPS agreed to abandon 
attempts to form a six-party bloc and accepted the exclu-
sion of the PSL from the system of inter-party consultative 
committees. 204 This amounted to the expulsion of the PSL 
from the national front and signified that the PSL would be 
prevented from exerting influence on the admin i stration of 
the elections. The Socialists ' change of course was 
announced in the pre s s the next day . 
External factors undoubtedly played a part in the 
~ecision of the PPS leadership . Stalin ' s personal views 
were no doubt an important influence. There is strong 
199 Borkowski Pertrakcje ••. op. cit., p. 437n . 
200 Stenogram obrad NMS ... op. cit., p . 59 . 
201 Ibid •• 
202 I bid.; Robotnik 8 . 9 . 46. 
,-
203 Cwik op . cit. , p. 171; Stenogram obrad m .... s ... op . cit. , 
p. 59 . 
204 Robotnik 27.9.46. The decision seems to have been 
taken sometime before 17 Se ptember , when Szwalbe told a 
meeting o f the provincial secretaries of the PPS t hat 
t he PSL would not enter the b l oc a nd that the PPS l ead-
ership had agreed ' to fight the PSL , but to fight in a 
~easonable way '. Stefaniuk F:Odzka orga ni zacj a PPS 1945- 1948 
(IpdzJ 1980) ,P. · 121. ' Hochfeld implied the same at the 
ZNMS meeti~g on 18 September, Stenogram ob r ad NMS ... op . 
cit ., p . 59. 
281 
evidence that a joint delegation of the PPR and PPS leaders 
visited Moscow on 28-30 August for talks with the Russians 
205 
on strategy. According to Miko~ajczyk 's account pub-
lished in 1948 it was at this meeting that Stalin dictated 
how the elections and the repression of the opposition were 
to be conducted. 206 It is indeed true that the talks 
came at a time when the Soviet government's policies at 
h d ' d' , 1 207 , , orne were har en~ng ~st~nct y. Howe ver , ~t ~s unlikely 
that Stalin ruled out further efforts to reach an agreeme n t 
with Miko~ajczyk. The immediate outcome of t h e visit was 
a renewed offer by the PPS and PPR of a dea l which the 
communists had hitherto opposed. At the time the PSL lead-
ership was far from discouraged by the visit. Kulerski , 
Mikoraj czyk's emissary, told the British that the Russian 
attitude had shown the same flexibility which the Social-
ists had found during their separate visit a few days 
before. 'In general', Kulerski reported, 'Stalin had con-
veyed the impression that he must have peace in Poland and 
t hat the present regime had no t conducted its affairs in a 
manner which ensured this. He had intimated t hat they must 
really try and do a deal with the PSL o n less unfair 
lines .•. ,.208 The talks, as a perceptive Socialist c ommen-
t t 1 b bl ' l ' 209 a or ater wrote, were pro a y ~nconc us~ve . 
Apart from direct Soviet a dvice o n the internal situ-
ation , it seems that the evolution of East-West relations 
with regard to Germany and the implicatio n s of this for t h e 
permanence of Poland's western frontiers had a major influ-
ence on the attitude of the PPS l eaders . As we have said , 
Ho lotov's pro-German speech in Ju ly doubtless contributed 
205 PRO F0371 56446 Nl1370; Miko~ajczyk The Pattern ..• o p . 
cit., pp. 190-91; "R" The Fate of Polish Soci alism 
Foreign Affairs Vo l. 28 nr. 1 , October 1949 , p . 131. 
206 M i ko~ajc zyk The Pattern •.. op . cit. , pp . 190-91. 
207 Z . Brze z inski The Soviet Bloc (Harvard , 4th ed ., 1971) , 
p. 44 . 
208 PRO F0371 56446 N1 233 6. 
209 "R" The Fate •.• op. cit. , p. 131. 
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to the determination of the PPS to achieve national unity 
at home. On 6 September the US Secretary of State , Byrnes, 
made his reply in a speech in Stuttgart which placed a 
question mark over American backing for the Oder-Neisse 
line. Despite Miko~ajczyk's public criticism of the 
h 210 h . d h . h speec, t e PPR se1ze t e opportun1ty to tar t e whole 
pro-Western orientation and the PSL in particular with 
accusations of unreliability on the issue of the frontiers. 
Byrnes' speech cast doubt on the value which the Socialists 
had placed on the continued participation of the PSL in 
the government coalition. It also underlined ·the need to 
secure Stalin's firm support for the Oder-Neisse frontier 
and to restore his confidence in the ability of the PPR-PPS 
alliance to stabilise the political situation in Poland. 
Stalin may have given the Socialists assurances on the 
frontier question during the talks held in August. 
Molotov 's statement of 17 September confirming the inte-
gr ' t f . d h S· . . 211 1 Y 0 Poland's front1ers rna e t e OV1et pos1t1on clear . 
The PPS leaders were also under various forms of pres-
sure from the communists. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, the PPR reviewed its line nowards the PPS at the 
Central Committee Plenum held on 18 September. The Plenum 
revived the prospect of a merger of the two workers' par-
ties , an issue which had largely been dropped since the 
period of the Lublin Committee . It also began a campaign 
to influence PPS policy ' from below' through jo int-meetings 
of local activists of the two parties. More personal forms 
of pressure may also have been brought to bear on the PPS 
leaders; Rusinek , for instance, was from May to September 
1946 under investigation by a special prosecutor after 
allegations had been made about his conduct in Stutthof 
. . 212 
concentration camp dur1ng the war . It is doubtful though 
210 Gazeta Ludowa 11.9.46. 
211 S . Trepczyrtski i N. N. Rodionow (eds.) Polska Ludowa _ 
Zwi zek Radziecki 1944-1974. Zbi6r dokument6w i 
__ ~~~~~w (Warsaw, 1974), p. 133. 
212 Robotnik 13.9.46. 
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if these factors played much part in the Socialists' accep-
tance of the four-party bloc. The pressures on the PPS 
had been much greater in July-August when the centrists 
had out-manoeuvred their left-wing critics and the PPR . 
Moreover, the party leadership's abandonment of the six-
party bloc was accompanied by re-emphasis of the special 
role for an independent PPS in Poland's f uture an4 the co n-
solidation of the 'centrists" control over the party 
organisation. 
However, the fundamental reason for the PPS leader-
ship's decision to abandon its fight for a six- party bloc 
was its acceptance that in view of the e ntrenched positio ns 
of both the PSL and the PPR this objective was simply un-
attainable . Consistent with the strategy they had pursued 
since 1944, the PPS 'centrists' believed that in these 
ci~cumstances they had no choice but to ally their party 
with the PPR in the coming confro ntatio n with t he opposition. 
Only in this way could they ensure that power would remain 
in the hands of the left without resort to direct Soviet 
intervention, and preserve the possibility that t he PPS 
would be able to broaden the ba se and moderate t he policies 
of the government f ormed after the electio n s . Hochfeld, 
the leading 'centrist' theore ticia n, explained t he 
leadership 's reasoning in a co nfidential speech delivered 
to a conference of the PPS youth organi sation in September . 
He frankly told the delegates that in the abse nc e of agree -
ment on the bloc, the alternative to fa b ricatio n of the 
elections would be national disas ter : 
' ... We will no t give up power ... we are a 
party which took power in exc ept i onal cir-
cumstances at a time when there was t he 
threat of a political void. To hand over 
power in such a moment •.• would lead to catas -
trophe, not to some different gover nme n t . 
If only it were a matter of handi ng power 
to Miko~ajczyk. But no, it would be hand -
ing power to anarchy . We would fi nd 
ourselves between the bands of t he NSZ a nd 
intervention by the Soviet Unio n ... Under 
no conditio n whatsoever can we a llow such 
a situation to arise . So it is a n open 
secret that i f it c omes to a n electoral 
showdown, those elections will be 
fabricated ••• '213 
\ 
He had no doubts that the communists possessed the mean s 
to manage the elections, nor any illusions about what 
this might mean for 'Poland's future development: 
' ..• the PPR has the sources of power in its 
hands - the army, the security forces, a 
large part of the state apparatus , industry 
They can do as they please. They do 
not want to use this power against society 
but they are able to do so . And then there 
would be nobody to help; Uncle Sam will not 
come to our aid; at the most he will sus-
pend a loan. But that will only damage 
Polish society, not help. Soviet mistrust 
would increase enormously and the possibility 
of rebuilding Poland with our own hands 
would sharply diminish. Our ideas of socia-
list humanitarianism and our hopes of 
rebuilding the Polish economy by raising 
the living standards of Polish citizens , 
and not at the human cost and personal sacri-
fice that was necessary in the Soviet Union , 
will be gravely at risk ... 214 
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Hochfeld saw little possibility of avoiding this o utcome , 
but nevertheless considered that the PPS s h ould persevere 
with its efforts to extend its influence and salvage what 
could be saved from the break-up of the coalition 
government : 
' Will the bloc come about? This is rather 
doubtful . The opposition is so great , that 
in view of the hostile attitude of t he PPR , 
our efforts to bring these two madmen to 
an agreement will be impossibl e . What 
should we do? r!aybe thr ow the towel in and 
tell the PPR to govern on its own. Or we 
could say something differe nt. We will not 
be the ones to fabricate the e lections , but 
we hope to enter the new situatio n as as 
strong a factor as possible , wit h the great-
est amount of power in our hands ... The PSL 
213 Stenogram obrad NHS ... op . cit., pp . 57 - 58 . 
214 Ibid ., p. 57 . 
has already lost its opportunity; it's 
finished. The PPS remains on the battle-
field .•.. It remains in order in a diffi-
cult situation to win that 5% chance of 
saving Poland's links with the West .•. We 
must do the dirty work in order that a 
cleansing of the atmosphere for clean work 
may follow from this 5 or 10% chance. This 
might or might not succeedi we do not know , but we must not give up'.2 5 
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As we shall see in the next chapter, the PPS leader-
ship attempted to put this strategy into action in the 
following months. But many party members rated its chance 
of success even lower than Hochfeld and sensed that Poland 
had reached a crossroads rather than a temporary detour . 
As one of the speakers who replied to Hochfeld ' s speech put 
it: 
'We will see that after the liquidation o f 
the PSL, the turn of the PPS will come. 
The conception of dependence on the Soviet 
Union is an opportunity for the PPR. There 
is no place for us within that conception ... 
Fabricated elections will weaken us, we are 
selling out. The conseque nce of fabricated 
elections is sovietisation of Poland' . 216 
The Church and the Catholic Camp (II) 
The development of a generally cool but correct rela-
tionship between Church and state authorities during 1945 
has been described above.* In spring 1946 as the commu-
nists commenced hostilities against the PSL in earnest and 
Miko~ajczyk took up the challenge, relations between the 
government and the Church began to s how some strain . This 
was to be seen in a gradual shift in the Church ' s positio n, 
from neutrality towards tacit support for the opposition, 
and increasing pressure from the communists in an ef fo rt t o 
stop this trend. 
* See Chapter 4, pages 207-15. 
215 Stenogram obrad NMS •.• OP e cit., pp. 59-60 . 
216 Ibid., p. 60. 
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The political tension in the country was discussed 
by the Bishops in conference at Jasna Go'ra on 22-24 Hay . 
In the communique issued afterwards, the Bishops roundly 
condemned the lawlessness and violence, the responsibility 
for which they placed implicitly, though unmistakably , o n 
the communists . 217 Shortly afterwards Borejsza se nt a 
representative to Hlond to warn him that the Party vi ewed 
the communique as a ' declaration of war' and that reprisals 
would be taken . But this threat seems to have been desig ned 
chiefly to lever Hlond into making a statement favourable 
to the government or at least publicly visiting Bierut as 
President before the referendum . Hlond refused to do 
either. 21B Instead, on the very eve of t h e referendum, a 
letter from the Pope containing a veiled attack o n c ommu-
nism was read out in the Polish churches. 219 
Once more the Krak6w Catholics showed a rather more 
conciliatory attitude than Hlond and t h e Church as a whole. 
Their reluctance to assume a posi tio n of fundame n tal oppo -
sition or negation towards the new political order was 
expressed in an article by Jerzy Turowicz publi s h ed in 
' Tygodnik Powszechny ' on April 7 . 220 Popiel a nd hi s fol -
lowers in the leaders hip of t he Party of Labour took much 
the same view . In February the SP executive had call ed 
for a comp romise between Mikolajczyk and t h e ' Democratic 
Bloc ' and in May at the congress of t h e Ki elce o rganisa-
tion of the SP he delivered a sharp attack on Miko~ajczyk 
for not facing up to p o litical realities a nd accepting the 
logical consequence of his return to Poland by joining the 
blo c. 221 Popiel seems indeed to have seen his role in the 
217 
o p . cit . , 
21B PRO F0371 56443 N9 1B5. 
219 Ibid . . 
220 Kozi k o p. ci t. , pp. 234-35 . 
221 Buj ak op . cit. , pp . 271 , 275. 
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party, and of the party in t h e country , as essentially that 
of a mediating force. 222 However the tough line of the 
Episcopate, the increasingly violent trend of c ommuni s t 
policy a nd the strong sympathy for the oppositio n amo ngst 
the SP grassroots made this line very d ifficult t o main-
tain. In March Popiel told the British he was o n th e verge 
of d issolving the party, lamenting that ' it was quite 
impossible to carryon. It really was a delusio n to think 
otherwise,.223 In May the leaders closest to the Church 
224 
raised o nce more the question of disbanding the party . 
Instead, according to Bujak under pressure from the 
E . 225 l ' p~scopate, the SP - or more accurate y th e P op~el fac-
tion - moved over to Miko~ajczyk ' s oppositionis t position . 
On May 21/22 the party executive adopted a formul a advis-
ing its supporters to vote the same way as the PSL in the 
coming referendum, while stating that a pro - government v o te 
(three times ' yes ') was also admissable . The ' Zryw- ites ' 
concurred for fear that otherwise the party would be d is-
solved . 226 This formula failed to prevent an ope n s p lit 
between left and righ t during the camp a i gn . While Popiel 
and his supporters campaigned f o r a ' no ' vote to questio n 
one, the communists, Socialists and ' Zryw ' factio n e ndea-
voured to swi ng the party back to i ts former neut ral i st 
line . At a meeting of the natio nal executive o n 25 June 
only Popiel 's casting-vote defeated a motion censuring th e 
activities of the ' right ', after Jdzef Gawrych , hitherto 
. 227 228 
a supporter of pop~el , h ad g o ne over to ' Zryw '. 
222 Bujak op . cit ., pp . 266 - 68 , 234-35 . 
223 ~ F0371 56436 N3492 . 
224 Bujak op . cit., p . 290. 
225 Ibid ., p . 277. 
226 Ibid ., p. 281. 
227 Gawrych was particularly vulne r able to communist pres-
sure . Before the war he had been active in the Sile-
sian Christian Democratic moveme nt a nd had run its 
a nti-communist intelligence section during t he 1921 up -
rising . In the 1930s as a member of the Silesian Sej m 
he had j o ined the right- wing Natio nal Party . ----
228 Bujak op . cit. , p. 283 . Felc zak was a b sent ill and 
d ied a few days later . His replaceme nt o n the execu-
~ive , another ' Zryw ' supporter , gave the group a ma jor -
~ty of one . 
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The 'Zryw' faction refused to accept this result and o n 
the eve of polling issued public calls for a pro -government 
vote. 
Complicating the dispute within the SP over re feren-
dum tactics was the forthcoming party congress, for 
although the ' Zryw ' faction had momentarily captured con-
trol of the national executive, no more than 5-10 % of 
congress delegates were on their side . 229 The expansion 
of the SP in early 1946 had been less selective than the 
' Zryw-ites ' had hoped and been based chiefly on the old 
Christian Democratic strongholds, Silesia and Krak6w, 
rather than the Christian labour tradition of western Po l a nd 
230 
where the 'left' was rather stronger. The communists 
tried to correct this trend by arresting activists from the 
, 231 
right ' of the party, but at one provincial conference 
after another the rank-and-file demonstrated their support 
for opposition to the government and weakened the ' Zryw ' 
group . 
The conflict came to a head immediately after the 
referendum. The communists as we h ave see n were reeling 
from the unexpected size of their defeat and their united 
front with the Socialists was strained to breaking-po int . 
Simultaneously they were faced with the prospect of a take -
over of the Party of Labour by the ' right ' at its Congress 
due to be held on 19-20 July . It is worth not ing that 
' Zryw ' was prepared to accept a compromise whic h would have 
given Popiel a clear majority on the executive while leav-
ing them with 40 % of the seats. They would not accept 
Popiel ' s offer of 25 % and demanded instead a postponement 
229 Bujak op. cit., p. 295 . 
230 Th e membership of the SP at its peak in mid-19 46 was 
probably about 100,000. In Silesia it has been vari-
ous ly estimated at between 16-60,000 members , see 
GO~~biowski pierwsze lata .•. op. cit. , p . 333; Bujak 
op. cit., p. 250; Potomski op . cit., p. 68 . In Krak6w 
it had some 9,000 members, see Kozik op . cit ., p . 230 
and in Poznan about 10,000, see Bujak op. cit ., p . 
238. It was also fairly strong in Lodz city , Cz~sto­
chowa and Bydgoszcz. 
231 See above, page 226. 
289 
of the Congress and purge of the membership.232 Szwalbe ' s 
attempt to mediate resulted i n a meeting of the two fac -
tions with himself and Zarnbrowski o n 13 July at which 
Szwalbe appealed to Popiel to accept the terms offered by 
' Zryw', promising at the same time a relaxation of the 
authorities ' measures against the SP . Zambrowski , speaking 
'brutally , but for the first time sincerely ', took a 
tougher line. According to Popiel, 
'he defe nded the methods used against the 
SP. They were in present Polish realities 
proper and necessary. After the experience 
with the PSL - Zambrowski said , we cannot 
allow the unhindered growth of a second 
political party, all the more dangerous 
than the PSL in that it rested on a unified 
ideological position. These words clearly 
showed and I understood them to mean that 
the other side had also had e nough of this 
bizarre "co-operation" .•. , 233 
No agreement was reached and the following day the take-
over of the party by the ' Zryw- ites ' took place , the Con-
gress was declared postponed a nd several of Popiel ' s s up-
porters , though not popiel himself , were suspended from 
the executive . After the protests of the ' righ t ' had been 
rejected by t he prime minister and the KRN , it announced on 
18 July that the party had suspended its activity . Within 
a month t he local organisation of the par ty had been largely 
disbanded , while the minority set about salvaging what they 
could. 
Mikotajczyk cl aimed that the elimination of the SP was 
a rehearsal by t he communists for their coming attack on 
the PSL . 23 4 This is unlikely . The communists had a clear 
interest in maintaining the existence of a broad ly neutral 
Catholic party in which sympathetic elements had a strong 
influence . The dissolution of the SP followed its marked 
232 CAHSD/KW SP Memoria~ i uchwa~ KW SP 1946 -4 7 , letter 
from KW ZG SP to Prezydium KRN , 15 . 7 . 46 . 
233 Popiel op . cit ., pp . 202 - 3. 
234 PRO F03 71 56440 NI0034 . 
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shift towards the opposition and many weeks of pre s sure t o 
force it to resume its initial unaligned stance . Th e c om-
munists were even ready to concede Popiel a majority o n th e 
executive to achieve this. As it was the bridge which 
the government bloc had established with the Catholic camp 
was now closed. In September the Bishops bluntly re jec ted 
the claims of the - ' Zryw-ite' SP to represent Catholic 
. . 235 ., d . Op1n1on and although 1t surV1ve as a separate o r ga n1 sa -
tion until 1950 it remained isolated and fissile wi t h 
nothing like the popular base of the party in 1945/46 . 23 6 
The Socialists certainly felt a mistake had be en made and 
in September 1946 and again in spring 1947 encourage d 
P . l' f h' . f 23 7 op1e s attempts to orm a new C r1st1an P a rty 0 La bo u r . 
The root cause of the decision of the SP ' right ' s eems t o 
have been their clear preference by mid-1946 fo r withdraw-
ing from politics rather than compromising o n th e opposi -
tionist character of their party. 
This seems to have suited the Church which a s po l a r i -
sation took place in the country , f o und it increasingly 
embarrassing to be identified with a p a rticular party s o 
closely . If the SP resumed a midd l e posi t i o n t he Chu r ch 
would be seen as distancing its e lf f r o m th e oppos itio n. 
If , on the other hand, the SP alli ed i tse l f with t h e PSL, 
the Church would be drawn into open co nf r o n ta tio n with t he 
communists. 238 In fact, the rift be t wee n t he Churc h a nd 
the government grew wider in any cas e a s t h e e l e ctio ns 
approached. Church statements c r iticised t he gover nmen t 
235 Komunikat z p1enarnej konferencji Episkopatu Po lski, 
8-10 .9. 46, Listy pasterskie episko pa tu ... op . cit., pp . 
45-46 . This was confirmed in th e ·Epi s c o pat e ' s s t ateme n t 
of 22 .10. 46 , see popiel op. cit ., p. 284 . 
236 The membership of the SP decline d f r om abo ut 27,000 a t 
the end of 1947 to l e ss than 18,000 in 19 50 whe n t he 
p arty was dissolved . Widy-Wi r ski ha d joine d the commu-
nists in 1949; Stefan Brzezinski a nd othe r s c o n t inued 
activity in the SD. 
237 Popiel op. cit. , pp . 230-31, 272, 281. 
238 Bujak op. cit ., p. 290. 
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and gave tacit support to the PSL. At the third p ostwar 
conference of the Epis copate at Jasna Gdra on 8-10 
September, the bishops repudiated the pro - government rump 
of the SP and issued a proclamation on the elections which 
reasserted the right of the Episcopate to involve itself ln 
public affairs, forbade Catholics to join parties whose 
principles or activities were in conflict with Christian 
teaching , and told the faithful not to vote for ' those 
lists whose programmes or methods of government are inimi-
cal to common sense, the well-being of the Nation and the 
state , Christian morality or the Christian view of the 
Id ' 239 ., h d 1 . wor . The left-wlng partles saw t e ec aratlon as a 
240 victory for Hlond's tough policy towards the government . 
This did not deflect the communists from their cautious 
line towards the Church. Despite personal attacks on 
241 Hlond , the Party carefully avoided being drawn into ope n 
conflict with the Church and continued to cultivate its 
, remaining links with Catholic circles throughout the e lec-
tion period, to little effect , as we shall see . 
239 Or~dzie Episkopatu Polski w sprawie wyborow do Sejmu , 
10 .9. 46 , Listy pasterskie episkopatu ..• Op e cit ., pp . 
40-44 . 
240 Robotnik 15.9. 46 . 
241 Robotnik 7 . 7 . 46 , 14.7.46. 
CHAPTER SIX 
'A MIGHTY LIGHTNING OFFENSIVE' (September 1946 - Spring 
1947) 
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Mobi lising the Party-State Apparatus 
Despite the Socialists' last-ditch efforts to keep ope n 
the possibility of a deal with Hiko~ajczyk , in September 
the communists pressed ahead with preparations for th e 
'mighty, lightning offensive' which Gomulka had called for 
two months before. Demonstrations held o n 8 September to 
protest against Byrnes' Stuttgart speech served as a symbo -
lic opening shot, and in Warsaw ended with a mob sacking 
the offices of 'Gazeta Ludowa', the PSL ' s daily newspaper . l 
On 18 September the Central Committee of the PPR met 
in plenary se~sion for the last time before the elections 
to consider the general political situation . Only fragm e n-
tary extracts from the speechs made at the Plenum have been 
published. However, it is clear from these a nd t h e resolu-
tion which was carried that the discussion centred on two 
main issues: relations with the PPS , which we will look at 
in the next section , and the campaign to crush the PSL a nd 
the underground in the run-up to the elections. 
The Central Committee presented the divide between the 
Democratic Bloc and the PSL in stark terms : 
1 
2 
' ••• the elections must settle t he great his-
torical confrontation between progress a nd 
backwardness; between democracy a nd fascism ; 
between the road leading to a great and pros-
perous Poland with its fronti ers resting o n 
the Oder Ne isse and the Baltic , and the road 
of political recklessness and national catas -
trophe; between the sacred rights of working 
men , the peasant and the white - col l ar worker , 
and the base interests of parasites , profiteers 
speculators, 2x-landowne rs a nd dispossessed 
mo nopolists'. 
Gazeta Ludowa 10.9.46. 
U chwa~a plenum KC PPR '0 naj wainiejszych momentach syt -
~acji polityczne j Polski', 1 8 . 9 . 46 , PPR ... i 1946 -
~ 1947 op . cit., p. 147. 
The resolution reaffirmed the Party's commitment t o a 
limited form of pluralism, offering : 
complete freedom for the opposition 
parties if in defending their principl e s 
and distinctive programmes they separate 
themselves from and combat actively all 
forms of fascist ideology and methods, as 
well as Jvery kind of illegal struggle o r 
terror' • 
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There would be no place for the PSL which t he Ple num 
claimed had 'placed itself outside the d emocratic c amp' a nd 
was 'tightening its alliance with the fa s cist underground 
and the fascist emigration'. In a clear r e f e r e nce t o th e 
coming offensive, the Central Committee warned that : 
' ••• Polish democracy has proved that it ha s 
sufficient strength to thwart t he r e ac t i o n' s 
every move . PSL calculations o n o b t aining 
dominance in Poland b y ally ing t hems e lve s 
with the underground and g et ting he lp fro m 
their foreign protecto rs will meet with th e 
determined resistance of t he mas ses a nd wi l l 
be completely crushed'. 4 
The election campaign would require ' t h e mobilisat i o n of 
all the constructive forces in t h e nation ' to ' c rush a nd 
shatter the centres of the reac t i o n in Pol and ,. 5 
In the view of the Party lea de r s hip t here was a clear 
cleavage between the ' democratic camp' o n t h e one side , 
and the 'reactionary camp', inc l uding the PSL , o n t he 
other. Great stress was p 1aced on the linkage betwee n t he 
PSL and the underground and the a ssoci a tio n of t h e PSL wi t h 
espionage and subversion . One of th e ma in tas ks of t he 
aktyw in the period leading up t o t h e e l e c t i o ns would b e 
' .•. to reveal the true face o f t he PSL: in reality t he 
3 
4 
5 
UChwa!a plenum KC PPR '0 na jwaz ni e js zych mo me n tach syt -
~acji polityczne j Polski ', 18 . 9. 46, PPR .•. i 19 46 -
1 1947 op. cit., p . 146. 
Ibid ., p. 145. 
Ibid ., p. 148. 
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ally of Anders and the bands of the fascist undergro und .. , 6 
PSL branches were described as often being no more than a 
I 
legal cover for the activity of the wiN a nd NSZ. 7 The 
Plenum discussed ways of giving publicity to the alleged 
connections between the PSL and the illegal opposition , 
including the use of political trials, and the identif ica-
tion of the two was a constant theme of trials in the foI-
l . 8 ow~ng months. Much less emphasis than in the past was 
placed on the presence of 'democratic ' elemen ts in the PSL 
which might be won over. 9 The leadership' s cl ear message 
to the Party rank-and-file was to deal with t h e PSL in the 
same indiscriminate and repressive way as it was dealing 
with the armed unde rground . In effect , the Party was ack -
nowledging that it had been unabl e to isolate the ' reaction ' 
and that its offensive would embrace not only t h e die - hard 
anti-communist right, but wide sections of c entre and left-
of-centre opinion grouped within and around the PSL . 
In this situation, the crucial strategic question was , 
as we have seen, whether the internal resources at the dis -
posal of the PPR would be adequate to the task of neutral-
ising the opposition and managing the elections without 
provoking serious international repercussions or a poli -
tical destabilisatio n at home in which the Russia n s might 
de cide that they had to intervene directly . As Bierut put 
it: 
6 
7 
8 
9 
' We are living through critical times whe n 
old political structure s die away and new 
ones come into being ••• t h e task of politicians 
UChwa!a plenum KC PPR ' a najwazniejs zych momentach s y t -
~acji polityc z ne j Polski ', 18 . 9 . 46 , PPR ... i 1946 -
~ 1947 OP e cit., p. 148 . 
Ibid ., p. 14 5 . 
Re chowicz Pierwsze wybory .•• p . 56 ; cf . Gazeta Ludowa 
17 , 18 .10. 46 . 
For instance, the September Plenum political resolution 
made no me ntion of winning over ' democratic ' elements 
from the PSL . 
and leaders is to steer the state in a way 
which will spare the nation from unnecessary 
loss and reduce the unavoidable conflict t o 
a minimum.' 10 
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In late 1946 it was still an open question whe the r th e c om-
munists would be able to achieve this. The fact that they 
did was due principally to the successful mobilisatio n o f 
the Party organisation and the organs of the state unde r 
communist control, particularly the central and local 
bureaucracy, the army, the Militia and the security for c es . 
The PPR expanded rapidly in the latter part of 1946 
and early 1947, and at the same time there was a mass a ct-
ivisation of its members to carry out tasks asso ciated 
with the election campaign. Membership grew f r om 347,000 
in June, to 420,000 in September, to 556,000 in Dece mb e r 
1946 and by June 1947 had reached 849,000. 11 As befo r e , 
organisations in the western and northern t e r r ito ri e s inc-
reased in size faster than those in central and eas t e rn 
Poland and the proportion of urban worker s incre a sed as t he 
Party continued to shed its predominantl y peasant cha r a cter 
of 1944_45. 12 
Motives for joining the PPR were various. It is 
important not to discount the genuine appea l of t h e Party ' s 
programme in radical and left-wing quarte r s . Th e Barty 
displayed a vitality and offered a visio n in t he 1940 s 
which was eroded in later years. Others we r e d rawn t o the 
PPR because it seemed the most e ff e ctive r o ute t o parti ci-
pation in the political, cultural and eco nomic r ege ne r a ti o n 
of Poland. 13 For many others Party membe r s hip p rovided a n 
10 Jutro Polski 29 .9. 46. 
11 PPR •.• i 1946 - i 1947 op . cit., p . 212 , PP R ... i 19 47 -
xii 1948 op . cit., p. 287. The Se ptember 1946 f i g ure 
is given in Go~~biowski i Go ra op. ci t ., p. 36 . 
12 The percentage of peasants in the membe rship of the PPR 
declined from 28 .1% at the beginning to 23.2 % at the e nd 
of 1946; in the same period workers incre a sed f r om 61.0 % 
to 64.7 %, PPR ... i 1946 - i 1947 op . ci t ., p . 21 3. 
13 On this point, see L. Ko:l:a kowski The Inte l l i gent s ia i n 
Po land: Genesis of a Revolution, e d . A. Brombe r g (New 
York , 1983), p. 58 . 
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opportunity for social advancement. But these were con-
stant factors that can have played little par t in the sud -
den expansion of the Party in the election per iod . Nor is 
there any convincing evidence of any spontaneous movement 
of opinion which could explain the growth. In fact, mos t 
new members appear to have joined the PPR not through spon-
taneous choice, but because material press ures or i nce ntives 
of one kind or another were brought to bear. In the 
countryside, for example, Party membership was not corre-
lated with differences in size of land owner s hip, but was 
heavily concentrated amongst peasants and former agricul -
tUral labourers who had benefited from the l and reform. 14 
In the towns strong pressure seems to have been placed o n 
white-collar and manual workers to join the PPR . The per-
sonnel supervisors who were attached to most off ices and 
factories to ensure that the more important p osts were 
occupied by government supporters appear to have stepped up 
their activity before the electio ns. 15 The British Consul 
in Lodz reported that workers in government - r un under-
takings had been issued with d is c h arge notices , with t he 
offe r of re-employme nt o n c ond i tion that t h ey jo ined the 
PPR.
16 
The rationing system and housing allocations pro -
v ided other means to persuade peop le to j o in t h e Party . 
These methods of recruitment were effective , particu-
larly in the towns, and especially amongs t office- workers , 
managers, government employees a nd t h e like, as a mea ns of 
extending the influence of the Party a nd in weakening the 
sense of solidarity which was essential to sustain the 
OPPosition. However the level of c ommitment and political 
education of the recruits was often very low . In 1946 
syste~atic politic~l training of PPR members had hardly 
begun. 17 The situatio n was particularly bad in the 
14 Ryszka .~ 262 op. C~I-" p. . 
15 PRO F0371 56452 H15949. 
16 Ibid., 56449 N14649. 
17 The Training Department of the Centra l Committee of the 
PPR was not es tablished until ~1arc h 1947, Kusmierski 
Propaganda polityc zna PPR w latach 1944 - 1948 (War saw , 
1976), p. 96. See also wytyczne Sekretariatu KC PPR w 
contd ..• 
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countryside, where the Party remained very weak . Rural 
cells tended to be little interested in affairs o u tside 
their locality and not infrequently members were said to 
18 be under the influence of the Church. The expansion of 
the Party was primarily a consequence of its tigh te ning 
grip on the state and economic apparatus: it did not re-
present a real broadening of the popular base of the PPR 
which remained narrower than that of any other communist 
19 party in eastern Europe. 
The election involved an unprecedented mobilisation of 
these members at all levels. A special network of tr6jki 
(triumvirates) was established within the party at provin-
cial, district and local level to organise the campaig n, 
and all members were required to follow their instructions 
in the period until the elections. As a rule, one member 
of the tr6jka was simultaneously the chairman or deputy -
chairman of the electoral commissio n responsibl e for 
administering the elections and counting the votes in each 
area . Another was in charge of the citi zens ' electoral 
committee~ which were established throughout t he country, 
typically to serve a village, a blo ck of f l ats or a 
contd •.. 
sprawie szko lenia kadr i politycznego wychowania 
cz~onk6w partii, February 19 47 , PPR .•. i 1947 - xii 
1948 OPe cit.,pp. 33-37. 
18 J. Szczeblewski Problemy rozwoju organizacyjnego PZPR w 
okresie scalenia organizacji partyjnych po zjed noczeniu 
PPR i PPS (xii 1948 - xi 1949), Z pola walki 1967 nr . 1 
(37), pp. 32-33; Uchwa~a Sekretariatu KC PPR o ce ni ajQca 
przebieg obchod6w Swi~ta Ludowego , May 1948 , PPR ... i 
1947 - xii 1948 Ope cit., p. 236. 
19 The numerical strength of communist parties in various 
east European states in relation to total population in 
1946 was as follows: 
Poland Czecho . Bulgaria Hungary Germany (Sovie t) 
Population 23.9ilin 12.0Bm 6.97m 9.2Om 20 . 5lm 
CP membership O.42m l.08m O.5Om 
(Sep 46) (Mar 46) (Mar 46) 
(1948) 
O. 65m 
(Sep 46) 
1. 3ilin 
(Apr 46) 
Brzez inski OPe cit., p. 86; N. Kolomejcz yk Rewo1ucje 
1udowe w Europie 1939-1948 (War saw , 1973), p. 352 . 
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factory or office. 20 Although the Party was una bl e to 
establish a full network of tr6jki 2l and o fte n h ad to rely 
on cadres from outside to man them (in Krak6w province , 
1,000 activists were brought in from Silesia to rein force 
d · . 22 ~str~ct committees), the apparatus seems to have b ee n 
generally effective in securing the Party ' s control over 
the electoral machinery and ensuring a high level of par -
ticipation by PPR members in the campaig n. The most re li-
able cadres were appointed to the electoral commissio ns , 
of which there were some 5,000 in the country as a whole . 
These were manned largely, or in some are as , exclusive l y , 
by the PPR. Although there were only abo ut a third as 
many commissions as there had been in the referendum , the 
numbers of cadres required to staff them was still c o nsider -
able, over 1,500 in Lublin province and mo r e t han 2, 0 00 in 
23 
Krak6w province, for example. The role of PPR members 
in the citizens' committees was impor tant also . The pur-
pose of the committees was to mobilise the other Bloc 
parties and non-party sympathisers, to organise canvassing 
and , above all, to make arrangements for ope n, collective 
voting. 24 Some 5,000 PPR members in Krak6w province , 
11,000 in Warsaw city and 19,000 in Upper Silesia sat on 
the committees. 25 In all, about 200,000 Party members too k 
20 Instrukcja KC PPR w sprawie pracy partyjnej tr6jki wyb -
orczej w obwodzie g~osowania, November 1946 , PPR ... i 
1946 - i 1947 op . cit., pp. 167-70. 
21 In 376 out of 527 polling districts in Krakbw province , 
183 out of 267 in Bia~ystok province, 345 o ut of 470 in 
Lublin province, 351 out of 386 in Rzesz6w province ; 
6wik op. cit., p. 190, Majecki op . cit., p. 165 , Olszew-
ski PPR ••• op . cit., pp. 306, 308 , Olszewski Pocz~tki •.• 
op . cit., p. 271. 
22 CWik op . cit., p. 198. 
23 Ibid ., p. 198; Olszewski PPR ... op . cit ., p . 306. 
24 Instrukcja KC PPR dotyczqca dzia~alno sci agitacyjnej w 
o~wodzi e wyborc zym, 1.12.46, P~R ... i 1946 - i 1~47 op . 
c~t., p. 173; Uchwa~a Sekretar~atu KC PPR 0 ko n~ecz nosci 
rOzbudowy form organizacyjnych w mie jskich i wiejskich 
o~~anizacjach partyjnych , January 194 7, PPR .•. i 1947 -
x~~ 1948 0E . cit., p. 22. 
25 Cwik op. cit., p . 192; Hill e brandt i Jakubowski op . cit ., 
p. 380; Rechowicz Pierwsze ••• o p. cit ., p . 93 . 
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part in door-to- door canvassing. J.6 
The Party also paid special attention to expanding 
ORMO in the immediate pre- electio n period. A Central 
Committee c ircular iss ued in October instructed Party com-
mittees t o assign quotas of members to ORMO in order to 
increase its overall strength from 70 , 000 to 150 , 000 by 1 
December . The PPS and SL were also to be asked to provide 
recruits . Un its were to be formed in each town , rural 
27 
commune and place of work . Although the target strength 
does not appear to have been reached , 106 , 000 ORMO reser-
28 
vists were deployed on election day . In other words , 
some 6 0,000 Party members were placed und e r arms for the 
. 29 
campal.gn . 
The Party apparatus in the state bureaucracy was also 
mObilised to ensure that the organs of central and local 
government were pitched against t he opposition. Thu s , 
publicity on behalf of the Bloc parties was co-ordinated 
and distributed by the Ministry of Information and Propa-
ganda . 30 More fundamentall y , the communists , with t he 
support of the other Bloc parties , made maximum us e of 
their majorities on the KRN and in t he provincial national 
councils to make certain that the administration of the 
elections would be firmly under their control . The 
electoral law was carried by the KRN on 22 September by a 
majority of 306 to 42 . Apart from providing for a d i stri -
bution of seats which discriminated in favo ur of the Bloc 
by overrepresenting the western a nd northe~territories and 
industrial c entres where the PSL was l ess well organised, 
the law allowed wide scope for ma nipula t i on a nd malprac-
tice . The main criticisms made by t he PSL were as follows . 
26 Kusmierski.op. c it. , p. 24? 
27 Okolnik KC PPR w sprawie d z ia~al nosc i ORMO, October 
~, PPR .•• i 1946 - i 1947 OP e cit. , pp . 149- 5l. 
28 Plikas Op e cit ., p. 255 . 
29 At the beginning of 1947 , 56 % of ORMO were members of 
the PPR , Syzdek Op e ci t ., p . 371 . 
30 Kusmierski Op e cit ., p . 249 . 
Fi rst and foremost , the administratio n of the elections 
was entrusted to the electoral commissions whose members 
were to be appointed by the provincial national c o unc ils 
(and not , as in the referendUM , the district natio nal 
300 
31 councils on wh ich the PSL was often strongly represented) • 
As a consequence , t h e PSL was almost entirely exc l uded from 
" fl " 32 ~n uence on the conduct of the elect~ons . Moreover , the 
law did not define the rights of tellers . In practice , 
commissions insisted that PSL tellers obtained certificates 
of good character from the UB before they were admitted to 
the count , with the result that in contrast to the refer-
endum , only a handful of PSL and independent wit nesses suc-
ce d d " "33 h d d b f II " e e ~n attend~ng . T e re uce num er 0 po ~ng 
districts facilitated central c ontrol over the count and in 
rural areas often meant that p easan ts had to travel long 
di stances in order to cast their votes . The commissions 
were empowered to strike from the register p eople alleged 
to have collaborated with the German s duri n g the war or to 
be involved with the underground. Large numbers of PSL 
34 
sympathisers seem to have been struck off o n these grounds . 
These measures and the inval ida tion of lists of PSL candi-
date s in 10 constitue nces (i . e . o ne fifth of the total) , 
all areas where the peasant movemen t was particularly 
a ctive , and the widespread application of ope n, collective 
vot ing on January 19 , ruled out any real possibility of the 
PSL winning a substa nti al number of seats and e nsured t hat 
t he c ommunists wo uld have free rei n to produce a favourable 
result . 
However, the purpose of the election offensive was 
not o nly to frustrate the electoral challenge of the PSL , 
b ut also to undermine the Peasan ts as an effective politi-
cal force." The administrative apparatus played an 
31 S. Woj cik PSL w walce .. • op. ci t . , pp . 22 , 29 . 
32 Ibid . , p . 33. 
33 Ibid . , pp . 29 , 34 . 
34 Ibid . , p . 33 . 
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important part in this process. From September onwards 
there was a marked increase in the use against the oppo-
sition of what Party historians term ' administrative meth-
Ods,.35 These included the arrest or repeated detention 
of PSL activists. According to W6jcik from mid-November 
PSL sympathisers were summoned to UB and MO offices on a 
mass scale for so-called 'interviews '. Over 100,000 
people were estimated to have received such summonses. 36 
The wave of arrests which took place from Septe mber on-
wards , extended, for the first time since early 1945, to t he 
top leadership of the party. The first major figures to be 
arrested were StanisJ::aw Hierzwa, vice-president of the 
Krakbw provincial committee, and Karol Buczek, editor of 
'Piast' and president of Krak6w city PSL, on 23 September.37 
By 1 December, according to Miko~ajczyk, 22 members of the 
Supreme Council of the PSL, 7 members of provincial exec-
utives, 147 members of district executives and 670 members 
of commune executives had been taken into custody , along 
. h 38 Wlt many thousands of ordinary party members . The PSL 
press was hit particularly hard. The police operation 
against the PSL press began in autumn 1946. 39 On 25 
September the UB raided the press department at PSL HQ, 
sealing off its offices and confiscating various documents. 
This action was aimed against the PSL ' s uncensored inter-
nal news sheet. 40 In the following weeks a series of 
arrests among PSL journalists and a clamp-down by the 
35 Cf. B. Pasierb Ruch ludowy na Dolnym Sl~sku w latach 
1945-49 (place of publication not given , 1972) p . lSO , Olszewski 
Pocz?tki •.• OPe cit., p. 287; Naumiuk Pocz~tki •.. OP e 
cit., p. 259; Wapinski OPe cit., p. 161; Dobieszewski 
i Hemmerling Ope cit., p. 147. 
36 Wojcik PSL w wa1ce OPe cit., p. 30 . 
37 K. Baginski Cenzura w Polsce, Zeszyty Historyczne 8 
(1965), p. 146. 
38 MikoJ::ajczyk The Pattern •.. OPe cit., p. 199. 
39 Bagirtski Cenzura .•• OP e cit., p . 146. 
40 Ibid. , pp . 146-47. 
41 
c ensor crippled the PSL press . 
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I n addition , bureaucratic means were used to a pply 
p ressure o n voters t o support the Bloc, while a purge of 
the loc al administration weakened PSL influence and ensured 
that local government staff worked actively on behalf of 
the Bloc . In Kielce prov ince , for example: 
' • • • a series of changes were made at prefec-
torial and vice-prefectorial level . Prefects 
were replaced in Stopnica , W~osz czowa , Kielce 
and Sandomierz districts; a whole range of 
vice- prefec ts were also replaced. A sch ool 
was organised at provincial level to t r ai n 
commune secretaries , with the students drawn 
from people holding sincerely democratic 
views and above all from the PPR . They were 
used to strengthen local government, replac-
ing many of the existing PSL officials who 
had until then acted as chairmen of t he 
national councils in many communes . These 
changes , made on the eve of the elections , 
had a positive influence on t h e attitude to 
the Democratic Bloc of t he lower levels of 
the administration . To a large degree , 
they accounted for t he a ctive involvement 
of the majority of state a nd local government 
staff in work related to the elections . 42 
The communists also tried to reduce or isolate the PSL 
groups on the national councils,43 and in at least one 
district where this proved impossible t he e n tire national 
council was dissolved . 44 In many areas t he local and sec-
urity authorities simply p reven ted t h e PSL from operating 
in the open as a political party. Internal party meetings 
were frequently prohibited (PSL public meetings had been 
banned since spring 1946 ). District execu ti v es were sus -
pended or dissolved in more than a dozen areas after 
September , most of them in t h e weeks immediately before the 
41 Baginski Cenzura • •• op. ci t . , pp . 147-48. 
42 Naumiuk Poc z~tki • .. op. cit . , p. 257. 
43 Wojnowski op . cit ., p. 161 . 
44 Kozik op . cit ., p . 217 . 
1 t · 45 e ec l.on. 
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A crucial part in the offensive was played by the 
army and security forces, especially in the r u ral areas 
where the Party was weak and the influence of the PSL a nd 
the underground most marked. Security operations agai nst 
the underground were stepped up during t he electio n period 
and at the turn of 1946/47 the regular army was u sed as th e 
basis for defence-propaganda groups (gn.!p'y ochronno-p ropa-
gandowe - GOP) which were sent into the countrys i de , oste n-
sibly to campaign on behalf of the Bloc a nd to prevent t he 
armed underground from disrupting the elections. 2,300 GOP 
were deployed between 5-21 December and 2,600 between 28 
December and 20 January. In all, 62,438 regular Polish 
Army troops took part, supported by activists of the Bloc 
parties, 9,800 KBW troops, 4,600 UB offi cers , 16,700 
Militia and 16,200 ORMO reservists. 46 
In reality the role of the GOP was far fr om purely 
defensive. They carried out some 850 operations against 
the underground, during which 341 alleged members of the 
47 underground were killed and over 5 ,000 arrested . Their 
activities were also directed against the PSL . The GOP 
48 wer e instructed to oppose actively PSL propaganda . Th e 
example of Rzeszow province shows what t his mea n t in prac-
tice. There the GOP dissolved 75 PSL circles a nd obtained 
the resignation from the PSL o f 2 , 555 members . 129 SL , 6 
PPR and 3 ZWM circles were established. In additio n, 27 
c ommune and 61 village administrators, as well as 9 other 
officials were replaced. 49 
45 The PSL was banned in 29 districts by the time of the 
election, Korbortski Polskie •.. op . cit., p. 245 . 
46 Plikas op. cit., pp. 253-55 gives slightly d i ffere n t 
figures for the numbers of KBW troops invo lved from L . 
Grot Dzia~alnos~ ochronno- ro a andowa wo ' ska olski e 0 
w czasie referendum (30.6.19 46r ) i wybor w do Sejmu RP 
(19.1.1947r), Wojskowy Pr zegl?d Historyczny 1 974 nr . 2 
p. 199, quoted here. 
47 Ibid ., p. 200. 
48 Ibid., p. 193. 
49 Olszewski Poczgtki .•. op. cit., p . 280 . 
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The employment of the regular army on such a scale 
against the opposition was of considerable political sig-
nificance. It demonstrated that the Party's control ove r 
a large section of the army (the troops seconded to the GOP 
50 represented about 40 % of the army's total strength) was 
much more secure than Nikol'ajczyk had thought. The army 
occupied a special place in the hearts of many Poles and 
its wide involvement in the campaign on behalf of the Bloc 
was of major psychological importance. But above all , t h e 
army provided the communists with the resour c es to make up 
for the deficiencies in the Party's organisation and popu-
lar base in the countryside. On their own, the UB and KBW 
were not strong enough to do this, whil e as we h ave seen, 
the political reliability of the Militia was ofte n uncer-
tain. The successful use of the army and t he extens i ve 
paramilitarisation of Party members in ORMO enabled the com-
munists to neutralise the opposition without resorti ng to 
extensive direct assistance from the Soviet forces . The 
Russians were able to keep a low profile througho ut the 
elections. There was no recurrence of the situation of 
1944-45 when Red Army and NKVD units were used against the 
underground on a wide scale. Asked by t h e British ambassa-
dor what part the Russians were pl ayi ng in t he election s , 
Miko~ajczyk spoke only of their role beh i nd the s c enes , in 
the security apparatus, where he b e lieved that the number 
of Soviet 'advisers' had increased a.nct that;· they were directing the 
Campaign against his party, and in the top echel o n s of t he 
Party, which in the shape ~f Berman was, he claimed, i n 
daily contact with the Soviet ambassador. 51 In his account 
of the elections published in 1948 he referred to Russians 
in the security apparatus and the officer corps of the 
Polish armed forces, but also described t h e effective and 
disciplined way the Polish army was used against the PSL . 52 
50 The strength of the Polish army was 165,000 in April 
19~7, speech by K. D~browski Sprawozdanie stenograficzne 
SeJmu Ustawodawczego, Vol. I, 15.4.1947. 
51 ~ F0371 56452 N16280. 
52 Miko~ajczyk The Pattern ••• OP e cit., pp . 201-24. 
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While it is impossible on the present base of evidence to 
identify clearly the extent of Soviet activity in Poland 
at the turn of 1946/47, it is apparent that this activity 
was well-concealed. What was evident was the onslaught by 
the Party and its Polish resources against the opposition . 
The Democratic Bloc 
Alongside the Party-state apparatus, the chief prop 
of the communists was the national front , now reduced to 
the alliance of the four 'Lublin' parties: the PPR, PPS, 
SL and SO. The September Plenum reaffirmed that the Party 
looked to this alliance as the popular base on which to 
achieve the programme defined in the 1944 PKWN Hanifesto 
and as a major weapon in the coming offensive against the 
oPposition . The resolution declared that : 
the central Committee will endeavour 
as before to strengthen the close and 
friendly co-operation of the 4 parties of 
the PKWN which have formed a powerful centre 
for the consolidation of all the democratic 
forces of the nation. That co-operation 
is and will be the guarantee of the full 
realisation of the principles of the July 
Manifesto, the guarantee of a lasting worker-
peasant alliance ••• the Electoral Bloc of 
the 4 Parties will play a decisive role in the 
struggle to smash the reaction and in the 
political stabilisation of the country ' .53 
The cornerstone of the Bloc was the alliance between 
the PPR and the PPS. Following the crisis in the united 
front during the summer, the September plenum examined 
relations with the PPS in unprecedented depth. The central 
importance of the partnership was reaffirmed and 'sectar-
ian and domineering attitudes' towards the PPS (perhaps a 
reference to the putsch episode) were or i t kised by Kowalski 
and others. 54 But although Gomu~ka stressed the continuity 
53 Uchwa~a plenum KC PPR '0 najwazniejszych momentach syt-
~acji politycznej Polski ', 18.9.1946, PPR ..• i 1946 -
~ 1947 OPe cit., p. 147. 
S4 ~wik OP e cit., p. 178. 
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of the Party's line on the united front and in particular 
on the question of the eventual merger of the two parties,55 
the September Plenum presaged the shift in the Party's 
position on the PPS which became clear after the elections. 
Since May 1945 the comrimnists had follO\ved a policy of 
allowing the PPS considerable freedom to develop as a 
broadly independent mass party exercising - at least for -
mally - joint hegemony with the PPR within the national 
front. The PPS was seen as a key factor broadening the base 
of the front and as a vital ally for the PPR in fe nding off 
the challenge of the PSL. However, from spring 1946 as 
rivalry and political differences between the two workers' 
parties became more pronounced and the 'centrist' leader-
ship under Os6bka and Cyrankiewicz steered an increasingly 
independent line as the Matuszewski 'left ' lost ground, 
the communists became seriously alarmed at the trend of 
events . in the PPS. The September Plenum noted these devel -
opments and concluded that the Socialists' efforts to reach 
a compromise with the PSL and their demands for parity in 
the allocation of offices in the state and economic admi n-
istration constituted an attempt to capture hegemony for 
the PPS in the 'democratic camp,.56 The Central Committee 
appears to have questioned the wisdom of allowing the PPS 
to develop as a second workers' party in 1944-45. Now the 
time had come to curb its independence and re-emphasise its 
jUnior role in the united front. According to Sierocki, 
the main points of the Central Committee's assessment were 
as follows: 
'Exceptionally favourable conditions for 
closer co-operation had existed during the 
period of the PKWN and the Provisional 
Government. Later the PPS had grown stronger 
in part because of the absorbtion of WRN-ite 
and right-wing elements. In attempting to 
obtain support in non-proletarian quarters 
55 T. Sierocki PPR-owska koncepcja jednosci ruchu robot-
niczego w latach 1942-1948, Z pola walki 1976 nr. 4 
(76), p. 18. 
56 Ibid., p. 17. 
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of society, a partial return to the old 
pre-war traditions of the Socialist move-
ment had occurred within the PPS. History 
had shown ••• that the PPS was a nationalist, 
Pi~sudski-ite and anti-Soviet party. It 
had also been a reformist party, and it 
still was. Thus for it to gain hegemony •• ~ 
would be a "backward step". Despite the 
changes that had taken place in the Polish 
Socialist movement, it had remained an inte -
gral part of European social democracy. As 
in social democracy everywhere, the Western 
orientation played a great part in its concep-
tion of Poland's foreign policy. In domestic 
policy, the PPS was inclined to make t he 
greatest possible concessions to the PSL in 
order to achieve the social reconstruction 
of the country at the least social cost. In 
the Plenum's view all of this demanded that 
the future development of the Polish social-
ist movement would have to be watched very 
closely, all the more so in view of t h e recent 
confrontation with the united fro nt (i.e. the 
Matuszewski faction - J.R.) elements . The 
Plenum ••• confirmed that the PPS "was devel-
oping into a regressive politica l force'" .5 7 
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Gomu~ka seems to have led the attack on t he PPS's supposed 
hegemonistic ambitions, while emphasising the importance 
of continuing the alliance, with the Socialists playing 
second fiddle. Again according to Sierocki , 'particularly 
severe statements about the PPS were to be found in the 
speech of the Party's general secretary , ~v~adys~aw Gomu~ka . 
He said that the PPS, not being a Marx ist party, was unable 
to bring about socialism .••• Therefore the PPS could not 
exercise hegemony in the workers' moveme nt and would ha v e 
to be satisfied with the position it had o ccupied 
hitherto,.58 
The objective of a single workers' party was for the 
first time to be made explicit. The resolution passed at 
the Plenum declared that 
'The strengthening of the united front 
through joint activity and gradual 
57 T. Sierocki PPR-owska koncepcja jednosci ruchu robotnic-
zego w latach 1942-1948, Z pola walki 1976 nr . 4(76) ,p.18. 
58 Sieracki Warszawska ••. Op e cit., p. 270. 
/ 
convergence of the positions of both wor-
kers' parties in matters of key importance 
is a basic objective of the policy of the 
PPR in aspiring towards the comp l e5e poli-tical unity of the working class'. 9 
308 
The Party would in future concentrate its attention prima-
rily on fostering co-operation with the grassroots organi-
sation of the PPS 'from below,.60 A campaign of joint 
meetings was to be organised with the purpose of weakening 
opposition amongst the PPS rank-and-file to the united 
front. Meanwhile contacts with the leadership would con-
tinue and talks would proceed with the aim of reaching a 
formal agreement on future policy and joint activity . 
Gomu~a warned the Plenum that difficulties could be expec-
ted on both fronts. In relation to the campaign of joint 
local meetings: 
' ••• we must expect obstruction (from) the 
(PPS) leadership, but not give up. It will 
be difficult to agree everything with the 
pPS. We are now raising the question of 
making an agreement between the leaderships 
so that certain matters will be formalised . 
We will pursue this even though it will re -
quire concessions from both sides ' .61 
At this stage the shift in PPR policy was felt more in 
terms of the organisational relationship between the par-
ties than on policy or programme. The communists continued 
to proclaim their commitment to t h e three-sector economic 
model, the 3-year economic reconstruction plan and the 
multi-party system - all basic tenets of t h e PPS 'centrists ' 
PhilosoPhy.62 In addition the communists, and in particular 
59 Uchwa~a plenum KC PPR '0 najwazniejszych momentach syt-
~acji politycznej polski ', 18.9.1946, PPR ••• i 1946 -
~ 1947 OPe cit., p. 147. 
60 Syzdek OPe cit., p. 365. 
61 Sierocki PPR-owska ••• Ope cit., p. 19.' 
62 Uchwa~a plenum KC PPR '0 najwazniejszych mome~tach syt-
~acji politycznej Polski', 18.9.1946, PPR •.• ~ 1946 -
~ 1947 Ope cit., pp. 143, 146. 
./ 
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Gomu~ka publicly associated the PPR with 'the best tradi-
tion of struggle for Poland's independence' of the PPS, 
while sharply criticising the KPP's record on the same 
. 63 ~Ssue. The PPR still hoped to harness the two ' traditions 
of the working-class movement but after the September 1946 
Plenum the communists were clear that this process would 
involve the fusion of the two traditions within a single 
united party, not an indefinite continuation of t he par-
tnership of the two separate parties which had developed 
over the previous two years. 
The communists' plans to redefine the character a nd 
direction of the united front were at odds with the poli-
tical strategy of the PPS leadership and anathema to many 
activists. As we have seen, the 'centrists' had accepted 
the 4 Party Bloc against the PSL with great reluctance. 
Though convinced that the united front must continue and 
anxious to improve co-operation with the communists, the 
~centrists' aimed, as Hochfeld had put it, to e nsure that 
the PPS would ' enter the new situation as as strong a fac -
tor as Possible, with the greatest amount of power' in its 
hands. They had no intentio n of acknowledging t he hegemony , 
of the PPR, or abandoning the cl aim of the PPS to play an 
independent and equal role in the government that was 
formed after the elections. Even as the party was resign-
ing itself to the inevitability of joining the communists' 
offensive against the PSL, these objectives were for cibly 
restated. On 15 September Cyrankiewicztold a meeting of 
the PPS aktyw in Wroc~aw that 'The united front ... the 
alliance of equal parties, the PPS and the PPR, is the 
basis of everything that we are building in Poland. Equal 
means no mutual suspicions, no hegemony, no disloyalty, no 
dogma of infallibility in either 9f the parties,.64 The 
63 Gomu~ka Przem6wienie wyg~oszone na akademii w Warszawie 
w 7 rocznicr ~mierci M. Buczka, 10 . 9 . 1946, Artyku~y ••. Vol . II OPe cit., p. 223. 
64 K. Janowski Kszta~towanie si~ jednosci ruchu robotnic -
zego naDolnym Sl~sku (1945-1948), Z pola walki 1971 
nr. 3 (55), p. 63. 
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same day at a huge public meeting in Lodz, Os b bk a decla r e d 
that 'the role of the Polish Socialist Pa rty a t t h e p resen t 
time is immense, we have taken on our s houlde r s t he bu rde n 
of raising the banner of national unity .•• the r ole t hat 
the party should play is in the fir s t r a nk'. Drobner who 
also spoke argued that history had g ive n t he PPS ' t he r i g h t 
to lead the workers' movement a nd t h e camp o f Pol i s h 
democracy' .65 
The differences of outlook we r e ref l e c ted i n the 'pact 
of unity of activity and co-operat i o n' whi c h was sign e d by 
Gomu~ka and Cyrankiewicz on 28 Nov ember . Th e negot i at i o n s 
which had preceded the pact had bee n l o ng a nd d i ffic u lt . 66 
The main problem was the question of hegemo ny . Ac cording 
to one member of the PPS Supre me Council, t h e ta l ks had 
indicated 'that the leadership o f th e PP R is of t h e opinion 
that the PPR is the principal, t h e leading , the go v e r n ing 
party, and the PPS only has to h elp '. The draft o f t he 
pact proposed by the communists had covered t h e joint off -
ensive against the opposi t ion, merger o f t h e PPR a n d PPS 
youth movements, and e vent ual f u s i o n of t he two partie s . 
The PPS counter-propo sal had prese n ted its posit i o n 
'strongly, clearly an d independe n t l y . If t h e PPS make s 
its contribution t o t h e eco nomi c reco nstruc tio n of the cou n-
try and t he c o nsol idat i o n of democracy , then to t he same 
e x tent the righ t to govern s hould exte nd to t h e PPs ,. 67 
The pact in i ts f ina l form fell s hort of t h e objec-
tives which the PPR l ead ership h ad set o ut at t h e September 
65 Stefaniuk OPe cit., p. 120; c f . Syzdek OPe c it ., p . 359 . 
66 The t a l k s seem t o h a v e bee n ini tiated a t a bo u t t he time 
o f the Septe mber P l e num, Stenogram o b rad m-1s ... Op e c i t ., 
p. 59. S zwalbe to l d the Lod z PPS aktyw o n 13 October 
t h a t the pact wa s being prepared , Stefaniuk OP e cit ., p . 
122. The PP S c e n tra l executive a g reed to negotiatio ns 
o n 25 October, Syzdek OPe cit., P . 368 . According to 
.s ome vers ions, t he terms o f tJ"Ie pact were ou tlined by Stalin 
during a visit by the PPR a nd PPS l eaders to Moscow o n 3 
Nov ember, L.M. Oa k Free a nd Unfetter e d (Newtown, 
Montgome r y , 1947), p. 23 a nd IO RIO The Fate ... OPe cit. , 
p . 132. 
67 W. Stawinski speaking to t he PPS bra n c h i n Widzew , Lod z , 
8 .11.19 46, q uoted in Stefaniuk Op e cit ., p . 124 . 
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Plenum, but extracted important concessions from the PPS in 
many areas. The PPS reaffirmed its commitment to assist 
in the offensive against the opposition, undertaking to 
exert all its strength 'to liquidate the b a nds of the fas -
cist underground', and to give full support to the secur i ty 
organs in restoring 'calm and the rule of law '. Above all , 
the PPS accepted the formula that it should ' fig h t . t he PSL 
which has slipped into the role of a l egal extension of 
the reactionary underground'. The PPS a l so agreed to the 
principle of 'closer -co-operation and joint activity i n all 
spheres of state and social life' and accepted join t party 
meetings and ideological training. The Socialists were to 
undertake 'uncompromising struggle against the influence 
of anti-Soviet and reactionary WRN-ite ideology' within the 
party. Last, but not least, the communists secured a ref-
erence to eventual amalgamation of t he two parties, although 
no urgency was expressed, and it was implied that merger 
would be preceded by a gradual process of deepening co-
operation and ideological convergence. 
However, the So cialists seem to have got t heir way on 
a number of points. Most important, there was no sugges -
tion that the PPR occupied a leading role in the united 
front and indeed, the principl e that 'both parties, as sep-
arate, independent and equal political organisms , will 
respect each others' organisational structure ' was given 
particular prominence. The PPS right to be consulted was 
embodied in the provision that 'both parties will agree a 
line on important political and e conomic issues before any 
public statements' were made. The communists reaffirmed 
their support for the government~ moderate economic policy 
and to the principles of the programme which had been set 
o ut in the PKWN Manifesto in 1944. Lastly, the two parties 
pledged themselves to work for t he achievement of the 
' worker-peasant alliance'. While no mention was made of the 
SL, the pact specifically ~tated t hat t he two parties 
should ' assist the process of secession of real democrats 
from the PSL' - a reflection of t h e Socia li sts ' strongly 
held . 68 Vlew. 
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As well as the declaration of principles in the p a ct, 
which was published, the two parties reached agreeme nt o n 
various detailed matters set out in an annex to the pact 
which was kept secret from the wider party a ktyw. 69 Under 
this annex, both parties undertook to agree t heir elec toral 
tactics, observe parity in appointments to t h e electoral 
commissions and apply severe sanctions (includi ng expul -
sion) against members who did not comply with t he terms of 
the agreement. Disagreements were not to be revealed i n 
public, though in exceptional cases and as a last resort , 
differences could be indicated by abstention. The parties 
agreed on the need to ensure that the 4-Party Bloc obtained 
a decisive majority in the next Se j m and decided on a pre-
liminary percentage allocation of seats. In the next 
government the PPR would nominate the president and t h e PPS 
the prime minister. 70 The allocation of certai n other 
portfolios was agreed and the PPS was to have deputy mini -
sters of public security and foreign affairs. The PPR was 
to receive a vice-presidency of 'Spo~em', the Socia list-
dominated co-operative union. Both sides accepted that the 
principle of equality should not be interpreted as parity 
in appointments to posts in the state administration. 
State officials (including vice-ministers ) were to take in-
structions from their superiors and not from their party. 
Disputes were to be referred to joint-committees of t h e two 
parties. The prime minister's right to allocate fu nds was 
68 Umowa 0 jednosci dzia~ania i wsp6~pracy mi~dzy PPR i PPS , 
28 .11.1946, PPR .•. i 1946 - i 1947 op . cit., pp. 204 - 207 . 
In the discussion of the pact in the Supreme Council of 
the PPS on 4 December Os6bka emphasised that the PPS 
would do all it could to win over the democratic and 
progressive f orces in the PSL, Syzdek op . cit., p . 370 . 
69 Ibid ., p. 369. 
70 It seems that the replace ment of Osobka by Cyrankiewicz 
as prime minister was agreed by t he PPS and PPR leader-
ships at this time. Hochfe l d implied this in an article 
Published in Robotnik 7.2.1947. 
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made conditional on the agreement of the PPR. It was de ci-
ded to establish joint mediation committees at c entral , 
provincial and district levels to sort out disputes between 
the parties. Finally, they were to co-operate in combating 
non-union industrial action and apply sanctions agai nst the 
organisers if they were party members. 7l 
Party historians claim that the signing of t he .pact -
and by implication the decision to accept t he communists' 
electoral strategy - was greeted with approval by the deci-
ded majority of the aktyw and members of the pps. 72 Bu t 
this seems highly improbable. It is most unlikely t hat the 
differences of view and the dee p mist r ust which h ad existed 
between the two parties in many part s of the co untry j ust 
a few weeks before could have be e n dispelled so quickly . 
Although the pact affirmed the indepe nde nce a nd equality of 
the two parties, the PPS had b ee n forced to give grou nd to 
the PPR in a number of important areas, notably o n the 
question of eventual merger. If the degree of active par-
ticipation by PPS members in the election campaign is any-
73 thing to go by (an estimated 30 % took part ) , it see ms 
clear that the attitude of the majority of the rank-and-
file to the pact was hostile , or at best apathetic . How-
ever, there seems to have been little ope n effective oppo -
sition to the leadership's line . In part t hi s was because 
the anti-Bloc right of t he party h ad already been out-
manoeuvred by the 'centrists'. The joint-meetings organised 
by the communists in September and October no doubt helped 
to isolate the right,74 but the main factor see ms to have 
been the activity of the general secretariat under Cyrank-
iewicz. The powers of this apparatus had been increased 
in August 19 46 when the secretaries of the PPS provincial 
71 Sierocki Warszawska ... op. ci t ., p. 275 ; cf . Syzdek op . 
ci t ., p. 369; Siero cki PPR-owska ••• op . cit ., p. 20 . 
72 Syzdek op. cit., p. 369 ; Kozik op . cit ., pp . 335-36. 
73 Syzdek op. cit., p. 375. 
74 Ibid., pp. 365-6 6 . 
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committees had been subordinated to the general secreta-
riat. Since the provincial secretariats had charge over the 
party organisation at local level, this meant t hat the 
. . 75 
ent1re aktyw was brought under central control. The gen-
eral secretariat used these powers to root out local 
leaders, both on the left and the right, who were critical 
of the national leadership. In November special delegates 
from the centre orchestrated the replacement of former -t\1RN 
rightists in the leaderships of Krak6w a nd Rzesz6w provin-
cial committees. 76 The biggest purge took place in Upper 
Silesia where the right which had captured the leadership 
at the end of September had maintained contacts with the 
PSL and resisted joint-meetings with the communists. In 
mid-November the general secretariat reorganised the prov-
incial committee and installed Tadeusz Cwik, one of 
Cyrankiewicz's main lieutenants, to s upervise the election 
campaign. 77 The impotence of the anti-Bloc faction in the 
f ace of the 'centrists' party machine was symbolised by 
Zu~awski's resignation f rom the PPS in November . 78 
Other critics of the pact agreed to abide by it , while 
playing down its significance. Drobner, who led the cri-
ticism at the Supreme Council of th~ party on 4 December , 
argued that 'people are losing faith in t he PPS and are 
saying - you have betrayed us, you have sold yourselves for 
a ministerial portfolio,.79 But despite hi s reservations 
a bout jOint-training and warnings against unification of 
the parties, except as a long-term goal , he was satisfied 
that the pact contained little that was new and voted with 
th e . . . f . . 80 N d b t t' . ma]Or1ty for rat1 1cat1on. 0 ou many ac 1V1sts 
75 Syzdek op. cit., p. 370. 
76 CWik op. ,cit., p. 180, Kozik op . cit ., p . 335 , Ols zewski 
Pocz~tki ..• op. cit., p . 253 . 
77 Kantyka PPS na Sl~sku ••• , op . cit., pp . 268-73. 
78 CWik op. cit., pp. 179-80. 
79 Sierocki Warszawska •.• op . cit., p. 277 . 
80 Kozik op. cit., p. 338. 
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were persuaded that the pact was the best compromise that 
could have been obtained in the circums tances and t hat it 
was essential to maintain party unity around t h e 'centrist ' 
leadership if its strategy of preserving the PPS as a n 
independent, equal partner of the PPR was to h ave a ny 
chance of success. 
The Socialists' agreement to the offensive .agai nst the 
PSL and the pact certainly did not imply any retreat from 
this strategy. Indeed the 'centrists' efforts to establi s h 
a strong and separate organisational and i deological iden-
tity for the PPS were at their most intense in t he later 
months of 1946 and the first half of 1947 . Particular 
attention was paid to associating t he party with the hi s -
torical and patriotic traditions of the pre- war PPS . I n 
November, for instance, mass meetings were held t hro ughout 
the country to celebrate the 54th a nniversary of the fou n-
dation of the pPS.81 The leadership did no t miss a chance 
to point out the contrast b etween the record of the PPS on the 
national question and that of the KPP . /. Thus Osobka pub-
licly contradicted the view that t he PPS h ad bee n respon- I 
sible for the failure o f t he l eft - wing government formed in 
Poland at the end of the Firs t World War , arguing that much 
of the blame lay with t h e communis ts 'who h ad a n incorrect 
attitude to the problem of Poland ' s indepe ndence ' . 82 
Attempts were also made to def i ne the party ' s position 
within the broader context of socialist theory . Th e 
'centrists' were anxious to show t hat t heir rejectio n of 
Western social democracy did not imply acceptance of t he 
sOvietisation of Poland . In December Rusinek told an 
International Socialist Conference in Prague t hat : 
' Until a short time ago there were d isagree -
ments in the Marxist camp on t h e question 
of the route to powe r •..• We are familiar 
with two models a nd both turned out to be 
wrong . The first , advocated by orthodox 
Marxists •.• declared that t he "dictatorship 
81 Stefaniuk OP e cit., p . 132 . 
82 Robotnik 23.10.46. 
of the proletariat" is the only correct 
and the only possible road to socialism . 
This "infantile leftist" conception divi-
ded the socialist camp. The reformi s ts, 
whose error lay in an excessively mechan~ 
istic view of the development of economic 
relations, gained the upper hand ...• The 
reformists were deprived of dialectical 
thought by fear of the dictatorship of t h e 
proletariat and led astray by a falsely 
conceived legalism •••. The . orthodox com-
munists applied their one formula to every 
country without regard to the objective 
conditions of the given country ..• both 
conceptions .•• were false in the se nse of 
there being only two roads to socialism. 
For history has shown us a third road, 
and that third road means for Poland -
the Polish road ••. ,83 
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For the Socialists the essential feature of the Polish road 
was the preservation of a substantial degree of individua l 
liberty and political and economic pluralism. The electio n 
offensive was viewed as a necessary, but temporary evil . 
Once the elections were out of the way a nd t he PSL no longer 
posed a threat to the left's hold o n power , constitutio nal 
safeguards would be introduced and t h e machinery o f repres-
sion would be wound down. As Hochfeld put it t he task of 
the new system of government was to 'build up t he sphere of 
f reedom and 'civic liberty, to liquidate .•. t h e transitional 
limitation of those freedoms and liberties,.84 
The main outward sign of the Socialists ' campaign to 
widen their influence and counter-bala nce the communists 
within the national front was t h e recruitment drive launched 
in August with the goal of increasing membership of the PPS 
fr om 250,000 to 500,000 by the end of 1946 and to one mil -
lion during 1947. 85 In fact, th e recruitment effort o n ly 
began in earnest in October; nevertheless by ear ly 1947 mem-
bership had reached almost half a millio n and by the end of 
t he year approaching three quarters of a millio n. Details 
83 Robotnik 15.12.46. 
84 ~obotnik 23.10 . 46. 
85 ~obotnik 27.8 . 46. 
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of the relative strength of the two parties by province 
at the time of the elections are given in Table Eleven. 
The growth of the PPS caused disquiet amongst the communists 
who found themselves in competition with the Socialists for 
members in many industrial areas and suspected that a sub-
stantial proportion of the PPS recruits were former suppor-
ters of .the PSL who now saw the PPS as the best means to 
oppose the communists. 86 The drive was to be a major factor 
in the renewed crisis in relations between the parties 
after the elections, but it was not until mid-1947 that the 
PPS called a halt to recruitment on such a mass scale . 
Table Eleven 
PPS and PPR Membership by Province at the Turn of 1946/47 87 
Province/City 
Biaa:ystok 
Gdansk 
Kielce 
Krakow 
Lublin 
Lodz - province 
Lodz - city 
Olsztyn 
Pomorze 
Poznan 
Rzeszow 
Szczecin 
Sl~sk-D~browa 
Warsaw - province 
Warsaw - city 
Wrocl'aw 
TOTALS 
PPR Hembership 
(J an. 1947) a 
6,040 
17,601 
37,558 
28,563 
16,071 
25,762 
25,032 
11,305 
61,061 
66,604 
9,213 
30,971 
88,352 
42,697 
29,034 
60,016 
555,880 
PPS Membership 
(Date as shown) 
1,600 (Jan o r Feb)b 
20,237 (1 Jan)c 
28,610 (end Feb ) d 
44,500 (e nd Jan) e 
7,143 (Jan or Feb)b 
16,319 (Jan)f 
23,908 (Jan)f 
6,027 (end Dec) g 
42,471 (Jan or Feb)b 
43 ,000 (Jan)h 
i 11,417 (end Dec) 
25,199 (Jan or Feb )b 
67,462 (1 Jan)j 
26,563 (Jan or Fe b)b 
29,160 (end Dec)k 
45,255 (end Dec)l 
438,871 
86 Stefaniuk op. cit., pp. 133-34; Syzdek op. cit., p. 375 . 
87 Sources: a. PPR •.. i 1946 - i 1947 op . cit., p. 212 ; . 
b. PRO F0371 66093 N6349; c. Przywuski op . cit., pp . 166-
68;~ Naumiuk Pocz?tki .•. p. 273; Cwik op. cit., pp . 
contd .•• 
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The PPS leaders believed that their party ' s role in 
the ele c tion offensive would have major significance both 
for its own future and for the viability of ' the Polish 
road to soc ialism '. They feared that if the national fro nt 
- and in practice this basically meant the PPR-PPS alliance 
- proved inadequate as a means of overcoming the opposition , 
the communists would resort to repression on a much wider 
scale and the forced construction of socialism. If this 
happened , there would be little place for an independent 
PPS; the communists would rest their rule on the security 
apparatus and a far greater degree of direct Soviet support. 
This linkage between the maintenance of the Socialist-
communist bloc and Polish self- government lay behind Cyran-
kiewicz ' s warning just before the elections that ' the 
simple truth is that the question of the united front . . . 
lies at the root of the problem of Poland ' s independence,.88 
The PPS therefore made concerted efforts to demonstrate 
its cohesiveness and effectiveness as a political force in 
the elections, and hence its continuing value to the com-
munists as a partner . A month before polling day special 
conferences were organised to instruct PPS local government 
officials on their duties . Th~ activists were told to co-
opera te closely with the PPR in accordance with the -November 
pact and to playa full part in ensuring a favourable out-
come, by for instance helping to organise open voting. 89 
On 6 January the entire party membership was ordered to 
report to local branches to be allocated tasks for the 
election period. 90 Non-participants were threatened with 
contd . •• 
192-93, 208; f. Stefaniuk Op e cit., pp. 281-82; g. 
Wojnowski Ope cit . , p. 176; h. K. Robakowski Rola i 
dzia~alno~6 PPS w Wielkopolsce i na Ziemi Lubuskiej w 
latach 1944-48 (Poznan, 1973), pp . 49-50, 59 ; i. Olszewski 
Pocz~tki . .• Ope cit . , p. 250 ; j. Rechowicz Pierwsze 
wybory .•• OPe cit., p. 80; k. Hillebrandt i Jakubowski 
oPe cit., p . 80; 1 . Janowski Kszta~towanie si~ jednosci 
ruchu robotniczego na Dolnym Sl~sku (1945-48) Z pola 
walki 1971 nr. 3 (55), p . 60. 
88 Robotnik 7.17..46 . 
89 Robotnik 23 . 12 . 46. 
90 Stefaniuk OPe cit . , p. 138. 
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se . 91 vere party sanctlons. 
However, the mobilisation of the PPS was o nly p artly 
successful. The aktyw undoubtedly played a key role in t he 
management of the elections. The PPS repres e ntative s o n 
the KRN and the provincial national councils collaborated 
with the PPR to make sure that the electoral commissions 
were monopolised by loyal adherents of the Bloc. Some dis -
putes occurred where the communists feared that nominees 
92 put forward by the PPS could not be relied upo n absol u tely , 
but none of these led to a break-down in co-operation. 
Despite the provisions of the Novembe r pact, the PPS did 
not generally achieve pari t y with the PPR on t h e commissions 
but whether this was due to the PPR rejecting PPS nominees , 
or the PPS being unable to find enough suitable candidates , 
is unclear. Nevertheless , the PPS role was c onsiderable , 
and a good deal greater than that of the communists' other 
allies. It is claimed that a total of 15,000 Socialists 
W • ., 93 I h h ere appolnted to the commlSS1ons. n areas were t e 
PPS was strong, its share almost matched t hat of the PPR : 
in Upper Silesia it had 703 full members (PPR - 848); in 
Lodz city 308 (PPR - 316) .94 A few l ocal c ommissions c o n-
sisted entirely of PPS members: 19 out of 29 1 in Wroc~aw 
. 95 provlnce, ' for instance. Elsewhere the PPS was well 
represented: in Kielce province it h ad 26 % of commission 
chairmanships (PPR 54 %, SL 20 %, so 1 %) ;96 in Krak6w pro-
vince 16% of commission members b e l o nged to t h e PPS (PPR 
58 %) ;97 in Lublin province 20 % of members were in the PPS 
91 Robakowski Ope cit., p. 126. 
92 Ibid., p. 126; Naumiuk PPR •.. Ope cit ., pp . 429 - 31 . 
93 Syzdek OP e cit., p. 375. This f i g u re presumably includes 
alternative members . 
94 Rechowicz Pierwsze wybory .•. OPe ci t ., pp . 142- 45 ; Stef-
aniuk OPe cit., pp. 134-35. These fig ures are incom-
plete: an unknown number of PPS a nd PPR member s are 
Classified as 'trade union' nominees . 
95 Janowski PPS .•• Ope cit., p. 123. 
96 Naumiuk Pocz~tki ••• Ope cit., p . 245 . 
97 ~wik OP e cit., pp . 198-99. 
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(pPR 6 8% , SL 10% , SO and non- party 2% ) ; 98 in Ols ztyn 22 % 
(PPR 62%, SL 13% , SD 3 %) • 99 The communists ' control over 
the electoral apparatus depended on the PPS. 
However , the PPS was unable to mobilise the bulk of its 
rank-and~file members . Although PPS members appear to have 
been more a c tive than the SL or SO , and there was a better 
turnout than there had been in the referendum, in total 
only about 3 0% of PPS members seem to have participated i n 
the campaign. lO O In most provinces the PPR achieved a mob-
l."l" t" 8 f " b 101 h " l.sa l.on of between 60 - 0% 0 l.ts mem ers . Party l.S -
torians attribute the difference to the tighter organisation 
and discipline of the PPR , 102 but it is likely that dis-
satisfaction with the Bloc in PPS quarters was also a major 
factor . 
To sum up, the agreement forged between the PPS and 
the PPS to manage the elections and crush t he opposition 
was unstable. Both parties accepted that harsh measures 
must be adopted to ensure that power remained in the hands 
of the left, but beyond this immediate objective , their 
views diverged on the role the PPS would play in the ' Polish 
road to socialism'. The PPS hoped to assure its future 
influence by making itself the indispensible link betwee n 
the communists and the nation. But its contribution in the 
election offensive, though important to the c ommunists, wa s 
primarily in the bureaucratic sphere, in the electoral com-
missions, the national councils and the central and local 
administration . The PPS was far less successful in giving 
real substance to the national front by rallying mass 
98 Olszewslti_ PPR • • • op. cit . , p . 306 . 
99 Woj nowski Ope cit ., p. 182 . 
100 20 % had taken part in the referendum, Syzdek Op e cit ., 
pp. 344, 375 . 
101 For example, 80 % 1n Bia~stok and Kielce , 70% in Gdansk , 
61% in Lublin provinces; Majecki OP e cit ., p . 171, 
Naumiuk Pocz~tki . • • Op e cit . , ~ . 278 , Wapi~ski OP e cit ., 
p . 135 , Olszewski PPR .•. OPe Cl.t., p. 309 . 
102 Syzdek OP e cit. , p . 375. 
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popular support to the Democratic Bloc. Indeed, only a 
minority of its own members responded to the leadership ' s 
call to active participation in the campaign. 
The SL and the SO were certainly much less important 
to the communists as partners than the PPS was . Both were 
widely regarded, even within the Bloc , as appendages of the 
PPR,103 with little genuine popular following. Kowalski , 
the SL leader most trusted by the communists, complained 
that in PPS circles the SL was viewed as a ' non-existent 
104 party' without support amongst the peasant masses. How-
ever, especially from mid-1946, the communi sts looked to 
the SL to provide the rural base of the national fro nt. 
The PPR did its utmost to foster its expansion . The high 
degree of PPR intervention in the affairs of the SL and the 
forced character of the SL's growth is well-illustrated by 
the 'plan of activity' of the PPR committee for Kolo dis-
trict for September 1946. The committee was to : 
'continue to lend assistance in organising 
SL circles •••• Call a conference of SL 
members on 20 September for the purpose 
of electing a District Committee of the 
SL . Man this meeting with our members ... 
sort out the matter of the local head-
quarters between the SL and the PSL .... 
Arrange for PSL members at t h e local level 
to go over to the SL ,. 105 
The campaign to expand the SL seems - on paper at least 
- to have·r~j d significant effect in the period preceding 
the elections . By late 1946 it is estimated to have had 
200 ,000 members , about the same number as in 1945 before 
the PSL was formed. l06 Much of the growth appears to have 
103 Zambrowski, writing in 1971 after his expulsion from the 
PZPR , distinguished between the ' full independence ' of 
the PPS and the 'considerable (znaczna) independence o f 
the SL and SO; Zambrowski Dziennik op . cit. , p . 70 . 
104 Halaba Stronnictwo •.. op. cit., pp . 195-98 . 
105 Pierwsze lata wladzy ludowej w dokumentach PPR ... op . 
cit ., p. 322 . 
106 N. Ko~omejczyk i B. Syzdek Polska w 1atach 1944-1949 
(Warsaw , 1968) , p. 162. 
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taken place amongst the settlers in the western terri to-
ries. Membership of the SL in Lower Silesia wa s sa i d to 
have jumped from 20,000 in August to 52,000 in J a nua r y ,107 
and in Upper Silesia from 4,800 in October to 25 , 800 i n 
December 1946. 108 However, the allegiance o f many of t hese 
recruits seems to have been only formal. In Upper Si l esia , 
the increase in the number of me mbe rs with pa rty cards was 
just 144, the others simply 'declared' that they woul d 
. . 109 Jo~n, and the SL was able to provide onl y 71 activi sts 
for the 6,600 places on the electoral commi s s ions . Th e 
pressure to make such declarations b e c ame p a r t icularly in-
tense as the election campaign got fully underway . Meet -
ings were organised at which the audience we r e c al l ed o n 
to proclaim publicly that they were l eaving t he PSL to jo in 
the SL. I10 But such growth, genera t ed b y the arr i val in 
the villages of army and police units o r by pressure o n 
settlers in the western territorie s who were economically 
dependent on the government, did l i ttle to b roade n t he b ase 
o f the Democratic Bloc. The rol e of t he SL in t h e elec tion 
campaign was limited lll and its me mbersh i p rema ined notor-
. 11 2 ~ously inactive unless prodded by the PP R. The commu-
nists subsequently recogni sed tha t t h e SL was i ncapable of 
winning over many of the p e asants they regarded as ' demo -
cratic' and after Miko~ajc zyk 's fl i g h t t h ey al l owed the 
reconstructed PSL to operate as a n al ternat i ve rallying 
107 N. Ko~omejczyk Niektore problemy roz woj u part i i po l i -
tycznych na Ziemiach Zacho dni c h w l atach 1945 - 46 , Z 
Eola walki 1964 nr. 2 (26), p. 17 5 . 
108 GO~~biowski Pierws ze la t a •.. OP e ci t ., p . 346 . 
109 Ibid., p. 346; Rechowic z Pi erwsze wybory ..• OP e cit ., 
pp. 1 4 2-45. 
11 0 Kozik OPe cit., pp. 360-61. 
111 Cf. Re chowicz Pi e rws ze wyb o r y ... Op e cit ., pp . 142 - 45 ; 
Naumiuk Pocz~tki ••• Ope ci t ., p. 27 8; Kozik OP e cit ., 
oPe cit., p. 36 2 ; Ma jec k i OPe c i t ., p . 171 ; wapitski 
oPe cit., pp. 135-36. 
112 Ko z i k OPe cit., pp. 416-17. 
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"t "I 1 4 113 POln untl 9 9. Moreover, even where t he SL succeeded 
in recruiting ex-PSL supporters it was sometimes not strong 
enough to prevent them shifting the party to t he right, 
1 d " "" h h " t 114 ea lng to tenslon Wlt t e communlS s . 
The SO was even less of a factor in broade ning the 
national front. It was not a mass party. In 1947 its " 
115 
national membership was only 27,783. Its recruits were 
largely drawn from office-workers, shopkeepers, craft sme n, 
"th" " 116 Wl a smatterlng of teachers and professl0nals. The 
party was over-represented in the KRN a nd the provincial 
and town national councils, partly beca u se of the relative 
abundance of well-educated people with administrative ski lls 
in its ranks. By the second half of 1946 t he liberal-
conservative wing of the so led by Jerzy Langrod and Prof . 
Adam Krzy~anowski, which was stro ngest i n Krakow , had lost 
t t " f " 117 ou 0 the staunchly pro-communlst act l0n. There seems 
to have been no major opposition to the 4-Party Bloc a nd 
Krzy~anowski was amongst those re-elected on the Bloc list . 
Even so, the SO seems to have been able to provide only a 
few score activists in most provinces during the election 
campaignl18 and in at least one area some of its members 
113 Cf. Uchwal'a Sekretariatu KC PPR oceniaj C¢ca 2 r zeJ:::icg 
obchod6w Swi~ta Ludowego , May 1948, PPR ••. i 1947 - xii 
~ OPe cit., pp. 234-37. 
114 Oobies zewsk i i Hemmerling OPe cit., p. 164 . 
115 N. Ko~omejczyk Polska na drodze ku demokracji socjali -
stycznej, Studia i materia!¥ z dziej6w Polski Ludowej 
Vol. 12 (1978), p. 64. The SO h ad 2 , 740 members in 
Krak6w province at the end of January 1947 ; about 1000 
in Rzesz6w province at the end of 1946; less tha n 800 
in Lublin province a nd about 30 0 in Ols zty n province in 
the second half of 1946; Kozik Op e cit ., p . 369 , 
Olszewski PoczC¢tki •.• Ope ci t ., p . 254, Olszewski PPR ... 
oP e cit., p. 322, Woj nowski OP e cit., p . 185 . 
11 6 P. Winczorek Miejs ce i rola SO w strukturze politycznej 
(Warsaw , 1975), p. 107. 
117 Stronnictwo Oemokratyczne w latach 1937- 1965 (Warsaw , 
1967), pp. 57, 63;64; Kozik Op e cit. , pp . 167-69 . 
118 Cf. Majecki OP e cit., p. 164; Wapinski OP e cit ., pp . 
135-36; Wojnowski Op e cit., pp . 182 , 185 ; Olszewski 
Pocz9tki .•. OP e cit., p. 272 ; Olszewski PPR ... OP e cit ., 
p. 306 , Rechowicz pierwsze wybory ••• OP e cit. , pp . 142-
45. 
119 
refused to take part. 
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In addition to the 4 Bloc parties, the PSL ' Nowe 
\'lyzwolenie' and the reconstructed Party of Labour were 
tolerated as legal opposition parties within the national 
front and indeed in some areas they put forward candidates 
on the Bloc list and were admitted to the national councils, 
inter-party consultative committees and electoral commis-
. 120 s~ons. The attitude of the PPR leadership to these 
parties was lukewarm. 
characterised them as 
Gomu~ka speaking to a Party audience 
'free marksmen' (wolni strzelcy) and 
stated that the PPR would not campaign against them or 
'scare the game away from their field of fire ,. 12l But the 
communist rank-and-file were often hostile. The Wroc~aw 
provincial committee described ' Nowe Wyzwolenie' as a 
partner for the PPS against themselves and the SL and 
claimed it would become 'a second PSL, a shelter for reac-
. 122 t~onaries fleeing before our pressure from the PSL ' . 
In Bia~ystok province SP activists were arrested or beaten 
123 
up. Nevertheless, ' Nowe toJy zwolenie' es tablished pro-
vincial and local branches during the autumn in preparation 
for the elections . Party historians in Poland are agreed 
that the new grouping made no real impression in t h e 
villages. 124 The ~arty won 397,754 votes (3.5 %) and 12 
seats in the elections . After the elections the PPR lost 
all interest in ' Nowe Wyzwolenie' . The pro-PPR faction 
119 Kozik op. cit., p. 371. 
120 Rechowicz Pierwsze wybory ••• op. cit. , pp. 142-45; 
Janowski PPS .•• op. cit., p. 123; Stefaniuk op. cit ., 
pp . 134-35. 
121 
122 
123 
124 
Gomu~ka Przem6wienie na uroczystym posiedzeniu ~odzkiej 
organizacji PPR z okazji przyjecia 50 - tysi xczne go 
Cz~onka partii, 1.1.47, Artyku~y ... Vol . II op . cit., 
PP . 334-35 . 
Sprawozdanie KW PPR za IX-X 1946 cited in Pasierb 
Ruch ••. op. cit., pp. 148-49. 
CAHSD ZG SP Akcja wyborcza 1946-47. 
Majecki op. cit., p. 162; Ols zewski Pocz~tki ... o p. 
cit., pp. 260-61; Kozik op. cit ., pp. 363-65; Wojnowski 
op . cit., p. 185; Dobieszewski i Hemmerling op . cit ., 
Pp . 143, 169; Rechowicz pierwsze wybory ... op. cit ., 
p . 86; Wapi~ski op . cit., p. 131. 
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led by Tadeusz Rek seceded to the SL in February 1947. In 
May the communists admitted that the party 'hRd no real 
. f 125 ~n luence or significance at the grassroots'. Neverth e -
less, the pro-PPS rump soldiered on until October, when it 
also joined the SL. 
The 'Zryw-ite' SP had continued activity after the 
departure of Popiel and his followers in July despite t he 
open disapproval of the Church. The communists and Socia-
lists also courted independent Catholic opinion . In 
November the Party press began carrying a number of articles 
restating the communists' position of absolute freedom of 
religion as a quid pro quo for the politica l neutrality of 
the Church. l26 On 23 November an interview which Bierut 
had given Ksawery Pruszyrtski in which he made a clear bid 
for a modus vivendi between Church and State was published , 
attracting wide interest. Bierut denied any fundamental 
conflict between the aspirations of Church and State a nd 
argued that the Church had failed to respond to the genuine 
shift in the attitude of the left in regard to religion and 
its attempts to reach a 'serious and l o ng-term understand -
ing'. The chief obstacles to such an understanding , he 
claimed, were the Germanophile tendencies of the Vatican 
and the use of the pUlpit by certain elements of the clergy 
to make attacks on the government. But , h e added t hat the 
ruling camp was open to discussion on making a new Concor-
dat and was willing to allow a separate Catholic grouping 
in the next Sejm. 127 The pro-government fringe of the 
Catholic camp led by 'D zis' i Jutro' enthusiastically took 
up Bierut's call for a modus vivendi 128 and talks involving 
Cyrankiewicz, W~adys~aw Wolski , the communist dep u ty 
Minister o f Public Administration , Julia Brystygierowa of 
./ 
125 OkOlnik Sekretariatu KC PPR w sprawie Swi~ta Ludowego , 
r1ay 1947, PPR ... i 1947 - xii 1948 op . cit ., p . 81. 
126 G~os 1udu 15.11.1946. 
127 Rzeczpospo1ita 23.11.1946. 
128 WOJ" C; k S / "t 59 ~ por ... op. Cl. ., p. . 
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the Ministry of Public Sec urity and a number of Catholic 
activists including Stefan Kisielewski were held o n the 
pr d S ' ,129 At t 't opose ~ grouplng . one sage 1 was suggested 
that up to 48 Catholi c deputies might be elected. 130 How-
ever , this initiative seems to have been scotched by Hlon}31 
and in the event only 3 independent ' progressive Catholics ' 
were elec ted on the Bloc list . The SP won 17 seats and 
530 , 000 votes (4 . 7%) . But apart from a mild success in 
Lodz city where it won 29% of the votes a nd 3 out of the 10 
seats , it failed to capture more than a small p art of the 
Catholic vote . This was true even in its strongholds like 
Silesia and Krak6w and despite the fact t hat in many areas 
it was the o nly tolerated alternative to the bloc p arties . 
The results were viewed by the ' Zryw-ite ' leadership as a 
setback and sparked off a spate of infighting a nd ideologi-
cal clashes within the party which lasted until its 
disbandment in 1950 . 132 The attempts of the maj ority led 
by Stefan Brzezirtski to revive a g e nuine Catholic labour 
party on the lines of the former Natio nal Workers' party133 
were frustrated by Widy-Wirski and his followers who saw 
the role of the SP as no more than a 'tra nsmissio n-belt ' 
to Catholic tradesmen and artisans . 134 A telling indica-
tion of the inability of the SP to find any real grassroots 
following is the fact that by 1948 three-quarters of its 
, 135 lncome was provided by the government. 
129 S . Kisielewski t'1sEomnienia Eolityc zne Krytyka 4 ( 1980) 
pp . 143-45 . 
130 Ibid . , p . 144. 
131 Ibid. , p . 145 . 
132 Bujak op. cit . , pp . 332-34 . 
133 Brzezirtski described the SP as having been founded ' o n 
the o rganisational framework of the National Workers ' 
Party', not mentioning the Christian Democr atic tradi-
tion, Sprawozdanie stenograficz ne ••. op . cit., 8 . 2.1947 
col. 50 . 
134 BUJ'ak op . 't Cl . , pp. 320-23. 
135 Ibid ., p. 362 . 
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In sum , the political base of the national fr o nt a t 
the tUrn of 1946/47 was little wider than it had b ee n i n 
May 1945. There had been some gains: the PPR had doubl ed 
its membership and the PPS had establishe d a g enu i n e mass 
following . But the growth of the PPR had been conce ntra t ed 
in the cities -and the western and northern t er ritor i es ; 
much less progress had been made in t he r ura l areas of 
eastern and central Poland. The expa nsio n of t he PPS had 
been accompanied by a weakening of the united fro nt , wh ich 
though patched up for the elections, wa s fun d ame n tally un-
stable . The national front had lost ground t oo , notably 
within the peasant movement. The mains t r eam of t he mov e -
ment which the SL had to some degree represe n ted un t i l t h e 
formation of the PSL remained solidly behind Miko~ajczyk . 
Also , link s with the Catholic camp had weake ned markedly 
durin~ 1946 . The true difference be tween May 19 45 a nd 
January 1947 lay not so much in any r ea l broade ning of the 
base o f the national front , but in t he s trength e ning of the 
bureaucratic and coercive resources a t t h e d i sposal of the 
communists: the Party apparatus, t he secur i ty for c es a nd 
the army, the network of cadres in t he c e n t r a l a nd local 
administration and in the management of ind ustr y a nd the 
trade unions, the leaderships of the a l l i ed parties and 
othe r social and economic ins titutions . Th e communists owed 
their victory over the opposition not, as Party h istorio-
graphy suggests, to a massive spo ntaneo us s hi f t of popular 
SUpport to the national front: nor to d ire ct Soviet in ter-
vention a s many had feared, but above a ll to t h e mobilisa-
tion of the s t ate-Party apparatus a nd t o a more l imited 
ex t e nt the apparatuse s of t h e all ied parties , particularly 
t he pPS . 
' The Reactio nary Bloc' 
The Su preme Council of the PSL met o n 6 Oc tober to 
d iscu s s the offer o f a compromis e tha t was no l o nger o n t h e 
t a ble . In his key note s peech Miko~ajczyk made ligh t of the 
expu l sio n o f the PSL f r om the in te r~par ty consultative com-
mitte e t he wee k before, but made p lain his view that a deal 
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was out of the questio n as long as the communists insi sted 
on hegemony . He regarded the issue as one of confide nce 
in his leadership: 
~I should like to emphasise that at least 
as long as I am responsible for carrying 
out the policy of this party , I personally 
will never s i g n an understanding which o n 
our part would allow the PPR and its satel-
lites an entirely unjustified majority . 
You must decide in this matter . If you 
decide differently , I as a loyal member of 
the party will submit to that decision, with-
out however taking any further responsibility 
for the policy of the party . 136 
An attempt by tvycech to keep the question open was over -
whelmingly defeated , attracting only 5 votes against 115 
with two abstentions (including that of Kiernik) . 137 The 
minority bowed to this decision. 
The general tone of Miko~ajczyk ' s speech had been som-
bre . He warned the council that ' without doubt we have 
difficult days ahead of us' and admitted that ' in the 
hearts of some faith in the future had already been sha-
ken' .138 However , he argued that on balance the results of 
the PSL ' s activity had been positive and that it was right 
to carryon with the policy of opposition: 
' The question arises - what next? . . Do 
we really tell ourselves that there is no 
chance? And then what? We know the poli-
tical results we have obtained ; but in the 
conviction that our activity and contribu-
tion remained essential to the interests of 
the Polish state , we know also that we can-
not and must not cease our fight .. . ' .1 39 
The cornerstones of his strategy r emained the same . He 
continued to place faith in the resilience and political 
136 Jutro Polski 15 . 12 . 1946 . 
137 ~ F0371 56447 N13136 . 
138 Jutro Polski 15 . 12 . 1946 . 
139 Jutro Polski 1.12 . 1946 . 
indispensibility of the peasant movement: 
'Is there really no balance on the credit 
side? There is. There is the most impor-
tant achievement, namely that we exist, we 
have survived, we remain active and will 
endure. There is a second: we are t he main 
object of interest; they hate u s a nd rage 
at us but they take account of our existence 
and our position in a great many issues , 
because it is not possible to jump over or 
pass by the presence of the peasantry and 
its representation - the PSL ' .140 
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The resolution passed by the Council declared t ha t i f the 
party remained united 'the unyielding attitude of the p ea-
sant ranks will convince our political oppone n ts of the 
fut'l ' " d ' ,1 41 ~ ~ty of apply~ng v~olence an coerc~on ... Just a 
month before polling day Miko~ajc zyk was still hoping that 
despite the repression the PSL would manage to secure 20-
30 % of the seats . 1 42 
He also continued to believe that interna tional pres-
sure and the danger of internal destabilisation would 
constrain the communists and p revent t h em from taki ng 
effective measures against his party. At t h e Council he 
reaff ' l' k ' h h 143 ~rmed his support for close ~n s w~t t e USSR . On 
10 October he sent a lengthy memorandum to Stalin in a b id 
t o short-circuit the pressure the communists were placing 
on the, PSL. 144 At the same time he called o n the Bri tish 
and Americans to step up economic pressure - pointing out 
that with economic prospects for the c oming year verging 
o n the 'catastrophic' and Soviet aid disappointing , the 
government would soon be forced to turn to the West for 
assistance . 145 But these overtures produced little result . 
1 40 Jutro Polski 8.12 . 1946. 
141 Jutro Polski 1.12.1946. 
142 ~ FO'371 56452 N16 279. 
143 Jutro Polski 8.12.1946. 
144 A translation of the text is in Mikolajczyk The 
Pattern ••. OP e cit ., pp. 339-41. 
145 ~ F0371 56447 N12480. 
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Not only did Stalin ignore the memorandum, but the Soviet 
'advisers' in the security apparatus were reinforced and 
Miko~ajczyk was forced to recognise that the Russians were 
not disposed to intervene on his behalf. 146 Moreover, whe n 
on 18 December Hiko~ajczyk delivered a protest against the 
election malpractices to the three Yalta powers, he was 
dismayed to discover that at first the Americans would not 
accept it. 147 The British and Bliss Lane managed to re-
verse this refusal and a series of exchanges between the 
three Powers began, culminating in the Soviet statement of 
13 January which bluntly rejected the protest and accused 
the PSL of involvement with the underground. 148 
Morale in the party fell as the extent of the repres -
sive measures became apparent and as doubts grew if the 
falSification of the elections could in fact be frustrated. 
r1iko~ajczyk himself had warned the party to expect an ' exo-
du f k ,149 ..J' s 0 the intelligentsia from our ran s anu ~n 
November toyed with the idea of a change of tactics: a boy -
cott of the poll combined with a peasant strike , in other 
words a return to the methods employed to oppo se the 
Sanacja in the 1930s.150 In the end, the party executive 
decided on 8 January to go ahead and contest the elections 
boycotting them only in those constituences where its lists 
had been invalidated. 151 The party seems to have been 
sustained in its resolve by a determination to go down 
fighting and the fact that it c ontinued to enjoy massive 
Support in the country. For although the PSL had suffered 
heavy organisational losses, political forces which had 
hitherto occupied a middle position rallied to the PSL as 
146 ~ F0371 56452 N16280. 
147 Ibid., Nl6289. 
148 A. Bliss Lane I Saw Poland Betrayed (3rd ed ., Bosto n, 
1965) , . pp. 231-37. 
149 Jutro Polski 15.12.1946. 
150 ~ F037l 56451 H1S 238, NlS29S. 
151 Jutro Polski 26.1.1947. 
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the country polarised between the Bloc and the opposition . 
This process was most apparent within the peasant movement 
itself where no significant open opposition to Miko~ajczyk 
developed until after the elections. Even Party hi storian s 
admit that the PSL remained strong in the countryside . In 
Kielce province for instance ' ••• the PSL still had a con-
siderable membership ••• in Ostrowiec constituency its 
strength in autumn 1946 was estimated at about 15 ,0 00 ... in 
Radom constituency at about 10,000 .•. the PSL-ites con-
trolled the majority of commune and village administrator 
appointments in all the constituencies ••. the PSL was a 
relatively numerous organisation during the election period 
'" it still possessed a great many sympathisers in soci -
ety,.152 In Lublin province 'despite a weake ned organi sa-
tion the influence of the peasant right on the countryside 
'I ' 1 ,153 I R / , , 
..•• was stl 1 qUlte arge • n zeszow provlnce ln 
January 1947 8 prefects (out of 17), 120 commune adminis -
trators (out of 120), 900 village administrators (out of 
1 154 / 
,2 44 ) belonged to the PSL. The PPR committee in Gdansk 
province reported on 19 October that it ' could not yet 
speak of a crisis in the local PSL at grassroots level ' .1 55 
Although the party's activists were prevented from opera-
ting in the open , it seems to have continued activity on 
a se ' , , 15 6 Th' ml-conspiratorial bas1s ln many areas . 1S con-
cealed network was sufficiently effective to ensure that 
PSL 1 '5' . 157 ists were presented ln all 2 cons t1tuenc1es . 
The most important ally of the PSL wa s t he Catholic 
152 Naumiuk Pocz~tki. .. Ope cit., pp . 259-60, 263 . 
153 Olszewski PPR •.• Ope cit., p. 298 . 
154 Olszewski Pocz~tki ••• OP e cit., p . 284 . 
155 Wapinski Op e cit., p. 131. 
156 Hillebrandt i Jakubowski Ope cit., p. 429 ; Olszewski 
Poc z ~tki ••• OPe cit., p. 257; Olszewski PPR ... OPe cit ., 
p. 278; Naumiuk Pocz~tki ... OP e cit ., p . 260 . Wojcik 
confirms that the PSL 's electoral organisation operated 
in secre~ , PSL w walce •.• Op e cit. , p . 28 . 
157 Ib id., p. 32. 
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church. The Bishops' September declaration calling on the 
faithful not to vote for parties whose outlook was ' inimi-
cal to ••• Christian morality or the Christian view of the 
World' was followed by a pastoral letter from Hlond on 20 
October which, as he told the British, was intended ' to 
make it quite clear that the voters should vote for the 
Polish Peasant Party although the Episcopate do not feel 
that this party is 100% satisfactory from their point of 
view,.158 Hlond's hostility to the formation of an inde-
pendent Catholic grouping in the Sejm seems to have been 
co I , th ' , 159 nnected with the desire not to sp 1. t e OppOS1. t1.on vote. 
In January the Bishops issued a sharp rebuke to the ' Dzis 
i Jutro' group for weakening the unity of the ' Catholic 
front' and trespassing 
by publicly supporting 
on the prerogative of the hi erarchy 
the Bloc. This was intended as a 
f ' 160 1.nal warning. Also, despite his personal support for 
the Oder-Neisse line, Hlond was unresponsive to government 
suggestions that he should use the opportunity of a lengthy 
visit to Rome at the end of 1946 to mediate between the 
Vatican and Warsaw on the question of recognition of 
Pol d ' ,161 d' t ' an s western front1.er . Accor 1.ng 0 em1.gre sources , 
Hlond 's main preoccupation during his talks in Rome was to 
make preparations for a new wave of pressure on the Church 
and possibly persecution which he expected after the elec-
tions. 162 The Bishops' endorsement of the PSL was accom-
panied at local level by overt and often active support fr om 
163 
the overwhelming majority of the clergy . 
The PSL also received support from the Socialist 
158 ~ F0371 56447 N12483. 
159 Kisielewski op . cit., p . 145 . 
160 Popiel op . cit., pp. 274-75. 
161 ~ Ambasada RP Paryz A46:1 . 
162 Ibid ., Ambasada RP vlatykan A44 48:2 (1947) 2 . 
163 Olszewski Pocz~tki ... op . cit., p. 282; Naumiuk 
POCzatki ... op. cit., pp . 263-64, 269 . 
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followers of Zygmunt Zu~awski who stood as an indepen de nt 
On the PSL list in Krak6w city . It was hoped to run inde-
pendent Socialist candidates in Lodz and Cz~stochowa too , 
but the PSL lists in both cities were invalidated. 
The PSL's other ally was the underground opposition. 
For although the party condemned the armed undergro und a nd 
vigorously denied the communists ' allegations that the two 
movements were linked , as we have seen, in social a nd poli-
tical terms the~e was much common ground betwee n the PSL 
and the illegal opposition and to an important degree t he 
strategies of each of the movements depended on the exist-
ence and activity of the other. The communists undoubtedly 
exploited the presence of the underground to justify re -
pression of the PSL, but it is clear that the armed res is-
tence was a major obstacle to the communists in the small 
towns and villages, where it gave teeth to the wider 
oPPosition movement. Beyond this, the PSL argued that its 
eXistence as a legal opposition kept the underground i n 
check and that the suppression of the party would be fol-
lowed by a violent destabilisation of the sort that had 
occurred in spring 1945. Miko~ajczyk to ld the October party 
Council that he wished to 
'emphasise what even our opponents must 
recognise, that the existence and sacri-
fices of the Polish Peasant Party protect 
Poland from chaos, and maybe from fratricidal 
struggle, because they sustain t he belief 
of ~illions of citizens that it is s till 
possible and necessary to resolve political 
problems through legal means • . . I fear that 
the aim of those who call for the banning 
of the PSL is not the normalisation of 
relations in this country , but the o utbreak 
of internal disorder so that by bloodshed 
they can achieve totalitarian power' . 164 
There is ample evidence that the underground remained 
a force to be reckoned with in many parts of t he country in 
the second half of 1946. More supporters of t h e govern-
ment, troops and officials were killed by t he armed 
16 4 Jutro Polski 8.12.1946. 
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underground in the summer and autumn of 1946 t ha n at any 
time since early 1945. One estimate puts the total member-
ship of the underground, including small groups and loosely-
linked organisations at approaching 100,000 at the end of 
1946. 165 Although full-scale offensive operations by the 
gUerillas became rather less common as the year wore on , 
they did not cease. 166 Indeed the presence of the under-
ground remained a major problem for the communists in the 
eastern and central provinces. In Kielce province for 
instance: 
the armed underground sharply increased 
its activity after the referendum •... In 
July in Pincz6w district, it destroyed the 
offices of 18 commune committees , murdered 
several Party activists and beat up about 
60 others. Even the district committee 
offices in Pinczow were closed temporarily 
fo r fear of terrorist attacks. In Cz~sto­
chowa district too almost the entire Party 
organisation was terrorised. Commune c om-
mittees and village circles of the Party 
did not meet and their secretaries and 
members •.. went into hid ing or sought help 
from the district committee. The terror 
of the reaction was particularly evident 
in Kozienice,.Radom and I~za districts ..•. 
The head of the agricultural section of the 
Kielce provincial commi ttee of the PPR wrote 
that "in these districts Party members live 
in fear of their lives a nd property ; they 
very rarely visit their homes and keep o n 
the move . If the reaction continues to ter-
rorise our members it will be difficult 
165 L. od~iemie zbro'ne w latach 1945-
19~8 , Z dziej w ' Pols)~i Ludo~eJ (Warsaw, 196? ), p . 385 . 
Us~ng Ministry of the Inter~or data , F . K ub~ca has cal -
~ulated that some 60,000 people belonged to armed groups 
~n 1946 (compared with 80,000 in 1945 a nd 46,000 i n 
1947), Czapla W walce ••• op . cit., pp . 193 - 94 . Wali-
chnowski points out that this must be a n underestimate 
of the numbers involved in the underground (which exten-
ded beyond the military organi sations) as a whole , 
Walichnowski op. cit., p. 332 . Some 55,000 people gave 
themselves up in the amnesty i n spring 1947 . 
166 For examples, guerill as attacked St Michael ' s prison in 
Krak6w on 18 August, releasing more than 200 prisoners , 
PRO F0371 56446 NI0746; o n 24 September about 20 KBW 
troops and militia were killed in an ambush by gueril -
las comma nded by Hieronim Dekutowski (' Zapora '), Caban 
contd .•. 
to get them to carry out the duties they 
will be assigned in connection with the 
forthcoming elections"!.167 
In Lublin province: 
I ••• the organisation went through a period 
of stagnation between April and autumn 1946 
in terms of the growth of its membership. 
In the villages of ~uk6w district, PPR 
members continued to conceal their member-
ship of the Party. As a result of under-
ground terror and the inability of the 
district authorities to organise members 
who had signed up, there was a complete 
break-down of contact between the PPR 
district committee and the rural areas. 
Many of the most active PPR members fled 
to the western and northern territories ... 
some went into hiding in other provinces; 
the district committee was in touch with 
60 members (out of 230), losing contact 
with the others for more than a year. A 
similar situation existed in several other 
areas controlled by the underground. In 
response to pressure from Party organisa-
tions the provincial committee of the PPR 
agreed not to send instructors to them in 
case this would reveal them to the 
neighbourhood l •168 
Finally, in Warsaw province, the PPR provincial committee 
reported late in 1946 that: 
Contd •.. 
IFrom September the activity of the bands 
has increased, reaching unprecedented inten-
sity. Innumerable attacks, with robberies 
and assaults are directed against Party 
members and the public security organs. 
The attacks have taken on a mass character. 
For instance in Sokolow and Gostynin dis -
tricts where they are more and more audacious, 
i Machocki OPe cit., p. 375; lViN units commanded by 
IJastrz~bl carried out a series of daring raids on 
towns in Lublin province between late October and the 
end of December, ibid., p. 380, walichnowski ' op . cit., 
p. 228. 
167 Naumiuk PPR ... op. cit., pp. 424 -25. 
168 Olszewski PPR .•• op. cit., p . 164. 
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e.g. a 3D-strong band attacked the town 
of Wyszkow and roamed around it fo r 24 
hours ••• ,169 
In the event, the underground did not prove to be a 
major disruptive factor in the elections. 17D By January 
1947 gueri11a activity had declined very significa n tly 
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(see Figure Two and Table Twelve). Party hi storians argue 
that the social base of the movement collapsed as the elec-
tions approached. According to this view popular revulsion 
with 'mass atrocities' committed by the underground, 
growing support for the Bloc and the increased effective-
ness of security operations against the guerillas combined 
to undermine its hold on the villages and s mall towns . 171 
In fact there seem to have been three mai n reasons why it 
was unable to respond to the communists' electio n offe n-
sive . First, there was in practice little that the u nder-
ground could do to affect the outcome of the elections , 
which depended above all on the effectiveness of the 
c ommunists' control over the electoral apparatus . Given 
the presence of the army, security forces a nd ORMO , it was 
a relatively straightforward task for the PPR to ensure the 
polling stations were defended from attack and to control 
the conduct of the voting and the count. Secondly , the 
underground seems to have been ser i ously weake ned by the 
secu r ity forces' operations in t h e period before t he elec-
tions. Although Party his t orians attribute the upsurge of 
underground activity in September- November to an ' offensive ' 
by the underground,172 it seems more probable t hat many of 
the incidents occurred as the security forces stepped up 
their activities . During October and November i ncomplete 
169 B. Dymek P i erwsze lata wtadzy ludowej na Mazowszu , 
Kurp i ach i Podlasiu 19 44 - 1948 (Warsaw , 1978) , p . 158 . 
170 The underground carried out 40 attacks o n members of 
electoral commissions on 71 polling stations duri ng the 
election campa ign, Walichnowski Op e cit ., p . 243 . 
171 Ibid. , p. 222 . 
172 Smosarski OP e cit ., p. 388 . 
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figures show that over 2,500 'members of the armed under -
ground' and suspects were arrested, and 344 killed in 
clashes with security units. 173 The GOPs arrested some 
5 174 ,000 more and killed 214 in December and January . The 
losses were particularly heavy in the political and mili-
tary leadership of the movement. The president of WiN , 
Niepok6~czycki and 17 other members of the supreme c ommand 
were arrested on 18 October. A new supre me command unde r 
Wincenty Kwiecirtski was rounded up in early January . WiN 
networks in the provinces were also devastated by arrests . 
In Lublin province, 879 ~\TiN members were uncovered in 
September and October. Amongst those arrested were the 
deputy-commander and propaganda chief of the province , 2 
area, 7 district, 4 sub-district and 13 local c omma nders , 
the commanders of 3 armed units and 19 li aiso n officers . 175 
WiN provincial commands in BycgosZcz , Katowice, Olsztyn a nd 
. 176 Bla~ystok were rounded up between September and December. 
The National Party networks in Krakow, Rzeszow , Gdansk and 
Bydgosz cz were broken by arrests in t he sec o n d half of 
1946 and the national leadership was detained in De c e mber , 
bringing an end to the activity of the party in poland . 177 
Th~~e factors and the sheer practical difficulty of 
conducting guerilla activity in har s h winter c o nditio ns no 
dOubt account for much of the fall-off of vio le nce in 
December and January. But, thirdly, political considera-
tions were also important. Much of t h e former AK under-
ground, notably WiN , had seen its struggle as complementary 
to the legal opposition and had pinned i ts hopes o n t h e 
election. Armed resistance was primarily smal l-scale and 
defensive in purpose. The raison d ' etre of t h e movement 
was not to mount a guerilla insurrectio n agai nst the 
173 Walichnowski op. cit., p. 223 . 
174 TUrlejska W walce •.• op. cit., p . 30 . 
175 Caban i Machocki op. cit., p. 122. 
176 Czapla W walce .•• op. cit., p. 71; Woj nowski op . cit ., 
p . 139; t-1aj ecki op . cit., p . 168. 
177 Pilacinski op . cit., p. 219. 
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Table Twelve 
Acti vi ty of tl1_~ Armed_I!nd~l"9"round, 1946_47178 
Nonth ' Terrorist ' Robberies Total 
Attacks 
Jul 1946 355 569 924 
Oct 1946 324 890 1214 
Nov 1946 369 9 71 1340 
Dec 1946 316 550 866 
Jan 1947 213 287 500 
Feb 1947 195 369 564 
Har 1947 463 
Killings on the 
Government Side 
356 
234 
27 1 
ll7 
179 
125 
104 
w 
w 
(Xl 
339 
communists which had no chance of succeeding against such 
unfavourable military odds, but to sustain the spirit of 
oPposition to the PPR and ensure that the elections were 
conducted fa ;rly.179 h . ht' d • Even t e more rlg -wlng un erground 
groups which looked to the National Party or the Government-
in-Exile were sceptical about the value of widescale armed 
activity . The command of the military arm of the National 
Party, the NZW , had unanimously recommended the suspension 
of guerilla activity as early as March 1946. 180 The 
Government-in-Exile was flatly opposed to armed struggle , 
fearing that the communists would take advantage of this to 
provoke an insurrectionary outburst before the e l ections . 
In a declaration t o the homeland issued in October 1946 it 
called on guerilla units to leave the forests . While urg-
ing passive resistence, it warned against ' armed action , 
wh ich in present circumstances can bring nothing except 
defeat', adding that ' the Polish question . .. is organically 
linked with the overal ly political situation of the post-
war world. That situation contains within it the seeds 
of inevitable changes ••. preserve those forces essential 
for survival ' .1 81 With the defeat of Miko~ajczyk and the 
consolidation of the communists ' hold o n power a large part 
of the eX- AK l eft the underground during the amnesty in 
FebruarY- April 1947. But few of them were permanently 
reconciled to the new order and between 1948- 56 many suf-
fered persecu tion . Those diehards who did not take advan-
tage of the amnesty in some cases continued guerilla activity 
into the 1950s; others who believed that conflict between 
East and West was inevitable t h ought in terms of conserving 
th . . 182 elr strength for more favourable tlmes . 
1 7 9 See page 202 . 
180 Pilacinski OP e cit. , p . 219 . 
181 ~ P RM E/2 0. 
182 For underground activity after 1947 , see Walichnowski 
~p. cit., Chap . 9 ; Caban i Machocki OP e cit. , S . Wa~ach 
Swiadectwo tamtym dniom (Krak6w , 1974) and By~ w 
Polsce czas ... (Krak6w , 3rd ed ., 1978) , Kluz OP e cit. ,; 
Majecki Op e cit. , Chap . 7. 
340 
The decline of the armed underground was d u e not to 
any sudden collapse of its social base as the elections 
approached . 
early 1947. 
The underground remained a major force until 
It was the crushing of the PSL which destroyed 
the political environment in which its activity had made 
sense in 1945-46. 
The lines on which the country polarised at the e nd of 
1946 were essentially the same as the divide whic h h ad 
existed in early 1945 before the formation of the Govern-
ment of National Unity. Ranged against the ' Lublin ' parties 
was a broad opposition movement which despit e its interna l 
differences was united by its refusal to accept communist 
leadership of the government. This moveme n t embraced t h e 
mainstream peasant movement, almost in its e n tirety , the 
Church and the overwhelming maj ority of the Catholic camp , 
the underground remnants of the AK and the National Party 
and a significant part of t he Socialist party . There is no 
dOubt that in 'free and unfettered ' e l ections the PSL would 
have secured a landslide majority . As it was , Miko~ajczyk 
lost the struggle for powe r but ensured t hat th e PPR was 
unable to rest that power on the broad l y -based national 
front which the Party had endeavoured to create since 1942 . 
The Elections 
By January 1947 the local organisation of the PSL had 
been 'broken, dispers ed a nd paralysed ' in many areas . 
Nonetheless, the party still made i ts presence felt not 
only in its rural redoubts, but also in urban centres . In 
Warsaw, the PSL: 
'campaigned vigorously •.• mainly by means 
of whispered propaganda a nd gatherings in 
private apartments and in front of churches . 
PSL members also distributed a great deal of 
literature , pu t up posters a nd organised 
public meetings •.•. Clashes betwe~n PPR and 
PSL canvassers were freque n t ,. 183 
183 Hi l lebrandt i Jakubows k i op . ci t ., p . 381 . 
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In Lublin students of the Catholic University organised a 3-
day strike which also spread to secondary schools and the 
secular university.184 In Silesia where t h e PSL was unable 
to distribute leaflets legally it found other means : in 
B~dzin literature was given out in a cinema while a film was 
Showing. 18S In Wroc~aw province: 
'slogans calling (on the electors) to vote 
for the PSL appeared on the walls of K~odzko 
on 17 January ..• leaflets also appeared in 
Jelenia Gora and Dzierzoniow. The next day 
more PSL leaflets showed up in Nilicz , LWDwek , 
Trzebnica, Jelenia G6ra, Strzelin, Zgorzelec , 
Zagan and other districts .•• t h e culprits 
were not found' .186 
In Katowice in the last week before the election t he PSL : 
'obtained a couple of lorry-loads of propa-
ganda material and sent out t heir people to 
post it up in the centre. The material was 
put up around the clock. The PPR organised 
a day and night rota in reply: as soo n as a 
PSL poster appeared it was torn down '. 187 
In the countryside the PSL was p revented from campaigning in 
many districts, but in some it had greater s uccess . In 
Rzeszow province, for example, it b nly managed to conduct 
its campaign on a mass scale in Krosno , ~ancut and part of 
Gorli c e districts. 188 In Lublin province : 
'the PSL was not able to organise mass propa-
ganda in consti t ue ncies 16 ( Zamosc) and 17 
(Che~) at all and essentially conducted 
individual campaigning o nly •.. the party 
achieved wider activity in constituency 18 
(Siedlce) where it organised public meetings . 
184 01szews k l.' ' t 310 . PPR ... op . Cl. ., p . . 
1 85 Rechow l.' cz ' b Cl.' t P 136 Pl. e rwsze wy ory ... op . . ,. . 
196 P , 
aSl.erb Ruch ... op . cit., p. 152. 
187 Rechowl.' cz ' b ' t P Pl.erwsze wy ory ... op . Cl. ., . 136 . 
188 01szewskl.' , ' t 281 Pocz~tkl. •.. op . Cl. ., p . . 
A considerable part of the local governme n t 
administration was drawn into the campaign 
on behalf of the PSL in this area ,. 189 
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The difficulties which faced the PSL may b e il l ustrated 
by the experience of the Bia~ystok provincial c ommit tee o f 
the Party of Labour, which was regarded as part of t h e l oyal 
oPposition and therefore presumably treated mo r e to l e r a n tly 
than the PSL itself. Its report to Wars a w on th e prog r ess 
of the election campaign dated 16 January is wo r t h quoti ng 
at lenqth: 
'Despite immense difficulties, the campa i q n 
has developed extremely well and auqur s t he 
very best results. The local inhabit a n ts 
scramble for SP votinq cards. On acco un t 
of the success of our campaiqn at the local 
level, hindrance from representat ives of the 
Bloc parties and the security orga ns has 
increased. SP posters are torn down o r 
covered up by the ZWM as soon a s t hey are 
put up and the only possibility that r emains 
is direct leafletinq at the d oo r step , at mar -
kets and in front of churches. In additio n, 
a number of people have been persecuted or 
given the sack for stating that t h ey are 
qoing to vote for the SP list. Amo ng others , 
engineer Budryk, who although no t a party 
member , said he was going to vote for l ist 
number 2, was sacked from the Bia~ys tok power 
station. 
Because small businessmen are join i ng the 
SP, several craftsmen have be e n arrested in 
the past few days, amongst others t he President 
of the chamber of commerce, Krukowski a nd 
Wojtasz . It is said that Krukowsk i has been 
released. 
In addition, on 16 January 19 47 whi le he 
was giving out the party ' s e ve of poll leaf -
lets in the market place o f Wysoki e r~azowieck ie , 
several individuals claiming to belo ng to the 
un came up to tHodzimier z Gu s t y n, inspecte 
his identity card , took him o ut s i de the t own, 
too k all the party ' s propagand a a nd hur n t it , 
after which they beat up Gu s t y n se verely and 
told him not to show hims e l f ih the district 
again . Besides beating him , t hey took all his 
documents . The Provincial Commit tee has reported 
this incident to the Mi l itary Procu rato r . 
1 89 Olsz e ws k i PPR ... op. cit., p. 310 . 
Despite our g~eat success, the Provinci a l 
Committee cannot guarantee how the el e c tion s 
will turn out since up to now not o ne of our 
tellers has been authorised (to atte nd t he 
count - J.R.), so that the Party h as no pos -
sibility of checking the result s of the 
election' .190 
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On polling day, January 19, the authori t i es d i d their 
utmost to ensure that voting was open. Th e co nd uct of the 
poll in Zory in Upper Silesia as repo rted b y t h e local 
circle of the SP was probably fairly t ypical : 
'There were no screens at all in the po l ling 
stations. The voting itsel f t ook place i n 
full view. Nobody could avoid vot ing openly . 
Every voter was spied on by PPR members of the 
Electoral Commission, Militi a me n, army officers 
etc .•• the chairman of the Lo c a l Commission 
did not give the envelopes t o t he voters , but 
every voter had to place thei r ba l lot paper in 
the envelope " which the chai r ma n held .in his 
hand with him looking at t he ballot paper they 
had cast. No one but membe r s of t h e PPR sat 
on the Electoral Commissio ns. If someone handed 
over a folded ballot pape r i t was immediately 
taken out of the envelope and unfolded to see 
if the voter had voten f o r a list other than 
number 3 (the Bloc list - J . R.). No- one was 
allowed to fold their bal l ot paper wh ich had 
to be placed in the envelo pe wi t h t he number 
visible. 
Tellers were no t a dmi t t ed because the pre -
fect had refused to s ign t he i r certificates 
of good characte r, despite t he fact t hat the 
HO had given some of them a positive recommen-
dation. Prefect Suchan d i d t hi s deliberately 
so as not to allow any of t he other parties ' 
tellers into the p o lling stations where they 
could interfe re with o pe n voting and witness 
the c ount ... '.191 
The c ommunists considered that o pe n, collective voting had 
been o ne of the most impo r tan t fa c tors in producing a fav -
ou r a ble r e sult. l92 In Kielce province about 90 % of t he 
19U 
191 
CAHSD Akty SP: 
was officially 
c o nstituency. 
Ibid. 
ZG SP Akcja wyborcza 1946 - 47. The SP 
cred i ted wi th 3 . 1% of the votes in this 
192 Uchwa~a Se kreta riatu KC PPR 0 koniecz nosci rozbudow~ 
for~ o r g ani z acy j nych w miejskich i wiejs~ich organ~~ 
zac J ach partyj ny ch, J an ua r y 1947 , ppn ••• ~ 1947 - X~~ 
~ OPe cit., p. 22. 
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of the voters were said to have voted this way.193 In 
Lublin province the proportion seems to have bee n betwee n 
30_45%194 and in Rzesz6w province an average of 30 %, 
chiefly employees of offices, factories and insti t uti ons 
and many villages. 195 According to PSL sources the arrange -
ments made by the Bloc for open voting broke dow n in man y 
196 parts of the country. There is some confirmatio n of 
this in Party sources. Open voting failed in Krak6w, 
Tarnow and other major towns in Krakow province , for ins -
tance. 197 In Rzesz6w and Wroc~aw provinces t here were 
cases of organised open voting for the PSL. 198 I n Kielce 
province where the PSL boycotted the poll after its lists 
had been invalidated the UB estimated that about 10 % of 
the electorate refused to vote. In some are as of the pro -
. l ' d h 19 9 v~nce, however, the entire popu at~on staye at orne . 
But even where the PSL was able to upset t he Bloc ' s voti ng 
arrangements it was unable to loosen i ts hold o n the count . 
This ensured that the PSL was unahle to repeat t h e local 
SUccesses it had achieved in the referendum: in Krakow , for 
example, the official results gave the PSL- Zu! awski list 
only 27 % of the votes. 200 The official re turns for the 
whole country are set out in Table Thirteen . 
How far the real results of the election , let alo ne 
the votes that would have been c as t in ' free and unfettered ' 
elections, differed from the official retur ns is impossible 
to say . PSL tellers witnessed the count through to the e nd 
193 Naumiuk Pocz~tk i •.• op. cit., p . 268 . 
194 Olszewski PPR .•. op. cit., p . 31 2 . 
195 Olszewski Pocz~tki ... op . cit ., p . 286 . 
196 W&jcik PSL w walce .•. op. cit ., p . 34 . 
197 CWik op. cit., p . 200 . 
198 Olszewski Poc z ~tki ... op . cit ., pp . 286 - 87 ; Pasierb 
Ruch •.. op. cit., p . 152; J a nowski PPS ... op . cit ., p . 
125. 
199 Naumiuk Pocz~tki ... op . cit., pp . 268 - 69 . 
200 CWi k op. cit., p . 202. 
Table Thirteen 
Official Results of the Election, 19 January 1947 201 
VOTES ( % ) SEATS 
Democratic Bloc 9,003,682 (80.1) 394* 
PSL 1,154 ,8 47 (10. 3 ) 28** 
Party of Labour 530 , 979 ( 4 .7) 12 
PSL ' Nowe tvyzwolenie ' 397,754 ( 3 .5) 7 
Others 157,611 (1. 4) 3*** 
TURNOUT 89 .9 % 
* PPS 116; PPR 114 ; SL 109; SO 41; SP 5; PSL ' NN ' 5 ; 
others 4. 
** 
*** 
Including Z . Zu~awski, elected as a n independe n t 
socialist . 
Progressive Catholics 
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in only about 100 pollin~ districts. In some 1 , 100 more 
information was obtained from other witnesses. Accordi ng 
to these data, 68 % of the votes were cast for the PSL and 
22 % for the Bloc. 202 At all events , the official returns 
could not change the fact that t~e popul ar base of the com-
munist camp remained much narrowe r than the Party had hoped 
h 203 w .en it embarked on the national fro n t strategy . But 
nor could the PSL figures alter the reality that t he 
elections marked the consolidation of communist rule for 
decades to come. 
' The New Stage' 
The aftermath of the election c onfirmed that the 
struggle for power in Poland had bee n settled , albeit at 
t he co st of alienating the greaty ma jority of PSL suppor -
ters fr om the national front. t-!iko-l'ajc zyk at first refuse 
to accept defeat, rejecting su~gestions from the PPR and 
201 
202 
Go~a Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa ... op . 
Kusmierski op. cit., p. 25 2. 
Wo j cik PSL w walce ... or . ci t ., p . 35 . 
cit ., p . 219 ; 
203 Wri ting in 1971, Zambrowski recal led the 1946 referendum 
a nd the 1947 ele ctions as ' bitter experiences ' for t he 
PPRleadership, Zambrowski Ozi e nnik op . cit ., pp . 92 - 93 . 
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204 PFS that he should leave the country and persevering with 
his policy of uncompromising opposition to the ne w gove rn-
ment . The majority of the party stood with him. The PSL 
supreme council endorsed this line when it met o n 1/2 
February, declaring that the new order was illega l a nd tem-
porary.20S ~1iko~aj czyk and his followers in the Sejm 
assumed a position of outright opposition t o t h e gover nment , 
warning that the country was ungovernable wi t ho u t the PSL 
and that the political tensions and economic d i ffic u lties 
which had been fuelled by the elections would soon propel 
Poland into 'indescribable chaos' and ' ana rchy ' . 206 
But Miko!ajczyk's strategy was in ruins. The PSL ' s 
protests over the conduct of the elections we r e i g nored by 
the authorities. The reaction of the Wes t to t he res u lts 
was confined to some mild economic r e pri sa l s a nd formal 
protests over the non-fulfilment of the Ya l ta agreement . 
The widespread belief - encouraged by M i ko ~ajczyk - that he 
Great Powers would intervene deci s ive l y o n his behalf was 
rudely disappointed . In fact , the We st aba ndo ned ~iko~a­
jczyk without ceremony . The Bri t i s h broke off all con act 
for several months . When Ga ine r , the new British amb ssa-
dor , met Mikoi:aj czyk in tray , he admi t t ed his discomfort : 
' whichever way y ou cut it, we have in effect 
inevitably dropped Miko la j c zyk s ince the 
elections . This of c ourse we d i d deliberately 
first because we wished t o a vo i d embarrassing 
Miko1:ajczyk, and secondly because it seemed 
more politic from our own p o in t of view '. 207 
The PSL had reaffirmed its commi t me n t to close reI tions 
between Po land and the Sovi e t u ni o n , 20S bu t the elec i o ns 
204 ~ F0371 66092 N2923 . 
205 Ibid ., 66091 N1500 . 
206 ~rawozdani e stenogra fic zne ..• OP e cit ., 4 . 2 . 1947 , 
cOl. 37, S . 2.1947, c o l . 60 . 
20 7 ~ F0371, 66093. 
208 Ch~opski S z tandar 9.2.1947 . 
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had made it perfectly clear that the Russi a ns had no f u r -
ther interest in coming to terms with Miko~aj c zyk . The 
party continued to operate l~gally, despite t h e fa c t t hat 
much of its local organisation had been di sso lved or drive n 
into semi-cons~iracy. The leadership s eems t o h a v e hoped 
that it would be possihle to preserve t he ba sic core of the 
party organisation until circumstances impro v ed or a crisis 
developed which would force the communists t o recognise 
that the needed the PSL. However, de spi t e ser i o us economic 
difficulties in early 1947,209 the politica l situation 
was characterised by stabilisation, no t cri s i s . I n June 
the British embassy reported that Poland h a d ' seemed calmer 
in the last three months than at any time s ince 1945 ' . 210 
The Upsurge of political violence which the PSI had warne 
would be the inevitable consequence of i ts suppression did 
not take place. As we have seen, unde r ground activity 
tailed off after the elections; where i t c o n tinued the 
security forces were well able to kee p it in c h eck . The 
PSL itself was allowed little opportuni ty to regro up the 
oPPosition. Attacks by the communist s o n t he party made 
i t s continued functioning as an ind e pe nde nt centre of oppo -
sitio n virtually impossible. ~he p a r ty press was tightly 
censored, in the countryside bra nche s were disbanded , 
premises closed and records d e stroyed , while many leading 
211 
activists were under arrest. 
Moreover, the party was s e ri o usl y split over strategy . 
At the February supreme council Ni e c ko , Wy~ech and Banach, 
Supported by a quarter of the de l egates , demanded that the 
PSL should come to terms with the new regime to salvage 
what it could of the influence of t he peasan t movement . 
The move was defeated but the minor i ty , refusing to bow to 
209 Je z ierski o p. ci t ., p. 98; J . Kali~ski Bitwa 0 handel 
1947-43 ( ~"iarsaw, 1970), pp. 61 -6 8 . 
210 ~ F037l 66093 N6707. 
21 1 J . Fajkowski Z dzia~alnotci ruchu l udowego na ~azurach 
i i"iarmii w lata ch 194 5-19 49, Rocz n ik dziej6w ruchu 
lUdowego 8 (1966), p. 266. 
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the decision, organised themselves into a fa c t i o n kn own as 
the PSL-Lewica (PSL-Left) which beg a n t o pub lish its own 
newspaper, 'Ch~opi i Partstwo'. The r e bels represente d a 
genuine current within the peasant move me n t , drawi ng t he ir 
supporters mainly from its economic, soci a l a n d ed ucatio n a l 
wing which was suffering as the political wing mo v e d 
fUrther and further into opposition. In March t h e l ead ing 
rebels were expelled and in following mo n t h s more e xpul -
sions took place. The 'leftists' carried t heir c ampa i g n t o 
the rank-and-file of the party, but des p ite t h e c rede n t i a l s 
and record of their leaders, seem to h ave e n c o u n t ered 
great difficulty in breaking down the l oyalty of the 
gra ' 'k ",' k' hard ll.' ne . 2 12 ssroots actl.vists to Ml. o~aJczy s 
The flight of Hiko;rajczy k fr om Pol a nd wi t h American 
and British help on 20 October 1 947 bro ug ht a n e nd to t h e 
oPposition activity of the PSL. Th e p a rty rema i ned i n 
e x istence until 1949 und e r the leadership of th e ' left i st ' 
g roup which a ssumed con t r o l of t h e party o rgan i satio n and 
press immediately after Miko~ajc zyk ' s d e partu re . Th e 
c ommunists hoped that t he 'r e bor n PSL ' would hel p to make 
up f o r the deficiencie s o f t he SL as a v e hicl e fo r win n i ng 
peasant support and extend ing the governme nt ' s i nfl u e n ce i n 
the countryside, but little was ach ieved . Some leadi ng 
f igures in the PSL had no t hitherto openly o p posed 
Hiko~ajczyk, such as Czesl-aw Po niecki , pres i dent of t h e 
Kie l ce provincial organisat ion, Andrze j Wito s a nd Kier n ik , 
wh o returned from a visit to the USA to r es ume t h e party 
cr,airmanship, threw in the ir l ot wi t h t h e new execu t i ve . 
But evidence on how fa r the ran k - a nd - file followed heir 
le a d , thoug h very t hin, sug g e st s t hat mo s t members s o od 
al oof from the new organisat i o n. In Ki e l ce provi nc e , fo r 
instance~ PS L membership i n spring 1948 was j ust 2 , 300 -
c o ' 2 13 I 01 mpared with 47,000 t wo years earll.er . n sztyn 
membe r s hip in late 19 48 was o ne te n th of t hat i n l a te 1940 . 214 
2 1 2 See , e .g., Dobieszewsk i i Hemmerling OP e ci t ., pp . 
1 71-72. 
213 N a urn i u k P P R. •• 0 p . c i t. , p p . 3 4 9 , 4 3 9 . 
214 Fajkowski Z dz i a~ al no ~ci ... op . ci t ., pp . 26 1 , 26 7 . 
In Poznat, where at its peak the PSL had ha d be t wee n 40-
70,000 members, by early 1949 it had jus t 5 ,000. 21 5 I n 
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the latter case as Z. Hemmerling admits, ' despi te t he ge ne -
rally favourable attitude of the administ r ative a u t horit i es 
to the reborn PSL, organisational work did no t p rod uce t he 
results expected. The reason for tre lack o f co nfide nce 
was the fact that a dozen or so activists of t he former PSL 
were still in prison. 216 Another facto r was t h e suspic ious 
attitude of local communist and SL act i vists , who despite 
central policy obstructed the revival of t he PSL . 217 Af er 
two years of existence when the 'rebo rn PSL ' was merged 
with the SL to form the United Peasant Party ( Zjed noczone 
Stronnictwo Ludowe - ZSL ) in Novembe r 1949 its verified 
membership was only 25,600. 218 
In the countryside the influe nce of t he PSL oppos i tio n 
remained strong despite the ele c t i o n defeat and the sup-
pression of party activity. A t e ll ing i ndication of the 
failure of the national front t o ge nerate ny fundamental 
shift in allegiances at grassroo t s level was the way that 
PSL supporters continued to dominate t he r u ral local govern -
ment apparatus long after the p a rty orga nisation had ceased 
to function . In PSL strongholds i t t ook two years for the 
communists to establish a grip on t h e lower- level national 
councils. In April 1947 specia l c ommi ssio n s were attached 
to district national councils t o car ry o u t purge . 219 
I n ~Jovemb'er , ~'larsaw issued a new circular complaining . 
that commune councils were still o ver l oaded with Mikotajczyk 
21SCobieszewski i He mm e r l ing Op e c it ., pp . 106 - 07 , 194 . 
216 Ibid ., p. 183. 
217 Dobieszewski i Hemme r l ing Ope cit ., p . 189 ; Uchwa~ 
Sek retariatu KC PPR oceniaj~ca p rzebieg obchod6w Swi~ 
LUdowego, May 1948, PPR .•• i 1947 - xii 1948 OP e cit ., 
pp . 236 - 37 . 
218 J. Fajkowski (ed .) Kr6tki z a rys histori i ruchu ludowego 
(Warsaw , 1969), p . 253 . 
219 ok61 n ik KC PPR w s praw!e Bracy a~minist~acyjno - ~amor- . 
Z ~d owej na terenie p ow1a tow , Apr11 1947 , PPR ... 1 1947 
xii 19 4 8 Op e cit ., p . 73 . 
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supporters, rich peasants and right-wing 'independents '. 
The circular gave detailed instructions on how to e xpel 
such elements and ordered the formation of special Party 
'triumvirates' to reorganise the councils, adding t hat in 
communes where 'there are no Party members at all ', a tri -
umvirate from a neighbouring commune should carry o u t the 
purge. 220 H. S£abek concludes from a study of the repre-
sentation of the various parties in vill age l ocal government 
that despite its losses during 1947, the PSL remained a 
significant force until at least early 1948. In Krak6w , 
even then it had 51% of village administrator s ; in Lublin , 
29 %, in Warsaw, 21%, and as S~abek points out t hi s index to 
some degree underestimates the influe nce of the PSL . It 
was in spring 1948 that the PSL was finally d i slodged fr om 
th . 11 . 221 e V1 age counc11s. 
The liquidation of the peasant opposition le f t a po li -
tical vacuum in the countryside which t he communis s , S L 
and 'reborn PSL' were unable to fill . The Party lacked ny 
grassroots organisation in much of r ura l central and eastern 
Poland . As late as the end of 194 8 PPR cells had been 
established in only 45 % of villages; in B i a~ystok province 
222 85 % of villages had no Party branch . Th e SL remained 
weak and inactive. In September 1947 by which time the PSL 
was no longer a competitor, the paid - up membership claimed 
by the SL was about 180,000 and two years later the SL 
223 
contributed just 230,000 members to t he 7.SL . Consider -
ing the inducements offered to jo in, this was a Ear cry fr om 
the 500 to 800 thousand members belonging to the PSL at 
220 OkClnik Sekretariatu KC PPR w sprawie r eo rgani zac j i 
gminnych rad narodwy ch, November 1947 , PPR ... i 1947 
xii 1948 op. cit., p. 162-66 . 
22 1 Ryszka op. cit., pp . 262-66. 
222 Szczeblewski Problemy rozwoju ... op . cit ., pp . 29 - 30 . 
Gomu~ka told the June 1948 plenum that t he Party had 
still to over c ome the probl e m of orga nising itself in 
the c ountrys i de . He admitted t hat ' o ur Party does no t 
sit in the countryside, or sits weakly ... ', Przemowi e ni e 
tow . Wies~awa ... op . cit., p. 69 . 
223 Fajkowski Kr6tki zarys ... op . cit ., p. 253 . 
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its peak. The great majority of PSL sUpporters ref used 
to compromise, replacing the active oppositio n of 194 5-46 
with passive disengagement from politics. A few weeks 
after the elections Zambrowski admitte d t h e p r ob l e m i n 
terms which laid bare the deep gulf between th e Party a nd 
rural opinion: 
'despite the defeat of the reaction a nd th e 
PSL in the elections, the seeds of t h e i r 
ideology still weigh on the conscio u s ness 
of the peasant masses. Distrust o f the 
working class, political sepa r a ti o n from t he 
town, unwillingness to c ontribute t h r o ug h 
contingents to the reconstruc t i o n of the 
democratic state, a selfish a nd veg e tat i ve 
attitude to economic pro ble ms , a pathy a nd 
hostility towards the momentum for re form 
of the progressive forces o f th e nat i o n, 
suspicion towards the politica l i dea s of 
peace and democracy - all these a nd similar 
failings disseminated by th e PSL in t he 
countryside will exe rt t h e ir i nflue nc e o n 
the outlook of the p e asan t masses f o r a l o ng 
time to c ome ,.2 24 
The brittle character of t he agreeme nt made betwee n 
the PPR and PPS in Novembe r 19 46 be c a me o hvi o us af ter th e 
elections . As we have seen, t h e PPS viewed the e l e c t i o n 
offensive as a historical ne cess i ty , justifi ed in o r der to 
avoid what it regard e d as t he poten t i a lly dis as tro us c o nse -
quences of a PSL victory. With t h e ele c tio ns out of th e 
way and the struggle for power resolved , t he So cial is ts be-
lieved that the government camp s h ould r e sume its efforts 
to win over a broad base o f popu lar s uppo rt f or soc i l i s m 
by Offering a moderate and plura l istic e co nomi c a nd po lit -
ical programme and relaxing t he e xceptio na l r epressive 
measures that they had d e emed ne c es sary d u r i ng h e elect i o ns . 
I n essence , the PPS f avo ured tak ing up again h e bro ad 
national fron t stra tegy where i t had be e n l eft of i n late 
1946 . 
In the post-el e c t i o n discu ss i o ns o f t he Po li s h r o ad 
224 R. Zambrowski Na nowym e t ap i e Nowe drog i 194 7 n r . 2 , 
p. 13 . 
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to socialism the PPS argued that it should proceed in 
broadly evolutionary fashion on t he basis of popular c o n-
sent. Though rejecting classical parliame ntary democracy , 
the Socialists proclaimed the strengthening of social c o n-
trol o ver political and economic institutio ns and the 
safeguarding of the rights of the individual vis-a-vis th e 
state as fundamental features distingui s hing the ' Po lish 
road' from the dictatorship of the proletariat . 225 In the 
economic sphere the PPS stood by the three - secto r model in 
which the private and co-operative sectors would pl ay a 
major part alongside state e nterp rise . Th e r o ad t o soc i -
lism would be determined, but gradual . Work should begi n 
o n laying the foundations 'at the quickest possible tempo , 
but that tempo should not be achi eved at the c o s t of 
excess ive (original emphasis) social effort , o f some kind 
of new revolutionary upheaval, of demands beyo nd t he c ap a-
. 226 Clty of the present generation'. The fun d am e n tal c o nd i-
tion for the construction of socialism was tha t 
'the majority of the popu lation wa n t e d i t 
and that it was achieved i n a way th a t 
suited its wishes, traditions , way of t hink-
ing, cultural relations and so on . In o ther 
words , we do not aim to repeat the c ou rse of 
the Russian revolution , which for Po land 
would be incorrect, for Poles would be 
unsuitable, and - what is more impo r ta n t - in 
the historical circumstances of t oday woul d 
be inapplicable,.227 
In Socialist eyes, t he rol e of the nati o nal fr o n t a nd of 
t h e PPS in particul ar was, as before , to secu re t he a c ive 
support of the widest possible sectio n of socie t y . Th 
government c amp should welcome o penly al l t hose who were 
prepared to work for t he reconstructio n of Pola nd o n 
225 J . Hochfeld Problematyka nowego okresu P rzeg l ~d Socj al i -
styczny 1947 nr. 3 (17) , pp . 4- 9 . 
226 S . Szwalbe Na nowym etapi e Pr z egl~d Socj a l istyc z ny 1947 
(17), p. 3 . 
227 Ibid ., p. 3 . 
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' democrat ic' lines , with party affiliation a nd ideolog ical 
allegiance very much a secondary consideratio n. Hochfeld 
eXpressed this attitude when h e wrote that: 
'the role of non-party citi zens , who work 
and think honestl" - even if sometimes 
critically - mu~t increase ••. we ne ed the 
a c tive participation of all citi zens ' . 228 
As for its own role, the PPS stood for strict obser-
vance of the Novembe r 1946 'un ity of activity ' pact , 
emphaSiSing that c o - operation s houl d be o n a n equal basis 
and that each party should respect the indepe nd e nce and 
organisational integrity of the other. The Socialists 
reaffirmed their c ommitment to eventual unific atio n with t he 
communists , but insisted t ha t this had to be preceeded by 
a gradual - and bilateral - process of deepening collabor-
ation and ideological convergence . It would be ' a long -
term pro cess' which 'could not be by-passed artifically ' 
229 
o r ' accelerated by any kind of pressure'. In sum , t he 
PPS leaders saw no reason to modify in any major way the 
general strategy which they had pursued co nsistently since 
the e n d of the war and which for much of t h at time the 
c ommunists had also proclaimed . 
However , the communists did not c o ntemplate a return 
to the broad national front of mid-1 944 or mid-1945 . Th e 
Pa rty ' s evol ution away from thi s a pproach towards the us e 
of fo rce had been a response to its inabili ty to undermin e 
the OPpos ition by non-coe rcive means . The communists were 
acute ly aware t hat the election offensiv e had not solve 
this d il emma . They rejected the Socialists ' view that , s 
Gomul:ka put it 
' ... the electoral victory of t h e democratic 
bloc has automatically solved all the problems 
o f the further cons tr uc tion of People ' s Poland ; 
t hat the work ing class a nd democratic govern -
ment are no longer threatened by any anger ; 
t hat the reaction in Poland h as disappeared , 
228 Robotnik 11.2 . 1947. 
229 S . S zwalbe Na nowym etapie Przegl~d Socjalistyczny 1947 
nr . 3 ( 17), pp . 3 - 4 . 
or at least has been so weakened that its 
existence is hardly to be seen; that in 
short the elections have solved the prob-
lem of class struggle in Poland'.230 
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Force - 'the class struggle' - was essential , for the oppo -
sition in spite of its setbacks was still a real threat to 
the new order: 
' ••• despite its electoral defeat, th e reac-
tion continues to represent a seriou s danger 
to the people's power and with favourable 
circumstances could rapidly recover its 
strength .•• any underestimation of the 
strength of the reaction and its potential 
by party organisations and the state apparatu s 
should be regarded as harmfu l ' . 231 
Th is sense of the insecurity of t he foundati o ns of the new 
government in terms of popular support , shaped the strategy 
of the PPR as it crystalli sed in 19 47. The strategy was 
in es sence a continuation and devel opment of the aggressive , 
hardl ine stance of 1946, applied to the tasks o f elimina-
ting the in f luence of the ' reaction ' in society a nd pre -
paring the ground for t he ' Polish road to Social ism '. The 
Party 's principal task was to press on with the campaig n 
it had launched in September 1946 : 
'to mobilise all the parties of the democra-
tic bloc for the f u rther march forward o n 
the road t o Peopl e ' s Democracy , to th e 
consolidation and development of our soc i al 
system •.•. After the victory , after the 
destructio n of the e nemy , o ur party must 
not rest o n its laurels since this wo uld give 
t he enemy i~2 opportuni ty to regenerate i s 
strength' • 
230 Gomu~ka Przem6wi e nie wyg~szone na akademii pierws zo -
m~jowej w Warszawie, 30 . 4 . 1947 , Artyku!y ... Vo l . II OP e 
Cl. t ., p. 412 . 
231 Gomu~ka Z przemowienia na plenum Kom i tetu Ce n tra l nego 
PPR , 13.4.1947 r , Artykuty ... Vol . II OP e cit ., p . 391 . 
232 Ibid~ , p . 388 . 
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The communists still claimed that the n e w order rested 
on a broad front of workers, peasants, wor k ing intelligen-
ts' d I' , d f 233 1a an , to a 1m1te extent, cra tsmen . I n pract i ce , 
however, they looked to the state appa ratus a n d t h e Party 
to drive Poland towards Socialism. Less a nd l ess emp hasis 
was placed on the national front . This i s not to say that 
the communists abandoned the national pla tform. The 
Polishness of the PPR was strongly underl ined i n 1947 . Bu t 
the stress was on the Party itself as a n a c t ive , d i sci-
plined, ideologically-committed movement wh ich would be 
able to carry the Polish revolution forwa r d desp i te its 
limited support amongst the nation as a wh o l e . The prio -
rity was no longer to draw forces outs ide t h e Democra ic 
Bloc into the government camp, but to e n s u re that the zeal 
of the Bloc parties was not dilute d by ideologically alien 
elements and to break the influence of s uch forces in 
society. 
The central role which the c ommuni sts expected the 
state appratus to play in the buildi ng of Socialism was 
made very clear in the exchanges be twee n the two workers ' 
parties over the character o f th e ' Polish road ' i n the 
Qo nths following the elections . In referring to the state 
apparatus both sides had in mind, p r incipally , the ' appar-
atus of state coercion', in other words the security 
forces . 23 4 Replying to Hochfe l d ' s c all for ' institutio n I 
checks' on the power of th e state b ureaucracy , Roman Werfel 
stated the Party's view that , for all t h e differe nces be-
tween the 'Polish r oad ' and t he c lass Marxist - Leninist 
path to Socialism : 
' ... the fundamen t al question for the victory 
of the work ing class remains the problem of 
breaking up the old bo urgeois pparatu s nd 
putting in its p l ace t h e workers ' ow n appar-
atus - o r in coun t rie s suc h as Polan - a 
2 33 R . Werfel Istota naszego pa~s twa i probl e m biurokra-
t yzmu, Nowe drogi 1947 nr . 3 , p . 118 . 
23 4 I b id., p . 114 . 
state apparatus of all the common people 
(ogblno - ludowy) which will d e f e nd t he 
people's power against e very atte mpt to 
overthrow it ' .235 
Far from limiting the state, Wer f el d e clared t h at 
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' ••• we must strengthen, expand , improve a nd 
make more efficient the sta t e app aratu s ... 
we must not do anything which mig h t weak e n 
or undermine it, or reduc e i ts significance ... , 2 3 6 
As for the danger of the bureaucracy l osi ng contact with he 
people, Werfel argued that this was not i n herent in t he 
nature of the state , but arose f r om t h e h uma n a nd i deo l og i-
cal vestiges of the old bourgeois order . It wo u ld c ease to 
be a problem as the old ideo logy was rooted o u t a nd cadres 
drawn from the work ing clas s e s were dra f ted in . 237 I n t he 
meantime it could be comba ted ' o n ly o n t he ba s i s of stren~th-
, 23 8 
enl.ng the apparatus of the p eop le ' s state '; ' i nstitu-
tl.' 1 h ' , 1 h f 1 23 9 ona c ecks' would be p o sl. t l.ve y arm u . On grou nds 
bo th of t heory and p ractic a l politics , t h e communi sts saw 
securi t y appa r atus, _ powerful and unfe tte r ed (excep t by Party 
control) , as indispensible . 
The other pillar o f 'P eopl e ' s Po land ' wo ul d be the 
Party . This would not be t h e PPR of 1946 , but t h e n e w un i -
t ed Par ty formed fro m the merger of the PPR a nd t h e PPS . 
Th e April 1947 Plenum iden t i f i ed t h e r e l a tio n s hip of t he 
t wo par t ies as the key fa c tor i n Po l a nd ' s dev elopme n t a nd 
initiated campaig ns to prepare the PPR to accommodate the 
PPS and to break down resi stanc e with i n t h e PPS to ' orga nic 
unif ica t io n~ After t h e P lenum , r e crui t ment to he PPR was 
r e ine d back and a ve rificat i o n a nd vetting of he existing 
235 R. tve rf e l ./ i Eroblem biurokra-I stota naszego 2an stwa 
t ;r:zmu, Nowe d r og i 1 94 7 nr . 3 , p . 118 . 
236 Ib i d ., p . 1 2 2. 
23 7 I bid . , p . 1 25 . 
238 I b id . , p . 1 25 . 
23 9 Ib i d . , p . 1 30 . 
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membership was carried out. 240 The 'declared aim was to 
transform its following 'from a party of PPR sympathisers 
into a party of PPR members; moving the focus from indices 
of . 1 h 1 .. ", 2 41 numer~ca growt to qua ~tat~ve cr~ter~a . At the 
same time the Central Committee launched a major programme 
of political education designed to 'strengthen the ideolo-
gical backbone' of PPR members, and in par ticu lar to find 
242 and train potential cadres to reinforce the Party aktyw . 
Initially, the communists' pressure on the PPS to make a 
serious start on the process leading to merger met fierce 
oPposition. From June onwards, the PPS leadership accepted 
the principle, but fought a rearguard action to defer the 
actual merger as long as possible. In r-1arch 1948 Cyra n!~i e ­
wicz abruptly changed course and agreed on hehalf of the 
PPS that the merger should begin. In December - after 
further delay caused by the leadership crisis in the PPR _ 
the Polish United Workers' Party (Pol ska Zjednoczona Partia 
Robotnicza - PZPR) was formed. 
As the leading role of the Party was underli ned a nd 
the independence of the PPS curbed, the s i g ni ficance of th 
national front decreased. The stress laid o n ideological 
criteria in recruitment to the PPR was echoed in the other 
parties of the Democratic Bloc . Recruitment had Con inued 
On a mass scale in the first months after the electio n , 
but the communists suspected the motive s or at least the 
political commitment, of many of those who jumped o n he 
bandwagon. 243 The April Plenum reversed the ' o pen doors ' 
POlicy of the previous two years . Great emphasis was 
240 
241 Ka ntyka Na drodze ... OP e cit ., p . 293 . 
242 Gomu~ka Z przem6wienia na plenum Komite~u Centralnego 
~R, 13.4.47, Artyku.ry ... Vol. II OP e c~t ., p . 395 . 
243 R. Zambrowski Na nowym etapie Nowe drogi 1947 nr . 2 , 
p . 14 . 
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placed on the danger of infiltration of the Democratic Bloc 
by 'reactionary' elements, which it was claimed were 
attempting to subvert the national front from wi t hin . 244 
Forces in society which the Party had sough t to co - exist 
with since 1944, notably the Church, now came under attack . 
At the April Plenum Gomu!ka c~lled for a r ooti ng-out of 
the old, harmful and up to now o nly par-
tially combated historical traditio ns , t he 
daily impregnation of the nati o n' s spirit 
with reactionary ideology by the Chur ch ; the 
education of youth, especially university 
youth, according to old idealist and reac-
tionary academic conceptio ns •.. ,24 5 
By the second half of 1947 campaigns were underway in the 
schools and higher education. The aim was to evolve 
' Marxist teaching methods to destroy the ruinous influe nce 
o f the reaction on children and working clas s youth (and) 
to develop in them a socialist view of t h e world ... , 246 By 
September the Episcopate was expressing its disquiet a t 
what it consid ered was a ' de liberately directed hidde n 
struggle with God and the Church ' a nd cal led the Faithful 
to its defence . 2 47 The same radical a nd aggressive stance 
on the part of the PPR was seen in many other areas as th e 
communists abandoned the policy of building alliances with 
the existing political and social movements a nd s o ught in-
stead to sweep them aside by transforming the nature o f 
Polish society. 
In many way s the campaigns initiated in 1947 were th e 
precursors of the Stalinist offensives of the perio d a f t e r 
1948. However, in 1947 they were placed firmly wi h in a 
na tional con·text . They were undertaken no t in confo rmi ty 
with the Soviet model of socialist cons truction , but becau s e 
in the Party 's view they were essential to the ' Polis h r oad 
244 Gomulka Z przemowienia na plenum Komitetu Ce n tralnego 
PPR , 13 . 4 .1947 , Artyku~y •.• Vol . II , op . cit ., p . 3 88 . 
245 GO~~biowsk i Pierwsze lata ... op . c it ., p . 348 . 
246 Ok61nik Sekretariatu I~C PPR 0 udziale partii w dz i a -r-
~lno§ci RTPD , 22 .10. 1947 , PPR ... i 1947 - xii 1948 op . 
Ci t ., p. 142 . 
247 L;sty t k' . k t op Cl.'t pp 5 2 55 • _ pas ers ~e ep~s opa u... . ., . - . 
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to Socialism'. It was in this national perspective tha t 
the essential continuity of the Party's line with t h e ob-
jectives it had pursued since 1942 was apparent . Gomu~ka 
was in the fore in proclaiming the national plat for m, bu t 
in 1947 he spoke with the authority of the l e ad e r s hip as a 
whole. The general assumption was that having s o rec e n t l y 
found a 'national' solution to the struggle fo r p ower , t here 
was every advantage in maintaining the national c o u rse as 
Poland moved towards Socialism. It was al so a ssumed t hat 
Stalin held the same view - not only Gomu~ka, b u t t he 
wider leadership too were puzzled by the impl i c at i ons of 
h 248 t e establishment of the Cominform in Septe mber 1947 a nd 
carried on much as before. Gomu~ka told the ina ugu ral 
meeting that in contrast to the old KPP , which had ' commi -
ted a great many errors ••. particularly o n t h e national 
question ', the PPR was a party of nati o na l independence 
(partia niepodleg~osciowa). This had helped i t immensely 
to broaden its political base in the wo r k ing c lass and he 
nation as a whole . 2 49 As for the Poli s h-Sov iet allian ce , 
the key was to show that it was justi f i ed ' from t h e poi n t 
of view of Polish raison d ' etat ' .2 50 After t h e Cominform 
session, the PPR insisted that its p o licies wou l d remai n 
unchanged: 
' In the future as in the past, we wi ll fig h t 
resolutely and without compromi se to defend 
peace and to safeguard the interests of 
Poland •••. The communist and Harx i st parties 
248 Berman told the August-September 194 8 Ple n um hat here 
had been mention 'o f certain he s itatio n s , of a lack of 
understanding of the new situatio n a year go at he 
September session of the Informatio n Bu reau when we 
were unable at first to grasp the po in t of an ope n , 
public co-ordination of revolutionary forces on an 
international scale', Nowe drog i 1 948 n r . 11 , p . 113 . 
In 1956 he told the october Ple num t ha t ' we had a dif -
ferent view on the Information Bureau t ha n the Soviet 
comrades and we defended our positio n. I recall that I 
was sharply cr iticised by Zhdanov ... ', Nowe drogi 1956 
nr. 10, p. 90. 
249 Nara da ... Op e cit., p . 58 . 
250 Ibid ., p. 6 4 . 
of all countries stand guard over pe a c e , 
freedom and the independence of natio ns ... 
There is no question of the Soviet Unio n 
and the other People's Democracies inte nd -
ing to force their political systems o n 
other nations •.•• The Polish Work e r s ' 
Party has shown that ••• it is building a 
strong and independent Poland; that it p laces 
the preservation of her independence a nd 
sovereignty above everything else . As fa r 
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as the interests of the People's Pol a nd a r e 
concerned .•• our Party k nows no comp romise ' . 251 
In this conception, the united Party of th e work ing 
class was to be the vanguard of the Polish r e vo lu t i o n and 
the internal mass base on which it would r es t . Th e alli -
ance with the PPS - 'the foundation of people ' s Pol nd ... 
th . ( . ) . . d 2 5 2 e prlncipal motor of all ltS vlctorl e s a n s uc cesses ' 
had been by far the most important fruit o f t h e natio nal 
front strategy and would provide the d riving force o n t he 
'Polish road to Socialism'. The Gomu ~k a l eadership aimed 
not simply to liquidate the PPS as a rival r r y nd po ten -
tial source of opposition, but to h a rness i ts c o nstituency 
and national traditions for the new Par ty . Unif icat i o n 
would be based on an ideological plat fo rm 0 M rxism-
Le ninism and nationalism; it would no t be ' mec ha n ic I ' . 253 
It would require a revision of attitude s o n bo h sides . 25 4 
The volte-face by the PPS leaders hip in Mar ch 1 948 
may we ll have been prompted by the fear t h at t he relat i vely 
favourable conditions for merger offered by Gomu~ka mig h t 
255 
not long remain on the table. If s o , th e fe rs were 
251 Gomuika Przemowienie na manifestac j i we tvro cJ:'awiu , 
25.11.1947, Artyku~y ••. Vol. II OP e c it ., pp . 486 - 89 . 
252 Gomu~ka Przem6wienie wyg~oszone na a k ad mil 
jowej w Warszawie , 30.4.1947, Artyku~y ... b 
411-12. 
253 
254 
Gomu~ka Jednosc 'mechanic zna ' c zy i deol o q i c z n ? 
Artykuly •.• Vol . I I Op e cit., pp . 431- 41 . 
Gomu~ka Z przemo'wienia na plenum Komi te u . . e n traln~go 
PPR, 13.4.1947, Artyku~y ..• Vo l . II Op e CLt ., p . 395 . 
Gomu~a argued tha t the Party sho u ld l ear n ' Po lish 
Marxism' • 
255 J . Holzer ('W. Pa~ski ') Agonia PPS OPe ci ., p . 21 . 
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well-founded. On June 3, as the crisis in relatio ns 
between the Soviet and Yugoslav communists was breaki ng , 
Gomu~ka addressed the Central Commit tee of the PPR o n the 
guestion of the ideological platform of the new united 
Party.256 He failed to carry the l eadership with hi s 
conception. Polish Stalinism had finally eclipsed t he 
national front strategy. 
256 Przemcwienia tow . Wies~awa ... O P e cit ., pp . 54- 71 . 
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The communists ' offensive against the PSL a nd the 
underground in the period leading up to the electio ns and 
the rapid decline of organised opposition in their after-
math, marked the close of the struggle for power which h ad 
begun d u ring the Nazi occupation and continued during the 
liberation. After 1946 the leading role of the PPR in t he 
state was assured . Th e Socialists ' attempt to preserv e n 
element of pluralism from within the government c amp had 
collapsed by 1948. Despite leadership crises and o utbreaks 
of popular discontent in 1956 , 1968 and 1970-71, it was not 
until t~e advent of solidarnosc more than t hree decades 
later that the communists again faced a maj or challenge 0 
their monopoly of power . 
The events of the turn of 1946/47 thus represented the 
culmination of the national front strategy which the Par y 
had tried to pursue with varying degrees of consistency 
since its formation in 1942 . The essence of the strategy , 
as stated by the Central Bureau of Polish Communists in 
July 1944 , was twofold . Its fi rst pu rpose was to establish 
a ' truly national government supported by the maj ority of 
the people '. The national front was to e mbra c e the workers , 
peasants , intelligentsia and petit-bo u rgeoisie nd a sub-
stantial part of the ' middle-bourgeoisi e '. In other words , 
the communists aimed to win over much of th e existing 
'London ' camp , leaving the diehard ' reactio naries ' isola ed 
and without a significant social base . Such a national 
fr ont wo uld provide a real ' bond between Polish communism 
and the nation and form the ' point of departure o n the 
road to changes in the system ' . Through t hi s regrouping 
the Party would be able to achieve the seco nd purpose of 
t he strategy: to create a balance within Poland t hat would 
allow it to ' smash the reactio n ' wi th its own internal 
forces , that is principally by political means a nd wi hout 
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being forced to tUrn to the Soviet Unio n for dir ect mili-
tary assistance. 
As we have seen, the communists e nco un tered imme nse 
difficulties in putting this strategy into action and we re 
repeatedly forced to modify their course . Virtually nothing 
was achieved in underground Poland. The attempt to estab-
lish a broad coalition around the PKWN in 1944 went off 
course within weeks. A combination of factors : its own 
insecurity, its numerical and organisational weakne ss and 
Stalin's doubts about its capacity to k eep control of 
events, or even of its partners in the PK~m , cau sed t he 
Party to rely directly on the Soviet presence to crush the 
underground. By spring 1945 the PPR leadership found 
itself facing incipient civil war. In the provinces the 
security forces and Party hardliners followed the lead of 
Soviet advisers rather than the Central Committee . The N y 
Plenum reasserted the leadership ' s authority and steered 
the PPR back to the broad national front strategy that had 
in effect been suspended since october 1944. 
Between J une 1945 and February 1946 the nati o nal fro nt 
strategy appeared to c orne clos e to fruition . There seemed 
to the c ommunists to be a real, albeit a steadily dimi ni sh-
ing, possibility that the London wing of t he Government of 
National Unity led by Mikolajc zyk , or at least a s ubstan-
tial part of it, c ould be drawn into the national front 
unde r PPR hegemony. The attitude o f the PSL to a joint 
electoral bloc was the test. However , Miko~ajczyk had 
different plans. He a i med at the reco nstructio n of t he 
coalition government under PSL leadership with the commun-
ists and their allies as the junior partne r . He believed 
that the PPR wou l d be too ~eak to prevent this unless he 
SOViet Union intervened directly o n its behal f , and th t 1n 
the final analysis Stalin wou ld prefe r to a ccept t h e new 
government than run t h e risk of internal destabilisatio n in 
Poland and economic reprisals from t he Western Powers . 
Followi ng t h e break- dow n of talks o n an electoral bloc 
in February 19 46 , the PPP- concluded that it was unrealistic 
to hope for a deal wi th tHko1:"aj c zyk . I t began to prepare 
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for the confrontation with the opposition which it now 
believed to be unavoidable. The Party tacitly accepted that 
its strategy had failed to detach the peasant movement 
and other sections of the London camp from the ' reaction ' . 
According to PPR propaganda , the PSL intended to fight the 
elections in an alliance with the 'reaction'; it would 
therefore be allowed no further part ·to play in political 
life. However , the ' centrist' leadership of the Party ' s 
only significant ally, the PPS, continued to believe that a 
broad national front, including the PSL, was attainable . 
This led to severe strains between the two parties. But 
the communists were unwilling to sever their partners hip 
with the PPS leaders , although in mid-1946 they appear to 
have come close to doing so. Such a rift would have spelt 
a return to the isolation in which the Party had found 
itself in the spring of 1945. For this reason, and perhaps 
because the Russians were not yet ready to run the risk of 
a show-down between the PPR and the PSL , the communists 
held their fire while the Socialists vainly attempted to 
resurrect the broad national front. In September 19 6 , it 
became clear that neither the PPR nor t he Peasants were 
interested in a compromise. The PPS, appeased by under-
takings on future policy and the distribution of power in 
the government to be formed after the elections, took the 
o nly course which it considered was open to it , and fell in 
with the communists ' offensive against the PSL . It saw 
this as the only way to preserve some influence over the 
PPR after the elections and avoid the danger of Soviet 
intervention. 
The results of the offensive demonstrated that the 
Party had succeeded _ probably beyond its expectations - in 
aChieving what was intended as the second purpose of the 
national front strategy. The communists had built up suf -
ficient resources to be able to mobilise the state - Party 
apparatus: the PPR rank-and-file, the bureaucracy, the army 
a nd the security forces to overcome the opposit i on without 
haVing to cal l in the Red Army to help. Undoubtedly Soviet 
ad . v~sers played an important part behind the scenes , but 
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their role was well-concealed and the Red Army was able to 
maintain its low profile. The Polish communists h ad 
consolidated their hold on the state with their own 
resources without provoking a major internal crisis, econo-
mic collapse or a break-down in relations with the West . 
Niko~ajczyk's confidence that they would be unabl e to do so 
had proved unfounded. 
However, the national front per se had contributed 
little to this victory. The PPS leadership and aktyw played 
an important part in managing the elections, but neither 
the Socialists nor the communists' other allies were able 
to draw the masses with them. The first purpose of the 
national front strategy: to rally the support of the ma jo -
rity of the nation and to isolate the 'reaction ', r ema ined 
unfulfilled. Contrary to the view put forward b y Party 
historians, the PPR had won the struggle for power despite 
the continuing narrowness of fts popular base , no t becau se 
it had succeeded in enlisting the support of the majority 
of the Polis h nation. The Party's recurrent res o rt to 
force to deal with its opponents, the unity of the peas ant 
movement even in defeat and the dominant position of the 
PSL in rural local government in many areas, the strength 
of the underground opposition, the disastrous results of 
the referendum in those urban areas where the c ount was 
conducted fairly, the absence of Party organisation across 
ma ny rural parts of eastern and central Poland into the 
late 1940's and the critical attitude of the Church, all 
belie the official interpretation that a widescale movemen t 
of opinion took place in the months before t he election to 
produce a landslide in favour of t h e bloc. Whatever s hi ft 
in op inion there was seems to have come after the elec t ion 
offensive when active opposition gave way to resig ned 
acquiescence and disengagement from politics. Indeed, the 
POlarisation of forces in Poland at the turn of 1946/47 
seems to have put yet another barrier between the Par y and 
large sections of the nation. 
The reasons for this failure were then largely inter-
nal . The national front strategy assumed that it would be 
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Possible to achieve a national consensus for the Party ' s 
vision of the future and that this would provide the cli -
mate in which it would be possible to neutral ise the 
'reaction ' by political rather than coercive means. 
However, the communists were unable to achieve that inter-
nal c onsensus and were therefore obliged to use much 
greater repression than they had intended to c onsolidate 
their power. This is not to say that external factors, 
notably Soviet influence, did not play an important part 
in shaping the communists' tactics and not only its 
strateg~ - during 1945-47. We do not have the evidence to 
guage accurately the extent of that influence, but it is 
safe to assume that it is considerable. However, one need 
look no further than the obvious inadequacy of the 
national front as an instrument to secure state power for 
the communists to explain the strategy's lack of success . 
Stalin's diktats were in this sense secondary . 
Party historians imply that if only the PPR had been 
allowed to persevere with the strategy after 1948 , free 0 
outside interference, it would have been possible, with 
time, to achieve an 'historical compromise' in Poland in 
which a genuine mechanism of consent betwee n the natio n 
and Polish communism might have been established . Bu t 
there is little substance to this. The essential features 
of the post-l948 phase were shaping up by 1946-47 . The 
Party had been propelled away from the national front and 
a harder, more aggressive and totalitarian course was in 
the ascendant by the time of the elections . As Zambrowski 
wrote many years later, while 1948 marked the ' great turn ' 
to Stalinism in Poland, the road leading to the turn runs 
directly back to the crushing of the opposition a the time 
o f the elections and the radicalisa t ion of the Party ' s 
l' , 1 lne In their aftermath . 
In a longer- term perspective, t he failure of the 
nati o na l front meant that the new pol itical order was thus 
1 Zamcrowsk i Dziennik ..• op. cit., p . 71. 
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fundamentally flawed from the start . The communists held 
the state, but outside the Party-state bureaucracy and 
the apparatus of coercion they lacked any firm internal 
basis on which to realise their social a nd economic objec-
tives . The historic achievement of the Polish Workers ' 
Party and the national front s t rategy wa s t h e cre tio n of 
a political system which was, and has remained , one of the 
more effective in Eastern Europe in neut ralising opposition 
and managing crises with its own interna l resources . But 
that system has been one of the least successful in estab-
lishing a mechanism of consent betwee n r u lers and ruled or 
in creating the conditions for economic a nd political stab-
ility. The roots of this failur e lie firmly in the forma-
tive years of 'People's Poland' between 1944 and 1947 . 
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Joime Reynolds 
'Lublin' versus 'London' -
The Party and the Underground Movement 
in Poland, 1944 -1945 
On 8 May 1945 the German Reich capitulated. On the same day in 
eastern Poland 'units of the armed underground about 300 strong 
attacked the town of Grajewo (Bialystok province), where they 
destroyed the buildings of the County Militia Command, the court 
house and the prefecture. They attempted also to capture the 
Security Police Office. A detachment of the 11 th Regiment of the 
Army of the Interior was despatched to assist the defenders . During 
the fighting the attackers suffered considerable losses and were 
forced to withdraw.'! 
In Poland hostilities did not end in 1945 . Incidents such as the 
one recounted were still occurring as late as 1947 and armed 
resistance to the communist authorities was being offered, albeit on 
a sporadic and localized scale, a decade after the war had ended. 
Poland, alone amongst the European People's Democracies, ex-
perienced not only open, legal opposition to the installation of a 
Soviet-sponsored, communist-led government, but also widescale 
underground opposition and guerrilla warfare. 2 
This article is concerned with the first year of this struggle: from 
the formation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation 
(PKWN) by the communists in Lublin in July 1944, until the con-
struction of a coalition government of ' National Unity' - contain-
ing members of the 'bourgeois' parties, most prominently the Peas-
ant Party (SL), as well as the communists and their allies - in June 
1945. During this period 'Lublin' was faced by the 'London camp': 
the military and political apparatus of the wartime anti-German 
undergrouncl loyal to the Government-in-Exile in London. In spite 
Journal oj Contemporary History (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), 
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618 Journal o/Contemporary History 
of internal conflicts and severe reverses in 1943 - 44, this movement 
remained intact and posed a great obstacle in the way of 'Lublin's' 
attempts to win popular support. This configuration of forces per-
sisted until mid-1945, after which a more narrowly-based 
underground operated alongside a strong legal opposition move-
ment grouped around Mikolajczyk's Polish Peasant Party (PSL) . 
Apart from the attention paid to the 'Polish question' as a prob-
lem of wartime and postwar international relations and a few 
studies of the Warsaw uprising, very little has been published in 
English on the first years of People's Poland. This is in spite of the 
fact that many Polish and emigre historians have written on various 
aspects of the subject and the availability of a considerable amount 
of documentary material. While the answers to many questions re-
main locked inside Party and Soviet archives, we can at least begin 
to check some of our assumptions against the accessible evidence.) 
Here, we shall examine the way in which the strategies pursued 
by 'Lublin' and 'London' developed and affected one another and 
show how the communists sharply altered course twice during these 
months, in October 1944 and May 1945. We shall suggest that these 
turns were related not only to the external pressures on the Party 
leadership exerted by shifts of policy in Moscow and moves on the 
diplomatic scene, but were prompted to a significant extent by the 
internal political situation the communists faced within Poland 
itself. This is not to say that direct Soviet influence on the Party' s 
line was secondary or irrelevant; 'advice' from the Kremlin and 
Soviet officials attached to the 'Lublin' apparatus carried immense 
weight. It was not, however, the sole determinant factor , but rather 
one factor amongst several which collided or coincided with one 
another in shaping the Party's strategy and tactics. Prominent 
amongst these was the communists' fear of the underground and it 
is with this that we shall be primarily concerned in this article. 
The Polish question was transformed in 1943. First, it became in-
creasingly obvious after Stalin grad that the German occupation 
would be lifted not by Poland's Western allies, but by the 'ally of 
her allies': the Soviet Union. Second, the Polish communists, with 
Soviet assistance, began to dispute radically the legitimacy of the 
Government-in-Exile and prepare their own administrative net-
work and armed forces to take power in the wake of the westward 
advance of the Red Army. 
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It was in these circumstances that the cold war between the tiny 
Polish Workers' Party (PPR) and more or less the entire remainder 
of the underground began to escalate into serious violence. In the 
summer of 1943 units of the NSZ, the National Armed Forces, a 
right-wing nationalist grouping on the fringe of the 'London 
camp', began to 'cleanse' the countryside of 'subversive and 
criminal bands'. On 9 August one of its detachments slaughtered 
twenty-six communist partisans and four civilians near Borew 
(Lublin province).4 This incident is frequently taken as marking the 
opening shot in the protracted struggle between the PPR and the 
wartime underground and its postwar legatees . 
The running battle between the extreme Left and Right, which 
continued unabated during the second half of 1943 and earl y 1944, 
was highly embarrassing for the ' London' mainstream and its 
Home Army (AK). 
While the right-wing nationalists of the NSZ argued that the 
und'erground should prepare to continue its war with the occupant, 
whether Nazi or Soviet, by destroying pro-Soviet and communist 
forces operating in conspiracy, this strategy was not one which the 
Government-in-Exile and the AK could adopt if it was to maintain 
any standing with the British and Americans as well as keep open 
the possibility of a compromise with the Soviet government. 
The 'Tempest' Plan 
The tactics of the AK and the civilian organs of the underground 
towards the advancing Soviet armies as set out definitively in 
General Bor-Komorowski's order of 20 November 1943 were 
therefore to mobilize and offer assistance to the Red Army, in this 
way presenting the Soviets with the dilemma of either de facto 
recognizing 'London' as an aIIy, or repressing 'friendly' AK units, 
thereby risking friction with the Western powers . The basic objec-
tive of operation 'Tempest', as the plan was code-named, was en-
capsulated in the foIIowing passage of Bor's order: ' . . . I have 
ordered commanders and units, which will participate in fighting 
the retreating Germans, to reveal their presence to the Russians. 
Their task . .. will be to manifest through their action the existence 
of the Republic.' s These tactics were not intended to assist the Rus-
sians, whose aim, Bor wrote, 'is the destruction of the in-
dependence of Poland, or at least its political subordination to the 
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Soviets' ,6 but as a means to bolster the Polish cause amongst the 
Western allies. As he put it, 'by giving the Soviets minimal military 
help we are creating political difficulties for them." 
'Tempest' began in January 1944 when the Red Arm y crossed the 
prewar frontier, but reached its peak during the huge Soviet 
offensive which began in late June and swept rapidly across the 
eastern kresy and during the second half of July into the territory to 
the west of the Curzon line which Moscow recognized as Polish. 
AK units were mobilized in German-occupied areas with instruc-
tions to capture towns shortly before they fell to the Russians and 
establish Polish administrations there; they were then to welcome 
the advancing Red Army as host s and reveal their forces to the local 
Soviet command. The tragic culmination of this plan was the War-
saw uprising, launched on I August in the expectation of imminent 
Soviet entry into the capital. 
In fact the commitment to revealing AK detachments to the Rus-
sians, though extensive, was not total. Bor, in the report he sent to 
Sosnkowski, the Supreme Commander in London, enclosing his 
order of 20 November, had added that, 'in case of a second Russian 
occupation, I am preparing in the utmost secrecy the skeleton com-
mand network of a new clandestine organization ... it will be a 
separate network unconnected with the AK organization, which 
has to a large degree been uncovered to elements in Soviet service'.8 
The new clandestine organization received the cryptonym, 'Nie', 
and according to Party historians was responsible for a number of 
the attacks on supporters of the Lublin Committee which occurred 
the following autumn.9 Not only 'Nie' remained underground; 
large sections of the AK were critical of the policy of leaving the 
conspiracy and reponing to the Russians. This was especially true 
of units linked with the National Party, on the anti-Soviet right of 
the 'London' spectrum, belonging either to the National Military 
Organization (NOW) or that part of the NSZ which had been merg-
ed into the AK. These formations retained a good deal of 
autonomy inside the AK and widely opted out of 'Tempest'.10 
Finally, the extreme-right, National Radical wing of the NSZ, 
which had remained outside the AK, was, as we have seen, pursu-
ing its own private war with the communists. 
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The 'National Front' 
While 'Tempest' was marked by an air of desperation, attempting 
to salvage something from a most unwelcome conclusion to fi ve 
years of underground warfare, the strategy which the Poli sh com-
munists hoped to realize in mid-1944 di splayed an almost unreal 
optimism. The Party was committed to constructing a 'broad 
national front' in which it would play the leading role: a Poli sh ver-
sion of Tito' s movement in Yugoslavia. The PKWN was intended 
as the focus of a coalition of 'democratic' parties which wou ld 
stretch deep into the 'London camp' to include Mikolajczyk ' s 
Peasant Party, the Socialists and even, it was hoped, the more 
moderate National Democrats. A discriminating policy was to be 
adopted towards the underground. As Radkiewicz, in charge of 
Public Security, later put it, 'we tried to differentiate between 
elements in the AK - fi ghting above all the NSZ, th e most fa scist, 
then the Pilsudski-ite, Sanacja core· o f the AK, while towards the 
Peasant Battalions we were very moderate'. 11 By stressing the need 
for national unity and the defeat of Germany, the communists 
hoped to detach a large part of the rank-and-file of the AK, which 
would be used as the basis for a big expansion of the Polish Army 
under Soviet command, leaving the 'reactionary' sections of the 
AK officer corps and the right of the 'London camp' isolated . 
In the initial weeks of its existence, the tasks of the PKWN would 
be to form a local administrative structure, create a new police 
force, organize supplies of food for the Red Army and make a start 
on land reform to win the support of the rural poor and the peasan-
try. Further underground activity would be out lawed, the bulk of 
the AK recruited into the Polish Army, with the NKVD on hand to 
deal with those remaining in conspiracy or resisting conscription. 
Paralleling efforts to mount a coalition of internal forces, the 
possibility of a deal with Mikolajczyk and his following in the 
Government-in-Exile would be left open . 
The July 1944 version of the 'national front' was heavily in-
fluenced by the ideas of those Polish communists who had spent 
the war in the Soviet Union and reflected their confidence that a 
regrouping of political forces at home was imminent. The 
underground Party leadership in Warsaw which had been trying for 
"This refers to followers of J6zef Pilsudski, whose military regime (the 'Sanaeja ') 
governed Poland from 1926-39. 
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more than two years without success to escape its isolation was less 
sanguine. Nevertheless, it was the emigre view which prevailed dur-
ing the first phase of liberation and this was summed up in a letter 
sent by the leadership of the Moscow group to the underground 
Central Committee on 18 July, just a few days before Lublin was 
taken. In internal policy, the letter warned against excessive 
radicalism which would alienate the peasantry and prevent the new 
government winning the support of the majority of the 
nation, seen as essential if 'the formation of a powerful reactionary 
underground, possessing a significant social base' was to be avoid-
ed. The strategic objective, wrote the emigre communists, was 'the 
creation of such an internal balance within which we shall be able 
to smash the reaction with our own internal forces' .'2 
The Strategies in Action 
Under the 'Tempest' plan, the Polish underground forces were to 
offer co-operation with the Red Army, but insist on retaining their 
identity as an integral part of the Polish Armed Forces loyal to the 
London government. The AK and its civilian network were, 
moreover, to negotiate solely with the Russian military authorities 
and hold aloof from any direct dealings with Lublin represen-
tativesY It was on these points that 'Tempest' came into collision 
with the national front strategy of the communists. 
Already in the eastern kresy 'Tempest' had set into a pattern of 
failure. '4 The Russians, unwilling to accept the political conditions 
implicitly tied to the co-operation proffered by the AK, had 
presented the Poles with the ultimatum of either joining General 
Berling's largely Soviet-officered Polish Army or disarming and 
dissolving their units. The advance across the Bug into territory 
recognized by Moscow as Polish and the priority given to broaden-
ing the base of the PKWN, which now for the first time became 
directly involved in the confrontation, nevertheless made what hap-
pened in the Lublin region something of a test-case. 
Lublin city itself was captured from the Germans in fighting be-
tween 23 and 25 July. Once shooting had died down, the AK and 
the Government Delegate for the city, Wladyslaw Cholewa, began, 
in accordance with 'Tempest', to take over the local administra-
tion. Proclamations were pasted up, the town hall occupied, State 
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Security Corps (the underground's police force) patrol s stationed in 
the streets and recruitment offices for the 'Lublin Battalion' of the 
AK opened . On 25 July the first PKWN represen tat ives arrived, led 
by Edward Ochab, and the next day General Berling and 
Aleksander Zawadzki arrived at the head of regular Polish units. 
On the same day attempts were made, by Radkiewicz it seems, to 
open talks between the PKWN and the' Londoners', who in line 
with 'Tempest', refused to enter negotiations with anyone except 
the Soviet military authorities. On 27 July a meeting took place be-
tween General Kolpaczka, commander of the Soviet sixth army, 
Cholewa and Colonel Tumidajski, the area AK commander. 
Kolpaczka issued the usual ultimatum : the AK forces had either to 
join the Polish Army fighting with the Red Army, or lay down their 
arms . The 'London' representatives followed their in structions and 
chose the latter alternative, adamantly refusing to recognize the 
PKWN. 
It is worth noting that thi s meeting lasted until 29 July, 
whereupon Cholewa and Tumidajski were allowed to leave, though 
under surveillance . Apparently Radkiewicz and the Russians had 
not yet excluded the possibility th at the underground leaders might 
revise their position. If this was the case, these hopes were enter-
tained for only four or five days as the process of disarming AK 
units in the region got underway. On the one hand the' Londoners' 
were alarmed by reports of arrests and deportations of AK officers 
and the internment of units, while on the o ther, PKWN security of-
ficia ls became convinced that the AK was handing over on ly a pro-
portion of its arms and disbanding only a part of its network. In 
both cases these fears were probably well-found ed. 
The 'Nie' organization has been mentioned, and in February in-
structions were issued which spoke of a 'second subsidiary network 
of civil and military leaders .. . which will remain underground, try-
ing to establish contact with the Polish authorities and informing 
them of the fate of revealed representatives ... ' .15 There were 
besides numerous AK units, particularly those linked with the 
nationalist right, which disagreed with the 'Tempest' strategy and did 
not come into the open. On the other side, the communists were not 
averse to using limited force in order to loosen what they saw as the 
hold of reactionary officers over the democratic mass of the AK. In 
practice this task was frequently left to NKVD detachments charg-
ed with providing security behind the front. These units were hardly 
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suited to drawing the fine distinctions such a policy assumed and 
from the start bloody clashes occurred between AK forces and 
those of the NKVD attempting to disarm them.'6 
The mutual suspicions were greatly intensified by the outbreak of 
the uprising in Warsaw on 1 August, which was interpreted in 
Lublin as a dire threat to its position, demanding a new aggressive 
stance to replace the flexibility and optimism of the first week of 
power. On 3 August Radkiewicz put the Security Department's 
view of priorities to the PKWN: '} / Mobilisation into the army of 
the broad mass of the AK. 2/ The arrest of the AK commanders. 
Our tactics - offensive ... the AK is attempting to seize Warsaw, 
to install its army and administration." 7 The repercussions of this 
tougher line were felt in Lublin immediately. On 2 August 
Radkiewicz had told the PKWN that 'the AK command in Lublin 
formally agreed to lay down its arms, but did this only par-
tially ... . We must commence determined activity, with the prob-
able use of repression. The AK has begun illegal work . . . " 8 The 
next day Tumidajski and Cholewa were brought in for further talks 
with the Russians with PKWN spokesmen in attendance. The 'Lon-
doners' attempted to clarify the uncertainty over the treatment of 
their men, refusing once more demands that they subordinate their 
troops to the PKWN until such time as an agreement was reached 
between the Committee and Mikolajczyk, then in Moscow. The 
two men were thereupon arrested and despatched into imprison-
ment somewhere in the Soviet Union.' 9 
The episode was duplicated in many other places: Zamosc, 
Przemysl, Rzesz6w, Bialystok and dozens of other towns and 
villages. In general, the confrontation lasted a few days before the 
Soviets intervened decisively and cleared out the AK authori ties. 
The course of events in Lublin demonstrated the inevitability of 
conflict between the two sides as they carried out their instructions, 
for although both strategies aimed at avoiding an open clash, they 
were more concerned with extracting de facto recognition from the 
other of their claim to rule Poland. The outcome of the manoeuvr-
ing in July and August 1944 was hardly satisfactory for either side: 
the PPR captured the administrative machine, but thanks to Soviet 
military power, not the support of a broad 'national front'; 'Lon-
don' demonstrated its military and administrative presence, but 
also its total powerlessness in the face of Soviet backing for the 
PKWN. 
Despite these setbacks to their respective strategies, neither side 
Reynolds: 'Lublin' versus 'London' 625 
openly abandoned its tactics. 'Tempest' continued until October, 
fizzling out as the Soviet-German front stabilized. Amongst the 
communists, the initial jolt of the Warsaw uprising gave way within 
a few days to a calmer appraisal of the situation. The arriva l in 
Lublin of Gomulka and other leaders of the underground Party 
was followed by reassertions of the broad national front line. In his 
first speech to the Party aktyw on 5 August, Gomulka warned 'do 
not alienate other groupings .. . invite [them] to co-operate . .. by 
pursuing such a policy we deprive the conservative element of its 
weapons, we can isolate the reaction from the masses still under its 
influence' .20 Over the following weeks the leadership persevered 
with this line, sustained by the Russians' apparent preference for a 
deal between Lublin and Mikolajczyk's following as well as the 
distinct possibility of the Red Army relieving the 'London' in-
surgents fighting in Warsaw. But on the ground, the strategies of 
both sides soon began to modify in the face of realities. 
Having witnessed what had happened in Lublin and elsewhere, 
AK officers on the ground were most unhappy about carrying on 
with the policy of revealing their forces to the Russians. At least 
one commander wired Warsaw to confirm whether this order re-
mained in force, adding that 'there is strong opposition amongst 
my officers and men' . 21 Bialystok AK, under the command of Col-
onel Liniarski, disobeyed the order en masse.22 By September , Bor 
himself had apparently dropped this aspect of 'Tempest' and began 
ordering AK concentrations to disperse and partisan units to 
dissolve. On 26 September he transmitted this message to Rzesz6w 
command: 'Do not organise any conspiratorial AK units. Dissolve 
partisan detachments under Soviet occupation [my emphasis -
J.R.] Disperse the troops ... '23. 
Although Bor was by this time referring to the Soviet presence as 
an occupation, there is no satisfactory evidence that the 'Nie' net-
work was activated. Its command was pinned down in Warsaw and 
communications with the outside severely disrupted. Bor, who was 
gambling on the Red Army relieving the insurrection in the capital, 
repeatedly and categorically forbade provincial commands to fight 
the Russians.24 Clashes occurred all the same; orders to avoid con-
scription were misinterpreted by some units, which resisted with 
force or occasionally assassinated recruitment officers.2S Shoot-
outs also took place between NKVD detachments and AK units in 
the process of dispersal or remaining in conspiracy.26 In some in-
stances, AK officers disobeyed Bor's orders to dissolve and stayed 
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underground to defend the population against marauding Soviet 
troops Y By the end of the year the Russians were claiming that 
some 300 Red Army officers had been killed. 28 
Such bloodshed, by no means all the work of the AK, was 
minimal in comparison with the level it was to reach in early 1945. 
But together with the growing feeling amongst party activists that 
they were being overwhelmed by the sheer inertia of the ad-
ministrative machine, as well as fears for the allegiance of the arm-
ed forces, this violence reinforced the arguments of the hardliners 
in the PPR who were demanding a more radical solution to the 
problem of the underground. 
The October Turn 
The Party's moderation towards the Home Army and the 
'democratic' wing of the London camp was maintained until early 
October. Its line was then abruptly transformed. By November a 
concerted effort to crush the AK was underway, an aggressive land 
parcellization campaign spearheaded a general radicalization of 
policy, while any deal with London had been indefinitely post-
poned. Although lip-service was still paid to the construction of the 
national front, in practice from October 1944 to May 1945 this 
strategy was submerged. Instead, the Party pursued a narrowly-
based, radical course which relied heavily on the repression applied 
by its own meagre security forces, greatly reinforced by Soviet units 
and advisers. 
The 'October turn' was sudden and drastic. As late as 26 
September the Party leadership had affirmed that its objective was 
'not only the maintenance, but also the broadening of the national 
front. . . [and] unification of the nation, conceived as the active 
solidarity of an the main strata of the nation, of all the democratic 
parties' .29 To the distaste of Party militants, repressive measures 
were kept to a minimum. Edwarda Orlowska, secretary for 
Bialystok province, complained of local activists coming' ... to us 
from the districts and saying "What sort of power is this?" 
Volksdeutsche and traitors walk about the town. Endeks [National 
Democrats - J.R.] openly make trouble and nothing happens to 
them ... . Why so far has there been no death sentence? Ruthless 
repression should be applied against the leading (AK) com-
manders. '30 From what other speakers at the same meeting said, it 
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is clear that the Party aktyw was not generally even armed at this 
stage.ll 
The level of arrests was restrained too. At the end of September 
Radkiewicz reported that only 3,000 (including 1,500 Home Army) 
people had been detained, most of whom had been pressed into the 
army. He admitted though that 'so far as arrests by the Soviet 
authorities are concerned, we do not have full data or in-
formation'.12 In the army itself the stress was on integrating not 
only AK troops, but officers too . An instruction to politruks of the 
1st Army dated 25 September ordered them to engender 'an at-
mosphere of friendly concern and fraternity' around AK officers, 
'strongly emphasising the factor of national unity' . While noting 
the danger of hosti le infiltration, it warned against the use of 
'police surveillance methods' .)) 
Land reform, which the communists saw as the key to capturing 
the allegiance of the peasants, was handled with the same restraint 
and was entrusted throughout the summer and early autumn to 
Andrzej Witos, head of the PKWN Department of Agriculture. 
Witos was a member of the Peasant Party, not noted for his 
radicalism. He planned gradual land reform 'in the majesty of the 
law' and was sceptical whether this would be administratively 
possible before the end of the war. Nonetheless , the communists 
gave him a free hand and as late as 26 September stressed in a Cen-
tral Committee circular that estate workers committees (organized 
and often manned by the Party) should co-operate with Witos' 
Land Offices. l4 
During the following week the Party shifted its stance fundamen-
tally. On 28 September amended instructions were issued to ac-
tivists in the countryside claiming that 'even amongst some district 
officials of Land Offices and estate administrators, just those to 
whom the state has entrusted the implementation of land reform, 
there is a desire to delay and deflect it . .. ' Estate committees were 
now advised to keep a close eye on Wilos' administrators and 
special Land Reform Commissions were to be created in order, 
amongst other things, 'to nip in the bud every attempt to obstruct 
the reform by lackies of the reactionary landowners'. 35 This was 
just a portent. On 4 October Radkiewicz, addressing the PKWN on 
security matters, digressed to announce the Party' s altered strategic 
perspective. Claiming that 'a new situation, a new distribution of 
forces has arisen', he argued that there was now 'a distinct dividing 
line [between] the two centres: the PKWN and London, without 
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any dividing line between Mikolajczyk and Sosnkowski' (leader of 
the London diehards). The attempt to differentiate between the 
various elements in the Home Army had not, he said, 'been con-
firmed by reality' and the divide between 'the PKWN and on the 
other side all the opponents of the PKWN' , demanded that 'hither-
to haphazard repression' give way to 'a period of planned, inten-
sive work'. 36 A few days later, the land reform campaign was set in 
motion; Witos was dismissed and an improvized apparatus, led by 
special commissars with sweeping powers, forged ahead with the 
parcellization of the estates. Party militants were allowed off the 
leash against the underground also. On 9 October Gomulka 
declared that 'the state must reply to the terror; the time has come 
to begin the counter-attack' . 37 A Decree for the Defence of the 
State was issued at the end of the month, introducing draconian 
penalties for 'subversion'. By mid-November a local commissar 
could report that 'peoples courts have been set up; 30 AK have been 
shot, 500 arrested' . 38 In the army the volte-face was particularly 
dramatic. The 'open-doors' recruitment policy of the summer was 
abandoned, Gomulka stating bluntly that 'the AK on which not so 
long ago we were determined to construct the Polish Army, have in 
the overwhelming majority of cases turned out to be hostile 
elements' .39 In November politruks received instructions con-
trasting sharply with those issued a few weeks before . 'Friendly 
concern and fraternity' towards the AK were now grounds for 
suspicion: 'Every political worker', the order demanded, 'must 
understand that today there is no room for any compromise with 
the AK in the army .. . treat advocates of a "neutral" or con-
ciliatory attitude to the AK as AK members unless they immediate-
ly engage in active struggle with the AK.'40 
The Party's change of direction in October 1944 meant that in 
Poland the foundations of communist power were laid in condi-
tions of virtual civil war and overt reliance on Soviet force of arms. 
This outcome was at odds with the strategy pursued by the com-
munists (both inside Poland and in Soviet emigration) during the 
war, or indeed later in 1945-48 in Eastern Europe generally. What 
prompted this apparent aberration? 
With the abandonment on 22 September of attempts by the Rus-
sians and Berling's troops to establish a bridgehead on the west 
bank of the Vistula, it became apparent that the Red Army would 
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not be used to relieve the uprising in Warsaw.41 Until then, this 
possibility had governed the political situation. As we have seen, 
Home Army command restrained its forces outside the capital in 
order not to antagonize the Soviets, while Lublin was half-prepared 
for early entry into a coalition with part at least of the London 
camp and the incorporation into its army of thousands of armed, 
battle-hardened insurrectionaries. With the stabilization of the 
Soviet front on the far bank of the Vistula and the collapse of the 
last pockets of resistance on the other side a few days later, the 
political situation was transformed. Whereas during the summer 
the PKWN had been able to some extent to capitalize on the 
patriotic elation which greeted the German retreat, the Soviet 
failure to save the uprising aroused a wave of popular hostility and 
bitterness towards the new authorities which undermined their ap-
peal to national unity. Moreover, it would be several months before 
the advance could resume, until which time the PKWN would have 
to maintain its grip on power and establish a political base by 
means other than patriotic slogans and calls to battle against the 
Germans. 
The implications of the Warsaw fiasco were sensed immediately 
in Lublin and doubtless discussed by the PKWN at a secret session 
held on 23 September .42 But the Party seems to have been perplexed 
by Soviet policy and uncertain how to tailor its own course to the 
new circumstances. The leadership's resolution of 26 September 
was perhaps intended to head-off questioning of the Party's 
general line until Soviet intentions were known, but the questioning 
continued anyway. The next day, for instance, Rola-Zymierski 
showed the way the wind was blowing in a speech to the PKWN: 
... the operation which the AK is undertaking in the terrain is becoming increas· 
ingly strong and determined . I have instructed that all materials be examined and 
am determined to take a clear position on this matter. So far we have sought a 
conciliatory way of dealing with the problem. As a result of the hostile activity of 
the AK and other organizations we were unable to achieve this . The state of 
affairs which has arisen in this country cannot be tolerated. The Polish popula-
tion is living under terror and we do nothing about it. I feel we can no longer be 
passive observers. 
Radkiewicz who spoke next supported this call for a more ag-
gressive approach.43 The next day, as we have mentioned, the Cen-
tral Committee issued its amended and toughened instruction on 
land reform. 
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These moves preceded formal consultations to clarify Stalin's at-
titude. On 28 September a PKWN delegation flew to Moscow, stay-
ing until 3 October, The visit, as its leader, Bierut, reported on his 
return, 'was the result of our doubts over the general situa tion aris-
ing from the checking of activity on the Polish front and the failure 
of the Warsaw operation'.44 Stalin, in his remarks to the full 
delegation, attributed the halting of the Soviet advance solely to 
military logistics and denied any political motives.4l However , in 
conversations with its communist members, he bluntly expressed his 
dissatisfaction with their political performance, particularly over 
land reform, and signalled a change of course. According to 
Bierut's subsequent report to the Politburo , 'Stalin cannot see 
revolutionary method in our approach .. . . He sharpl y criticised our 
softness, that up to now not one landowner has been im-
prisoned .... As he put it "get better or get out" .'46 
Hitherto, Soviet pressure had consistently tended to restrain the 
radicalism of the Polish communists and stress the overriding im-
portance of avoiding contention with the West over Poland . Now 
suddenly Stalin was reprimanding the Poles for their cautiousness. 
However, while it is clear that Stalin's intervention was a critical 
factor prompting the 'October turn', it would also seem that a 
significant and growing section of the Polish Party had reached the 
same conclusion before the delegation' s departure. Stalin's injunc-
tions obviously demanded an urgent display of aggression from 
the PPR leadership, which complied without delay, but for much 
of the aktyw and at least part of the upper echelons of the Party, 
Stalin was simply at last allowing them to go in the direction they 
favoured and which they believed the political situation demanded. 
Many of the Party activists, especially those charged with 
establishing the authority of the PKWN outside Lublin, had for 
some time been calling for a more aggressive line. These cadres 
were keenly aware of just how narrow was the support for the 
Lublin regime and felt increasingly exposed and powerless as the 
underground dispersed back into conspiracy. Sporadic assassina-
tions, passive resistance and the continued domination by London 
sympathizers of large parts of the militia, local government and 
even the security apparatus set up by the communists, aroused the 
fears and suspicions of such beleaguered cadres. These doubts were 
heightened by a growing feeling of immobilisme and wasted oppor-
tunity, especially over land reform, as well as the ambiguous and 
unreliable attitude of the communists' supposed allies amongst the 
, 
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Peasants and Socialists. The outlook of these militants was shaped 
both by their awareness that time was short in which to install an 
adequate state machine before the Red Army continued its advance 
and by deeply-rooted ideological traits. Veterans of the prewar 
Communist Party of Poland (KPP) who constituted the backbone 
of the aktyw of the PPR in many cases found the new national 
front strategy altogether too liberal and gradualist. Internal Party 
reports frequently made reference to the distaste of older com-
munists for the tactics they were expected to apply. Ex-KPP cadres 
who had joined the PPR after liberation had, according to one 
report from Praga, 'a whole range of sectarian prejudices from the 
period of KPP work and it is difficult for them to adapt themselves 
to our Party's system of work in the current sitaution' Y At Party 
meetings, hardliners found a receptive audience for their criticisms 
of the mildness of the official line. One of them, Wit old Konopka, 
drew applause at a conference of the aktyw held on 10-11 October 
when he demanded that 'alongside campaigning against the AK, we 
must of course shoot at them and gaol them. By not shooting we are 
encouraging the enemy's impudence.'48 Anther KPP stalwart and 
prominent figure in the PPR leadership, Leon Kasman, encap-
sulated the mood of the militants: 'Our Party has succumbed to the 
parliamentary disease. With power in our hands, we have not ap-
plied terror towards the reaction . ... We showed our enemies soft-
ness - not a single head has fallen ... '49 
Some modern Warsaw historians have argued that this sectarian 
strain in the Party extended into the top leadership where it was 
represented above all by lakub Berman, Hilary Mine, Roman 
Zambrowski and Stanislaw Radkiewicz, all of whom had spent the 
war years in Moscow and were judged to be particularly subservient 
to the Soviets. The national front strategy, on the other hand, so it 
is claimed, was identified with the section of the Party which had 
fought underground in Poland during the war and amongst whom 
Gomulka was the leading figure. The 'October turn' is presented as 
a victory for the hardline 'Muscovite' faction over the 'native' sup-
porters of the national front. 50 
In fact, the differences within the Party leadership over strategy 
tended to cut across the wartime divide. Thus the leading 'hawk' in 
the Politburo seems to have been Bierut, who had been in Warsaw 
from 1943. His views corresponded to those of a vocal hardline ele-
ment amongst the rank-and-file of the underground PPR. On the 
other hand, as we have seen, the 'broad' national front strategy in 
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the form crystallized in July 1944 had been largely the product of 
the Moscow emigration, closely reflecting Soviet requirements. The 
underground PPR inclined to a more radical 'democratic' 
national front and had been criticized for sectarianism by the 
Moscow group because of this. The 'October turn' in many ways 
vindicated the position of the 'natives' against the emigres , and for 
all the differences in outlook between them, it was Bierut and 
Gomulka who took the lead in orchestrating the 'turn'. Moreover, 
the 'democratic' character of the national front was once again ac-
cented. 
Ideological undercurrents and differing political backgrounds 
apart, by mid-September all sections of the Party were increasingly 
disturbed by accumulating evidence of what was taken to be a wide-
ranging conspiracy by London to overthrow the PKWN. Reports 
from local branches were alarming; rumours were put about that 
the PKWN would resign on 15 September; that the Germans were 
about to return; that the Western allies were on their way or that a 
coup d'etat was imminent,ll The PKWN deliberating on the situa-
tion in Warsaw gave serious consideration to the possibility that 
Mikolajczyk was about to parachute into the city and establish his 
government there. s2 Disquieting reports were received from the 
army too. On 16 September the deputy-commander (political) of 
the 5th Infantry Division described the progress of political work 
amongst the civilian population: 
The AK. infuriated by this campaign, has gone on to the coun ter-offensive ... a 
peasant PPR member of the organizational committee was badly wounded. The 
AK distributes masses of leaflets threa tening th ose answering the call-up with 
death and makes armed attacks on conscripts .. .. The civilian authorities are 
timid and lack imagination . In Lukow there is no garrison commander ... the 
Militia is completely helpless. It must be stressed th a t the reserve of the popula-
ti on towards us is dicta ted to a large extent by fear of AK terror ... . The troops 
still look on the PKWN with reserve, unconvinced of its permanence, and the 
majority still hope for an agreement with the London ' government' . AK activity 
has a depressing effect on the troops .... Almost 100 perqnt of the soldiers are 
fanatically religious ... n 
A particularly worrying aspect of what was seen as a concerted 
campaign by the AK to undermine the PKWN was its apparent suc-
cess in dissuading trained officers from joining the army. Rola-
Zymierski informed the PKWN on 18 September that while the 
< 
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general mobilization was going according to plan, only 960 of the 
2,400 officers required had been recruitedY 
These fears did not abate. On 29 September the Governor of 
Bialystok province filed a particularly disturbing report: 'the AK is 
beginning to activate very intensively here ... setting up armed 
detachments. In the Bialowieza forests these are thought to number 
17,000. Other large forests have their units too .... Unconfirmed 
rumours are circulating that a large-scale armed demonstration is 
being prepared, with 14 November or another later date being men-
tioned. ' ll The Party leadership seems to have expected an insurrec-
tion against the PKWN timed to coincide with Mikolajczyk's 
arrival in Moscow for talks in mid-October .16 His previous arrival 
in Moscow in August had been immediately followed by the out-
break of the Warsaw uprising, which the communists were almost 
certainly right in regarding as no mere coincidenceY The desertion 
of whole units from the army - some 3,000 troops in all from the 
Second Army during Octoberl8 - culminated on the night of 12113 
October with the desertion of much of the 31st Infantry Regiment, 
apparently at the instigation of ex-AK officers,l9 and was seen as 
confirmation of such fears. 
The picture which emerges is that by late September 1944 th e.. 
leadership of the PPR was encountering increasing difficulties in 
convincing the rank-and-file of the correctness of its moderate 
course. The apparent reactivization of the AK and the hardening of 
the Soviet attitude to the prospect of a deal with London seemed to 
remove both the internal and external props of the national front 
strategy. Once Stalin had given the signal, the Party with alacrity 
jettisoned the line it had pursued for almost three years. 
The 'October turn' was viewed in various ways by the different 
sections of the Party. For the militants it represented the final 
abandonment of a tactical stance dictated by international con-
siderations but which seemed to them to have little relevance to the 
situation on the ground or basis in revolutionary Marxism-
Leninism. The indications are, though, that for the leadership, the 
'turn' was intended as a short-term tactical detour within rather 
than a departure from the national from strategy. It was an-
ticipated that a further attempt to reach agreement with London 
would take place when this suited Soviet foreign policy and when 
Lublin had strengthened its internal position and weakened that of 
its rivals. Bierut, in talks with Stalin on 12 October, in reply to the 
634 Journal oj Contemporary History 
latter' s enquiry whether Lublin favoured an agreement with 
Mikolajczyk, said 'we want to reach an understanding, but we 
would prefer that this took place later'. 60 Meanwhile, the emphasis 
would be on winning over the masses - especially the peasants 
through land reform, 'from below' . Deals 'from above' with the 
bourgeois parties could await more favourable circumstances. 
This was the intention, but the 'October turn' had a momentum 
of its own which was to sweep the Party rapidl y into positions quite 
incompatible with the national fro nt. 
The Underground and the Aftermath of 'Tempest' 
The widespread belief within the PPR that the underground was 
not only still a military threat, but was also sufficiently belligerent 
to contemplate a rising against the Lublin Committee was quite 
mistaken. In fact, as we have seen, by September and October, the 
AK Command was ordering its units to disperse and cease con-
spiratorial activity . With the capitulation of Warsaw on 3 October, 
Bor went into German captivity along with many of his staff , while 
his successor, General Leopold Okulicki, escaped to begin organiz-
ing a new command in the Czestochowa region. This command was 
cut off from a large part of the AK network and also viewed very 
suspiciously by government circles in London. Okulick i was 
regarded by many as a reckless officer too closely identified with 
Sosnkowski, the effective leader of the opposition within the 
emigration to the kind of concessions which might allow a deal with 
the Soviet Union. Okulicki' s appointment was not officially en-
dorsed until shortly before Christmas, by which time Mikolajczyk's 
government had been replaced by one composed of critics of his 
policy of seeking an agreement at the cost of concessions on the 
eastern frontier. In the meantime, General Tatar exercised tem-
porary command of the AK by radio from England. 61 
Apart from these command problems, after the failure of the 
uprising and 'Tempest', the underground was in no state to under-
take offensive operations. In the liberated zone of Poland, where 
several million Soviet troops were stationed, this would have 
amounted to suicide . In his 'Guideline for activity during the winter 
period 44/45' , issued on 26 October, Okulicki admitted 'the great 
confusion and chaos' in the AK ranks and the need to 'overcome 
fatigue and a certain kind of stupor'. He laid stress on the impor-
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tance of grouping together all military organizations under the AK, 
and preparing for the worst by adapting the conspiracy so that it 
could 'last out a possible Soviet occupation'. There was to be no 
armed resistance to the Russians, although the policy of revealing 
AK units was now specifically abandoned.62 
These instructions no doubt failed to reach many 'akowcy' in the 
field, but with very few exceptions, underground detachments were 
disinclined to take on Soviet and communist forces; their objective 
was rather to elude NKVD round-ups or conscription by dispersing 
to their homes or into the forests and sitting out the winter until the 
Red Army resumed its offensive in the spring. Equally, the military 
formations linked with the right-wing National Democrats, the 
National Military Organization (NOW) and the NSZ had in general 
opted-out of 'Tempest', scattering their troops and burying their 
organization in deep conspiracy. In spite of Okulicki' s calls for uni-
ty, the endeks were gradually detaching themselves from the AK 
and in November the National Military Union (NZW) was created, 
envisaged by its founders as a rival framework for the nationalist 
forces. Even the extreme National Radical NSZ were relatively 
quiet in 'Lublin Poland', though in German-occupied territory they 
continued their war with communist and Soviet partisans.63 
The ascription of the overwhelming difficulties of the PKWN in 
late 1944 to underground activity had then very limited validity; 
such difficulties had their origin in the objective weakness of the 
PPR and the narrowness of its influence, rather than subversion or 
sabotage.64 Nevertheless, the case for striking at the AK while it was 
weakened and the Russians were at hand was persuasive and this 
consideration may have lain behind much of the militancy drumm-
ed up in October. 
The Counter-Altack 
The 'Lublin' counter-attack, as Gomulka had defined it, lasted 
until May 1945. While continuing to employ the rhetoric of the 
'national front', the communists in fact unleashed a campaign of 
terror designed to destroy the same underground forces which a 
few weeks before they had been courting. By early 1945 Party propa-
ganda was equating the AK with the Gestapo. 
Inevitably, the work of hunting down AK suspects was largely 
left to NKVD units. The Polish 'Internal Armies' amounted to only 
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slightly over 2,000 men61 at this time and Sta lin had told Bierut, 
Os6bka and others at a meeting on 18 October that Polish forces 
could not cope with the security problem and the Soviet Army 
would have to play a bigger role than hitherto. 66 From mid-
November to mid-January the Soviet and Polish forces were 
deployed for what was described as 'offensive operations' or 'dis-
arming the terrain' . This involved mass identity checks on males 
aged between 16 and 50 and the arrest of suspects. It is not possible 
to gauge accurately the extent of these arrests: fragmentary official 
figures covering three districts in the southern part of Lublin pro-
vince put the number of detainees at 664, but, especially where 
Soviet troops were used, it is probable that the round-ups were 
much greater.67 At the same time, as we have seen, executions o f 
AK officers began. 
This campaign was transformed by the renewal of the Red 
Army' s advance on 12 January, which by the end of the month had 
liberated the bulk of central Poland . Suddenly, the communists 
found themselves with huge new expanses of territory to ad-
minister , while simultaneously their protective Soviet shield disap-
peared westwards. By no means all the Russian units pursued the 
German retreat, but the military resources at the disposal of the 
PPR shrank dramatically just at the moment when the demands 
made upon them multiplied . Compounding this shortage of man-
power, the Party' s radical line left the communists isolated with a 
considerably narrower front of allies than the previous summer. 
After January therefore, the PPR was engaged in an attempt to ter-
rorize the underground from a position of profound weakness . 
Party membership and the strength of militia and security organs 
mushroomed during the first months of 1945, but their political 
reliability remained extremely uncertain . The security apparatus 
and militia were still riddled with members of the underground, 68 
while the Internal Army, soon to be renamed the Internal Security 
Corps (KBW) was only partly form ed and trained by May 1945, 
when Moczar, one of its organizers, stated bluntly that it was not 
yet ready to take on the underground. What could happen when iIl-
prepared troops were deployed was mentioned by Gomulka : 'the 
3rd Battalion of the Internal Army went out into the terrain and 
2,000 people deserted' .69 
This vulnerability left the Party very heavily reliant on the re-
maining Soviet cover and those Polish security forces it had at its 
disposal. The employment of Soviet troops against the AK was an 
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embarrassing necessity which came under heavy criticism at the 
May 1945 Plenum. Even Radkiewicz agreed that it was 'unfor-
tunate that two Red Army regiments were sent to Bialystok; Poles 
should be used against the AK. The attitude that the Red Army will 
establish order for us here is bad.' The Central Committee was also 
alarmed by the tendency of some local Party chiefs to ignore the 
Politburo and pursue their own line using security organs and the 
Russians. The UB apparatus, conscious of its key role in protecting 
the Party's hold on power, began to slip from beneath Party con-
trol. Gomulka went so far as to warn 'that a second state is begin-
ning to grow up over our heads. The security organs are making their 
own policy, with which no-one is supposed to interfere.' 70 
Such tendencies, denounced as 'sectarianism'. arose from a kind 
of siege mentality which gripped the aktyw in the early months of 
1945. The apparatus set up in the wake of the Soviet advance was 
extremely shaky. In many areas Party 'commissars' ruled by 
decree, while local cells functioned in conspiracy, or elsewhere tried 
to exclude opponent s from local councils and security by 
monopolizing all positions of power. In many districts, especially 
in the countryside, the authorities operated from fortified enclaves 
amidst often hostile populations. This isolation and suspicion 
seriously hindered political work and began to create tensions in-
side the Party, where hardline critics of the leadership such as 
Konopka or Wlodzimierz Zawadzki, provincial secretary in 
Rzesz6w from September 1944 to January 1945 and then in 
Krak6w, a KPP veteran who had been effectively leading the party 
in 1938 when it was dissolved by the Comintern. provided a sort of 
'left' opposition to the Politburo.71 
But the clinching argument against the policy of terror was that it 
began to look self-defeating. The round-ups which began in 
November continued into spring 1945 on a big scale. Emigre 
sources claim that as many as 50,000 members of the AK were 
arrested and transported to Siberia at this time,72 but there is no 
way of course of verifying this figure . Claims that some 8,000 peo-
ple were incarcerated in Lublin castle at this time are plausible 
enough in view of official data revealing 1,646 arrests by the UB 
and MO alone in Lublin province between January and April. In 
the same operations, over 300 members of the underground were 
killed.73 Internment camps were set up for the AK at Skrob6w, 
Rembert6w, Piotrk6w and elsewhere. But as Figure 1 clearly 
demonstrates, the repression, far from breaking the underground, 
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Icontributed to the massive irruption of armed resistance in the spr-
ing. In fact, when the Central Committee Plenum met in May , the 
leadership attempted to reassert its control over a security ap-
paratus which had itself lost its grip on the underground. Gomulka 
concluded the Plenum by saying that the existence of 'certain 
elements of crisis' was undeniable. 'In the reactionary camp there is 
a crisis, but we have been un able to narrow its base . We are unable 
to fight the reaction without the Red Army. That says something 
about [our) base .'74 
FIGURE 1 
Assassinations or Governmenl Supporters and Orricials (1944·47) 
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Gomulka was right. The hard line had weakened and scattered the 
underground without seriously undermining its support and 
prestige amongst the bulk of the population . Mass a rrests and in-
ternment created an atmosphere of tension and hostility to the 
communists in which clandestine activity proliferated and the 
underground, like a hydra, sprouted new members as fast as the 
security forces picked off the old. 
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In spite of the repression, the stance of the underground remain-
ed generally defensive; resistance was offered on a sporadic and 
unplanned basis. Official historiography lays great emphasis on the 
'Nie' organization which it credits with an influence and degree of 
coherence it did not possess. In fact, the first three months of 1945 
witnessed the virtual disintegration of the underground, with its 
leadership endeavouring to pick up the pieces, while rapidly coming 
to the conclusion that some kind of compromise had to be reached 
with the Russians. Non-recognition of the 'Lublin' authorities and 
the conviction that the PPR was merely a Soviet puppet ruled out 
any direct approaches to the Polish communists. 
Okulicki at this time gives the impression of a man swept along 
on an irresistible tide of events. On 19 January he ordered - to the 
surprise and puzzlement, it seems, of London, most of the AK as 
well as the communists - the disbandment of the AK. Emigre 
historians claim the decision was unpremeditated and conditioned 
by the mood of defeatism within the movement and the urgent need 
to sanction its members' flight from NKVD round-ups.7s Party 
historians argue rather that it had been planned in advance and was 
designed to prune down the AK, leaving only the dependable cadres 
of the 'Nie' organization: the skeleton of the new anti-Soviet 
resistance.76 Okulicki's order had indeed been ambiguous about the 
next step: 'We do not want to fight the Soviets, but we wiJl never 
agree to live except in an entirely sovereign, independent, justly 
governed Polish state. The present Soviet victory has not ended the 
war ... ' President Radzkiewicz, endorsing Okulicki's order on 8 
February, attempted to dispell the uncertainty, stating specifically 
that armed activity had ceased.71 
The order added to the confusion and fragmentation reigning in 
the underground in the aftermath of the Soviet advance. Many of 
the conspirators, like the Russians, did not believe the order and 
simply ignored it, and began to repair and regroup the organiza-
tion. In Bialystok, for instance, Colonel Liniarski disobeyed the 
order and set up an independent 'Citizens' AK' ,78 while· the 
nationalists, who radically disagreed with the decision to disband, 
took further steps to revive their own military networks. And of 
course Okulicki himself did not cease activity, forming a central 
command for 'Nie', which apart from this never really got off the 
drawing-board.79 
The centrifugal processes at work in the military arm of the 
underground were matched by fission within its political leader-
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ship, at home and in London. In November Mikolajczyk, ready to 
settle with the Lubliners on terms favoured by the British and 
Americans, was dumped as Premier of the Government-in-Exile 
and replaced by the intransigent Arciszewsk i. Mikolajczyk ' s Pea-
sant Party went into opposition and following the commitment of 
the' Big Three' at Yalta in February 1945 to the creation of a Poli sh 
coalition government, it succeeded in winning over Delegate 
Jankowski and most of the underground political leaders to 
Mikolajczyk's line. By March 1945 the London camp was dividing 
in two, just as the communists had intended nine month s earlier, 
with the peasant movement and the centre groupings searching for 
a way out of conspiracy and entry into coalition with the PPR , 
while the intransigents were left isolated . Significantly the former 
AK, as represented by Okulicki, with some reservations, fell in with 
Jankowski. 
The talks held between the Russian military command in Poland 
and the fifteen underground leaders headed by Jankowski and 
Okulicki at the end of March, which terminated with the arrest of 
the fifteen and their disappearance to the Soviet Union where they 
were put on trial in June, demonstrated the risks which the AK and 
the Delegatura were prepared to take to promote a deal. Okulicki 
had at first refused to participate, but finally caved in to 
Jankowski's persuasion and Russian insistence on his presence.so 
While much has been published in the West about the arrest and 
trial of the fifteen, we know nothing for certain about the motives 
of the Russians in seizing the Poles or how and at what level the 
decision was taken. But as the criticisms directed at the NKYD and 
the Soviet military authorities at the May Plenum showed . the af-
fair was an enormous affront and embarrassment to the Polish 
communists. According to Jankowski' s successor as Delegate, 
Stefan Korbon ski, who, it is worth noting, clearly had sources of 
information deep inside his opponents' camp, 'Lublin govern ment 
circles consider the arrest of the fifteen by the Soviets a great 
mistake. They themselves are washing their hands of it. .. '81 They 
had little choice but to accept the fait accompli, but in an extra-
ordinarily clumsy way the Russians had closed what seemed to be a 
promising opening for the PPR to escape from the political impasse 
into which it was drifting. 
The coup certainly mUltiplied the difficulties facing the com-
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munists and must have significantly contributed to the irruption of 
underground violence in April, May and June which brought 
Poland to the brink of civil war. Other factors too prompted the 
upsurge of guerrilla activity: the season - spring was suited to par-
tisan warfare; the mass arrests, which propelled thousands of 
young men into the forests; and the realization that militia and 
security posts, or even prisons and internment camps often 
represented easy targets. The use of Red Army units and 'workers' 
brigades' to collect contingents from the peasants also aroused a 
great deal of conflict. These factors accounted equally for the ac-
tivization of Ukrainian nationalist insurgents in south-east Poland. 
But besides, Yalta seemed to promise a new phase and the end of 
the communist monopoly in the administration. The defeatist, 
defensive mood which had weighed on the underground for months 
began to give way to a more offensive and hopeful one. 
Soviet attempts to stamp out the resistance continued unabated. 
On 26 April London heard that 'The pacification has begun of Gar-
wolin, Lukow, Lubartow and Zamosc districts. The Soviet Army 
surrounds villages and transports all the men, other than 
youngsters and the elderly, eastwards. The arrests numbering be-
tween ten and twenty thousand have provoked a mass exodus to the 
forests and the formation of irregular armed units, which never-
theless adopt a passive attitude, only defending themselves when at-
tacked. The Soviet Air Force bombed the Czemiernickie forests.' 82 
The report, even if exaggerated, indicates accurately enough the 
degree of fear and terror sweeping the countryside. By no means all 
the armed units remained passive ei ther. On 24 April, guerrillas 
overran the town of Pulawy, massacring the local securi ty 
policemen. A couple of days later the same happened in Janow, 
then Kozienice, then Grajewo. These were sizeable towns. Militia 
posts in the countryside faced an unenviable task - on the night of 
27128 March formidably armed and trained UPA (Ukrainian 
nationalist) units simultaneously wiped out the entire system of 
militia stations in Lubaczow and Jaroslaw districts, while in 
Bialystok province, according to official data, some forty militia 
offices had been demolished by March.8l In May pitched battles 
took place between security forces and ex-AK units led by 'Orlik' 
(Marian Bernaciak) and 'Lupaszko' (Zygmunt Szendzielarz) . The 
latter was to continue his war with the communists until 1949. 
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The 'May Turn' 
In mid-April, against this background of escalating violence, came 
the first clear signs that the communist leadership was edging away 
from its hard line. Wlodzimierz Zawadzki, who was depicted as the 
embodiment of 'sectarianism', was replaced as provincial secretary 
in Krakow, by Aleksander Kowalski, a more conciliatory figure 
and a firm supporter of Gomulka's leadership and the 'national 
front' strategy. Then in early May the Politburo began to tone 
down its radical economic policy, abandoning experiments with 
'workers' control' and proclaiming the prerogatives of private in-
dustrialists. The decisive volte-face occurred at the Central Com-
mittee Plenum on 20-2 1 May, when the leadership more or less 
unanimously condemned the radicalism of recent months and 
rallied once again to the broad national front suspended in Oc-
tober. 
The turnaround fitted in with international developments: Yalt a, 
the end of the war and the patching up of the differences between 
the allies which had delayed progress in forming the projected 
Polish coalition government, but it preceded Hopkins' placatory 
trip to Moscow· and to an important degree seems to have been the 
outcome of an internal debate within the PPR, stretching over 
several weeks. While the documentary evidence avai lable makes it 
clear that Stalin was directly involved in the October 1944 'turn', 
material on the May 1945 Plenum suggests that his role on this oc-
casion was more detached. By May Stalin appears to have been 
allowing the Poles greater scope for independent action and the 
chief obstacle to adopting a more moderate line was the 
autonomous activity of Soviet officers and 'advisers' in harness 
with hardliners in the Party and UB. As Finkielsztajn told the 
Plenum : 'there is a difference between Stalin 's position on our 
sovereignty and the way the Soviet people on the ground look at the 
matter'.84 The May 'turn' was conditioned, it appears, as much by 
the internal political crisis arising from the narrowness of support 
for the PPR and the upsurge of political violence, as well as 
ideological strains inside the Party, as by broad international con-
siderations. 
Immediately following the Plenum, changes took place on the 
military and security fronts. In order to reduce the government' s 
"Hopkins new to Moscow on 2S May. 
" 
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reliance on Soviet policing, the formation of the Polish security 
corps, the KBW, was speeded-up and three regular army divisions 
were deployed in eastern Poland. On 31 May Radkiewicz ordered a 
'mini-amnesty', releasing from internment those AK prisoners 
thought not to be actively hostile to the authorities , a category 
which covered mainly the Peasant Battalions, the armed wing of 
the Peasant Party. The discriminating policy towards the AK was 
back, replacing what for six months had been the obligatory line 
'of condemning the AK from beginning to end , without distinction 
between leaders and led' . 85 
These measures, the change of attitude and the political regroup-
ing in June, which they anticipated , contributed to the sharp fall -
off in guerrilla activity during the summer as the forest units 
disbanded and men returned to their homes or fl ed abroad, con-
cealed by the huge migration of refugees across central Europe in 
the weeks and months following the German surrender . 
The End of the Underground State 
The agreement reached between Mikolajczyk and ' Lublin' 
representatives in Moscow at the end of June 1945, under which 
Mikolajczyk was to return to Poland as vice-Premier of a coalition 
government, in effect marked the end of the underground state 
formed in 1939/ 40, which had survived, battered, until mid-1945. 
At a meeting in Krakow on 27 June, the political leadership of the 
conspiracy formally disbanded and announced this publicly on I 
July.86 
The military underground, commanded by Colonel Jan Rzepecki 
since Okulicki's arrest, had been reorganized as the Armed Forces 
Delegation (DSZ), in part because the 'Nie' organization was now 
known to the Russians, but also it seems as a more strictly military 
formation than its predecessor, firmly subordinated to the under-
ground political leadership. While setting itself the task of 
'liquidating particularly harmful persons' and 'armed resistance to 
the nation's destruction as well as the depopulation and devastation 
of the country', the DSZ sought to curb unco-ordinated resistance 
and two appeals were issued in May to this effect. The DSZ suc-
ceeded in gathering together rather more of the old AK network 
than had 'Nie', but a considerable part, including the nationalists, 
remained outside, and its organization was still far from complete 
644 Journal of Contemporary History 
in August 1945, when, following the dissolution of the under-
ground state, it followed suit.8' 
These events ended the first chapter of underground resistance to 
communist rule in Poland, but as Figure 1 shows, violent opposi-
tion continued at a high level until early 1947 and in a sporadic, 
localized way until the early 1950s. The final traces of the move-
ment survived until the amnesty of 1956-57 . The change of Party 
strategy in May 1945 solved the political crisis but the narrower 
security problem remained. 
Nevertheless, in 1944-45 the struggle, as party historians admit, 
showed many of the characteristics of a civil war. Until mid-1945 
the Government-in-Exile functioned as an internationally recogniz-
ed political centre; the British allowed it direct radio contact with 
Poland; inside the country a secret parliament united all the major 
non-communist parties; locally, 'London' ran affairs and its 
military arm, fragmented and weakened though it was, remained 
intact and was able to command the loyalty of the vast majority of 
underground soldiers. Above all, as Gomulka admitted, the' Lon-
don' camp maintained its social base . The fighting, even allowing 
for the Soviet role and spontaneous resistance on the part of 
underground groups, took place against the background of the ex-
istence of two rival governments, each with its own state apparatus. 
After mid-1945 this was no longer the case, the bulk of the guerrilla 
movement pinned its hopes on Mikolajczyk's opposition capturing 
the governing machinery which had its origins in Lublin. The 
Government-in-Exile carried on, but ceased to constitute an effec-
tive rival to the Warsaw authorities. 
The policy of the Polish communists towards the underground 
from mid-1944 to mid-1945 corresponded neither to the consistent 
pursuit of a broad national coalition of progressive groupings 
presented in official historiography, nor to the unrelenting persecu-
tion of the 'London' underground depicted in the majority of 
emigre and Western studies. 
Rather the strategy meandered between these two alternatives. 
From July until early October 1944 a genuine attempt was made to 
fragment 'London' and win over its more radical leaders and rank-
and-file supporters. From October until about May 1945 the Party 
adopted a much more aggressive posture towards the underground 
and applied a policy of terror towards the AK, which not only 
,., .' 
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abandoned any further attempt to exploit divi sions in the con-
spiracy, but denied that they existed, treating 'London' as a 
uniform reactionary bloc. In May 1945 this line of indiscriminate 
hostility was replaced by what was in essence a revival of the earlier 
'national front' line. 
The 'turns' in October and May were prompted not simply by 
directives from the Kremlin, but rather by the imperatives of 
changes in the internal political situation in Poland resulting from 
Soviet policy, the activity of Soviet forces, the paucity of the 
human resources at the disposal of Lublin and the need to adapt 10 
the unanticipated consequences of earlier strategies. The failure of 
the Red Army to assist the AK in Warsaw in September 1944 
together with the increasing difficulty of constructing a 'national 
front' and maintaining PPR hegemony within it, propelled the Par-
ty into adopting a radical and belligerent stance, aiming at destroy-
ing the underground . This stance forced the Party into almost total 
reliance on Soviet military power and ils own securily apparatus. 
Moreover, rather than solving the 'AK problem' it led by the spring 
to an upsurge of political violence which the communists, with the 
narrowness of their support, were unable to manage. It was this 
crisis which enabled the leadership to silence the hard liners and 
security men and swing the Party back to the broad national front. 
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COMMUNISTS, SOCIALISTS AND 
WORKERS: POLAND 1944- 48 
By JAIME REYNOLDS 
bltroductiOll 
MUCH has been written about the workers' 'uprisings' in Poland in 
1970-71 and 1976, as well as the workers' councils movement of 1956-
58.1 There is, however, virtually no published material on the ea rlier 
phase of industrial unrest (that which lasted from 1945 until at least the 
beginning of 1948)- an episode ignored even by otherwise well-
informed students of the Polish 'workers' opposition' ,2 
Why is this ? Primarily, of course, because the authorities took great 
pains at the time to conceal the details of this phenomenon, and Polish 
historiography is not yet sufficiently liberalized to handle such a subject 
openly. Secondly, Western observers had considerably greater difficulty 
in obtaining information about internal events in Poland in the inune-
diate postwar years than is the case today. Moreover, it is the far Left 
which has most profusely examined working-class dissidence in 
Eastern Europe since it apparently confirms their critique of state 
socialism.3 In the 1940s, on the other hand, the Left generally preferred 
to turn a blind eye to the problem. 
Perhaps, too, the working-class unrest which was evident immediately 
after the war has been neglected because it raises some awkward 
questions- in particular, if Polish state socialism was in fact established 
in the teeth of opposition from a significant proportion of the prole-
1 See, in particular, Dokumenty. Poznan 1956-GT/ldzien I 970 (Paris, 1971) ; 
Ewa Wacowska (ed.), R ewolta Szczecinska i i ei znaczmie (Paris, 1971 ); Ruch oporu . 
Doku", ... ty (Paris, 1977). In English: D . L ane and G. Kolankiewicz (eds.), Social 
Groups in Polish Society (London, 1973) , is useful on 1956-59 and 1970-'7 1, especiall y 
the chapters written by the editors. An article by Peter Green in Net. L eft Rroiew, no. 
101 - 102, February-April 1977, pp. 69- 108, 'The Third Round in Poland', is 
informative on the 1970S. Dissmt in Poland I976-77 (London, 1977) contains 
documents in translation. 
, This is true of Peter Green's article. There is mention of the Lodz strike in J. 
Malara et L . Rey, La Pologne d'une Occupation a rAutre, 194-1-52 (Paris, 1952). 
• For the Marxist critique of East European state socialsim see ] . Kuron and K . 
Modzelewski, A Revolutionary Socialist Mamfesto (London, n .d.) ; C. Hannan , 
Bureal/cracy and Rroolution in Eastern Europe (London, 1974); also Poland 1970-7 1: 
Capitalism and the Class Stn'ggle (Detroit, 1977) . Hungary 1956 by Bill Lomax 
belongs to the same school. See D. L ane, Tht Socialist ["dllstrial State (London, 
1976), ch. I . 
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tariat, its capacity to overcome and neutralize this threat must be 
considered very seriously. It is not only in the present decade that the 
Party has had to reckon with the workers: the problem has existed from 
the very beginning of its rule. 
In this article I shall describe the way in which relations between 
the workers' parties and the class they claimed to represent developed 
in these years-and then consider the relevance of this period to later 
outbreaks of labour unrest. 
The Political Context 
The Red Army, together with several Polish divisions trained in the 
USSR, liberated Poland with two offensives-one in the spring and 
summer of 1944, the second starting in January 1945. During the first, 
a communist-dominated Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) 
was installed in Lublin under Soviet sponsorship to administer that 
portion of the country-roughly one-third- then freed from Nazi 
occupation. This government carried on until mid-1945, recognized 
by the Soviet Union, but not by either the Western allies or the bulk 
of the Polish underground, which as before regarded the Government 
in Exile in London as the only legitimate authority. In June 1945 this 
confusion was largely resolved when Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, leader of 
the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the most important of the 'London' 
parties, returned to Warsaw with various other emigre politicians and 
became Deputy Prime Minister in a coalition Provisional Government 
of National Unity, accepted by all the Allied Powers. The Premier was 
a socialist, Osobka-Morawski, and the other deputy premier was 
Wladyslaw Gomulka- the Secretary-General of the communist Polish 
Workers' Party (PPR). 
There followed- until the elections of January 1947- an intenie and 
violent struggle for power between Mikolajczyk's PSL, backed by the 
British and the Americans, and the PPR, which enjoyed the rather more 
effective support of the Soviet Union. 
A key factor in this struggle was the position of the Polish Socialist 
Party (PPS), the leadership of which maintained an uneasy alliance with 
the communists throughout the period, culminating in the amalgamation 
of the two parties in ]948. The PPS is of particular interest to us as it 
was a rival working-class party competing with the communists in the 
industrial centres, while the Peasant Party dominated the countryside. 
Moreover, although the post-1945 PPS broke with its prewar anti-
communism and many of its old leaders were excluded from political 
life, it retained a fierce sense of identity and a distinctive, albeit Leftist, 
social-democratic outlook- nowhere more evident than in its continued 
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commitment to economic pluralism. Far from being a communist 
'satellite' led by 'stooges', it represented a major obstacle to the PPR 
version of state socialism. 
Mikolajczyk's opposition was rapidly undermined following the 1947 
elections, which were rigged to ensure his defeat. The communists, in 
partnership with the socialists, thus established a firm hold on state 
power, and during 1947- 48 the foremost question concerned the nature 
of the socialism which was to be built. The policy divergences between 
the two parties-to some degree hidden during the fi ght to secure the 
Left's hold on the government apparatus- now revealed themselves. 
As the communists launched their first offensives on the economic 
front the socialists conducted a furious rea rguard action. By late J947 
the onset of the Cold War and the formation of the Cominform 
intensified Soviet pressure on the PPR leadership and the possibility 
of some specifically Polish road to socialism receded as Stalinist models 
were adopted. The PPS opposition collapsed early in 1948 and, a few 
months later, Gomulka, who had resisted elements of the new line, was 
replaced by the more compliant Bierut as Secretary-General of the PPR. 
By the end of the year the first collectivization drives were under way 
and details of the six-year heavy industrialization plan began to emerge . 
It was against this background of violent political change that Polish 
industry itself underwent a series of shocks and upheavals after the war. 
By 1945 some 65 % of industrial plants had been destroyed, national 
income, which stood at 17"7 milliard zlotys in 1938, had fallen to 6·8 
milliard, while the population had declined from 35 million to 24 
million- a loss which disproportionately severely affected the skilled 
labour force.4 By 1948 production had largely recovered or exceeded 
prewar levels, investment and expansion were proceeding on an 
unprecedented scale, the pattern of ownership had been transformed, a 
huge influx of labour from the countryside contrasted with chronic 
unemployment in the 1930s, and determined efforts were being made 
to alter the worker's whole attitudes and perception of his interests. 
For the sake of clarity, I have divided the period into four phases, 
demarcated by changes in the communists' strategic outlook. The first, 
from July to October 1944, sees them during their initial weeks in 
government, improvising desperately to make some impact on the 
welter of problems before them. The second, lasting until May 1945, 
was marked by a radicalization of the party's policy aimed at mobilizing 
the peasants through land reform and the workers by giving them 
effective control over their factories. In some ways this phase resembles 
the 'War Communism' adopted by the Bolshevik Party in Russia 
between 1918 and 1921. The third phase, from June 1945 to April 1947 
, Polsha Ludowa I944-50 (Ossolineum, 1974), pp. 279, 285, 341. 
was one of relative normalization in industry as the struggle for power 
between the PPR and PSL raged. Finally, from spring 1947, the m ines 
and factories began to feel the first impact of Stalinization. 
Phase One: July to October I944 
The first period of PKWN administration was marked by a high 
degree of political and economic chaos and the tendency of the PPR to 
regard industry as a low priority. 
The territory liberated in 1944 was, in any case, underdeveloped 
industrially, and the communists, already overstretched by the imme-
diate tasks of forming local administrations, establishing a police force, 
recruiting for the army and finding food for millions of Soviet troops, 
were generally prepared to leave industrial recovery to local initiative 
for the time being. Moreover, the Party's strategy at this stage was 
predicated on the need to win over elements from the bourgeois camp 
by promising an early restoration of factories to their private owners, 
and nothing was said about the role of the workers.5 
In the industrial areas the workers who remained faced immense 
difficulties. The economic system was in ruins- three rapidly deprecia-
ting currencies were in circulation, transport and raw materials were 
lacking, the labour force had dispersed and often machinery and 
buildings had been wrecked during the offensive . In m any cases the 
prewar owners had long since disappeared, so when their German 
supervisors retreated the workers simply carried on, electing a committee 
to act in place of the management- frequently this had existed under-
ground during the occupation anyway- and m aking a start on repairing 
equipment, contacting the authorities and resuming production . The 
PKWN representatives encouraged such initiatives, without being in a 
position to assist very much- indeed, many of the politically reliable 
workers were poached by the army, party or police, and the Party does 
not appear to have issued instructions on the functions of the factory 
committees until 2 October. 6 
Phase Two: October I 944- M ay I 945 
These instructions, which stressed the 'great role' to be played by 
the factory committees, including representation on the management 
with the director and delegates of the local administration, were 
• A. Przygonski , Z zagadnieli strategii frontll narodowego PPR I 942-45 (Warsa\\, 
1976), p . 290. The PKWN M anifesto made no mention of workers ' counci ls , whi l~ 
laying great stress on the need for an early resto ration of private ownership (Manifest 
PKWN, reprint, W arsaw, 1974, p . 20). 
• PPR V III.I944-XII. I945 . D okufne1lty (Warsaw, 1969), pp. 57-61 'Instrukcja 
KC PPR w sprawie pracy czlonk6w partii w zwillzkach zawodowych:, Lublin, 2 
October 1944. 
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symptomatic of the general radicalization of PPR strategy during 
October. A few days later the PKWN withdrew its decree providing 
for the early reprivatization of factory ownership,7 and shortly after-
wards a 'revolutionary' land reform was launched, accompanied by the 
dismissal of several members of the Lublin Committee. 
The communists, faced with a crisis in the army and a rising wave of 
opposition activity, abandoned their strategy of constructing a 'wide 
national front' including bourgeois groupings, and adopted aggressive, 
radical tactics designed to win over the workers and the poorer peasantry. 
The concession of effective workers' control in the factories was part 
of this package. 
The tactical character of this move was demonstrated by the re-
luctance of the PPR to institutionalize the development by defining 
in law the precise role of the factory councils. Thus a draft decree ready 
in October was withdrawn in order to be radicalized,8 but the PKWN 
was still discussing the matter fruitlessly in December, despite the 
socialist Drobner's insistence that 'the working class demands the 
speeding-up of the decree'. 9 
The main reason for the delay seems, however, to have been the 
desire to produce a decree which would meet the needs of the more 
industrialized regions, as yet still occupied by the Germans.10 Anyway, 
within days of the liberation of these areas a decree was passed which 
largely recognized the existing situation- the councils retaining their 
wide powers, including participation in management.H 
The problems posed by this arrangement soon became evident. 
Frequent conflicts arose between the factory director, together with his 
technical staff, on the one hand, and the factory councils representing 
the manual workers, on the other. The workers' representatives 
considered that the managements had failed to adjust their thinking to 
the new order in industry and were refusing to allow the councils an 
adequate say in decision-making.12 The specialists in return argued that 
the councils undervalued their role. A particular bone of contention 
was the councils' tendency to reduce differentials and productivity 
bonuses, as well as excluding non-manual staff from a share in profits. IS 
7 Polsha Ludowa I944-50, p. 3 I I. 
8 Ibid., p. 313n.; D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (eds.), op. cit., p. 90. 
g LSE documents. Extracts from the protocols of sittings of the PKWN, July-
pecember 1944. AURM, t.t. Sittings of 12 and 28 December; Drobner's comment 
IS from the latter. 
10 K. Kersten, PKWN (Lublin, 1965), p. 132. 
11 PPR VIII.I944-XII.I945 ... , pp. 267- 75, 'Dekret Rady Ministr6w, 0 
utworzeniu rad zakladowych', Warsaw, 6 February 1945. 
11 D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (eds.), op. cit., p. 91-quoting report of KCZZ for 
April 1945 (from J. Gol\!biowski, 'Problemy nacjonalizacja przemyslu', in Uprze771Y-
slowienie ziem polshich w XIX i XX wieku (Warsaw, 1970), p. 514. 
11 PPR VIJ1.I944-Xll.I945 ... , pp. 145-52, 'Uchwala plenum KC PPR w 
521 
Evidently, the party's radical line often unleashed an ultra-radical 
response from the workers, which according to some commentators 
was 'anarcho-syndicalist' in character.14 This overreaction was tolerated 
as long as the Party was furiously expanding its membership, but in 
May it was to be condemned by the Central Corrunittee as 'sectarianism'. 
Apart from the over-radicalization of the councils, the PPR also had 
to reckon with the danger of their take-over by anti-communist elements. 
This threat grew in March and April when the material conditions of 
the workers sank to a new low level. Real earnings in the first half of 
1945 were less than 10% of their 1938 1eveI,15 and the towns were swept 
by severe food shortages, only partially relieved by the despatch of 
workers' brigades into the countryside to collect quotas from the 
peasants. Mine, the Industry Minister, told the May plenum of the PPR 
Central Committee that there had been some 'progress'- 'a month ago 
there was no bread in Lodz, now they're calling for dripping'.16 Short 
protest strikes and absenteeism were widespread,17 and in this atmos-
phere there was a marked revival of underground activity. In some 
country areas the level of violence reached civil war proportions, while 
in the industrial regions the illegal anti-communist section of the 
Socialist Party, known as the WRN, pursued a policy of operating 
within the trade unions and workers' councils to turn dissatisfaction 
with material hardship against the government and the PPR.18 Since 
many of the activists of the legal wing of the PPS were indistinguishable 
from the WRN, the communists tended to monopolize the factory 
councils and trade union corrunittees-excluding the socialists by 
sprawach gospodarczych', Warsaw, 26 May 1945 . 
" W. G6ra, Polsha Rzeczpospo/ita Llldowa I944-47 (Warsaw, 1974), p. 129. Sec 
also B. Syzdek, PPS w latach I944-47 (Warsaw, 1974), pp. 261-2. 
" Polsha Ludowa I944-50, pp. 357- 8, also p. 367. 
" LSE documents . Extracts from the protocols of the Central Committee plenum 
of the PPR, 20-21 May 1945, AZHP. 
17 See, for instance, T. Sierocki, Warszowsha organizacja PPS, I944-48 (Warsaw, 
1976), p. 171; J. Kantyka, PPS 110 Slqshu i w Zag/~bill Dqbrowskim .v latach I939-48 
(Katowice, 1975), p . 185; E. Wojnowski, Warmia j Mazury w latac" I945-47 (Olsztyn, 
1970), p. 91. 
The report of the Lodz Party Committee to the Central Committce for April/May 
'945 (see Z pola wall,i, 1971, no. 4, pp. 287-8) contains this description of the position 
in the local factories: 
Against the background of food-supply difficulties strong tension of feelings in the 
factories. In the period of this report, especially in the past rew d ays, a dozen or so 
brief strikes in Lodz, Pabianice, Konskie . .. The strikes las t as long as the shop-
floor meetings which the works' councils call immediately the stoppage begins . .. 
Factory cells display complete impotence towards the strikes. As a rule the m eetings 
arc very stormy; the workers, and especially the women workers, heckle the speakers; 
they shout: 'Fine democracy, when the.re's nothing to eat;' 'The parasites stuff 
themselves as always, and the worker starves' , etc ... . It is clear that the strikes are 
initiated by people sent in by the Reaction . .. 
.. Kantyka, op. cit., pp. ,61-2, reveals that Puzak, leade r of the WRN, was active in 
Silesia in March '945. Puiak's own account was published in Zeszyty historycz1le, 
'977, no. 4', pp. 128-3 1. 
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force.1o This practice was also to be condemned as 'sectarianism' in 
May, but its prevalence was inevitable in view of the weakness of the 
communists' organization and the Party's siege mentality at the time. 
Phase Three: May I945 to April I947 
It was this sense of political isolation, together with the renewed 
prospect of a deal with Mikolajczyk, which prompted the communists' 
change of strategy in May 1945. The radicalism of the preceding months 
was criticized, the need for a rapid return to private ownership re-
affirmed,20 and directions issued to share power with the allied parties 
at all levels. 
So far as industry was concerned, the PPR leadership decided that the 
time had come to reduce the powers of the factory councils. In the 
interests of 'efficiency' the Central Committee called for 'the increased 
and strengthened authority of the director, engineer and foreman', 
which was spelt out as meaning that, while the management and factory 
council jointly decided questions concerning the employment and 
laying off of workers as well as the material and cultural affairs of the 
work force, 'the director alone decides all matters related to the economic 
and technical management of the concern as well as matters relating to 
bonuses'. On pay, the Central Committee rejected egalitarianism in 
favour of wages linked to productivity and skills, with a share of the 
profits going to non-manual personnel. Finally, there were promises to 
improve the food supply.21 These resolutions amounted to the abolition 
of workers' control. The councils lost their hold over the purse strings 
and organization of production, and were left with the role of attend ing 
to the social welfare of the work force. 
Apart from the motives mentioned earlier, the need to raise pro-
duction and productivity weighed heavily. In April the index of 
industrial production stood at only 19% of its 1937 level.22 Gomulka 
identified the cause as 'the lack of discipline, the demoralization in the 
working class' .23 It is difficult to assess how the 'working class' received 
the constriction of the powers of the factory councils. Production rose 
very rapidly during the remaining months of 1945, but strikes and 
protests remained a recurrent feature.24 What evidence there is suggests 
10 LSE documents. May 1945 plenum, speech of Sowinski-suggests that 
provi~cial party organizations h ad to force local committees not to monopolize factory 
counCIls. See also Syzdek, op. cit., p. 310 . 
•• Polska Llldowa I 944-50, p. 3'5, Ministry of Industry circular, IS May ' 945. 
21 PPR VIII.I944-XII.I945 ... , 'Uchwal. plenum .. .' (see footnote 13) . 
.. I. Kostrowicka, Z . L andau and J. Tomaszewski, His/aria gospodarcz a Pols"; 
XIX i XX wieku (Warsaw, 1975), p . 486. 
IS LSE documents. May 1945 plenum, speech of Gomulka. See also GOlllu lka's 
interview in Trybllna Z wiqo:kowca, I June 1945, reprinted in his Artykuly j przemow-
i, ,,ia. vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1962), pp. 288-92. 
,. See. for instance, ]. Naumiuk, PPR na Kielecczyztlie (Warsaw, 1976), p. 359. 
that it was shortages and opposltton to the communists rather than 
discontent over the diminished role of the workers' councils which 
provoked trouble, although the councils and not the trade unions were 
most prominent in airing this unrest. In September, for instance, 
Gomulka was obliged to listen to a barrage of criticism at a meeting of 
representatives of the councils in Lodz, before replying with a fighting 
speech.26 
Another consideration which may have prompted the communists' 
move away from workers' control was their decision to relax their hold 
on the councils-elections to which began in May and continued until 
November. It soon became clear that the PPS was making substantial 
gains at the expense of the communists26-a development the PPR 
viewed equivocally. While recognizing that their isolation could be 
overcome only by conceding a greater share of power to their political 
allies, the communists sought to prevent the process from going too far, 
and to ensure that their opponents were excluded. The communists 
were identified with government policy and factory management, while 
the socialists resumed their traditional 'trade-unionist' outlook and were 
involved in organizing many of the strikes, being active, for example, 
in opposition to a ministerial decision to cut rations, which led to a 
strike threat at the Cegielski works in Poznan-scene of the workers' 
riots in June 1956- in August 1945.27 All this threatened the PPR with 
the loss of its influence over the working class. Thus, while Zambrowski, 
head of the party Secretariat, wanted 'to give the workers the opportunity 
of fre~, secret elections, wherever it is possible' ,28 he also warned that 
'the PPS is growing numerically because it leads the defence of the 
interests of the working class and wins over members'.29 It is known 
that in a number of cases the local party officials decided that free 
elections were impossible and intervened to increase the communists' 
share of seats,So and everywhere strenuous efforts were made to avoid 
contests by nominating joint PPS-PPR lists. There were also cases of 
draconian measures being taken against socialists involved in organizing 
strikes-one Tadeusz Borowiec was sentenced to ten years for his part 
in leading a strike by loom operators at a mill in Pabianice in July.s1 
See also footnote 27. 
to Gomulka, op. cit., pp. 36C>-7; 'Nasze trudnosci i drogi ich przezwyci~zenia' 
(Lodz, 13 September 1945). II Sierocki, op. cit., p. 175. 
17 K. Robakowski, Rola i dzialalnose PPS w wielkopolsce i no Ziemi Ltlbtlskiej w 
latach I945-48 (Poznan, 1973), pp. 83-84; see 'Sprawozdanie KM PPR w Poznaniu 
za o~res o~ 15 IX do 15 X 1945', Zpola walki, '97', no. 4, p. 316, for Ihe aftermath 
of thIs stnke . 
.. LSE documen ts . Posiedzerua Sekretariatu KC PPR, Extracts, AZHP 190: II, 
17 June '945. .. Ibid., 23 June 1945 . 
•• Jutro Polski, 20 January '946, reports such an incident in elections held at the 
Panstwowy Zaklad Przemyslu Bawelnego, 26 November 1945. The report is based on 
Robotni" , 8 December 1945. 
" D. Healy (ed.), The Cllrtain Falls. The story of the socialists in East'TII Europe 
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In 1946 the connection between industrial unrest and political events 
in the country became even more marked. In the spring there was a 
discernible increase in dissatisfaction in the industrial areas32- partly, 
no doubt, due to inflation, which began to accelerate from late 1945, but 
probably linked also to the intensification of political tension between 
the communists and Mikolajczyk. Certainly, the PPR tri ed to pin the 
blame on the Peasant Party: in a joint declaration issued with the PPS 
in Warsaw in June, they alleged that 
trouble-makers, hiding under the label of the PSL, are trying to 
arouse a strike atmosphere, spread artifi cial dissatisfaction and 
ferment ... and smash the unity of the trade union and workers' 
movement.33 
There may have been a large element of truth in this ; curiously 
enough, the Peasant Party did enjoy a considerable degree of support 
even in urban areas and also in some trade unions- the tramway and 
local government workers, for instance. Moreover, after a conversation 
with Mikolajczyk in M ay, the British ambassador reported to London 
that he 'gathered . .. that if he [Mikolajczyk] is ejected from the 
Government he will try to cause any resultant disturbances to take the 
form of strikes nominally for higher wages rather than a political 
outburst'.34 
Nevertheless, the attacks on the PSL, with their emphasis on the need 
to maintain working-class unity, were at the same time a thinly disguised 
(London, 1951), p . 58. Pabianice was a stronghold of Szczerkowski (WR N); Syzdek, 
op. cit., p . 89. 
a. Sieracki, op. cit., pp. 267- 9 ; N aumiuk , op. cit ., p . 18 1. J. Gol~biowski, Pierwsze 
lata I 945-47 (Katowice, 1947), p . 331, quotes this laconic report of the Silesian Militia 
Command for January 1946: 
In connection with big shortages in food supply and the existence of too g reat a 
discrepancy in rations and wages between the workers and the colossally swollen 
white-collar and m anagement apparatus . .. it is even possible to talk of a certain 
wavering in the mood of the working class . . . 
This perhaps refers to strikes in the coalmines in late 1945. See Z pola walki, '97 [, 
no. 4, p. 339. .. Sierocki , op. cit. , pp. 267-9 . 
.. PRO F OJ7[ 56439 N .6245 /34/5 5/ [5 M ay 1946; M ikolajczyk went on a speakin g 
tour of industri al Silesia in April 1946 and en couraged PS L activists to campaign 
amongst the workers and gain representation on the works councils. These efforts 
seem to have been frustrated successfullY by the communists. See Gol~biowsk i , 
op. cit. , p. J J I. 
In Gdansk too oppositionist elements were active. According to the Provincial 
Committee of the PPR (report 19 October, 1946) : 
For nea rly a year both ports have been causing us a lot of difficul ty and p roblems. 
In practice we have been continually balancing on the edge of a strike. Criminal 
elements, unconnected with the working class either in the past or present, have 
crept into the ports. The only b ait for them was the opportunity to steal. It was an 
element which with diffi culty accepted the political or educational influence of 
union organizations. This state was skilfully fuelled by openly hostile elem ents 
frequently connected with foreign intelligence. ' 
(R. Wapinski, Pierwsze lata w/adZ}' ludowej na ,vybrzez u gdariskim (Gdansk, [970), 
p . 86.) 
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warning to the socialists to keep in line and also suggest that the PSL 
tactics were aimed at exploiting the sensitive relations between the two 
workers' parties at their tenderest point- in industry. A series of 
elections to trade-union executives in mid- 1946 which \-vere ma rked by 
socialist gains further raised the temperature.ao This pattern of the 
communists- to some extent in harness with the socialist central 
leadership- endeavouring to restrain the grassroots PPS activists in the 
factories, was confi rmed by one of the points of the pact signed between 
the two leaderships in November. In the unpublished addendum it was 
agreed that 
the leaderships of both parties held the position that all actions 
undertaken to the detriment of the position of the trades unions will 
be jointly combated, and in relation to their initiators, if they are in 
the party, the most severe organizational measures will be applied .so 
The implications of this agreement became clea rer in January 1947 
when the factory councils were merged with the trade un io ns and given 
additional tasks in raising productivity.37 The trade union apparatus was 
by this t ime a centralized body covering virtually the entire labour force, 
responsible for coordination and political work in industry. The merger 
thus brought the factory councils-up to then independent, decen-
tralized organs- into this hierarchy, which within the next two years 
was transformed into a 'transmission belt' executing party policy rather 
than articulating and defending the workers' interests. From the start 
the communists had held a dominant position in the upper echelons of 
the union organization, but the PPS scored another round of successes 
in elections in ea rly 1947, and formed a majority on many of the 
executives at lower levels.3s 
The year 1946, however, was generally speaking a yea r when some 
degree of economic normality was restored. Production regained prewar 
fi gures,a9 wages rose considerably and prices were steady. The emphasis 
was on satisfying consumption needs- primarily, no doubt, in order to 
win support for the government as it prepared for a show-down with 
the opposition. 
This recovery was interrupted early in 1947 by a burst of inflation-
wages and prices shooting up by over 20% in the first half of the year .40 
One obvious reason for this was the severity of the winter, followed by 
spring floods and a summer drought, which together disrupted trans-
•• Sierocki , op. cit. , p. 175. In Silesia, fo r example, PPS strength on works councils 
surpassed that of the PP R in August 1946 (Gol<; biowski, Pierws::e ... , p . 308). 
30 Ibid., p. 275. 
:: P?lska Llldow~ I 944- 50 , p. 347. The decree was amended on 16 January 1947. 
S ,erock" op. CIt •• pp. 175, 180. 284. 
:: This was true of basic industrial products; fu ll rcco,·c ry ca me in 1947- 48. 
Polsha Llldowa I 944-50, pp . 358-<}. 
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port, reduced the harvest, and led to shortages. But, apart from natural 
disasters, hold-ups in the release of Western investment credits due for 
the end of J946 and difficulties encountered in reaching the targets of 
the first eight-month plan-especially in the coal industry-hit the 
production of industrial consumer goods. The growth of rural pur-
chasing power after the abolition of quotas in mid-I946 also fuelled 
inflation.u 
The effect of this on the workers was a drop of 10- 15% in rea l 
wages,42 and in December 1946, when the government postponed pay-
ment of the traditional end-of-year bonus,43 and again ea rly in J 947 when 
an attempt was made to end rat ioning on certain items, there were 
waves of protest .44 
In the middle of April the Central Committee of the PPR met in 
Warsaw to discuss the party's response to the economic crisis, and a 
month later Minc launched the so-cal1ed 'battle for trade'. 
Phase Four: April 1947- December 1948 
The 'battle for trade', although ostensibly motivated by economic 
considerations, had strong political overtones. Its central feature was a 
drive against private traders together with the expansion of the state 
sector in retail distribution. But the offensive against 'speculators' and 
' rich peasants' also served to smash the last remnants of Mikolajczyk's 
opposition. In the first four months of 1947, the Special Commission 
to Combat Malpractices and Speculation sent some 24,000 people to 
labour camps without formal trial.45 
The main significance of the 'battle' for our purposes is that for the 
first time the economic policies of the communists and socialists 
seriously and openly diverged. Until the April plenum the nwnerous 
conflicts between the two parties had been chiefly concerned with 
squabbles over their respective share of influence and office in industry 
and central and local government. Where economic disputes had arisen 
it was frequently the PPS which had taken the more radical line, but 
now the communists were calling into question the whole future of the 
mixed economy, one of the tenets of PPS policy. Clashes over economics 
- centring on the pace of industrialization, the balance between invest-
ment and consumption and the role of cooperatives- were matched by 
dissension over the powers of the Sejm, the guarantee of civil rights and 
debates in the parties ' theoretical journals about 'socialist humanism'. 
The fundamental incompatibility between the long-term objectives 
of the communists and socialists was becoming apparent. For the PPR 
.. Ibid., p . 303. .. G6ra, op. cit. , p. 245. .. Polsha Llldowa I 944-50, p . 309 . 
.. Ibid., p. 366; J. Naumiuk, Poc:;:qtki wlad:;:y llldOflJej na Kielecc:;:yi nie I 944-.J7 
(Lublin, 1969), pp. 181 , 234 . 
.. A. Jezierski, Historia gospodarcza Polski Llldowej (Warsaw, 1971), p . 116. 
the class antagonisms present under capitalism, expressed in strike 
action and the organization of structures to defend working-class 
interests, no longer existed once ownership had passed into the hands 
of the state and its own control over the political system had been 
consolidated. Thus any independent activity amongst the workers 
predicated on the view that antagonisms between labour and the state 
would continue was regarded as obsolete and reactionary. The days of 
the PPS, still wedded to economic pluralism and anxious to safeguard 
the rights of the individual against the power of the state, were clearly 
numbered, and in May Gomulka announced that the time had come to 
begin the process of 'organic unification' of the two parties.46 This attack 
came at a time when the socialists' support amongst the workers was 
discernibly surpassing that of the communists. In Warsaw, for instance, 
the results of elections to the executives of 26 unions at the turn of 
1946-47 saw the PPS increase its share of seats from 29'5 % to 42'7%, 
while the PPR share fell from 52 '2% to 40'8%, in spite of various 
devices to prevent this happening." 
The connection between the fate of the PPS and the future position of 
the workers in industry became increasingly obvious in the second half 
of 1947. 
The socialist leadership vigorously opposed the merger proposals and 
trade programme in May and June, but at the end of that month it 
retreated, dropping its fundamental objections to the communists' 
economic strategy and reaffirming its commitment to eventual 'organic 
unification', without specifying when this would take place. The full 
r~asons .for this collapse are unclear, but the arrests of several prominent 
flght-wmg socialists in June were hardly coincidenta1.48 
Even after this compromise had been reached at national level, tension 
between the two parties in the factories continued at a high pitch. Once 
again the communists applied pressure on the socialist leaders to 
discipline local activists engaged in organizing strikes.49 Besides this, the 
PPR launched a campaign of joint works meetings with the PPS during 
the summer, aimed at identifying and neutralizing oppositionists. 50 
. " F~r Gomulka's speech, see Artykuly i przem6wienia, vol. 2, pp. 397-~22. For 
diSCUSSions of the differences in outlook between the PPS and PPR, see, for Instance, 
K. Cwik, Problemy tUlptlldzialania PPR i PPS w wojewOdztwie krakowskim I945- 4B 
(C:,aco.w, 19,?4), pp. 223--'7; Kantyka, op. cit., pp. 308-13; Sierocki, op. cit., pp. 278-89 . 
.. Sierockl, op. cit., p. 175. . . . 
H. R~s , A Hutory of Modern Poland (London, 1966), p. 231. Sierocki , op: ell ., YP. 381-3 gives a fairly full account of the m eeting of the PPS Supreme CounCil , 30 
u!!e 1947, which ended the crisis. 
p PPR 1.r947-XII.r948. Dokumenty (Warsaw, 1973), 'Ok61nik KC PPR i CKW 
PS w spmwie przeciwdzialania pr6bom wywolania strajk6w', Warsaw, 6 June 1947, 
Pp. 268-70 . 
•• Cwik, op. cit., p. 230; also 'R', 'The Fate of Polish Socialism', Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 28, no . I, October 1949, p . 136. 
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Having brought PPS leadership into line, the communists unveiled 
the next stage of their economic programme, the centrepiece of which 
was wsp6lzawodnictwo--a form of socialist competition modelled closely 
on the Stakhanovite system in the Soviet Union. 
The movement began in earnest in July with the appeal of Wincenty 
Pstrowski, a coaIminer from Zabrze in Silesia, to his workmates. 
Pstrowski had recently overfulfilled his norm by a record 270% and 
now challenged others to exceed this performance. Accompanied by a 
loud fanfare of publicity, Pstrowski and other heroes of labour were 
paraded and decorated at galas and trade-union gatherings, while in 
the mines and factories work-rate became an index of political 
dependability. 51 
The objective of these schemes was simply to improve productivity 
and labour discipline at a time when living standards were falling as 
~onsumption was held down to provide for the sharply increased 
mvestment targets set for 1947. 62 The pressure on the standard of living 
was further intensified by Poland's rejection of Marshall Aid in July at 
Soviet behest. 53 Indeed, the supply of aid and loans from the West had 
largely dried up by this stage. 54 Thus, between the second and fourth 
quarters of 1947 average earnings fell by over 20% , while prices 
remained constant or rose-the increase in the case of meat and meat 
products amounting to over 20% in the final three months of the year.55 
The reaction of the bulk of industrial workers to wsp6lzawodnictwo 
was, predictably, hostile. It provoked a stonn of protest, which, in some 
cases at any rate, escalated into violent strikes-we shall see what 
happened in the case of Lodz in a moment. 
The socialists often shared this hostility, 'drawing attention to the 
workers' lack of interest in the movement', 'maintaining that 
wsp6lzawodnictwo utterly destroys the physical strength of the workers' 
?nd 'that it was developing to the detriment of the working class and 
mstead of benefits brought the state material losses'. 56 
It seems, then, that in the autumn of 1947 the communist leadership 
Was confronted by the concerted and vociferous opposition to its economic 
policy of much of both the working class and the PPS-as well as some 
?f its own membership. Unfortunately, there is very little accessible 
mformation on the extent, duration and methods by which this 
resistance was overcome. It does appear, however, that to the list: Poznan, 
1956 ; Szczecin, 1970; Radom, 1976, we should add: Lodz, 1947.5' 
:' J. Roszko , Prawda 0 g6rniku Pstrowskim (Warsaw, 1975). 
I Pol~",! Ludowa I944-jO, p. 304. Investment i~creased from 2'0 milliard zlo tys 
to ~'8 nulhard zlotys, 1946-47. .. G6ra, op. CIt., p. 235. •• IbId., p. 245 . 
•• Polska Ludowa I944-jO, pp. 358-9; Jezierski, op. cit., p. 509. 
" RObakowski, op. cit., pp. 92-93. 
Perhaps we should also add Gdansk, 1946. Against a background of continual 
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'R~d' Lodz, the centre of Poland 's textile industry, has a tradition of w~rkmg-cIass militancy dating back to the nineteenth century and 
~vld~nt as recently as 1971.58 T he influx of large numbers of rural 
II~T~l1grants seeking employment after the war did not dampen this 
mllItancy- indeed, the 'worker-peasants' were rega rded as a particu-
la.rIy volatile element in the labour force. 59 The same was true of the 
hIgh percentage of women workers in the mi lls. I n both 1945 and 19+6 
there had been strikes in Lodz-in each case with anti-Semitic over-
tones ; another local tradition, 60 and, as has already been mentioned, it 
Was on the Lodz workers councils' delegates that Gomulka vented his 
anno.yance at strikes and protests in September 1945. Moreon r, 
relatIOns between the PPS and the communists had been especially 
stra~ne~ here, and the loyalties of many of the PPR members in the 
textile mdustry were divided.61 
T~e course of the disturbances in Lodz can be traced by a careful 
reading of Glos ludu, the organ of the PPR, although considerable efforts 
Were made to conceal what was happening. 62 The strike seems to have 
taken place during the second half of September, but it was not until I [ 
October that this was admitted publicly, when Gomulka, speaking to 
the PPR Central Committee, explained what had occurred; 
Our party has always had the courage to speak the truth, even though 
that truth was bitter. We cannot not say a few words of truth to those 
ternsion in the ports (see footnote 34), the dockers, on 10 August 1946, s truck in 
p otest at the arrest of three of their colleagues for s tea ling corn , although attempts to 
}ntroduce a new contract system and cut down on pilfering-in response to demands k~fm UNRRA-Iay behind this. In the resulting disturbances one UB officer wus 
I .Ied and two others wounded. The ports returned to normal after railway and 
shipyard workers had been brought in to break the strike. In the aftermath of the st~lke 74 dockers were sacked and 189 had their r ight to work and li" e in Gdansk WI~~drawn . See Wapinski, op. cit., pp. 86-87. . . . 
. The tradi tion of working-class militancy in the Lodz textI le Industry mamfested ~self In major strikes in M ay 1892, M ay 1905, 1927/28, August- September 19P, 
p.nl- May 1933 and 1936. Generally associated with these were wIldcat occupallon 
'Bnkes, str~et demonstrations and d ashes with the police. Se~ ~urthe r : (\. ProchOl k, ok~nt IOdzk. w ,oku I892 (Warsaw, 1950); B. Wachowska, Stra]kt okupacy]nt w 16dzkllll 
. fgu prztmyslowym w [atach kryzyst/ gospodarc:::ego I 929-33 (Lodz, 1967) ; L. ~Ieszczynski, Ruch strajkowy w przemyilt wlokimnic:mym okrrgll IOdz kltgo w lalaell 
'{;ysl/ gospodarczego I 929-33 (Lodz, 1969). . . 
L By 1950 one-thi rd of Loelz's population were ,pos~war . r~ra l Immlgra!'ts-{D . 
r ane ~~ G . Kolankiewicz (eds.) , op. cit., p . 93. ] . Kqdzl~ l sk l , I"; 0 prob!ellue modelll 
t ew~ll/c], kulluralll ti (Loeiz, 1964) , p. 84, has fu rther detaI ls, noung that the bulk of h~otncre.se was in 1945- 47. . 
I For the strikes see: Protokoly KC (1945) for %0 September, Zes:::yty Imtoryc:::lIe, 
973, no .. 24, pp. 137- 8; and PRO F0371 56455/ [0598/34/55 / 19 August 1946. On 
Lodz antI-Semitism , see P. Lendva i, Ami-Semitism ill Eastern Europe (L~mdon, 1971 ), 
pp;. 1 S+-~%. 11 Robakowski , op. cit., p '. t 36; Syzdek, op. ClI . , PP .. 346- 7. 
IneVItably, any discussion of strikes in Poland IS frustrated by the patchIness of sour~e material. The following account of the Lodz strike of 1947 is based largely On 0!ficlal-an~ therefore heavily censored- press reports, speeches by Party leaders and 
circumstantIal evidence. N ecessarily it contains gaps, and the author would welcome 
any Observations or corrections from readers. 
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Lodz millworkers who a dozen or so days ago, under the influence of 
hostile agitation, left work. As is well known, this took place at the 
Poznanski63 works in connection with the transfer of several spinners 
to operating a larger number of looms. The protest action against 
working on an increased number of looms threatens the interests of 
the workers themselves, is harmful to the state and for the completion 
of the economic plan ... 64 
The fact that this statement was published shows that the trouble in 
Lodz was of considerable dimensions; that news of it had spread in spite 
of the black-out and that the abundant newspaper items concerned with 
the Lodz mills which had appeared over the previous month must be 
read in a new light. It also indicates that the party leadership had taken 
a tough line with the strikers. 
The events at the Poznanski works were the spark which ignited an 
already highly combustible atmosphere. First, as we have seen, real 
earnings fell sharply after the summer of 1947, a drop felt especially 
acutely in Lodz since prices, exceptionally, rose there by 4% in the 
second half of the year. 65 Second, production at the mills appears to have 
been sluggish for several months in spite of claims that targets had been 
overfulfilled. This was due to shortages of raw materials and the dis-
appearance of workers into the countryside during the harvest, but also, 
as was frankly admitted, to stoppages and a lack of urgency in 
overcoming difficulties.66 Third, September was 'Rebuilding Warsaw 
Month', to which everyone was expected to contribute by working 
unpaid on at least one Sunday. On 12 September the Lodz factory 
councils issued a call to the millworkers to devote Sunday (21 September) 
to the cause, adding that this would constitute 'a blow against the 
barbarian German imperialists'. 67 
The call clearly met with a hostile response from workers in many 
areas, for on 17 September the Central Council of the Trades Unions 
(KCZZ) announced that 
As a result of numerous queries by the trades unions ... the devotion 
of one day's work on behalf of the rebuilding of Warsaw on 21 
September has turned out to be impracticable for technical reasons 
in a whole range of industries ... 
'3 There were more than 20 state-owned mills, manufacturing chiefly cotton, in 
Lodz at this time. The Poznanski works (PZPB no. 2) in the centre of the city was the 
second largest. The Scheibler works (PZPB no. fl, employing over 9,000 workers, was 
the b,ggest factory in Poland. Central direction was in the hands of a Central Office 
for the .Textile Industry (CZPW), the director-general of which was a young 
commUlllst, Walenty Wende. .. Glos Iud" (organ of the PPR), f2 October 1947 . 
.. Polsha Ludowa 1944-50, p. 351. 
II Glos ludu, 2f September 1947. 
" Ibid, 12 September f 947. 
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Where the extra Sunday was not worked, the KCZZ recommended 
a collection of voluntary contributions for the rebuilding of Warsaw 
on 30 September or I October (pay day) . .. 68 
Nevertheless, on 21 September Glos ludu announced that 
The Lodz world of labour is devoting the gross wages of one day of 
work to the rebuilding of Warsaw. That day will be Sunday, 21 
September . . .69 
In fact, it seems that the Lodz mills had already been at a standstill for 
several days when this statement was issued. 
The main cause of the trouble was, however, wsp6lzawodnictwo. After 
the. coaImines, the textile industry was the next sector of industry in 
:-vhlch the Party attempted to implement socialist competition, and here 
It met with stiff opposition from the mass of the workers. Prior to 
Pstrowski's appeal there had already been some attempts to organize 
so-called 'work-races' amongst the women mill workers by the 
Communist Youth Union,10 but from September the campaign was 
stepped up. A contest began between Stakhanovites in the mines and 
~he mills, while the industrial and sports pages of newspapers became 
Increasingly indistinguishable, displaying such headlines as 'Geyerowcy 
go for a winner- Whole team wants to beat Szajbler', or 'Lodz Victors 
League Table' ad nauseam. 71 
. In fact, the number of workers who joined the scheme was tiny. 
Figures were not given, although Robotllik managed to let slip on 20 
September that only just over 100 weavers were involved out of a work 
force numbering tens of thousands.72 Two months later, Sokorski, 
Secretary of the Polish TUC, was still complaining that the number of 
competitors was much too small. 73 One of the chief reasons for this was 
that the Stakhanovites were by no means as popular with their work 
mates as they were with the press, facing the disapproval, if not 
ostracism, of the remainder of the shop floor and many supervisors. 74 
Regardless of claims that the movement was voluntary and spon-
~an.eous in character, the methods by which it was extended were simply 
lfihmidatory. A series of meetings was held in the mills during the first 
Weeks of September at which particular workers and foremen pledged 
themselves publicly to enter the competition and then called individually 
on their less enthusiastic fellows to follow them. At the Poznanski works a 
meeting of weavers on 9 September decided 'unanimously' and 'without 
:: Ibid., '7 September '947. II Ibid., 21 September 1947' 
" Roszko, o/>. cit., p. 69. 11 GloJ [udu, 30 September, 20 October, '947 ' 
" RGobotnik (organ of the PPS), 20 September 1947. 
" l~s ludu, 10 November 1947. 
Ibtd' ,4 September, 20 October, 1947. 
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long discussion' to join the scheme and two days later a similar meeting 
was held amongst the foremen.75 
The objections to wsp6lzawodnictwo voiced through the factory 
councils and trade unions, as well as by PPS and some PPR shop-floor 
activists, were time and aga in answered in the Party press over the next 
months and boiled down to three basic points. 76 First, there were 
doubts as to the practicality of such methods in Polish conditions- in 
plain words, was it feasib le to transplant Soviet mechanisms for 
enforcing work discipline and raising productivity to Polish industry, 
where the workers had 50 years' experience of combating not dissimilar 
attempts made by capitalist employers? For many workers the distinction 
b~tween wspolzawodnictwo and capitalist work rationalization was 
difficult to detect. Besides, in view of the physical state of both labour 
f?r.ce and machinery, the practicality of significantly increasing produc-
ttVlty, except in the very short term, without damage to health and a 
decline in the quality of output was questioned. Second, the subject of 
pay inevitably arose. The workers wanted a much tighter commitment 
on the part of the Party and government that higher work rates would be 
re~arded with higher pay and that overfulfilled norms would not be 
r~lsed. At the same time there was a great deal of suspicion that paying 
big performance bonuses would inject an element of arbitrariness into 
the pay structure, since obviously output depended on a whole range of 
factors quite independent of the effort of the individual operator. The 
Party line-underlined after the disturbances in Lodz- was that 
przodownicy (leading workers) should receive high wages, privileged 
working conditions and exemption from taxes. 77 Third, there was a 
persistent fea r that higher productivity would result in lay-offs. This 
fear arose out of the massive overemployment78 in the mills and the fact 
that the main thrust of the wsp6lzawodnictwo campaign was directed at 
reducing the rat io of operators to looms. 
The Course of events in Lodz during late September and early 
October remains very hazy. Censorship prevented any but the most 
cryptic reports from appearing in the press and official pronouncements 
admitted only a minor dispute at the Poznanski works. 
According, however, to the correspondent of The New York Times, 
Who visited the city on 23 September, the strike had begun on the 15th 
When the day shift at the Poznanski mill stopped work in protest when 
a group of przodownicy began working four machines instead of two. 
That evening the strikers were joined by the night shift and some 6,000 
OCcupied the factory. Police cordoned off the mill and arrested about 
80 of the strike leaders. This sparked off sympathy stoppages at seven 
;: Ib~d. , II, 13 September 1947. 71 [bid., 20 O ctober 1947 (Minc s peech ). 7' IbId., I, 20 October 1947. 
PRO F03? 1 S6446/ Nlo?46/34/SS /23 August 1946. 
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Or eight other mills until about one-third of the work force (at least 
40 ,000 workers)-the bulk of them women- were idle. At the time of 
the correspondent's visit 5,000 of these were still on strike at the 
Poznanski, Biederman, Buehle and Campe Albrecht factories. Uncon-
firmed reports suggested that two women had been killed in clashes 
between strikers and non-strikers. Other rumours that 12 workers had 
died were officially denied a few days later. 79 
The strike could not have come at a more embarrassing time for the 
Politburo since it coincided with the inaugural meeting of the Comin-
f~~, attended by Zhdanov and a host of high-ranking communist 
dignttaries, at the Silesian resort of Szklarska Poreba. This fact may 
aCcount for the delicacy with which the strike was handled while the 
meeting was on. 
The initial reaction- apart from the arrests- took the form of 
applying pressure through the Party organizations and issuing exhorta-
tions to return to work. On 19 September a conference of the heads of 
the economic sections of provincial committees of the PPS and PPR 
Was held in Warsaw, at which it was decided to extend socialist 
co~petition in the textile industry and press on with transferring 
SPinners from minding one loom each to minding several.80 The 
fOllOWing day a meeting of 250 communist and socialist activists in the 
ma~agement of the mills took place to bring the two parties into line 
behtnd the wsp6lzawodnictwo campaign, suggesting that the attitude of 
some of the socialists was equivocal. 81 Meanwhile, at Szajbler's, and no 
doubt elseWhere, huge posters appeared proclaiming that 'Every Hour 
Lost Hits the Three-year Plan'.82 
The attempt to end the strike through political channels seems to have 
continued for over a week, culminating in the signing of an agreement 
on Tuesday, 30 September at a meeting of representatives of manage-
ment, trades unions, wsp6lzawodnictwo committees and the factory 
cO~cils. The main point of the agreement was that 'work races' within 
the Industry would begin the next day and continue until the end of the 
year. The only hint of a concession to the strikers announced that other 
factors apart from output alone would be taken into account in the 
COntest.83 
What happened next is tantalizingly unclear. According to emigre 
sources police units were used to crush the strikers' resistance84 and in 
:: GTh• New Yor" Times, 25, 26 September 1947. 
81 los IlIdu, 20 September 1947. 
c Ibid:, 29 September 1947. This meeting was addres~ed by Kazimierz Witaszewski, BO~unlst. ChaIrman of the Polish TUC, Tadeusz CWlk of the PPS, and Wlndy!law '~~kowsk' of the PPR (Dzienni" Pol,ki (London, 30 September 1947». 
It Glos II/dll, 30 September 1947. .. Ibid., 1 October 1947. 
Jlltro Polski, 17 January 1948, 24 October 1948. See also Malara & Rey, op. cit., 
Pp. 134-5 · 
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view of the availability of firearms in the inunediate postwar years, such 
an operation could well have involved a considerable degree of violence. 
All we can wring from the official press is that on 5 October Marshal 
ROla-Zymierski, Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army, together with General Zarzycki, a high-ranking officer of its 
political apparatus, were in Lodz for a presentation ceremony at the 
Geyer works. Their presence and Zymierski's speech, in which he said 
that he received a banner from the workers as testimony of their 
'attachment to the army and understanding that the army stands guard 
Over the achievements of the working class and Polish democracy', 
strongly suggest some military involvement in dealing with the strike.85 
The following day a government instruction was issued ordering 
substantial cuts in the prices of a whole series of manufactured consumer 
products,86 which suggests that the strikers had not been totally routed, 
but had forced the government into making some concessions. The 
authorities were certainly concerned that what was happening in Lodz 
might spread to other industrial centres and from 4 to 7 October the 
third anniversary of the formation of the police forces was celebrated at 
short notice with parades and shows of strength- presumably to deter 
any emulation. 87 No celebrations had been held in J946, and in J948 
only two days were devoted to them. 
Once the position stabilized, the Party leadership restarted its 
political campaign. Gomulka made three major public speeches during 
October and visited Lodz on the 26th. 88 Minc also spoke, answering 
criticisms of wsp6lzawodnictwo,89 and on 8 November a 'National 
Conference of Multi-loom Operators' was held in Lodz, the audience 
of J,OOO Stakhanovites hearing speeches from Sokorski and Szyr, the 
Deputy Minister for Industry.90 
In the industry itself yet another round of meetings got under way; 
the local PPR-PPS economic aktyw met on I I October, 'in the presence 
of representatives of the leaderships of both workers' parties', the PPR 
aktyw met on the 19th, and on the 21st a plenum of the factory councils 
Was held. Meetings in the mills resumed towards the end of the month.91 
The reason for all this frenzied activity was quite simple: the strike 
had ended, but the Party still faced stiff resistance to wsp6lzawodnictwo 
from the bulk of workers,92 while its image had been severely tarnished 
by events during recent weeks. As was the case in later crises, the Party 
sought to recover its position and press on with its economic policy with 
a mixture of concessions, coercion and appeals to reason and patriotism. 
Much effort was devoted to reassuring the workers that their fears about 
.. Glos [udu, 6 October 1947. 
" Ibid., 4 October 1947. 
II Ibid., 21 October 1947. 
1\ Ibid., 22, 27 October 1947. 
.. Ibid., 7 October 1947. 
•• Ibid., 2 I October 1947. 
" Ibid., 9, 10, II October 1947. 
•• Ibid., 29 October 1947. 
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the dire consequences of wsp6lzawodnictwo were groundless,93 while 
Gomulka in particular stressed the economic necessity of raising 
p.roduction and speJt out the perilousness of Poland's international 
sltuation.94 The carrot of big bonuses and better working conditions was 
also repeatedly dangled in front of would-be przodownicy.95 
Simultaneously, the necessity 'to combat as severely as possible ... 
economic sabotage consistently carried out by reactionaries and enemies 
of People's Poland . . . ' was proclaimed. These 'reactionary pro-
VOcateurs' were, one supposes, leaders who had come to the fore during 
the strike, and the terms in which they were described leave no doubt 
that most of them ended up in gaol. 96 
The factory councils also came in for criticism and attempts were 
made to drive a wedge between workers and councilsD7_ preparatory to 
a full-scale purge of opponents of wsp6lzawodnictwo in the coming 
elections. This line of attack, still evident some months later,98 demon-
~trates the problems these bodies posed for the Party and the difficulty 
It faced in dislodging and silencing well-entrenched workers' spokesmen 
from these organs. 
Many of these representatives were socialists and, as has already been 
mentioned, there is evidence that the PPR-PPS alliance was under 
seVere strain during the strike and that the communists' first concern 
Was to whip the socialists back into line. The PPS leadership in Warsaw 
pu?licIy, at any rate, backed wsp6lzawodnictwo and called for the 
strikers to return to work. 99 Nevertheless, there was an ambiguous, 
cryptic tone to the language used in several of the reports appearing in 
~obotnik, the socialists' newspaper,lDO and shortly after Lodz the PPS, 
hke the Czech Social Democrats, briefly asserted its independence. 
Despite communist pressure to set a deadline for the merger of the two 
parti.es, the leadership at the PPS Congress in December 1947 
studIOusly avoided fixing any timetable. Cyrankiewicz, the Secretary-
General, went so far as to declare that 'the PPS was, is and will be 
necessary to the Polish nation'. Shortly afterwards he emphatically 
aSSured a delegation of party activists from Silesia that 'there was not 
and Was not going to be a merger, and if there had to be, it would be 
:: Ib.:d., 1 October 1947 . 
.. Ib •. d., 12,20 O ctober 1947 . 
.. l b •. d., 27 October 1947 . 
• , Ib •. d., 14, 20 October '947 . 
•• Ib~d., 22 October 1947. 
b IbId., 20 January 1948, 'Generalne pranie. Nier6bstwo i oder"'"nie si~ od spraw 
ro .:'tnt~6w nie mog,! bye metodami pracy R ady Zakladowej '. 
,.. Ib.d. '. 3 October 1947. 
For Instance, on 2 October, Robotnik informed its readers that 'in spi te of 
Obstacles in the shape of temporary shortages of electrical energy, a continuing, Stub~orn battle is in progress between particular factories for first place in production 
. .. See also footnote 72. 
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taken care of by the head and not the arse' (bedzie zalatwione przez 
glowy a nie 'd(Upy ).IOI 
It appears that the PPR also had to contend with a revolt in its own 
ranks. The membership of the Lodz party organization dropped by 
nearly one-fifth during the second half of 1947. This was connected with 
the nation-wide verification of m embers at that time, but the purge in 
Lodz was markedly more drastic than elsewhere and, while other local 
parties rapidly recovered in 1948, Lodz city recruitment stagnated .I 02 
\Vhether there were any further outbursts of industrial protest after 
Lodz is uncertain- in all probability there were, albeit of a disorganized 
and despairing kind . The performance of Lodz mills continued to draw 
Party criticism throughout 1948.103 Very little is known about strikes 
betw'een 1948 and 1956 although these clearly took place-there were, 
for instance, violent disturbances in the Silesian coal industry in 1951 .IM 
The PPS ceased to function as a significant counterweight early in 1948, 
although the formal merger was delayed until D ecember. The trade 
union- factory committee apparatus was brought under centralized 
control and it was the Party committee in each concern which 
increasingly made the decisions.lo5 Wsp6lzawodnictwo was extended-
not, however, under the inspiration of Pstrowski, who proved an 
unfortunate choice as a Stakhanovite super-worker, dying in April of 
the same yea r. The lot of the workers did improve substantially during 
1948, with wages up nea rly 40% and prices down by over 20%-
although real income was still about one-third less than prewar levels. 
Good harvests, increased investment outlay, and a big improvement in 
the output of consumer goods combined to push up living standards.l oB 
The year 1948 was, then, a breathing-space for the workers-ahead lay 
the six-year plan. 
Cotlelusion 
The main conclusion arising out of the preceding account is an 
obvious one: between 1944 and 1948 Polish industry regularly 
experienced expressions of working-class discontent, which frequently 
took the form of strikes, of which some were certainly violent. Much of 
101 Kantyka, op. cit., pp. 337-9. 
101 PPR I .I947-X !1.I948 . .. , p. 287, zal~cznik I. Sec also Secretariat's crit icisms 
of low m embership in Lodz mills , 10 March 1948, ibid., pp. 2II - 12. Several prominent 
figures in mill management and the trade u.nions were expelled from the party a t the 
end of September (Dziennik Polski (London), 2 O ctober 1947). 
, .. Cios ludu, '5 rninut wczesniej-s rninut p6zniej-nielatwe sprawy PZPB Nr. 2 
w L6dzi', 27 July 1948 ; 'Krajowa naroda oktywu wlokienniczego PPR pi~tnuje bl~dy 
w pracy admin istracj i przemyslu i zwiqzkach zawodowych ' , 6 O ctober 1948. 
'04 M alara & Rey, op. cit., pp. 275-6. 
'.6 p'PR I.I947-XII. I948 ...• pp. 2II-14. 'Jnstrukcia Sekreta ri lltu KC PPR w 
spraWle Wzrostu partii w zakladach p rzemyslowych'. I., J. M. Montias, Central Planning in Poland (Westport, Conn., 1974), p. 68. 
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the discontent was due to material hardship, but in very many cases it 
assumed a political character-sometimes in the shape of opposition 
~o the government and PPR at other times in terms of the incompat-
Ibility of the communist ~onception that industrial relations had 
entered a new era with the abolition of private ownership and the 
socialist view that conflicts of interest between worker, management 
and state remained and should be allowed organized expression. It 
comes as no surprise that the outlook of the PPS was more in line with 
the mood of the bulk of the labour force, and that the PPR was forced 
eventually to neutralize the trades unions, factory councils and finally 
the PPS before it could impose its industrial philosophy. 
But how relevant are the experiences of 30 years ago to the disturb-
anc~s of the 1970s? The contrasts are apparent enough; 1944-48 wa~ a 
Penod of political disorder and instability. Significant non-commUnIst 
~arties were operating independently of the PPR and in varying degrees 
In oPposition to it- above all, there existed an alternative workers' 
party. In 1956 and again in the seventies it was political rigidity and 
economic stagnation which fuelled the crisis, while the absence of any 
other channels for discharging discontent apart from the Party and 
~rade union bureaucracies amplified the frustration which manifested 
Itself in rioting and direct appeals to the Party leadership, and prompted 
the mobilization of workers' councils against the atrophied Party-union 
apparatus . 
. Moreover, the Communist Party has greatly changed in character 
Since the late 1940s. Its leaders then showed much greater confidence 
and aggressiveness-the qualities of men fighting for power with history, 
~nd S:alin, on their side. Today a different generation of leaders who 
~ve rIsen to the top via the Party bureaucracy or industry have to cope 
wl~h the problems of running an immensely more sophisticated economy, 
satisfying the rising expectations of a mobile, educated, largely urban 
PO~~lation and maintaining the fine balance which allows a degree of 
pohtlcal and intellectual pluralism while retaining the reins of power 
firmly in the hands of the Party. 
. Nevertheless, with due respect to the altered historical environment, 
It Would be a mistake to discount the relevance of the immediate postwar 
Years for two main reasons. First, the character of these disturbances has 
remained remarkably constant. The Party leadership tries to push up 
Productivity and dampen down consumption, only to be confronted by 
a spontaneous wave of strikes and violent protests against rising food 
Prices and shortages. The workers' councils and shop-floor Party 
aC~ivists line up with the strikers. The Politburo responds with a 
miXture of concessions, draconian repression and direct appeals to the 
Workers. Internal and external enemies are blamed for fanning the 
G 
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flames- I947 or 1976? Second, the experience of the 1940S is the initial 
chapter of the story of the stonny relationship between Poland's 
Communist Party and its working class-without it, the tale is 
incomplete. 
Thus it was the failure of the PPR to mobilize the bulk of the 
proletariat in its support during the first phase of its rule which prompted 
the resort to coercive and undemocratic methods of maintaining labour 
discipline, which hardened into the regimentation of the Stalinist years 
and has left its mark to the present day. This was not simply a mindless 
translation of Soviet models to Polish conditions, but was rather a 
similar reaction to the same problems which bedevilled Soviet com-
munism in the twenties and thirties. The parallels between Soviet 
experience in industry between 1917 and 1921 and that in Poland are 
very strong.107 Indeed, the trend was clear before Poland lurched 
towards Stalinism in 1947- 48. 
Moreover, by examining labour- Party relations over a 30-yea r period 
a somewhat different picture emerges than if we concentrate our 
attention only on the 1970s. Thus, instead of concluding that the long-
~erm stability of the Polish political system shows signs of breaking down 
10 recent years, one is tempted to conclude that it is the periods of 
stability rather than of crisis which are abnormal- that the years 1972- 75 
rather than 197D-71 or 1976 were exceptional. 
The three decades of People's Democracy in Poland have been 
c~aracterized by sporadic crisis, interspersed with periods of contained 
dlScontent and stagnation and, infrequently, of stability and rapid 
economic growth. The political system is perhaps one of the most 
e~cient in Eastern Europe in neutralizing opposition and managing 
cnses, but one of the least effective in creating the conditions for long-
term expansion and political stability. 
Finally, we should note that the Party at any rate has no doubts about 
the continuing relevance of the experience of its first four years to 
current circumstances and assiduously cultivates a smokescreen of 
political myth which has disguised so long the details of relations 
between the PPR, PPS, and the workers. 
London 
107 See L. B. Schapiro, The Origins of the Communist Autocracy (2nd edn., London, 
1977), esp. CM. XIV, XV, XVI. 
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APPENDIX 
PPR MEMBERSHIP AND ITs SOCIAL COMPOSITION 
Total 
Date Membership Workers 0 ' 70 Peasallts 
july 1944 C.20,OOO:l ? 
December 1944 c,34,oOO" ? 
January 1945 69,239a ? 
April 1945 301,712" 56'1 c 36'7 
August 1945 193,329" 96,646 53'5d 33 '8 
December 1945 235,300' 143,103 61'oc 28'1 
December 1946 555,888b 359,529 64'7 f 23'2 
June 1947 848,821 b ? ? 
December 1947 820,786b 473,905 S7'7 f 21,6 
June 1948 997,024b 568,376 57'oil 22 '3 
September 1948 l,006,87J b 577,585 57 '3f 22 ' 1 
PPS MEMBERSHIP AND ITS SOCIAL COMPOSITION 
1939 30,000 + h 
December 1944 7,663 h 
April 1945 124,428h 
June 1945 156,832h 
December 1945 194,107~ 
60 i Late 1946 283,300~ ? 
March 1947 500,0001 ? 
June 1947 660,oook ? 
December 1947 700-750,o~ok 62k 14 
September 1948 607,000' 57'8 i 9,8 
December 1948 SI 3,oook 61'4k 9'5 
a N. Kolomejczyk, PPR I944-45 (Warsaw, 1965), pp. 275-'7, 
b PPR I ,I947-XlI.I948. Dokumenty (Warsaw, 1973), p, 287, 
c Kolomejczyk, op, cit" p. 286; statistics for 49 % of membership, 
d Ibid,; statistics for 93 % of membership, 
e Ibid,; statistics for 99'7 % of membership. 
f PPR I ,I947-XlI.I948. Dokl/menty, p, 288. 
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% Others % 
? 
? 
? 
7 ' 2 
12'7 
10'9 
12'1 
? 
20'7 
20'6 
20'6 
24 
32'1 
30'1 
II Rueh robotlliezy w Polsce Ludowej (Warsaw, 1975), p, 40, 
h A. Reiss, Z problem6w odbudowy i rozwojll organizacyjnego PPS I944-46 (Warsaw, 
1971), pp. 69, Il7- 19, 188-9, 31 6-1 7, 
i W. G6ra, PRL I944-'J4 (Warsaw, 1974), pp. 216, 276, 
j K. Cwik, Problemy wspoldzialania PPR i PPS w, woj, krakowskim I945-48 
(Cracow, 1974), p, 210. 
k B. Syzdek, PPS w lataeb I944-48 (Warsaw, 1974), pp. 380,407,437. 
